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Abstract 
The thesis explores the rundown process of one large long-stay hospital for people with 
learning difficulties in the north west of England during the later years of the twentieth 
century. It does this through a multi-voiced account which draws on oral history 
interview and documentary data relating to managers, staff and relatives. This 
polyphonic approach, focused upon those who had agency in the rundown of the 
institution, enables an in-depth examination of the processes and meanings of such an 
immense organisational change. 
The research found that the contraction of the Royal Albert Hospital, Lancaster was a 
complex process, involving high levels of managerial acumen, compassion and 
enthusiasm. However, although presented by those implementing change as being 
predicated upon sound ethical and ideological principles, the study also indicated that 
this institutional rundown was shaped significantly by a neo-liberal agenda bound up 
with imperatives of logistics and cost. Tensions and contradictions associated with the 
latter were partly reflected in the viewpoints of staff and families who were critical of 
elements of the policy and practice of organisational downsizing. The oral history data 
in particular suggests, however, that these oppositional perspectives were discredited 
and distanced within the constraints of a dominant organisational narrative which 
espoused the absolute rightness of institutional closure. Furthermore, this ethically 
infused rhetoric underplayed the negative impact of the rundown on employees as they 
experienced insecurities associated with the loss of a meaningful and, in many 
instances, long-standing workplace. 
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The research contributes to the literature on the social history of learning disability, 
especially pertaining to institutional closures and deinstitutionalisation; organisational 
studies (the management of change); deindustrialisation; and oral history methodology. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Research Rationale 
1 .2 Thesis Structure 
1.3 A Note on Terminology 
1.4 Conclusion 
This study examines the rundown process of a large long-stay hospital for people with 
learning difficulties in the north west of England during the late twentieth century. The 
twin aims of the research were: to reconstruct how the contraction occurred; and to 
identify what institutional rundown meant for those involved. Underpinning these 
objectives, and the study overall, was a rationale rooted in a fusion of personal and 
historical interests. 
1.1 Research Rationale 
Having studied institutional histories as a community oral historian, mainly through the 
recorded testimonies of people with learning difficulties, I concluded that a closer 
examination of the ways in which these monolithic establishments closed represented a 
logical next step. The choice of the Royal Albert Hospital, Lancaster as the locus for the 
research reflected a personal connection. During the 1980s, both on-site and at the 
nearby college, I had worked as an adult educator with individuals with learning 
difficulties who resided at the hospital. Starting in 1981 this involvement, under the 
umbrella of the local authority adult education college, had taken myriad forms. Initially, 
in the role of adult literacy volunteer, I worked closely with a man who resided in one of 
the hospital's smaller and more independent living units. Then in 1985, for a year, I was 
a member of an educational team which carried out 1:1 assessments with all the 
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hospital residents. Working in ward settings brought me into direct contact with most 
areas of the hospital, including the 'back wards' and ones which were permanently 
locked. Coming from a non-nursing background, the job constituted one of the most 
powerful, and, at times, moving, experiences of my life. I was impelled to adjust to a 
world, which, with its congregate, regimented patterns of living, was radically unlike 
anything I had previously encountered. Around the same time I became a college-
based adult education tutor, teaching students with learning difficulties, many of whom 
either resided at, or had recently moved out from, the Royal Albert. By the end of the 
1980s my own employment narrative had been entwined with that of the Albert' for 
nearly ten years. 
My own interest in the lives of those resident at the Royal Albert was enhanced by 
having the opportunity to record their life stories during my tenure at the adult education 
college in Lancaster. Collaborating with a hospital social worker and charge nurse, itself 
a sign of the increasing links between the 'asylum' and those outside its walls, I led 
reminiscence sessions with hospital residents. Having been away for ten years, I 
returned to the area in the early 2000s, at which point I set up an on-line archive 
comprising the audio tapes from these sessions, along with fresh recordings (Ingham 
2006). Largely absent from these archival accounts were any in-depth testimonies 
which dealt with the final period of the hospital's existence. These had been years, as 
already pinpointed, which carried a personal resonance for me. Furthermore, the 
individual testimonies of institutional life were weighted, quite appropriately, towards 
those voices which could be construed as 'forgotten lives' (Atkinson, Jackson et al. 
1997). Lacking were accounts providing insights into how hospital closure was enacted 
by those who exercised agency in relationship to people with learning difficulties. The 
narratives of managers, staff and families were generally missing from this institutional 
, The Royal Albert Hospital was referred to loca"y as 'the Albert' as we" as 'the Royal Albert'. 
Both epithets will be used throughout the thesis. 
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story. I was motivated to rectify this state of affairs and, given my contacts and 
residency in Lancaster, was in a position to do so. 
Researching the rundown of a large long-stay institution for people with learning 
difficulties, however, went beyond self-interest. Institutional closure was, and still is in 
part, a phenomenon which has swept through the United Kingdom, North America, 
Australia, New Zealand, Scandinavia and other European countries during the past 
forty years. During this period it has been an integral element in the shift to community 
care which arguably has dominated the landscape of learning disability social policy in 
the UK and in all the richer countries of the western world (Emerson 2004:187). 
Institutional closures have impacted on the lives of thousands of people. In England and 
Wales, for instance, in the 19705 there were nearly 70,000 people with learning 
difficulties resident in congregate NHS establishments (MIND 1977; Ryan and Thomas 
1998). Well over half of these hospitals, of which there were around eighty, had in 
excess of 500 residents, with a significant number housing a thousand or more people 
with learning difficulties (Morris 1969; Ryan and Thomas 1998). Moreover, inextricably 
linked to these huge, and in many cases architecturally impOSing, institutions were 
considerable numbers of staff, families and members of local communities (DHSS 
1976; DHSS 1985). Starting in 1986, however, with the demise of Starcross in Exeter 
(Radford and Tipper 1988), twenty years later almost all of these NHS organisations 
had ceased to exist - in some cases literally as bulldozers had cleared the sites. Even 
though 'people had said they would never do it' (Mitchell and Chapman 2008) within a 
relatively short space of time one after another of these apparently unassailable 
embodiments of social policy had closed. 
Cited in Chapter Two are studies which indicate that processes of institutional rundown, 
in the UK and internationally, were protracted affairs involving high levels of complexity, 
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challenge, emotion and negotiation, as well as logistical and financial entanglements. At 
the core of this globally experienced downsizing was the displacement of thousands of 
people whose lives, rightly or wrongly, had become anchored in a discredited form of 
care. However, although significant pieces of research have been carried out into the 
manner in which some of these organisations contracted, there are salient gaps in the 
literature. Particularly lacking are studies which offer in-depth insider accounts of the 
micro-politics of these organisations as they underwent such a colossal and, for some 
stakeholders, painful transition. Similarly under-researched are the multiple meanings 
which rundown had for those charged with supporting people with learning difficulties 
through such a transition. Both in the UK and internationally, the depiction of hospital 
rundown is patchy, with the lack of detailed case studies frustrating attempts to develop 
a better understanding of this seminal feature of learning disability policy and practice. 
Researching elements of the nuts and bolts of this dramatic change with reference to 
one large, long-stay institution seemed both timely and expedient, while it still resided 
within living memory. Furthermore, eliciting a range of viewpoints, gleaned from oral 
history and documentary data, offered the promise of both reconstructing the event 
itself and embracing the diversity of meanings it had for key stakeholders. 
Regardless of personal associations, the Royal Albert Hospital as a choice of case 
study fulfilled important historical criteria. It exemplified the contraction of a large long-
stay NHS hospital for people with learning difficulties, having a thousand residents in 
the 1970s with almost equal numbers of staff. It was run by the North West Regional 
Health AuthOrity (NWRHA) which, as referenced in Chapter Two, prided itself on the 
progressive manner in which it pursued a policy of deinstitutionalisation. However, of its 
three main NHS hospitals for people with learning difficulties, this institution was the 
only one to close by resettling all its residents to community settings: Brockhall 
transferred nearly half its residents to Calderstones, another institution, which still 
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retained a degree of on-site provision at the time of writing. The exploration of the 
blurred edges between learning disability social policy and implementation could be 
particularly revealing in a context in which there was such a powerful rhetoric espousing 
the progressive principles of the day. 
Idealism was also evident in the institution's inception in 1870, when it opened as the 
Royal Albert Asylum for Idiots and Imbeciles of the Northern Counties (Roberts 1992). It 
was one of five 'voluntary idiot asylums' set up nationally during the middle years of the 
nineteenth century, four of which, including the Royal Albert, had regional remits 
(Gladstone 1996). All these institutions focussed primarily upon children and young 
people with learning difficulties, offering training and education lasting between five and 
seven years, after which time they were able to leave as 'economically independent and 
morally competent individuals' (Roberts 1992; Gladstone 1996:138, 141-2; Jackson 
1996). Although, as with other institutions, the Royal Albert became a long-stay adult 
residence for many people with learning difficulties during the twentieth century, this 
was not its original remit. As argued by Gladstone, these voluntary asylums were 
pervaded by a 'positive optimism', expressed in the idea that 'the idiot may be 
educated' (Gladstone 1996: 138). Funding the pursuit of this notion was Victorian 
'philanthropic endeavour' with all five establishments being funded by public, not state, 
moneys (Roberts 1992; Gladstone 1996:140-1). These charitable roots provide the 
Royal Albert Hospital, Lancaster with a significant place in the history of learning 
disability institutions in the UK. Privileging a study of its closure recognised its particular 
contribution to the social history of learning disability. 
Driving this study, however, was a political desire to reposition, albeit in a modest way, 
learning disability research itself. People with learning difficulties, and their history, and 
arguably those who have supported them (Mitchell 2000), have traditionally been 
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marginalised and stigmatised. This research presented the opportunity to challenge this 
ghettoisation and place the rundown of the Royal Albert in a wider context both 
historically and academically. The latter was attempted by being open to insights from 
organisational and political studies, as well as giving credence to a perspective that saw 
the hospital not just as a therapeutic environment but as a workplace. Historically I 
aimed to explore the idea that institutional rundown was an integral facet of national and 
local political shifts occurring during the latter part of the twentieth century. Expanding 
the gaze of the study was fuelled by the belief that this would enrich the research topic 
itself, the social history of learning disability and potentially other academic disciplines. 
1.2 Thesis Structure 
Informed by the research rationale and a review of pertinent literature, the study 
pursued two overarching lines of enquiry: 
1. How did the Royal Albert contract? 
2. What did the rundown of the Royal Albert Hospital mean for key stakeholders? 
Discussed in Chapter Two are the ways in which these overarching questions were 
adapted and broken down into manageable sub-questions. These avenues of 
interrogation are explored within the structure of the thesis which consists of ten 
chapters: 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 Literature Review examines the literature pertinent to the research. In 
particular it looks at deinstitutionalisation policy. as we" as specific studies focussing 
upon the practice of institutional closure. Through highlighting gaps in the Oterature the 
chapter references the specific questions addressed by the research. 
Chapter 3 Research Methods: Theory and Practice reviews the qualitative research 
literature informing the approaches adopted by the study. The chapter then describes 
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and evaluates the processes of data collection and analysis, especially relating to the 
study's oral history interviews. 
Chapter 4 Pressures of Change explores the often contradictory pressures applied by 
external bodies to the process of contracting the Royal Albert. Although drawing upon 
various policy documents, especially those issued by the Regional Health Authority, the 
chapter's insights hinge upon the oral testimonies of former managers at the institution. 
Chapter 5 Agents of Change: A Hegemonic Approach argues that a dominant 
strand in the managers' implementation of rundown at the Royal Albert was the 
application of a hegemonic approach. Through a combination of rhetoric and coercion, 
attempts were made to engender the consent of staff, families and people with learning 
difficulties to a deinstitutionalisation agenda. 
Chapter 6 Agents of Change: Personalities and Providence discusses both the 
impact of managerial personalities and good fortune upon the shape and pace of Royal 
Albert contraction. 
Chapter 7 Voices of Resistance explicates the viewpoints of those who were critical of 
dominant facets of the policy and practice of Royal Albert rundown. 
Chapter 8 Acts of Resistance draws heavily upon oral testimony and internal hospital 
documents to highlight how disquiet with elements of the Royal Albert closure 
processes was expressed in tangible ways. 
Chapter 9 Meanings of Change focuses upon the multiple and contrasting meanings 
the rundown of the Royal Albert had for key organisational stakeholders. In particular, 
the chapter discusses the dichotomy between proponents and resisters of institutional 
contraction. 
Chapter 10 Conclusion brings together the main findings of the thesis and points out 
avenues worthy of further research. 
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1.3 A Note on Terminology 
Historically many labels have been ascribed to those individuals who, in the UK at least, 
seem to be generally known as 'people with leaming difficulties' or 'people with learning 
disabilities' or 'learning disabled people' (Walmsley and Johnson 2003; Rolph, Atkinson 
et al. 2005; Johnson and TraustadAottir 2005a; Welshman and Walmsley 2006; 
McClimens 2007; Humber 2008). Internationally, however, the term 'people with 
intellectual disabilities' has an increasing currency (Johnson and TraustadAottir 2005a; 
Johnson and Walmsley 2010). However, my chosen contemporary phrase is 'people 
with learning difficulties' and in so doing the study aligns itself politically with the 
terminology favoured by advocacy groups, such as People First.2 The use of such 
terminology does not imply a relationship with any sort of 'measurable' criteria of what is 
a 'learning difficulty' or 'intellectual disability', about which there appears to be little 
consensus anyway (Welshman and Walmsley 2006:5-6). The historic labels used in the 
thesis reflect a desire as a historian to be as authentic as possible. 
1.4 Conclusion 
This introductory chapter has set the scene for the thesis by outlining its aims, rationale 
and structure. It has suggested that a mixture of personal and broader historical 
imperatives lay at the heart of the research. Chapter Two considers the wider literature 
which helped inform this study of institutional rundown. 
2 www.peoDlefirstltd.com 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
2.2 Deinstitutionalisation 
2.2.1 Policy Framework 
2.2.2 Policy Drivers 
2.2.2.1 Hospital Scandals 
2.2.2.2 Ideas and Ideology 
2.2.2.3 Campaigning Groups 
2.2.2.4 Political Economic Imperatives 
2.2.3 Research Implications 
2.3 Institutional Closure 
2.3.1 Overview of Institutional Closures in the United Kingdom 
2.3.2 Institutional Closure Research Perspectives 
2.3.3 Themes of Institutional Closure 
2.3.4 Research Implications 
2.4 Conclusion 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the literature on the history of deinstitutionalisation of people with 
learning difficulties in the late twentieth and early twenty first centuries, with a particular 
focus on institutional closure. It draws on developments in the UK and further afield, 
especially Australia, New Zealand, Scandinavia and North America. The chapter 
14 
identifies gaps in the literature, and emerging themes which are examined throughout 
the thesis. 
Writers make important distinctions between the interconnected concepts of 
deinstitutionalisation and institutional closure (Atkinson 2000; Bigby and Fyffe 2006). 
The former's focus is the 'process of resettling people from hospital into the community' 
(Atkinson 2000:87). The success of deinstitutionalisation is predicated on ensuring that 
people with learning difficulties are able 'to take their place in society as ordinary 
citizens' (Atkinson 2000:87). This in turn requires 'Significant support to people with 
intellectual disabilities as well as societal change' (Bigby and Fyffe 2006:569). However, 
as explained later in the chapter, the ideological and fiscal climate of the late twentieth 
century discredited hospitals as a suitable place of care. Within this context the closing 
of institutions formed a lynch pin of a deinstitutionalisation strategy. Institutional closure 
is summarised by Bigby and Fyffe as constituting 
the progressive reduction in the number of people with disabilities living in a 
large residential facility or the cessation of a facilities operation (Blgby and Fyffe 
2006:569). 
Framed within a conceptual framework of deinstitutionalisation, such a definition 
enables the focus, as in this study, to rest firmly upon the changes within the institution 
itself. 
2.2 Deinstitutionalisation 
This section provides firstly an outline of the literature on deinstitutionalisation policy, 
particularly pertaining to the UK in the twentieth century. It then proceeds to analyse the 
main drivers behind the move away from institutionalised care for people with learning 
difficulties. Overall the section highlights the context in which institutional closure was 
conceived, as well as identifying themes of particular relevance to this study. 
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2.2.1 Policy Framework 
The second half of the twentieth century witnessed the creation of a national legislative 
and policy infrastructure in the UK making possible the demise of large long-stay 
institutions for people with learning difficulties (Booth, Simons et al. 1990; Collins 1992; 
Stevens 2004; Walmsley 2006). Welshman, Nind and Rolph suggest that: 
a gradual transition is presented from predominantly institutionally based, 
medically provided and group-focused care through to the most recent Valuing 
People strategy where the emphasis is on person centred planning, with people 
with learning difficulties gaining control of service design and delivery 
(Welshman, Nind et al. 2005:18-19). 
This is not to say that reality has always reflected this 'official history'. In the same 
publication the authors, and others, demonstrate that families experienced actual 
provision as patchy and varying considerably across time and place (Rolph, Atkinson et 
al. 2005). Similarly, as indicated elsewhere in this chapter, the implementation of 
institutional closure was often at odds with govemment rhetoric. All this notwithstanding, 
the policy statements represented in particular by the 1959 Mental Health Act (1960 
Scotland), 1971 White Paper Better Services for the Mentally Handicapped (followed by 
the creation of the independent advisory bodies - the National Development Group and 
National Development Team), the Jay Report 1979, and the 1990 NHS and Community 
Care Act, emphasise an increasing drive, in rhetoric at least, towards community rather 
than institutional based care for people with learning difficulties (Ryan and Thomas 
1998; Stevens 2004; Welshman and Walmsley 2006). It appears to be the third quarter 
of the twentieth century which laid the policy foundations for institutional closure 
(Radford and Tipper 1988:76; Welshman 2006:17-18). However, what seems less clear 
is the point at which the state proposed the closure of all long-stay institutions for 
people with learning difficulties. Stevens, for instance, contests what he describes as 
the 'common modern miSinterpretation of the published policy' that institutional closure 
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was initiated by the 1971 White Paper Better Services for the Mentally Handicapped 
with the 1989 White Paper Caring for People merely confirming this commitment. He 
describes the statements in both papers as being 'more guarded' (Stevens 2004:237). 
Ryan and Thomas, however, do indicate that the 1971 White Paper pledges itself to 
halve the number of hospital places for people with learning difficulties by 1991, but not 
closing all institutions (Ryan and Thomas 1998: 117). Hamlin and Oakes, in turn, assert 
that the 1971 White Paper 'set the agenda for deinstitutionalisation in the UK' (Hamlin 
and Oakes 2008:47). The crucial shift away from long-term institutional care, according 
to Stevens, 
can be more appropriately traced to the government review of services Mental 
Handicap: Progress, Problems and Priorities (DHSS 1987) (Stevens 2004:240). 
Identifying the exact point at which total closure became government policy, rather than 
a general push towards reducing the institutions in size, appears to be a contested area 
requiring further investigation. 
Ideologically this movement away from institutional care as the twentieth century 
unfolded seemed to be inextricably bound up with a shift in the definition of 'community 
care'. Welshman and Walmsley, for instance, accept the position of Andrews in stating 
that: 
throughout history, 'community care', if we include in that term care in families, 
has been the dominant mode of care provision for most people most of the time 
(Andrews 1996; Welshman and Walmsley 2006:8). 
Such an argument fits easily with the concept of there being 'a continuum between 
institutional and community care' (Thomson 1998; Rolph 2000:25). Supervision, 
guardianship and licensing, for example were built into the mental deficiency legislation 
of the early twentieth century (Rolph 2000:20,24). These ideas contrast with those who 
see community care as the opposite of institutional care. According to this polarised 
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perspective the origins of community care reside in the findings of the 1954 Royal 
Commission and the subsequent 1959 Mental Health Act (Bulmer 1987; Rolph 
2000:22). Welshman and Walmsley, however, stress that during the crucial mid-century 
period there was a radical transformation in the official perception of community care 
from it being viewed as a necessary adjunct to instituti0!1al care to being seen as a 
positive alternative (Welshman and Walmsley 2006:9). Examining the reasons 
underpinning such a shift in the thinking of social policy makers is the focus of the next 
section of the chapter. 
2.2.2 Policy Drivers 
Researchers, in disentangling the forces driving these policy developments towards 
deinstitutionalisation, and with it hospital closure to whatever degree, often define the 
second half of the twentieth century as a juxtaposition between factors which on the 
one hand discredited institutions, the institutional 'push', and on the other those which 
fomented an increasing movement towards community care, the community 'pull' 
(Collins 1992; Felce, Grant et al. 1998; Walmsley 2006a). Within these parameters it is 
possible to view the complementary and, at times, competing influences of hospital 
scandals, ideological changes, pressure groups, and the economics of institutional and 
community care (Welshman and Walmsley 2006:233-235). The chapter now considers 
each of these elements in turn. Although the geographical focus in exploring these 
areas, is mainly a UK one, I am aware that, as Lavalette and Mooney argue, any study 
of British welfare policies is illuminated by a consideration of European socio-economic 
developments (Lavalette and Mooney 2000). Their argument is that despite having 
governments of different political hues, similar welfare policy developments occurred 
across Europe especially post-1945 and from the early 1980s (Lavalette and Mooney 
2000:3). Albeit worthy of investigation, such a broad sweep is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
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2.2.2.1 Hospital Scandals 
During the 1960s and 1970s there were Committees of Inquiry into at least 19 learning 
disability and psychiatric hospitals in England (Martin 1984; Butler and Drakeford 2005). 
In assessing the impact of scandal on generic social policy Butler and Drakeford sound 
a note of caution suggesting that the relationship is complex, with scandal as much 
reflective of policy trends as their creator (Butler and Drakeford 2005:4-5). Evidencing a 
'push' away from institutional care, the committee reports were highly critical of 
institutional living conditions and 'presented a catalogue of failures at all levels of 
service provision and management' (Korman and Glennerster 1990:15). Amongst 
inquiries focussed upon long-stay hospitals for people with learning difficulties, including 
South Ockendon (1974) and Normansfield (1978), the first and probably most influential 
dealt with Ely Hospital, Cardiff in 1969 (Butler and Drakeford 2005). Extremely poor 
living conditions were exposed by the News of the World in 1967. The report arising out 
of this scandal impacted nationally with Richard Crossman, Secretary of State for Social 
Services, insisting that the entire document was published, followed by a working party 
which eventually led to the establishment of the Hospital Advisory Service (Butler and 
Drakeford 2005:59). On the working party were not only Geoffrey Howe who chaired 
the Ely Inquiry but Peter Townsend and Pauline Morris, both involved in Put Away a 
landmark sociological report 'which provided a devastating picture of conditions in the 
larger institutions' (Morris 1969; Welshman 2006:35). Two years later the White Paper 
Better Services for the Mentally Handicapped acknowledged serious issues 
surrounding long-stay NHS institutions (Booth, Simons et al. 1990:2). However, the 
various policy documents, certainly arising out of the Ely Inquiry, while portraying a 
negative picture of institutions, did not appear to contemplate their demise, rather it was 
about improving their level of provision; the emphasis was one of reform not closure. A 
strong dissenting voice in this consensus appears to be Peter Townsend who, in 
reviewing Pauline Morris's research, asserts that: 
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A structural change must be started ... There must be a complete reorganisation 
of services - so that the subnormal persons are no longer isolated in hospitals 
remote from the community (Townsend 1969:xxxii). 
2.2.2.2 Ideas and Ideology 
In their overarching summary of community care developments during the second half 
of the twentieth century both Welshman and Walmsley identify changes in ideas and 
ideology. They, however, shy away from making unequivocal claims as to their impact 
upon policy (and practice): Welshman in analysing the period 1948 -71 intimated that 
ideas alone do not drive change - although they can influence direction of 
changes (Welshman 2006:17). 
Similarly, with respect to the last 30 years of the century, Walmsley asserted that: 
ideas alone did not drive change, (however) they did create mental frameworks 
within which change was conceptualised (Walmsley 2006:55). 
Adding to this dialogue, admittedly with a focus upon institutions for those with mental 
illness (in England and America), Scull is highly sceptical of an analysis which 
emphasises the importance of ideas, arguing that: 
in general, social policy proves only mildly susceptible to the shifting intellectual 
fads and fashions of the day (Scull 1976: 185). 
He suggests that ideas critical of the asylum were prevalent in the 1860s and 70s, but 
similar assessments had far more impact in the 1950s and 1960s. 
The arguments had not changed, but the structural context in which they were 
advanced had (Scull 1976:194). 
During the third quarter of the twentieth century fundamental critiques of institutions did 
surface, probably none more powerful than the sociological analysis offered by Goffman 
in Asylums in 1961 (Goffman 1961; Korman and Glennerster 1990:13-14; Welshman 
20 
2006:33). At around the same time Russell Barton, who was Physician Superintendent 
of Severalls Hospital in England, in similar fashion described dehumanising aspects of 
institutional life (Korman and Glennerster 1990:14; Welshman 2006:33-34). In their 
reflective study of deinstitutionalisation in the UK, Hamlin and Oates stress the key role 
played by the ideas of both Goffman and Barton in encouraging this movement away 
from the long-stay hospitals (Hamlin and Oakes 2008:47). Institutional closure in New 
York State around 1990, according to Castellani, was partly driven by the idea that 
'large institutions were de facto inappropriate' (Castellani 1992:596). Further studies in 
the UK such as Put Away and Robb's Sans Everything in 1967 emerged during the 
1960s, all discrediting the idea of institutional care (Robb 1967; Morris 1969; Welshman 
2006:33-34). Concurrently during the fifties and sixties research was being done which 
took a critical but more reformist stance. Welshman charts the contribution of 
psychologists such as Jack Tizard and Neil Q'Connor, amongst others, which 
challenged the perception of people with learning difficulties as needy and passive, 
requiring control either through families or in institutions (O'Connor and Tizard 1954; 
O'Connor and Tizard 1956). Regarding institutions, psychological research indicated 
that many residents were wrongly classified and should not be in long-stay institutional 
care (Brandon 1960). Furthermore, studies such as the 'Brooklands' experiment (Tizard 
1960),1 demonstrated that when given an appropriate alternative environment to that of 
an institution, people with learning difficulties could develop both psychologically and 
educationally. Overall, Welshman argues, the burgeoning psychological and 
sociological research literature of the 1950s and 1960s helped to inform the direction of 
social policy (Welshman 2006:25-33). 
1 Supervised by Jack Tizard, this project took 32 children with high support needs out of a large 
long-stay institution, and placed them in smaller community based units. These individuals, in 
contrast to a 'control group' remaining in hospital, showed considerable developments in mental 
abilities and independence. 
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Walmsley and Johnson suggest that 'it was but a small step' from the assertions of 
Q'Connor and Tizard to the idea of normalisation (John son and Walmsley 2010:67). 
Initially formulated by Bank-Mikkelson, this concept was defined in the Danish 1959 
Mental Retardation Act as: 
Making normal mentally retarded people's housing, education, working and 
leisure conditions. It means bringing them the legal and human rights of all other 
citizens (Bank-Mikkelson 1980:56). 
What has become known as the Scandinavian strand of normalisation thinking was 
further developed in the 19605 in Sweden by Nirje (Emerson 1992; Mee 2005; Tilley 
2006). He summarised it as: 
Making available to all mentally retarded people patterns of life and conditions of 
everyday living which are as close as possible to the regular circumstances and 
ways of life of society (Nirje 1980:33). 
Both this definition and the earlier one of Bank-Mikkelson emphasise what Emerson 
calls: 
the basic rights of people with learning difficulties in an egalitarian society 
(Emerson 1992:33). 
This approach was incorporated in the United Nations Declaration of the General and 
SpeCific Rights of the Mentally Retarded (United Nations 1971). Further developed in 
the 1980s, Mee suggests that in this vision of normalisation the individual had 'the right 
to choose'; it was not a 'life prescription' but rather about 'providing opportunities' for 
living like other people in the wider community (Mee 2005:46). 
What Tilley describes as 'a more elaborate version of normalisation' was developed 
during the 1970s, and beyond, in North America by Wolf Wolfensberger (Emerson 
1992; Tilley 2006:60). Unlike the Scandinavian model, this drew heavily upon a 
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conceptual framework related to sociological theories of deviance and labelling. In his 
early writings Wolfensberger defined normalisation as: 
Utilisation of means which are as culturally normative as possible, in order to 
establish and/or maintain personal behaviors and characteristics which are as 
culturally normative as possible (Wolfensberger 1972:28). 
His concern was 'to reverse or prevent devaluing', a process which 'for the first time' 
hinged upon the presentation and interpretation of a person with a learning difficulty 
(Mee 2005:47). By 1983, reflecting its theoretical underpinnings, Wolfensberger had 
renamed his theory social role valorisation (SRV). He argued that 
... the most explicit and highest goal of normalisation must be the creation, 
support and defence of valued social roles for people who are at risk of 
devaluation (Wolfensberger 1983:234). 
Unlike the original Scandinavian verSion, Wolfensberger's perspective hinged on 
integration, not segregation: there was no place for separate congregate living as 
represented particularly by large long-stay institutions. In addition, again in contrast to 
the normalisation of Ni~e and Bank-Mikkelson, it has been claimed that SRV 
was only tangentially concerned with the rights of people with a learning 
disability. Indeed the right to not be segregated is seen as a bigger issue than 
the right to choice ... (Mee 2005:55). 
A dominating emphasis on 'autonomy, empowerment, and self determination' 
(Wolfensberger 2002:253) is viewed by Wolfensberger as potentially dangerous for 'a 
person of limited, disturbed, or diminished mentality' (Wolfensberger 2002:257). The 
latter's welfare is best served, according to Wolfensberger (2002), by ensuring that she 
or he is regarded as a valued member of society. 
Wolfensberger's normalisationlSRV has not been without its critics in the field of 
learning disability (Dalley 1992; Atkinson 1998; Mee 2005; Walmsley 2006). However, 
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although Race (1999) questions its impact, there is a general consensus among 
researchers, summarised by Walmsley, that these ideas: 
have been remarkably influential in the design and philosophy of learning 
disability services since the 1970s (Walmsley 2006:44; Philpot and Ward 1995; 
May 2000; Deeley 2002). 
Deinstitutionalisation, it is claimed, has been a central feature of these service 
developments (Emerson 2004:187). The Jay Report with its critique of learning 
disability nursing, emphasised normal living in the community with support from non-
medical professions and was, Walmsley argues, a clear example of SRV being adopted 
at a policy level (Jay 1979; Mitchell2003; Walmsley 2006). Three years after this report, 
in 1982, the new syllabus for Registered Nurse in Mental Handicap (RNMH) was. 
introduced. This it was claimed by the Royal College of Nursing was heavily influenced 
by normalisation, 'the prevailing philosophy of care' (RCN 1989:6), and 
reinforced the direction of mental handicap nursing away from being a speciality 
based on an illness-dominated medical model (RCN 1989:13). 
During the 1980s as hospital closure programmes, including the Royal Albert, came into 
being many members of nursing staff attended Wolfensberger influenced PASS 
workshops, intended to 'spread the gospel' of normalisation and drive change 
(Wertheimer, Ineichen et al. 1985; Korman and Glennerster 1990:64; Emerson 1992; 
Wangermann 1992). Chapman highlights the 1983 All Wales Strategy as explicitly 
recognising its debt to normalisation (Chapman 2006). Similarly, the North West 
Regional Health Authority (NWRHA), overseer of the closure of the Royal Albert, seems 
to have been heavily influenced by the principles of normalisation, both the European 
and North American versions, especially in its 1983 nationally recognised guidance 
document, A Model District Service (NWRHA 1983; Wangermann 1992; Walker, Ryan 
et al. 1993; Chapman, Asbury et al. 2006). However, institutional studies indicate 
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(ironically) that the adoption of normalisation had a reforming influence in improving the 
living environment within institutions (Malster 1994; Godsell 2002; Ingham 2003). 
2.2.2.3 Campaigning Groups 
Significantly, both Morris's 1969 study and Tizard's Brooklands experiment were 
commissioned by a parents' group (the National Society for Mentally Handicapped 
Children and Adults) symbolising the influence of campaigning organisations, 
speCifically parental but also others, in the dynamics of policy change (Morris 1969; 
Rolph 2006; Tilley 2006; Walmsley 2006; Welshman 2006; Welshman and Walmsley 
2006). Members of the Open University Social History of Learning Disability Research 
Group, apparently alone amongst the other analyses, emphasise: 
the efforts of the families themselves, usually parents campaigning for improved 
services for their children, articulated through local voluntary societies from the 
early 1950s (Welshman and Walmsley 2006:234). 
The same authors assert that while difficult to assess the impact of families vis-a-vis 
pOlicy development 'there is no doubt that post World War Two they were an important 
force' (Welshman and Walmsley 2006:234). Rolph while recognising that the 
relationship of families to institutional care is complex, also stresses their role in 
influencing 'the shift from control to care to citizenship' (Rolph 2006:186). In addition, 
Welshman points out the contribution made by another campaigning group, the 
National Council for Civil Liberties. In 1951 they published 50,000 Outside the Law - a 
report distinctly critical of unjust Institutional detainment. The parental movement then 
joined forces with NCCL and pressurised the government Into setting up the seminal 
1954 - 57 Royal Commission on the Law Relating to Mental Illness and Mental 
DefiCiency (Welshman 2006:23-24). This In turn was key to the 1959 Mental Health Act 
espousing community care Ideas and revoking the Mental Deficiency Acts of the eariy 
twentieth century. 
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Although recognising the crucial influence of Mencap2 in influencing the shift towards 
deinstitutionalisation, another parental group, Rescare, is identified as extremely critical 
of the move away from segregated forms of care (Ryan and Thomas 1998:158; 
Stevens 2004:240-3). Set up in 1984, Rescare has become a firm advocate of so-called 
'village and intentional communities' for people with learning difficulties 
(www.rescare.org.uk), such an idea becoming embodied in the 2001 White Paper 
Valuing People (Stevens 2004:243). However, the actual degree to which Rescare's 
resistance influenced the shape and pace of institutional closure, arriving fairly late on 
in the policy development landscape, requires further research. 
Furthermore, as the century wore on the voice of user groups, such as People First, 
was increasingly heard, critical of institutions and campaigning for the rights of people 
with learning difficulties (Ryan and Thomas 1998: 160-1; Stevens 2004; Rolph, Atkinson 
et al. 2005:23-4). Sympathetic to the positioning of such groups have been pressure 
groups such as the Campaign for the Mentally Handicapped (CMH), later renamed 
Values into Action. Stevens claims that its activities, like Mencap, were influential in 
policy gravitating towards institutional closure (Ryan and Thomas 1998: 121-2; Stevens 
2004:240). 
2.2.2.4 Political Economic Imperatives 
Many writers stress economic 'push' and 'pull' forces as prime drivers in the closing of 
long-stay institutions for people with learning difficulties. Korman and Glennerster 
(1990) argue that changing ideologies in themselves were not enough to impact upon 
national policy. Policy changes occurred in the 1960s and 70s when governments came 
to believe, in a climate of 'fiscal stress, that community care would be cheaper' (Walker 
2 Formerly known as the National Society for Mentally Handicapped Children and Adults. 
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1982; Scull 1984; Korman and Glennerster 1990:18). Walmsley quotes Dalley (1989) in 
arguing that 'community care was expected to be less expensive' (Dalley 1989; 
Walmsley 2006a:82). Wright supported such a stance by citing a 1980 government 
paper which calculated that costs of community care were cheaper than the institutional 
option (Wright 1982:172). In addition, the Audit Commission (1986) claimed that the 
development of community services, and 
the reduction of long-stay hospital provision ... is generally considered better in 
most situations. It is also more economical in many cases (Audit Commission 
1986:1). 
Against this 'pull' towards community care Walmsley positions the 'push' fador of poor 
funding leading to the hospital scandals of the late 1960s and 1970s, In the process 
tarnishing institutional care (Walmsley 2006a:82). GOOsell, with reference to the UK, 
and Castellani, in discussing the closure of six institutions in New York State in the later 
part of the twentieth century, also highlight economic factors as ck,minant drivers in 
delnstitutionalisation: community care was perceived as a cheaper option; and 
institutional care costs were rising (Audit Commission 1986; Korrnan and Glennerster 
1990; Castellani 1992; GOOsell 2002). The hospitals were not only In need of upgrading 
but by the mld-1980s increased staffing levels had meant that they were 'costing 
considerably more to run than they were a decade ago' (Audit Commission 1986:62). 
However, their sale would release substantial capital revenues (CMH, MIND et al. 1975; 
Korman and Glennerster 1990:18). Furthermore, as Welshman pain18 out, pivotal policy 
documents of the late 1950s and early 1960s (1959 Mental Health Ad, 1962 Hospital 
Plan) were produced by Conservative Governments pursuing an agenda of expenditure 
cuts in public services (Welshman 20068:66-67). 
Other authors have presented an economic analysiS within a broader political critique. 
Langan (1998) and Lewls (1998) both argue that although reducing the cost of the 
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welfare state had been a concern of the 1970s Labour Government, it was under the 
government of Thatcher in the 1980s 'that this (the cost-cutting) argument was honed 
and deployed with great effect' (Lewis 1998:48). In the public sector, including the NHS, 
the emphasis was on shifting the burden of social care away from the government, as 
an integral expression of a New Right, neo-liberal, ideology which espoused the virtues 
of private enterprise and the market (Langan 1998; Lewis 1998). This constituted an 
ideological underpinning to a government drive to close state-run institutions and shift 
the financial responsibility for learning disability services to other providers. A more 
Foucauldian analysis is presented by Scull (1976; 1984). He argued, in relationship to 
people with mental illness, that the social control of those seen as 'deviant' was better 
accomplished, in the light of a fiscal crisis in the second half of the twentieth century, 
through 'decarceration' and reliance upon cheaper welfare programmes. This provided 
a context in which institutional critiques had a currency, in influencing social policy, in 
the 1960s and 1970s which they had failed to have in the 19th century (Scull 1976; Scull 
1984). Lavelette and Mooney taking a Marxist overview of drivers in social welfare 
developments argue eloquently that the latter can only be understood with reference to 
class, because this 
provides the context within which policies are developed, welfare states 
reorganised and in which groups get access or are denied access to welfare 
(Lavalette and Mooney 2000:9). 
Their definition of 'working class' is positioned in relation to the means of production, 
and embraces many 'oppressed' groups including people with learning difficulties. 
Other commentators also claim that economic considerations played a significant part 
in driving policy change (Welshman and Walmsley 2006), not only in the UK but 
European wide (Means, Richards et al. 2008:223-27). 
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2.2.3 Research Implications 
The literature on the history of deinstitutionalisation, as depicted here, suggests an 
intricate web of policies, initiatives, influences and perspectives. In the midst of this 
complexity it is possible to identify a central and contested theme. This relates to the 
degree to which the drive to close large long-stay hospitals, and develop community 
care, reflected the needs, desires and rights of people with leaming difficulties or was 
driven by imperatives of cost, convenience and neo-liberal ideology. To help unpick this 
conundrum my research asked: 
What were the external pressures shaping the rundown of the Royal Albert 
Hospital, Lancaster In the late twentieth century? 
An examination of this question constitutes the focus of Chapter Four of the thesis. 
2.3 Institutional Closure 
Having discussed deinstitutionallsatlon as an overarchlng framework, this section 
examines the literature on aspects of Institutional closure Itself. Firstly there is an outline 
of the extent to which delnstltutlonallsatlon poliCies translated Into actual InstitUtIonal 
closures In the UK during the late twentieth century. Then the section considers the 
type of studies, both In the UK and Intematlonally, which have been undertaken In this 
field. This Is followed by a consideration of key themes which have emerged from the 
research Into the closures of Institutions. Finally, the Implications of this review for my 
own study are summarised. 
2.3.1 Overview of Institutional Closures In the United Kingdom 
Despite the rhetoric of community care being heightened with the 1959 Mental Health 
Act and the 1962 Hospital Plan, hospitals for people with learning difficulties \\W8 still 
being built In England during the 19508 and 60s; In fact the total number of hospital 
residents peaked In 1969 (Stevens 2004; Welshman and Walmsley 2006). The 
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significant 1971 White Paper, Better Services, as already indicated, was not promoting 
the closure of all hospitals (Ryan and Thomas 1998; Stevens 2004) and during the 
following decade numbers hardly reduced, with any decrease largely explained by a 
dramatic fall in the number of children admitted combined with the deaths of long-stay 
residents (Booth, Simons et al. 1990: 1; Emerson and Hatton 1994: 1-2). Investment in 
institutional infrastructure continued well into the eighties in some cases: both the Royal 
Albert and Normansfield, for example, put substantial resources into new on-site units 
as a response to critical reports (Alston and Roberts 1992); and the head of Cambridge 
Priority Services Unit making it clear, with respect to Ida Darwin Hospital, that as late as 
1985 if 'we had spare cash we had to invest it in the institution,3. Tyne, at that time a 
researcher with CMH, writing in the early 1980s, argued firstly that: the 1981 Care in the 
Community paper was 'based firmly on the White Paper (1971) supposition that there 
will always be those who need hospital care' (Tyne 1982:149); and secondly. 
it seems almost inevitable that, with increased pressure from the community, 
hospitals will once again begin to open their doors to new admissions, and that 
the hospital population will cease to fall or even begin to grow agaifl (Tyne 
1982:157). 
What appeared to shake up this institutional inertia was the 1983 Health and Social 
Security Adjustments Act which allowed DHSS benefits to finance former hospital 
residents in private and voluntary residential community accommodation (Korman and 
Glennerster 1990; Godsell 2002; Walmsley 2006a). In addition, this act introduced 'the 
dowry' system, an annual payment made by the district health authorities to local 
authorities to provide financial support for each individual who moved out of hospital 
into the wider community (Hudson 1991). Impetus was given to resettlement from the 
Royal Albert by this legislation (Wangermann 1992). Nationally the 1980s, leading into 
the early 1990s, witnessed a rapid reduction in the hospital population. and by 1992 it 
3 Stephen Thornton, interview with Jan Walmsley, March 2005 
30 
was 44% of its 1980 level (Emerson and Hatton 1994). This changing demographic, 
combined with the prediction that most institutions of this nature would have closed in 
England by the end of the century, led two academics to confidently assert that 'hospital 
closure or deinstltutionalisation' is a 'specific task nearing completion' (Emerson and 
Hatton 1994:2). 
Although taking a while to get started it seems, therefore, that by the 1990s the closure 
programme was finally well on track. However, such a view was challenged strongly at 
the time, particularly by Collins but also by other commentators. The new financial 
arrangements introduced by the 1990 NHS and Community Care Act, combined with a 
lack of earmarked funding, were seen as detrimental to the momentum of resettlement 
which had been built up in the preceding years. 
Much of the energy and purpose of the closure programme has been 
-dissipated ... while It cannot be said that community care has been cancelled it is 
clear that, for at least some people with leamlng difficulties, It Is being 
indefinitely postponed (Colllns 1992:10). 
Practitioners and researchers, both at the time and since, have emphasised the impact 
of the new funding regime Introduced by the 1990 Act (Korman and Glennerster 1990; 
Wangermann 1992; Walmsley 2006a). Prior to this legislation community care, In many 
Instances, had been effectively financed from a national pot via the DHSS. Now with 
new assessment procedures money was to come via a more restricted locally 
controlled budget. The effect of this altered funding environment on the quality of 
delnstltutlonallsation was summed up by Pamela Chartwood, Chief ExecutIve of Avon 
Area Health Authority In 1997, saying that they have had to compromise their Ideals 
regarding the quality of community accommodation for residents moving out of Stoke 
Park: 
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There is no way now with the changes. That (the ideal of 4 or 5 bedroom 
houses) was when we were drawing on Social Security money flowing like an 
ever-open tap. The tap has been shut off now (GodseIl2002:163). 
Also impacting during this period were a range of other factors. Economies of scale in a 
large hospital, for instance, militated against resettling residents as it cost as much to 
run a half-empty ward as a full one (Wright 1982:172; Walmsley 2006a:83). Moreover, 
Collins criticised the lack of strategic leadership from the Conservative Government, 
placing undue emphasis on the goodwill and determination of personnel at a local and 
regional level (Collins 1992). Outside England, the lack of a coherent strategx to 
facilitate deinstitutionalisation was highlighted in a review of the All Wales Strategy, 
which is generally seen as a model of community care implementation. In the mid-to-
late 1990s researchers argued that: 'No large hospital in Wales has closed and there is 
doubt as to whether complete institutional closure will be achieved' (Felce, Grant et al. 
1998:94). Crucial reasons for this state of affairs were that county planning was neither 
suffiCiently strategic nor linked to hospital resettlement. 
Running counter to the push towards deinstitutionalisation during the late twentieth 
century was the contention that these monolithic structures would not close entirely, 
with residual residential services remaining on site. In Making a reality of community 
care, the Audit Commission in 1986 stated that, alongside community provision: 
there will a/ways remain a very important role for hospitals (although on a 
reduced scale) in caring for a small number of very severely handicapped 
people; and residential care will continue to play an important role in the 
spectrum of care (Audit Commission 1986:1 ).4 
4 My italics. 
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Almost a quarter of a century later there were 753 former hospital residents still living 
on NHS campuses in England suggesting that the report's prediction has been realised 
(OH 2010). Calderstones, one of three former hospitals in Lancashire, continued to 
have, according to one well informed source, 150 residents in 2008.5 Emerson and 
Hatton summarise the argument, prevalent In the 1990s, that while few would assert the 
need to retain institutional care in Its current form, there are those who argue that there 
is a 'need for some sort of institutional provision for people with more complex needs' 
(Emerson and Hatton 1994:2). Underlying such a position was the suggestion that care 
for these individuals would be cheaper in an institutional rather than In a community 
setting: 'Good community care is costly' (Korman and Glennerster 1990). Furthermore, 
embracing the views of those critical and supportive of deinstitutionalisation, a lively 
debate about the wisdom of segregated communities of people with leamlng difficulties 
continu8d into the twenty first century (Cox and Pearson 1995; Cummins and Lau 2004; 
~ 
Emerson 2004). However, assessing the extent to which these arguments In favour of 
some form of institutional care impacted upon institutional closures remains 
problematic. 
2.3.2 Institutional Closure Research Penpectives 
Presented here is an outline of the research landscape associated with the mechanics 
of institutional closures; this will be further illuminated, later In the chapter, with an 
examination of key themes which emerged from the literature. 
In life stories research, nationally and Internationally, former hospital residents refer to 
the moving within and out of long-stay establishments (Atkln80n, Jack80n et al. 1997; 
Cooper 1997; John80n and TraustadAottir 2005). Indeed some of this work has touched 
upon migration between Institutional environments (RoIph 1999). These studies, by 
11 Tom McLean, Interview September 8" 2008. 
33 
their very nature, have a strong historical dimension. This contrasts with other 
contemporaneous research, which often had the express purpose of either impacting 
on the policy or practice of deinstitutionalisation or being seen as the final chapter in an 
institutional history (see below). Much of this research in England - including psychiatric 
hospital closure - written primarily from a policy perspective was carried out around the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. Policy studies at this time include a review document of the 
closure of Brockhall, the first large long-stay institution in the north west to close (Peters 
and Freeman 1992), as well as accounts of the closure process of long-stay institutions 
for people with learning difficulties in South East (Korman and Glennerster 1990) and 
South West England (King 1991). In addition there is a piece of research embracing a 
number of case studies nationally to analyse why institutional closure appeared to be 
floundering and to offer ways forward (Collins 1992; Collins 1993; Collins 1994). 
Internationally, and straddling the onset of the twenty first century, are pertinent pieces 
of American and Australian research (Castellani 1992; Bigby 2005; Bigby and Fyffe 
2006). 
All of these studies, written at the time, are of interest in providing insights into the 
political and economic dynamics of closure, although the voices of those at its heart are 
given little direct expression. Addressing this imbalance in relation to people with 
learning difficulties has been the focus of some later work, prominent amongst which 
has been an international compilation written and collated by Johnson and 
Traustadottir, who wanted to produce 'an account that brought together the lived 
experiences of people with intellectual disabilities and their families with reflections on 
deinstitutionalisation' (Johnson and Traustadf30ttir 2005a:17). They do this through the 
medium of life stories, and case studies showing how policy played out in the lives of 
those who moved out of the institution. Interestingly, and as with a London based piece 
of work carried out in the early part of the twenty first century (Owen 2004), Johnson In 
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her own study represents the process of closure from the perspective of those who are 
seen as being the most challenging, those who are on 'the back wards' of the large 
long-stay institutions (Jones 1975:96; Johnson 1998; Johnson 2005). In a study of 
Stoke Park learning disability institution, in Bristol, reference is also made to the 
particular issues in hospital closure encountered by those with 'a history of severe 
mental illness, psychotic or anti-social behaviour' (Godsell 2002:182). 
Embracing the perspectives of not only people with learning difficulties, but also their 
relatives and staff are a number of UK, Australian and New Zealand studies (Johnson 
1998; GOOsell 2002; Gates 2008; Milner 2008; Stewart and Mirfin-Veitch 2008; Gleeson 
2010). Echoing such an emphasis are two pieces of research executed in the late 
1980s and 90s in Northern England (Booth, Simons et al. 1990; Walker, Ryan et al. 
1993). One of these evaluates the North West Regional Health AuthOrity's resettlement 
policy, focussing upon 
the experience of a group of people resettled from the three largest mental 
handicap hospitals in the region, and ... their progress towards the 'five 
accomplishments' that underpin the principle of normalisation ... (Walker, Ryan 
et al. 1993:i). 
This research drew upon the viewpoints of families, staff and service users presenting 
insights into aspects of deinstitutionalisation pOlicy and practice In North West England. 
In a similar vein, the other north of England study, located In Klrklees, Yorkshire, while 
referencing policy was more concerned to evaluate 'the process of relocation itself, and 
of Its effect on the lives of the movers and their families', as well as reflecting upon staff 
perspectives (Booth, Slmons et al. 1990:22). This latter focus was at the core of 
Godsell's study of Stoke Park, concentrating upon 
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the ways in which the closure of the hospital, and the movement between 
hospital and the community, have influenced staff's perception of the services 
and the roles they perform within them (GodseIl2002:194). 
In analysing seminal facets of the relocation process, as well as the closing of the 
hospital over a period of time, Godsell gives considerable prominence to the voices of 
direct care staff. Unlike work on staff reflections on resettlement in the North West 
England (Mitchell and Chapman 2008), the perspectives in Godsell's work were 
gathered at the time of relocation. Both studies, however, focus primarily upon staff who 
took up posts in community learning disability services. 
Institutional histories in the UK, including the Royal Albert, and further afield, sometimes 
contain a concluding chapter dealing with closure, often because the work has been 
commissioned as the hospital runs down. Some of these reference policy and embrace 
the voices of residents, staff and, in some instances, families, although as 'the last 
word' they do not present detailed analyses of the hospital closure process (Radford 
and Tipper 1988; Malster 1994; Hutchings 1998; Ingham 2003; Manning 2008). 
2.3.3 Themes of Institutional Closure 
A core theme of the literature on institutional closure, as already indicated, is that it was 
a highly complex process, whether at a micro or macro level, embracing an intricate 
web of relationships between different stakeholders, along with profoundly demanding 
logistical, administrative and resource issues. 
In the face of such labyrinthine organisational challenges, strong and expert leadership 
is emphasised as a key factor in the implementation of institutional rundown (Korman 
and Glennerster 1990; King 1991; Castellani 1992; Collins 1992). In the case of the 
closure of Darenth Park, Kent, the researchers argue that: 
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The central lesson to be learned is that top-class managerial skills are required 
to achieve this apparently unglamorous task (Korman and Glennerster 
1990:123). 
Such a sentiment is echoed by Castellani who, in his study of institutional contraction in 
New York State in the 1980s and 1990s, emphasises that those responsible for 
implementation needed 'problem solving, negotiation and conflict resolution' skills, more 
than 'routine management capacity and technical competence' usually associated with 
what he describes as 'middle management' (Castellani 1992:208). Moreover, in her 
nationwide English research in the 1990s, Collins pointed out that where clear and 
determined leadership existed financial difficulties merely slowed down the pace of 
institutional closure (Collins 1992). 
Following the Griffiths review of 1983, general management replaced the tripartite 
consensus management structure.6 This innovative shift was introduced across the 
NHS at regional, district and unit levels (Klein 2001; Webster 2002). It is suggested that 
this was all part of the business of targets and cost cutting particularly attractive to the 
Thatcher government as it reduced expenditure in public services (Booth, Simons et al. / 
1990:6). Moreover, general management can be viewed as a dominant strand in a 
managerial onslaught on public services in the UK during the 1980s (Newman 1998). 
However, regardless of the motivating forces, Korman and Glennerster argue that in 
learning disability services: 
general management did prove an important contributory factor in speeding up 
the process of hospital closure and in many areas unit general managers 
became key figures (Korman and Glennerster 1990:27). 
I n contrast to the previous management structure, now: 
6 In its re-organisation of 1974, the National Health Service introduced consensus management. 
It came to permeate the NHS, and was defined by its emphasis on collective decision-making, 
made by multi-disciplinary teams comprising doctors, nurses and administrators (Harrison 1982; 
Small 1989; Adams 2009). 
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a single person could be given charge of the complex process of running down 
a large institution (Korman and Glennerster 1990:27). 
These researchers assert that this clarity provided scope for manoeuvre in the 
implementation of hospital closure. 
Although studies, such as the one on Darenth Park, emphasise the importance of 
leadership in implementing institutional closure, first hand managerial accounts 
although touched upon internationally (Johnson 1998; Enbar, Morris et al. 2004; 
Manning 2008) are lacking or under-represented. One of the exceptions to this is the 
memoir of the Chief Executive of Exeter Area Health Authority charting 
deinstitutionalisation policy and practice in South West England during the 1970s and 
80s (King 1991). However, this is purely, as he acknowledges, one managerial 
perspective amongst many who were involved in that process, as well as presenting a 
broad regional sweep. Although Korman and Glennerster (1990) emphasise the vital 
role of general management in the context of institutional closures across the UK, they 
present insubstantial evidence to support such a claim. In addition, there are those who 
questioned the radical impact of the introduction of general management in the NHS 
during the 1980s (Hunter 1994; Langan 1998; Webster 2002:174). Furthermore, there 
is very little material which provides insights into who the general managers and other 
members of middle management were: their beliefs, values, feelings, the meanings 
implementation had for them, beyond an allusion to career advancement (Korman and 
Glennerster 1990:27). Such a lack of focus makes it difficult to assess the impact of the 
agency, or 'capacity', of specific individuals upon the implementation process (Korman 
and Glennerster 1990:27). This is in contrast, for instance, to a broader literature 
relating to deinstitutionalisation which is littered with the names of influential people 
(Butler and Drakeford 2005; Welshman and Walmsley 2006). Moreover, accounts such 
as those presented by Korman and Glennerster (1990), King (1991) and Collins (1992, 
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1993, 1994) in which administrative and managerial issues are pinpointed, tend to 
adopt a macro-focus, with issues such as financing, logistics and inter-agency 
relationships dominating their viewpoint. There is far less on the micro-political and 
ethical entanglements which occurred within an organisation as management attempted 
to implement its contraction. 
Integral to the complex human dimension of institutional closure, both in the UK and 
internationally, was the theme of resistance. In her Australian study, for instance, 
Johnson argues that: 
The announcement of the decision to close Hilltop immediately divided staff, 
families and people living at the institution into those supporting its closure and 
those resisting it (Johnson 1998:84). 
This dichotomy is replicated in other studies (Radford and Phillips 1985; Collins 1993; 
Godsell 2002; Gleeson 2010). Although public opposition to closure is pinpointed, the 
primary focus is upon resistance by families and by institutional employees (Radford 
and Phillips 1985; Enbar, Morris et at 2004; Malacrida 2008; Manning 2008; Stewart 
and Mirfin-Veitch 2008; Gleeson 2010). According to the research the nature of 
opposition, where It occurred, was predominantly of a collective nature, whether 
through family groups or, in the case of hospital staff, trade unions (Johnson 1998; 
Manning 2008). On occasions, as referenced in North America, alliances were formed 
between employees and relatives, sometimes with public bodies, to oppose closure 
(Enbar, Morris et al. 2004; Malacrida 2008). However, although less prominent, studies 
do highlight Instances of IndMduallsed actions by staff which could be construed as 
undermining resettlement (CoUlns 1993; Johnson 1998; Godsell 2002). These, as with a 
selection of collective actions, are viewed as having slowed down Implementation 
processes (Radford and Phllllps 1985; CoUlns 1993; Tessebro 1993; Tessebro and 
Lundeby 2006). There were Instances in North America where an alliance of families, 
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staff and the public prevented closure happening at all (Enbar, Morris et al. 2004; 
Malacrida 2008). Mostly, though, the studies reveal that resistance was overcome and 
institutional rundown was implemented. With possible parallels for staff attitudes in 
learning disability institutions, one researcher argues that in the case of a London 
based psychiatric hospital closure: 
Negative attitudes tended to be seen as a kind of inevitable fighting against the 
dying of the light (Tomlinson 1992:66). 
Occasionally, particularly in the United States, resistance was defeated in legal arenas 
(Enbar, Morris et al. 2004). Acceptable settlements or guarantees regarding continuity 
of employment are indicated as being crucial in overcoming potential and real 
opposition from hospital staff (Audit Commission 1986; Korman and Glennerster 1990; 
King 1991; Enbar, Morris et al. 2004). One study also argues that a rapid 
implementation programme was devised to prevent the development of an effective 
opposition (Johnson 1998). For families, however, the research consensus is that 
opposition withered away as resettlements proceeded. Relatives were initially anxious, 
and resistant to closure, but became re-assured and supportive of the process as 
former hospital residents settled into houses in the community (T 0ssebro and Lundeby 
2006; Stewart and Mirfin-Veitch 2008; Lemay 2009). Moreover, one North America 
study suggests that an institution's family group was a prime driving force for the 
adoption of deinstitionalisation (Shumway 1996). 
Lacking overall in the studies which reference resistance by staff or families is a 
detailed examination of their point of view. The oppositional perspective tends to be 
seen as reflecting self interest, in terms of job losses, or, for relatives, anxieties about 
their own family member safely in an institution for life. Moreover, those reacting 
adversely to institutional closure were merely a management problem. Korman and 
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Glennerster, for instance, while expressing some sympathy towards the predicament of 
staff, assert that: 
The longest-serving staff were often the most difficult to deal with.7 Q.uite a 
number of people did not take up the posts that were reserved for them - they 
simply did not want to move, and were often unable to give a reason why. They 
resented the hospital closing and were not willing to give the new jobs a go. The 
hospital had had a very stable core of staff, and no matter how many warnings 
were given, they refused to move (Korman and Glennerster 1990:120). 
The implication here is that management had kindly reserved jobs for members of staff, 
had given sufficient warnings, but bizarrely and obstinately these individuals refused to 
give the 'new jobs a go'. In other words they were stuck in their old and irrational ways. 
The position of these employees is framed purely in terms of the management agenda, 
which they were obstructing. There is little attempt to understand, or legitimise, this 
alternative perspective. To say that they 'simply'did not want to leave understates the 
complexity of the situation of staff in terms of meanings, emotion and their relationships 
with people with learning difficulties (Godsell 2002; O'Driscoll 2006; Gates 2008). One 
exception to those studies which collude in this community care research narrative is 
written by Gleeson (2010). He argues that the division, highlighted earlier, between 
those for or against closure reflected positions either side of an ethical faultline. There 
was a 'moral schism' between 'righteous reformers' and 'fearful reactionaries', and 
anyone questioning deinstitutionalisation was perceived as engaging in 'acts of moral 
failure' (Gleeson 2010). Drawing upon a comparative analysis of the closure of two 
Australian institutions, Gleeson argues that this dismissive attitude belies the point that 
opposition towards closure had a validity; it was resistance. Using the parents' group at 
Kew Cottages as his exemplar he asserts that their institutional rundown critique was 
rooted both in genuine caring, as an 'affective community', and credible concems over 
7 My emphasis. 
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the implementation of features associated with a neo-liberal agenda. Such an argument 
reinforces Gleeson's overarching claim that: 
periods of intense transition in the ideology and mode of care are reflective of 
wider social transformations not merely of therapeutic or institutional shifts 
(Gleeson 2010:5). 
In terms of highlighting the negative impact of a business, and management, culture 
upon closure processes other researchers can be construed as having sympathy with 
such a standpoint (Radford and Phillips 1985; Walker, Ryan et al. 1993; Johnson 1998; 
Godse1l2002; Bigby 2005). However under-represented, arguably because these 
perspectives are viewed as 'wrong', are studies which examine institutional contractions 
from the critical stance of staff, families, and indeed hospital residents. 
Issues associated with resourcing the move from hospital, including the development of 
community provision, were, as illustrated below, examined in the different studies. In 
some cases deinstitutionalisation appeared relatively straightforward: monies realised 
by the closure of Starcross (King 1991), for example, financed the cost of relocating its 
residents; and almost 20 years later, across the other side of the world, the closure of 
Kew Cottages in Australia, similarly, helped to fund community residences (Manning 
2008). Furthermore, the decision to close Darenth Park, in Kent, was triggered by the 
promise that this would finance deinstitutionalisation (Korman and Glennerster 1990). 
However, in North West England increasing financial pressures seemed to impact on .. 
the process of institutional closure and resettlement (Walker, Ryan et al. 1993). There 
appeared to be a shift in policy, during the 1980s, by the Regional Health Authority from 
one based primarily on the resettlement needs of the clients to one determined by more 
bureaucratic imperatives. By the late 1980s researchers argued that, 
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the programme and pace of resettlement had to be structured in the most cost 
efficient way which, in turn, was closely dependent on the rundown of the 
hospital (Walker, Ryan et al. 1993:17). 
One expression of this was the introduction of ward closure programmes, including the 
shutting down of wards when they were judged to be no longer economically viable. As 
other studies reference, the economics of closure could easily become enmeshed in the 
politics intra and inter Health and Social Services (Booth, Simons et al. 1990; Korman 
and Glennerster 1990). 
Institutional closure and reprovisioning resource issues could impact adversely on 
people with learning difficulties moving out of hospital; in other words, those it was 
meant to serve. Studies, both in England and internationally, emphasise how financial 
concerns resulted in inter-ward moves for reSidents, impacting negatively on the health 
of some individuals (TurnbuIl1993; Stancliffe 1998). Other ways in which poor 
resourcing could play a crucial role in how people moved out of hospital are explored by 
Johnson in her study of women leaving Hilltop in Australia. She describes half of the 
residents being prevented from transferring into the community because the monies 
were not there (Johnson 2005). Bigby, in a separate Australian study, extends this 
argument to show how the business culture prevalent at the time of the resettlement of 
58 long-stay residents impacted negatively on this process and indeed set the tone for 
their new life in the community (Bigby 2005). Overall the research studies mentioned 
reveal how the more negative features of institutionalisation played out in the actual 
relocation process. In reflecting on her own work and others, Johnson, for Instance, 
pinpoints the lack of Influence, lack of voice - either directly or Indirectly - that residents 
had In resettling (Johnson 2005a). Such sentiments resonate with UK research. In 
North West England for instance Walker, Ryan and Walker in their study of resettlement 
from the three main hoSpitals in the early 1990s, Including the Royal Albert, state that: 
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Movers were inadequately involved not only in the choice but also in the 
preparation of their new home. In most cases they were simply presented with 
the completed package (Walker, Ryan et al. 1993:ix). 
This sentiment resonates with other British studies (Booth, Simons et al. 1990; Ingham 
2003). Matthew Godsell develops the theme further, suggesting that preferential 
treatment occurred in the relocation process during the 1980s at Stoke Park: 
While some of the people with less severe disabilities had moved into group 
homes in NHS and community care trusts the people that remained in hospital 
were put into groups with people that shared common characteristics e.g. their 
age, physical impairment or behaviour. Wards were also referred to as 
accommodation specifically for people with challenging behaviour, or multiple 
impairments (Godsell 2002:175-6). 
Such streaming in turn suggests that medical model thinking, viewing people primarily 
in relation to a perceived impairment or 'problem', was still prevalent within the 
framework of a social change viewed by many as progressive. However, in the same 
study, Godsell indicates how normalisationlSRV had filtered down and 'encouraged 
nursing staff to create a more domestic setting for services' (Godsell 2002). In some 
ways this example of conflicting ideologies appears to be emblematic of the whole 
process of closure and relocation, whether at a national, regional, local or personal 
level: namely that it was highly complex and often encompassed contradictory and 
competing forces. 
2.3.4 Research Implications 
A review of the literature on institutional closure indicates that there are key 
weaknesses in our understanding of the ways these large long-stay hospitals were 
contracted during the late twentieth and early twenty first centuries. Under-researched 
are what Gleeson describes as 'the many small scenes of moral and political struggle 
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around processes of closure'(Gleeson 2010:12). Lacking also are insider accounts of 
institutional rundown, whether from the standpoint of managers, staff or families which 
could shed light on this struggle. Opposition to the closing of institutions was, in 
general, viewed as a managerial problem, rather than a valid informed voice. Infusing 
this perspective were ideological underpinnings, linked with normalisationlSRV, 
emphasising the rightness of the task to implement closure. This ethical framework both 
underplays the impact of a bureaucratic and cost agenda, and 'others' those individuals 
who were critical of the process and policy of institutional contraction. In this 'othering' 
the meanings that the institution had for staff, particularly those who left the institution or 
were not involved in direct care, are largely miSSing from studies. Equally, however, 
beyond references to the professional task and the ideological zeal of the times, studies 
pay little attention to the meaning change had for those charged with implementation. 
Although existing research emphasises the importance of organisational leadership, 
there is a lack of managerial perspectives on the enormity of the task faced by those 
implementing change within their respective organisations 
In order to investigate these issues, this thesis asked a number of related questions 
about institutional contraction: 
How did managers implement the rundown of the Royal Albert Hospital, Lancaster? 
This constitutes the focus of Chapters Five and Six. 
What were the viewpoints of those who resisted the closure of the Royal Albert? How 
did they express their resistance? 
These Interilnked questions are examined In Chapters Seven and Eight respectively. 
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What meanings did Royal Albert rundown have for implementers and resisters of 
change? 
This is investigated in Chapter Nine. 
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the literature on deinstitutionalisation and institutional 
closure which helped shape the thesis and identify key research questions. Chapter 
Three discusses the research methods which were employed in the study. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH METHODS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 
3.1 I ntrod uction 
3.2 Research Theory: Literature Review 
3.2.1 Qualitative Enquiry 
3.2.2 Microhistory and Case Study 
3.2.3 Oral History 
3.2.4 Polyphony 
3.2.5 Reflexivity 
3.2.6 Political Issues 
3.3 Research Practice: Data Collection and Analysis 
3.3.1 The Case Study 
3.3.2 Archival Material 
3.3.3 Interview Participants 
3.3.4 Interview Processes 
3.3.4.1 Interview Logistics 
3.3.4.2 Interview Subjectivities and Reflexivity 
3.3.5 Data Analysis 
3.4 Conclusion 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the theory and practice of the methods employed in researching 
the contraction of the Royal Albert Hospital, Lancaster. The research questions outlined 
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in the previous chapter were distilled into two overarching, and entwined, 
methodological challenges: how to reconstruct a past event? How to establish what this 
event meant for those involved? Firstly the chapter reviews the literature which 
informed and justified the approaches taken to explore these research avenues. Then it 
highlights critical elements in the practical application of chosen methodologies for the 
data collection and analysis carried out in the study. 
3.2 Research Theory: Literature Review 
This section discusses the literature on qualitative research which shaped the 
development of the study. Initially an overview is presented, then more specific reviews 
of case study and microhistory, oral history, multi-voicedness or polyphony, reflexivity, 
concluding with a consideration of the politics of the research methodology. 
3.2.1 Qualitative Enquiry 
I used a qualitative research approach to investigate the research topic. Such a model 
of enquiry hinges upon inductive analysis, a multiplicity of variables or voices, and a 
focus upon the richness and the depth of topics rather than their representativeness 
(Merriam 1998 cited in Yow 2005:5; Ziebland 2009). Although some researchers 
problematise assumed differences between quantitative and qualitative approaches 
(Silverman 1997; Yow 2005), the latter is perceived as far less controlled than the 
former which examines 'researcher-controlled answers' (Yow 2005:5). Unregulated 
data are seen as essential facets of qualitative research (Patton 2002) which embraces, 
as exemplified by soft systems methodology (Checkland and Scholes 1999), t~e 
'messiness' of both problematic human situations and of the research process (Law 
2004). 
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Qualitative enquiry is viewed as recognising the subjectivity and ambiguity involved in 
researching complex human contexts. Although subjectivity is prevalent in quantitative 
methodology, in qualitative enquiry it is acknowledged as integral to the investigative 
process (Yow 2005; Ziebland 2009). Douglas (1976) suggests that: 
Rather than trying to eliminate the subjective effects, the goal must be to try to 
understand how they are interdependent, how different forms of subjective 
interaction with the people we are studying affect our conclusions about them 
(Douglas 1976:25 cited in Yow 2005:7). 
This reflexivity on the part of the researcher is therefore seen as a crucial component of 
qualitative research. On this point the research was sympathetic towards Day's position 
in recognising that researchers inevitably bring pre-existing knowledge to the study, 
suggesting that 'an open mind does not mean an empty head' (Dey 1993). To facilitate 
an 'open mind' the study adopted the qualitative position that the research was an 
iterative process, involving ongoing learning and reflection, moving between data 
collection and analysis, and a fluidity in decision-making about the shape of the 
research. 
Briefly outlined, these tenets of qualitative enquiry are now exemplified with reference to 
specific research methodologies. 
3.2.2 Microhistory and Case Study 
Central to the research task was the reconstruction of salient features of the contraction 
of the Royal Albert Hospital. It was assumed based upon a literature review, discussed 
in Chapter Two, that this Institutional rundown constituted a considerable labyrinthine 
process. A key methodological challenge was how to embrace such complexity: the 
multi-perspectives; the inter-relationships between people and organisations both within 
and without the walls of the asylum; the changing dynamic over time; and the inter-
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connectedness with wider socio-economic, historical, political and cultural contexts. 
Oral history, explained later in the chapter, was chosen as a core methodology to 
unpick the interactive elements of this organisational change. A broader conceptual 
framework, however, was provided by the traditions of microhistory and case-study. 
Microhistory focuses on what could be described as small scale studies (Ginzburg and 
Tedeschi 1993); classic examples of the genre include a medieval village and a 
medieval French peasant (Le Roy Ladurie 1980; Davis 1985). Importantly such an 
approach is not parochial but merely concerned to adjust the scale of analysis, based 
on: 
the unifying principle of all microhistorical research ... that microscopic 
observation will reveal factors previously unobserved (Levi 2001:101). 
These factors, these interpretations could relate to broader contexts, so for instance 
Levi claims: 
it becomes immediately obvious that even the minutest of actions, say, 
somebody going to buy a loaf of bread, actually encompasses the far wider 
system of the whole world's grain markets (Levi 2001 :100). 
This type of analysis resonates with the 'thick description' of Clifford Geertz, who 
argued that, 'Historians do not study villages ... they study in villages' (Geertz 1973:22). 
Other researchers have built upon such ideas to set up what they describe as a micro-
macro framework for their studies (Thomson 1996; Eaman 2001; Johns 2002). Similar 
to this study, Johns researched an institution, including its closure, and wanted to 
understand what occurred on the ground as well as a broader picture. He saw a micro-
macro approach as offering 
alternative perspectives (for) examining the same phenomenon in different ways 
(Johns 2002:31). 
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Importantly this methodological framework allows attention to fall on the dynamic 
interconnections between wider and more local social forces. These, however, are not 
two separate entities, because: 
the macro appears no longer as a particular layer of social reality on top of 
micro-episodes ... Rather it is seen to reside within these micro-episodes (Knorr-
Cetina and Cicourel1981 :34). 
In social history of learning disability research such approaches seem to accord with 
auto/biographical methods. Atkinson, for instance, emphasises that the individual story 
is told 
against the social and historical backcloth ... Auto/biographical research has the 
capacity to combine the political document with the historical - to reflect the 
lives which have been lived, but to see beyond the individuals to a wider view of 
learning disability (Atkinson 1997:22). 
The theoretical underpinnings of a microhistorical tradition, as outlined here, echoed my 
own research aim of situating an institutional closure within a wider world. 
Tensions, however, between the micro and the macro are highlighted in the 
microhistoricalliterature and the closely related social scientific area of case study 
research. A leading proponent of the latter approach, for instance, describes studies in 
which the researcher is fundamentally interested in the particular case, as 'intrinsic case 
study' (Stake 1995; Stake 2005:445). He suggests that the purpose of such research is 
'not to come to understand some abstract construct or generic phenomenon' (Stake 
2005:445). The focus is on making sense of the particular case, rather than creating 
theory. Stake contrasts this with an 'instrumental case study' where: 
a particular case is examined mainly to provide insight into an issue or to redraw 
a generalisation. The case is of secondary importance (Stake 2005:445). 
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Nevertheless, he emphasises that an in-depth study is still carried out, but the purpose 
is ultimately to learn about some 'external interest'. Stake, however, does argue that the 
two conceptual frameworks of 'intrinsic' and 'instrumental' are not mutually exclusive, 
and, in practice, the research topic may lie somewhere on a spectrum between the two. 
This offered a clarification for this research, enabling a focus both on the closing of a 
particular institution and development of ideas which had a broader resonance in the 
social history of learning disability. In this case study research there was likely to be a 
tension between the 'instrumental' and 'intrinsic'; and so there was a need to be aware 
that 'damage' could occur if theory was created at the expense of focussing upon 
'features important for understanding the case itself (Stake 2005:448). 
Concern about the micro-macro relationship resonates with microhistorical studies. 
Burke warns that: 
If the micro-historical movement is to escape the law of diminishing returns, its 
practitioners will need to say more about the wider culture, and to demonstrate 
the links between small communities and macrohistorical trends (Burke 
1992:43). 
In Burke's view the interplay between the micro and macro is integral to the value of 
microhistory, otherwise it 
might become a kind of escapism, an acceptance of a fragmented world rather 
than an attempt to make sense of it (Burke 2001 :116-7). 
Stake on the other hand argues that ultimately learning is shared between the 
researcher and the reader. In presenting the case the researcher, in the rolo of teacher, 
facilitates a process of discovery learning on the part of the reader (Stake 2005:454). 
The latter makes sense of the case by contextualising with their own experience, 
including knowledge of other cases and the subject. 
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Although such sentiments reflect authentic facets of an active dialogue between a 
researcher and their audience, they constitute a limited perspective. In this study the 
presumption was that connections with a wider world were intrinsic to understanding the 
institutional contraction of the Royal Albert. This interplay would add richness to the 
research and contribute to wider debates concerning deinstitutionalisation. Expression 
was given to this viewpoint in the research with the consistent contextualising of a 
broader literature. The relationship between the micro and the macro was a vital 
component in making the closure programme of the Albert such an interesting and 
exciting object of study. 
3.2.3 Oral History 
Oral history's emphasis on the in-depth interview, along with its recognition of the 
centrality of subjectivity and induction in the research process, means that it 
complements the qualitative research approaches already discussed. Although 
specifying the key attributes of oral history is not unproblematic (Yow 2005:3-4), the 
research drew upon helpful working definitions. Perks, for instance, suggests that in 
essence: 
Oral history is spoken history: it is the recording of people's unique memories 
and life stories (Perks 1992:5). 
The 'recording' element implies the presence of another, or others. Such a state of 
affairs enriches and complicates the creation of historical data in that: 
someone else is involved who frames the topics and inspires1 the narrator to 
begin the act of remembering, jpgs memory, and records and presents the 
narrator's words (Thompson 1988; Yow 2005:4). 
Above all oral history, according to one practitioner, can be revelatory in that it: 
1 My emphasis. 
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is a powerful, indispensable source; it provides a depth of insight that can rarely 
be retrieved from other sources. It is unique in offering the opportunity for a 
subjective reconstruction of past lives (Hareven 1982:382). 
Unpicking these brief observations about the nature of oral history provides a useful 
starting point from which to explain its relevance to the research topic. 
One of the primary goals of this study was 'the reconstruction of past lives'; in this 
instance the lives of those individuals whose experiences constituted the evenf of 
institutional contraction. The aim was to 'arrive at an approximate understanding of 
what happened', accepting that the reconstruction of an event 'in its entirety' is not 
possible (Yow 2005:21). One oral historian however argues that a vital peculiarity of the 
discipline 'is that it tells us less about events as such than their meaning' (Portelli 
1981:99). In Portelli's polyphonic study of a Nazi massacre in Rome, although 
embracing an ontological position (which resonated with this research) that the 
'event... actually happened' his focus was on its multiple meanings (Portelli 2003:15). 
He was not concerned with 'factual revelations or discoveries' choosing to rely upon 
'the scepticism and conclusions of existing scholarship' (Portelli 2003: 15). For this study 
the latter was thin on the ground, as were archival documents, many of which had 
either been shredded, put in skips or burnt;3 failing that, material such as case notes of 
former residents in recent times proved hard to reach because of ethical considerations. 
In other words, a major historical source for the research was the oral testimony of 
former stakeholders. The problematic nature of such a position for historical 
reconstruction is further emphasised by Hareven who claims that: 
2 For the purposes of the research Royal Albert rundown was viewed as a single over-arching 
event, albeit comprised of a number of smaller 'events'. 
3 Conversation (April17'h 2008) with Phil Morgan, who was a custodian of Royal Albert archives 
held by the NHS. 
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Beyond any doubt, oral history is a record of perceptions; it is not a re-creation 
of historical events (Hareven 1982:377).4 
Hareven, however, does offer a proviso to the above assertion. She argues that oral 
history 'can be employed as a factual source only if corroborated', stressing that a 
historical account relies on 'the necessity of cross-checking information' (Hareven 
1982:377). In the same vein Portelli's study relied upon the importance of documentary 
records 'to establish a problematic but plausible framework of events' (Portelli 2003: 16). 
This regard for other sources was reflected in this study through, as itemised later in the 
chapter, the use of various policy documents, private correspondence, minutes and 
importantly the local newspaper. However this triangulation, as discussed below in 
relation to polyphony, also extended to an internal examination of the oral data. Further 
assistance in the reconstruction of the Royal Albert rundown was provided by the 
adoption of a conceptual framework created by Frisch (1979; 1990). The American oral 
historian coined the phrases 'more history' and 'anti history,5 to define ways in which 
oral testimony can contribute to history (Frisch 1979; Frisch 1990). 'More history' relays 
the possibility that oral data can be used, like a traditional historical source, to enhance 
and enrich already known aspects of our history. It can 
swing the flashlight of history into a Significant, much neglected, and previously 
unknowable corner of the attic (Frisch 1979:74). 
However, Frisch also asserts that people's recorded memories can provide a way 'to 
communicate with the past more directly' (Frisch 1979:74). This 'anti-history' in the form 
of authentic first hand accounts, as Rolph and Walmsley demonstrate in learning 
disability social history, can by-pass and challenge 'the established record' (Rolph and 
Walmsley 2006:84). These ideas of Frisch, combined with a focus upon the 
.. My emphasis. 
S Originally called 'no-history' (Frisch, M. (1979). "Oral history and 'Hard Times': A review essay .. 
The Oral Historv Review 7: 70-79.) 
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triangulation of sources, provided a useful oral historical framework for this research 
study. 
Hareven (1982) suggests in her definition that oral history offers a subjective historical 
reconstruction. As oral history has matured into a confident academic discipline it has 
embraced this subjectivity as a central strength, rather than a problematic historical 
source (Thomson, Frisch et al. 1994; Portelli 2003). About oral sources, Portelli says: 
They tell us not just what people did, but what they wanted to do, what they 
believed they were doing, what they now think they did (Portelli 1981 :99-1 00). 
Oral historical enquiry perceives memory and the development of historical 
consciousness as subjects worthy of study in their own right (Bodnar 1989; Grele and 
Terkel 1991). At the same time Yow (2005) is careful to emphasise that memory has a 
value as an authentic record of past events. She suggests that, if viewed critically, 
'autobiographical or individual memory' can be used 'as evidence' by oral historians 
(Yow 2005:51). Oral history however deals with 'narratives and memory as historical 
facts' in themselves (Portelli 2003:16). The approach can do this by differentiating 
between 'events and narrative, history and memory' (Portelli 2003:16). Bearing these 
dichotomies in mind, this dual emphasis on sense-making and what happened meant 
that oral history was an approach ideally suited to this research. 
3.2.4 Polyphony 
A central strand of the research was the gathering, creating and analysing of interview 
data gleaned from different perspectives. Oral testimony itself, as explained above, was 
potentially a rich and rewarding approach to assist in fulfilling this task. However, 
providing a dynamic thrust to data analysis was the adoption of a conceptual framework 
relating to viewpoints employed by oral historians, and academics from other disciplines 
(Schrager 1998; Rouverol 2000a; Portelli 2003; Smith and Nicolson 2007; Riessman 
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2008; 80mat, Henry et al. 2009). They have been inspired by the ideas of Mikhail 
8ahktin, a Russian literary critic, on polyphony or multi-voicedness (8akhtin 1984; 
Dentith 1995). Drawing upon their commentaries, as well as 8akhtin himself, outlined 
below are strands of 8akhtin's thinking which were relevant to the research. 
8akhtin emphasises the social context of utterances; what people say, as Riessman 
explains, contains an 'I - thou', it implies a dialogue with other voices, with other 
contexts (Riessman 2008:105-107). This narrative-researcher claims that 8akhtin's 
thinking is the foundation for the dialogic analysis of narratives which, in contrast to the 
emphasis on 'what' by thematic analysis, the 'how' by structural analysis (as explained 
later in the chapter), looks at 'who' is speaking, and why and when i.e. the social 
context of their utterances. As Schrager, and other oral historians have aptly 
demonstrated, such an approach enables an interpretation of the multi-voices within 
single interviews, an 'inner dialogue': 
... far from dealing only with ourselves when we tell about the past, we 
incorporate the experiences of a multitude of others along with our own; they 
appear in what we say through our marvellous capacity to express other 
perspectives (Schrager 1998: 285). 
In addition, dialogic analysis enables meanings to emerge by comparing and 
contrasting viewpoints across interviews, between different narrators (Schrager 1998; 
Rouverol2000a; Portelli 2003). Importantly this approach assumes as central the notion 
of 'dialogue', that what people say has both arisen out of, and relates to real or 
imagined interaction with social contexts. There is a strong egalitarian ethos underlying 
this notion of polyphony. 8akhtin, from studying Dostoevsky's The Brothers Karamazov, 
asserts that here is an example of a polyphonic novel, the narrative of which has 
emerged from a dialogue between characters, all of whom have 'fully valid voices', and 
have the status of 'subjects', rather than 'objects' of some authOrial discourse (8akhtin 
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1984; Dostoyevsky 2003). Riessman extends this dialogic idea to include that occurring 
between teller and listener, as well as writer and reader- the latter dialogue relating to 
Stake's view that the wider significance of any individual case study is dependent upon 
the engagement and knowledge of those reading the research (Stake 1995; Riessman 
2008). 
This polyphonic approach had two broad implications for the research. Firstly, it 
presented a way of investigating interview, and other, data which did not preclude 
thematic or structural analysis, and, moreover, connects with notions that lie at the core 
of oral history analysis - exploring contradictions,. gaps, listening to voices, oppositional 
narratives, with their social contexts and making sense of stories (Thompson 1988; 
Riessman 2008). Secondly, for research involving a study of a multi-voiced event, it 
offered ways in which to engage diverse viewpoints within a framework of genuine 
dialogue, and to hear the different voices. Although approaching a study in this way can 
generate discomfort on the part of the researcher, polyphony offers the possibility of 
rich meanings to emerge. This was the case in an oral history study of Linda Lord, a 
worker in a chicken factory in the USA who lost her job when the plant closed (Rouverol 
2000a). Rouverol argues that in attempting to draw together Linda's narrative in some 
sort of coherent fashion she and her co-author were excluding those voices in Linda's 
inner dilaogue which they, as reseachers, either found uncomfortable or did not agree 
with. It was only when they opened themselves up to the idea of multivoicedness, giving 
equal weight to all of Linda's voices, some apparently contradictory, that deeper 
understandings started to emerge. This polyphonic idea is embodied in Linda's 
describing her time at Penobscot Poultry as being one when, 'I was content and not 
content'. In some ways the researchers initially wanted it to be one or the other, 
whereas they came to realise that Linda embraced both these sentiments, these 
'voices', equally and simultaneously; MichaeJ Frisch defined this as a state of 
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'multivalence' as opposed to ambivalence, implying confusion (Frisch 2000). These 
insights, and similar ones, enabled the researchers, and Linda it appears, to see how 
this individual narrative had a resonance with a wider world, in particular touching upon 
the potentially complex dialogue between 'community' and 'industrialisation'. This 
approach resonates with the microhistory, case study and auto/biographical 
methodologies discussed earlier. 
3.2.5 Reflexivity 
Integral to a qualitative research paradigm, and adopted by this study, is the idea of 
reflexivity (Fontana 2004; Jootun, McGhee et al. 2009). An interpretation of this concept 
is that: 
Reflecting on the process of one's research and trying to understand how one's 
own values and views may influence findings adds credibility to the research 
and should be part of any method of qualitative enquiry (Jootun, McGhee et al. 
2009:42) 
Particularly informative for this research were the ways in which this approach has been 
examined in oral history and inclusive research literature (Gluck and Patai 1991; 
Walmsley and Johnson 2003; Rolph and Walmsley 2006). 
Exploring the subtle way an interviewer's preconceptions can creep into and influence 
an oral history interview, Walmsley and Rolph (2006) pinpOint examples from each of 
their respective PhD studies. Their argument is that they held an orthodox viewpoint, in 
this case that institutional life was bad, which had a detrimental effect on how they 
heard, or in fact didn't hear, stories from former residents whose memories conflicted 
with this perspective (Walmsley 1995; Rolph 2000; Rolph and Walmsley 2006). In 
discussing issues of inclusive research with people with learning difficulties Walmsley 
and Johnson emphasise the need for reflexivity on the part of researcher, especially an 
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awareness of the impact that their values and beliefs can have upon research 
processes and outcomes (Walmsley and Johnson 2003:38-41). An argument for self-
reflection is further developed by the authors as a way of increasing awareness of 
power relationships in a research study. They highlight that, 
part of the underpinning of both feminist and participatory action research (is to) 
stress the importance of the researcher 'standing with' those involved in the 
research and of breaking down the barriers between self and others (Walmsley 
and Johnson 2003:39). 
Certainly some other researchers have embraced aspects of this reflective approach. 
Matthew Godsell and Howard Mitchell in their respective pieces of research into staff 
working with people with learning difficulties and Sharon Lambert in her study of Irish 
women emigrating to Lancashire all emphasise some of the positive aspects of being 
'insider researchers' when interviewing (Mitchell 1998; Lambert 2001; Godsell 2002). 
Their positions all gave them easier access than would have been the case if they had 
been 'outsiders' but equally they all felt that being perceived as someone with shared 
values (and experiences) assisted in the quality of disclosures from those being 
interviewed. Godsell's interviews were carried out as Stoke Park Hospital, Bristol, was 
due to close, a time when: 
many people were anxious about the future and their jobs ... In an atmosphere 
where there was a lot of anxiety and uncertainty it was an advantage to be 
perceived as an insider. Rather than suppressing my Identity the Interviews 
presented an opportunity to exploit it in order to gather more information 
(Godsell 2002:83). 
Similarly, Mitchell claims that part of the 'rapport' that could be created was linked with 
a sense of solidarity against a world which either devalued or criticised learning 
disability nursing. As he says, 'People who worked there (Lennox Castle Hospital, 
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Glasgow) were touchy' (Mitchell 1998:30). However he goes on to explain that this trust 
had a downside to it, asking himself: 
What did they trust me to do and did I have a duty towards them because they 
had shown trust and friendliness towards me (MitcheIl1998:30)? 
This can be interpreted as a potential issue, only slightly less so for 'outsiders', for all 
researchers who base much of their approach upon those sorts of sympathetic building 
blocks. Both of the former nurses, Godsell and Mitchell, highlighted another serious 
issue in that they felt their relationship with hospital residents was problematic because 
of their professional status. Godsell suggested that 'it may have had a detrimental effect 
on some of the residents I encountered' (Godsell 2002:85). Mitchell, being quite 
confident that he would have been seen 'as a representative of established authority', 
also implied that this would have influenced what was shared in the interviews. Part of 
his evidence for this assertion is: 
the fact that the most free and lurid criticism of the hospital and nurses that I 
recorded was from an ex-patient who did not seem to grasp that I had worked 
there myself (MitcheIl1998:32-3). 
Not everyone, however, is an insider researcher, in the sense discussed above, and 
sometimes more conscious efforts have to be made to break down barriers between 
interview partners. Olson and Shopes, for instance, refer to their oral history interviews 
with working class women, and being aware that: 
as educated, academic women we have been afforded - at least in the eyes of 
the larger society - higher status, greater access to resources, and 
consequently more power than the working class women we interview (Olsen 
and Shopes 1991:193). 
However, they made efforts to communicate biographical elements they held in 
common with the people they interviewed; all this helping in 'equalising the encounter'. 
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They believe that it was their attitude of solidarity with interviewees which was crucial in 
contributing towards 'a more egalitarian encounter' (Olsen and Shopes 1991). Olsen 
and Shopes describe how they communicated, to those they were interviewing, their 
own critique of the inequalities present in the larger social and political world that 
we all inhabit as citizens ... At times we and the people we are interviewing 
become allies in a common critical endeavour (Olsen and Shopes 1991:196). 
Such reflections are very similar to the above comments of Johnson and Walmsley in 
'standing with' research participants. 
3.2.6 Political Issues 
In this chapter's preceding discussion there has been an implicit assumption that this 
research was owned by the researcher. Positioning of this nature is politically 
contentious and, as Rolph and Walmsley argue, has been challenged in various 
academic studies (Rolph and Walmsley 2006). Fine, for instance, highlights 
the way in which much qualitative research has continued a discourse of 
'colonising the other', speaking for and about those with whom we research 
(Fine 1998 cited in Walmsley and Johnson 2003:38-41). 
There is the view that: 
only people who have the experience of oppression have the right to write about 
it (Rolph and Walmsley 2006:85). 
In the social history of learning disability research such a perspective Is strongly held by 
Simone Aspis who challenges: 
The power relationship between non-disabled researchers and researchers Who 
have been labelled by the education system as having learning 
difficulties ... There are too many different researchers jumping on the 
bandwagon of learning disability research which includes providing their own 
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interpretations and solutions to our individual and collective experiences (Aspis 
2000:2-3). 
She goes on to argue that people with learning difficulties 'are being used as puppets' 
(Aspis 2000:3). Entwined with such a stance is the one, also deriving from the advocacy 
movement of the last 20 years or so, that the only, or certainly dominant, voices heard 
in learning disability history should be those of people with learning difficulties 
themselves (Walmsley and Atkinson 2000). The themes relayed here can be related to 
both the content and the process of research into the social history of learning disability. 
The latter is as much about whose voice dominates in the historical endeavour, as to 
whose voice is heard in its products. 
Non-learning disabled researchers, as I am myself, have responded to some of the 
above issues, warning of the dangers of 'one-sided history' (Walmsley and Atkinson 
2000). Mark Jackson also emphasised that 'the history of learning disability is not solely 
about people with learning disabilities.' Because it involves the lives of others 'it is a 
shared history' (Jackson 2000:xii). This was the case in my research which, like Rolph's 
study of hostels, had to take account of 'multiple discourses and constructions, the 
official view as well as the personal experience' (Rolph 2000:58). This is consistent with 
a postmodernist influenced perspective which questions the notion of 'over-arching 
truths' (Williams 1996:63) and propounds that 'the sum of voices will reflect more 
accurately the past in all its myriad ways' (Jenkins 1997:207; Rolph 2000). However, 
the danger in this is that the voices of the people with learning difficulties are 
underplayed and the official version once again dominates (Rolph 2000:75). Such a 
sentiment was a pertinent warning for this institutional oral history which was heavily 
weighted towards respondents who were not people with learning difficulties. 
Furthermore, the data collection and analysis process was firmly in the researcher's 
hands; it was neither inclusive research nor one embracing 'a shared authority' between 
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researcher and narrator (Frisch 1990; Walmsley and Johnson 2003). The research did 
not focus upon ownership issues but upon whose voices were heard in the closure of 
one long-stay institution for people with learning difficulties (Rolph and Walmsley 
2006:98). A polyphony of former managers and staff, hitherto under-researched, 
enabled insights into the complexities and multiple-meanings of learning disability policy 
implementation. 
3.3 Research Practice: Data Collection and Analysis 
3.3.1 The Case Study 
The case study was the late twentieth century contraction of the Royal Albert Hospital, 
Lancaster, a large long-stay institution for people with learning difficulties. As discussed 
in Chapter One, this choice reflected a personal interest. In this sense the research 
topic could be described, in line with a discussion earlier in the chapter, as an intrinsic 
case study (Stake 1995). Connections with the place represented a degree of insider 
knowledge which it was anticipated, quite correctly, would assist in Identifying and 
accessing potential interviewees. Similar to Johnson, however, in her study of a locked 
ward in an Australian institution, this research focus also aimed to have an instrumental 
value (Stake 1995; Johnson 1998). In other words, research Into the rundown of the 
Royal Albert had a potential resonance beyond the confines of any esoteric interest. As 
highlighted in the previous chapter, there are contested interpretations as to how NHS 
long-stay hospitals for people with learning difficulties contracted in the later part of the 
twentieth century. The UK picture of institutional closure appeared to be patchy; local 
case studies, such as this one, could assist therefore in creating a fuller picture of the 
implementation of deinstitutionalisation policies. The Royal Albert Hospital was of 
particular interest because it was run by the North West Regional Health Authority 
(NWRHA) which prided itself on being progressive in pursuing a policy of 
deinstitutionaJisation (Wertheimer, Ineichen et al. 1985; Walker, Ryan et al. 1993). An 
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in-depth study of one north west institution promised important insights into the 
mechanics and meanings of institutional closure within a policy environment imbued 
with the powerful community care rhetoric of the time. 
3.3.2 Archival Material 
In addition to recording research interviews, in a limited way the study drew upon an 
existing archive of Royal Albert oral histories (Ingham 2006). I had previously recorded 
life histories, for instance, with four of the research participants. These interview data 
offered important contextual insights into the multiple personal meanings of Royal 
Albert contraction. There is a wide ranging debate about re-visiting data in oral history 
and social scientific research (Bornat 2003; Moore 2007). However, like Bornat (2003), 
the material used had been deposited in a public archive. Moreover, most of it was from 
earlier interviews with research participants, and importantly these and any other oral 
recordings were of interviews involving myself. 
There was, as stated already in this chapter, a paucity of documentary material. 
However, it was possible to access a selection of documents for triangulation purposes, 
to provide 'more history' (Frisch 1979), and to help with the construction of a 'plausible 
framework of events' (Portelli 2003:16). In terms of the latter, they assisted with the 
charting of the sequences of hospital contraction - oral sources are notoriously 
unreliable for establishing dates. The core public documentary source was the weekly 
published local newspaper, the Lancaster Guardian: all the copies of this paper 
contained on micro-film, in the Lancaster Public Library, covering 1984 to 1996. In 
addition private individuals, some of them interviewees, lent copies of regional and 
hospital policy documents, internal reports, training materials, and the archive of the 
Royal Albert Hospital League of Friends (RAHLOF). The latter contained minutes and 
correspondence for this relatives' group and proved to be a rich source of data. Sadly, 
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from a historical perspective, I was told on numerous occasions that material had been 
discarded. As with the oral testimonies, these documentary data were scrutinised 
critically and contextually, and triangulated both with each other and the recordings of 
interview participants. 
3.3.3 Interview Participants 
The principles of purposeful, or purposive, sampling underpinned the choice of 
interviewees (Stake 1995; Patton 2002). As one analyst argues: 
The idea behind qualitative research is to purposefully select participants 
(who) ... will best help the reseachers understand the problem and the research 
question (Creswell 2003:185). 
In other words the interviewees were chosen because they each offered an 'opportunity 
to learn' about the research topic (Stake 1995:451). The latter required an interview 
sample which: represented multiple-perspectives on Royal Albert contraction, by virtue 
of role and/or attitude towards the event; and allowed for flexibility of selection as the 
study developed. 
A core element of the study was the reconstruction of an event. Given the paucity of 
written accounts, the starting point therefore was to contact key informants who could 
provide an overview of the contraction of the Royal Albert. Early in the research 
interviews were carried out with members of senior and middle management, as well as 
a senior figure at the Regional Health AuthOrity. My own insider knowledge, as well as 
other names provided by interviewees aided identification and access to these Initial 
contacts (Patton 2002). These interviews assisted in drawing up a schema of potential 
perspectives on the rundown of the hospital. 
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However, and pertinently for the study, these early research interviews with managers 
provided insights into how those implementing change narrated their experience. These 
narratives both extolled the virtues of the closure programme of the Royal Albert, and at 
the same time highlighted and distanced themselves from oppositional voices. Similar 
to Adams' study (2009:71), the research was in danger of producing a homogenous 
selection of participants. So within the overarching research remit of engaging with a 
multiplicity of viewpoints, based predominantly upon role, I sought out those who may 
have held alternative perspectives to the one I was hearing (Adams 2009). The 
potential identities of such individuals were provided by the managerial interviews 
themselves, Royal Albert archival oral testimonies, and research documentary data. A 
mixture of further word-of-mouth contacts, personal acquaintances, and, on one or two 
occasions, cold calling then enriched the sample in terms of multiple viewpoints. Those 
interviewed, however, from whatever background, were individuals who had long 
standing involvement either in the Royal Albert itself, the contraction process, the NHS 
or learning disability services. All research participants (charted in Table 1) revealed a 
high level of emotional investment in their relationship to different facets of Royal Albert 
contraction. 
3.3.4 Interview Processes 
This section reviews the logistics, ethics and subjectivities of interview processes 
adopted and encountered during the research. 
3.3.4.1 Interview Logistics 
Thirty semi-structured in-depth interviews, all with differing degrees of life history 
content, were at the heart of the research (Yow 2005). These encounters were 
recorded on audio mini-disc and lasted between just under an hour to three hours. 
Information was also gathered in a more peripheral manner through a number of 
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Table 1: Research Sample of Oral History Interviewees6 
Residents Staff: Non-Nursing 
Two women (anonymised) were Mr. S. Webb (Chief Engineer) 
interviewed. Brian IlIingworth (Porter) 
Senior Management Jimmy Downham (Painter and Decorator) 
Other Staff 
David Jordison (General 
Manager/Chief Executive of Priority Dr. Prasad (Clinical Psychiatrist) Services Trust) 
Geoff Hopkinson (Divisional Director Gudrun O'Hara (Social Worker) 
of Nursing Services/General Manager) Bernadette Hobson (Clinical Psychology 
Phil Morgan (Senior Nursing AdministratorNoluntary Services Co-ordinator) 
Officer/Acting General Manager) Bob Dewhirst (Head of Learning Disability 
Nursing) 
Middle Management Trade Union Representatives 
Steve Mee (Nursing Process Co-
M.J. Kiernan (NHS Lancaster - Branch ordinator/Resettlement Officer) 
Dave Spencer (Resettlement Officer) Secretary of NUPE/Joint Shop Stewards Committee Secretary) 
Mary Lawrenson (Nursing Officer) Nikki Riley (COHSE Royal Albert Shop 
Staff: Nursing Steward) 
Tony Dennison (Charge Nurse) 
Non-Royal Alb~rt Personnel 
Malcolm Alston (Charge Mrs. Ann M. Wilson (Secretary of 
NurselManager of Independence RAHLOF/former RAH Deputy Administrator) 
Training Unit) Jenny Dunkeld (Officer-in-Charge Riverview 
Eric R. (Staff/Charge Nurse) Hostel, Lancaster/former RAH Sister) 
Mrs. Creed (Staff Nurse) Paul Whitfield (Chief Executive of Lancaster 
Anonymous 1 (Nursing Officer - Male) Health Authority) 
Anonymous 2 (Charge Nurse) Tom McLean (NWRHA Advisor/Divisional 
Anonymous 3 (Ward Manager - Male) Nursing Officer of Calderstones Hospital) 
Gordon Greenshields (NWRHA Chief 
ExecutivelNHS Finance Director) 
" 
8 See: Appendix I for abbreviations; and Appendix ii for more detailed biographical and 
professional information. 
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informal conversations, whether on the telephone or face-to-face. Interviews occurred 
mainly in the homes of interviewees, others taking place in offices and a day centre, as 
well as my own home. Deciding upon the appropriate venue was the prerogative of the 
interviewee. This process, however, may have been compromised in relationship to the 
two research participants with learning difficulties, where arrangements were mediated 
through a third party gatekeeper. All but two of the interviews were locally based, 
occurring either in Lancaster or within a five to ten mile radius. 
Interviewees were usually contacted by telephone, or occasionally via email. This initial 
contact allowed me to explain the purpose of the interview and the research. 
Sometimes, if a fuller explanation was needed, I sent them an information sheet. 7 
However, as the research developed I became aware that this could prejudice the 
interview through creating prior expectations. It seemed, for instance, that one 
individual had rejected the opportunity of a recorded interview because of the emphasis 
on closure. His perspective, as with some others, was upon the Royal Albert itself not 
its rundown, which was resented. Also important was how respondents viewed the 'later 
years'; too much information regarding how I saw this period again may have 
prejudiced what was recounted. Therefore the information sheet was used in a more 
circumspect manner than originally planned, supplemented by discussion of aspects of 
the research at the time of the interview. 
The aim of the oral history approach was to encourage respondents to tell their own 
stories, as far as this was possible given the collaborative nature of interview data 
creation (Gluck and Patai 1991). Often interviewees needed little encouragement, 
launching into their memories before there was time to set up the recording equipment. 
Stock interview questions, of which there were about six or seven, were open-ended, 
7 See Appendix vi. 
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designed to elicit the perspective and memories of the teller.8 Additionally, in 
preparation for each interview consideration was given to the individual respondent 
(80rnat 2003). This meant distilling any information about either the particular person or 
their circumstances. In some instances this process of individual preparation resulted in 
one or two specific questions, or merely, as with the general questions, a number of 
personal reference points jotted down on an index card. This approach is based upon 
previous experience as a community oral historian. Invariably in the research interviews 
little reference was made to the notes, but the work beforehand helped orientate the 
focus on the individual being interviewed. It was an important precursor to the rapport 
essential for a rich, in-depth interview (Yow 2005). 
At the end of the interview respondents were provided with the opportunity to engage in 
a consent procedure. The pro-forma used offered individuals a range of choices as to 
how their data were to be used.9 Four of the narrators used the clearance form to 
specify their desire for discretion with regard to names of people they had mentioned. 
Also, in two instances interviewees stressed their wish for any critical comments, if 
used, to be contextualised. Three individuals wanted to view the transcript prior to 
completing a clearance form. Furthermore, expressed verbally or in writing, a number of 
people indicated that they desired total or partial anonymity. 10 
Complex and nuanced ethical issues regarding interviewing are prevalent in oral 
history, research into the social history of learning disability and qualitative research 
generally (Thomson, Frisch et al. 1994; Rolph 1998; Yow 2005; Tilley and Woodthorpe 
2011). Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter, or thesis, to discuss this topic In 
any great depth, concerns regarding informed consent, anonymity and general 
8 See Appendix v. 
9 See Appendix vii. 
10 See Table 1. 
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sensitivities around the analysis and dissemination of data were integral to the 
research. The study was primarily guided by the need to embrace the specificity of the 
topic, to provide transparent evidence-based research, and to respect the wishes of 
those participants who wanted their names used (Tilley and Woodthorpe 2011). 
However, even if the latter was the case, this still posed dilemmas for myself as a 
researcher. The study, for instance, critiques stances passionately held by some of 
those interviewed; individuals, or sources, with whom I 'have personal relationships' 
(Thomson et al 1994: 35). Also I chose to anonymise extracts from interviews where I 
believed, taken out of context, the analysis may be construed as personally detrimental 
to the teller. Overall, however, as discussed earlier, the research process did not 
embrace 'a shared authority' (Frisch 1990). Interviewees were not given the option of 
either hearing, or participating to any degree in the analYSis of their oral historical 
accounts. Although not water-tight (Thomson et aI1994), such circumstances would 
have provided the opportunity for research participants to make better informed choices 
about the use of their names. Ultimately much of the ethical discretion, albeit 
engendering a degree of discomfort, resided with myself as the researcher. The 
clearance procedure highlighted here, in combination with ongoing reflexivity, a rigorous 
iterative approach to interview data, and discussions with peers and supervisors were 
all employed to ensure that, as far as possible, exacting standards of ethical research 
practice were upheld. 
3.3.4.2 Interview Subjectivities and Reflexivity 
As discussed earlier, the principle of the researcher 'standing with' those interviewed 
can constitute a central feature of qualitative research. This implication of solidarity 
resonates with a dominating ethos of much oral history work which: 
has often been linked to grassroots and progressive politics, and to the 
democratic impulse to 'give voice' to historical subjects marginalised, oppressed 
71 
or forgotten by traditional documentary history (Thompson 1988; Hamilton 
2008:35; Perks 2010). 
Such a spirit reflected my own personal and professional background, which was 
embedded in a self-defined radical identity. Integral to the latter has been a commitment 
to oral history as an advocating and liberating force for people with learning difficulties, 
and others, who have so often been the objects rather than subjects of political and 
historical narratives. Similar to some of the commentators already quoted, such 
positioning on my behalf was reinforced by interviewing and working directly with the 
least powerful sections of society (Ingham 1997; Ingham 2003). From the onset, 
however, and in its development this PhD research severely challenged my radical 
'comfort zone' (Hamilton 2008; Perks 2010). Potentially it appeared to require me as a 
researcher to 'stand with' managers, arguably the institutional 'elite' (Hoffman 1976; 
Harris, Kelly et al. 2008; Adams 2009). Traditionally, and I am deeply rooted in this 
tradition, barring the odd exceptions, British oral historians have been averse to 
researching 'history from above' (Berridge 2010; Perks 2010). However, interviewing 
'the powerful' as one researcher asserts does not mean taking their side (Berridge 
2010:98). Similarly, in terms of my own unease, a commitment to a polyphonic account 
of closure brought me into contact with members of staff with whom I had strong 
conflicting ideological and political viewpoints. Hamilton (2008) suggests that in these 
situations it is crucial to separate the idea of empathy, critical for a 'good' interview, 
from that of solidarity. The latter she suggests is about political analysis and action 
while: 
establishing empathy in an interview does not imply support for the narrator's 
political position. To the contrary the ethical interview may depend upon a 
willingness to distinguish between empathy and solidarity, and to allow 
emotional discomfort to lead to a questioning of political pieties, both those of 
narrator and of the interviewer (Hamilton 2008:42). 
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This position demands a high degree of sensitivity, and reflexivity, on the part of the 
researcher. However like Berridge, with elite interviews, it is emphasising an awareness 
of political, ideological and professional boundaries. 
With reference to the reflexive areas touched upon above, the focus now shifts to look 
more closely at how these issues played out in this study. Predicated upon the belief 
that an oral history interview is a collaborative venture between the teller and the 
interviewer (Thompson 1988; Bornat 2003), three facets of the research interview 
process were brought into sharp relief: relationships with 'like-minded' narrators; 
empathy with oppositional perspectives; and interviewing managers. These are now 
considered in turn. 
Interviewing 'like-minded' people 
One of the interviewees, in describing the fervent atmosphere of change at the Royal 
Albert during the 1980s, recalled that: 
we somehow had a group of like-minded people who were together at the same 
time. 11 
With at least four of the respondents I sensed that I was included as one of these 'like-
minded people'. This was not an unproblematic position. In his institutional oral history, 
for instance, Adams implies that because of a degree of insider status 
it was necessary to maintain constant vigilance in order to preserve an 
appropriate sense of emotional distance from my topic (Adams 2009:77).12 
Underpinning this stance was a concern that he would collude in a hospital history, 
similar to others elsewhere carried out by former staff, which emphasised 'the positive 
aspects of the regime' (Adams 2009:77). Adams, similar to Godsell and Mitchell 
(mentioned earlier), was a former member of health care staff. Although not falling into 
11 Mary Lawrenson, Interview September 9th 2009. 
12 My emphasis. 
73 
this professional category, my background is in adult education and oral history work 
with people with learning difficulties, including those associated with the Royal Albert. 
Part of this involvement, at different times (including the 1980s), had meant 
collaborating directly with two key interviewees 13 in promoting reminiscence work as a 
tool for advocacy (Bornat 1989; Walmsley and Atkinson 2000). Based on the work itself, 
and informal discussions over a number of years, the over-riding impression was that 
we, myself and these other professionals were on 'the same side' (Berridge 2010). In 
essence, this 'side' encompassed a viewpoint critical of institutions and the medical 
model, but which at the same time espoused the rights of people with learning 
difficulties. Unlike Adams, the danger for the researcher here was collusion in a 
narrative eulogising regime change, rather than the regime itself. The 'constant 
vigilance' required that the researcher did not 'go native' (Berridge 2010:97). In her 
discussion of related issues in interviewing policy makers, Berridge argues that 
historians have a different agenda. The former she asserts can see 'matters only in 
terms of taking sides.' A historian on the other hand needs to 'withdraw into objectivity' 
(Berridge 2010:97). These comments had a powerful resonance to this study. 
The presumed solidarity with these 'like-minded' interviewees was experienced in 
myriad nuanced ways. In one interview, for instance, the narrator recalled his early 
memories of a mutual acquaintance (another research participant): 
The place he came to was Bungalow One. I was the staff nurse at the time ... 
And we had the kind of conversations that you and I are having now, from day 
one. What is this place? What's going on here? What's this aI/ about? What's 
going to happen in the future?14 
In a narration which emphasised active involvement in the deinstitutionalisation 
agendas of the day, this extract positioned myself as a researcher, the interview, and 
13 Dave Spencer and Steve Mee. 
14 Eric R., Interview August 11th 2009. My emphasis. 
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the past in a continuum of solidarity. Trust in my discretion was exercised by another 
narrator. In an impassioned interview teeming with names of individuals, including 
family members, the teller was adamant that she did not want any names to appear in 
published form. Other interviewees were more circumspect about the use of names. A 
number of those I interviewed at the time of the research were occupying 'elite' 
positions in learning disability services, and agreed to be interviewed during their 
working day. However, although, given their busy schedules, arranging an interview 
often took a little time, when we did meet time was not an issue. One individual arrived 
at my house in the morning and told me he had 'all day'. Another, a senior manager, 
was insistent she had all morning, and during the interview when I checked how we 
were for time, she insisted that we continue. These interviews, as did another, lasted for 
up to three hours and proved to be extremely rich sources of data. In all these instances 
the generosity regarding time was completely unexpected; in pre-interview 
arrangements the explicit agreement was that they may last an hour at the most. Such 
experiences ran counter to one or two of those experienced by other researchers 
(Harris, Kelly et al. 2008; Adams 2009). I did wonder whether such magnanimity would 
have been afforded a researcher viewed as unsympathetic to 'the cause'. These 
narrators shared tales of earlier collusion in the institutional regime, mistakes they had 
made, as well as, at times, revelations about their lack of expertise in certain areas. 
Again I reflected as to whether this indicated a degree of trust in my discretion borne 
out of a notion of solidarity. Furthermore, as highlighted earlier, like an insider 
researcher I asked myself if the generosity of time and spirit carried expectations of the 
account I was to deliver of those years of intensely felt change (Mitchell 1998). 
Interviewing 'non-like-minded' people 
As already discussed, the study actively sought out, and wanted to hear, viewpoints 
which ran counter to those enthusiastically implementing changes linked to 
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deinstitutionalisation. However, such a research agenda posed challenges. 
Encountered in the research were individuals who were steeped in discourses of 
learning disability with which I did not agree. There was a resonance with the question 
articulated by Hamilton: 
What happens when the narrator is not an 'ideological hero', and is instead 
someone whose political views the interviewer does not share (Hamilton 
2008:36)? 
Tellers, for example, used medical terminology to describe people in their care, as well 
as the institutional language of 'higher' and 'lower grade'. In one instance, moreover, 
based on a number of testimonies of former staff and residents, I was reasonably sure 
that a former nurse (anonymised) had physically and verbally abused people with 
learning difficulties. These interviews generated a degree of discomfort on my part as a 
researcher. An important underpinning to this disquiet was a presumption that during 
the 1980s, I would have dismissed some of these individuals as 'fearful reactionaries' 
with myself firmly positioned in the 'righteous reformer' camp (Gleeson 2010).15 
However, for the purposes of the study, and what Hamilton (2008) describes as an 
'ethical history', it was important to hear these voices and confront any unease. 
Although there was a qualitative difference between some of this study's respondents 
and the narrators described by Blee (1993) and Hamilton, their concerns echoed with 
this research. Part of the issue was the need for rapport, and establishing an 
empathetic relationship in an interview (Bornat 2003; Yow 2005). Blee in her interviews 
with members of the racist Klu Klux Klan suggested that she found this surprisingly 
'easy to achieve' (Blee 1993:605). At the same time she felt that this was 'fraudulent'; 
based as it was on non-disclosure of her own far more liberal perspectives. Similarly, in 
my interviews, when I encountered the sort of institutional views described above, the 
15 See Chapter Two. 
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priority was to propel the interview along (Blee 1993; Hamilton 2008) rather than being 
adversarial; historical needs were paramount. I wanted to gather and understand 
'interesting research material' (Hamilton 2008:37). In fact on one occasion (and it did 
only happen once) I inadvertently used the term 'high grade', reflecting the language of 
my narrator, in an attempt to draw out a point. Both Blee and Hamilton emphasise that 
although they encountered viewpoints with which they disagreed, nevertheless they 
could not help liking some of the people they interviewed. Additionally, and important 
from a research perspective, by embracing their own discomfort and temporarily 
abandoning their own political posturing, a complex history started to emerge (Blee 
1993; Hamilton 2008). Blee observes that: 
Oral histories of Klan women reveal that many held complicated attitudes 
towards gender, race, economics and nationalism, attitudes that did not fit 
traditional political categories, such as reactionary or progressive (Blee 
1993:600). 
My research experience echoed such complexity with regard to one or two 
interviewees. Although Blee warns about being 'deceived' by the narrator's subjective 
presentation, I found, like Hamilton, it was more complicated than that. Seven of the 
interviewees in particular, although holding certain viewpoints contrary to my own, 
conveyed believable narratives of human endeavour and caring. There were occasions 
when I was 'deeply moved' by the interviewee's account (Hamilton 2008:38). Their 
narratives, moreover, challenged the dominating viewpoints, including that held by this 
researcher, on institutional closure. By choosing to interview 'non like-minded people' 
the research invited the possibility of a richer level of understanding. 
Interviews with senior personnel 
Nine individuals were interviewed who had held key middle and senior management 
positions, both at the Royal Albert and at a district, regional and national level in the 
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NHS, during the period of study. Whether at the micro-institutional level or further afield 
these individuals could be described as 'powerful (in terms of position, knowledge and 
influence)' with 'considerable authority' (Harris, Kelly et al. 2008:237). Furthermore, at 
the time of interview although four had retired, at least two had assumed greater 
managerial responsibilities in regional learning disability services. Overall within the 
context of the study this interview sample could be construed as comprising elite 
members (Hoffman 1976; Harris, Kelly et al. 2008; Adams 2009). Some researchers 
suggest that elite interviews have characteristics different to the more traditional oral 
history, and social scientific, encounters (Harris, Kelly et al. 2008; Adams 2009; 
Berridge 2010). This assertion had a qualified resonance with the experience of this 
research. 
In order to tap into the knowledge, the insights and narratives of senior personnel, like 
Adams this study adopted the default setting of 'an interested but essentially na"ive 
researcher' (Adams 2009:78). This provided data-rich initial interviews. However, the 
most senior Royal Albert managers were re-interviewed in order to gather contextual 
life history data and to explore one or two questions which had emerged as the 
research developed. In these interviews research findings were used to probe a little 
deeper, provoking slightly defensive responses, which were revealing in themselves. 
Based on her research into health policy makers, Berridge intimates that 'elite 
interviewees': 
can be too well read, too knowledgeable and too canny, I would suspect that 
this is less the case for 'history from below' (Berridge 2010:94). 
In this research this canniness was evident with one individual who had stories about 
people with learning difficulties at the Royal Albert which politically could be 
misconstrued. These were deliberately shared off-tape, because of concerns that they 
could be used to support a less than progressive learning disability discourse. I 
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experienced a wariness on the part of another narrator who was concerned as to how 
the interview data might be used. The roots of this anxiety, again spoken off-tape, lay in 
the fact that this individual had dismissed people in the past and they would be 'out to 
get me'. In both the instances cited here there was an acute awareness of a public 
dimension to the interview encounters. Berridge also intimates that the status of the 
interviewer is important in these sorts of interviews. Although difficult to be unequivocal 
about this, I felt that being a PhD researcher provided authority. This contrasted greatly 
with a previous life as a community oral historian in the voluntary sector. In one of the 
interviews, for instance, the respondent seemed concerned to illuminate all his 
academic achievements, including the possibility that 'like me' he could have gone on to 
do a PhD. However, one of the surprises these interviews threw up was the notion of 
those who were in power being vulnerable. Two of the respondents presented 
essentially tragic narratives which included themselves as victims, while another couple 
of senior figures emphasised stories of resistance to those above them. Finally, similar 
to most interviews I have conducted over the years, regardless of past or present status 
the respondents seemed very willing to talk, and were pleasantly surprised as to how 
much they recalled. 
3.3.5 Data Analysis 
To interpret the study data analytical tools were chosen which enabled the generation 
of ideas, the teasing out of the meanings in stories, the identification of emergent 
themes, an openness to surprises, and making sense of the complex human 
interactions endemic in the organisational change of the Royal Albert contraction. In 
addition, and already touched upon, I aimed to be a reflexive researcher. More 
speCifically these elements, encompassed within a micro-macro framework, translated 
into an oral historical approach aided and abetted by a mixture of dialogic, narrative and 
thematic analysis. These complementary qualitative research methods enabled a 
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rigorous interrogation of the research data, both oral and documentary. Here I outline 
salient features of this process. 
A core interpretative act of the research was to turn the oral history recording, the 
source data, into a transcription (Portelli 1981; Adams 2009). There are debates 
regarding the degree to which the researcher attempts to include all the pauses and 
hesitations of speech into the written document (Perks and Thomson 2006). Although 
one or two transcriptions were fuller versions than others, ultimately I adopted Portelli's 
(1981) perspective that they were always going to be imperfect representations of the 
spoken word; so the main criteria became readability. However, the link with the raw 
oral data was maintained by using a computer software package called Transana which 
enables a researcher to use the transcript to locate easily any point in the original 
recording. This digital tool proved invaluable in the retrieval of tellers' actual voices. 
The research's oral history approach, as discussed earlier in the chapter, involved the 
use of triangulation as well as a dialogic analysis of data. The latter was complemented 
by the use of thematic and narrative (or structural) analysis. Thematic analysis, or 
grounded theory, was used in a partial way in the study, as a way of identifying themes 
in order to develop ideas which have 'the ability to predict or explain' (Glaser and 
Strauss 1999; Oreszczyn 1999:44; Rolph 2000; Charmaz 2006; Ziebland 2009). This 
approach was used in the spirit exemplified by one researcher in her study, who 
suggests that the 'process was a creative rather than simply a mechanical one allowing 
for many links to be made and further categories to emerge' (Rolph ~000:140). 
Combined with dialogic analysis, a thematic approach was particularly useful when 
analysing data, both oral and written, pertaining to the respective viewpoints of 
implementers and resisters of institutional contraction.16 Such a process, and others 
16 See Chapters Five and Seven. 
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carried out in the research, were assisted by the use of the qualitative data analysis 
software package Hyper Research17 which facilitated both coding and retrieval of data. 
However there is a danger in thematic analysis that data are fractured. On this point 
Riessman quotes Charmaz, an advocate of grounded theory: 
We take segments of data apart, name them in concise terms, and propose an 
analytical handle to develop abstract ideas for interpreting each segment of data 
(Charmaz 2006; Riessman 2008:74). 
In contrast, narrative analysts 'attempt to keep the story intact for interpretive purposes' 
and 'strive to preserve sequence and the wealth of detail preserved in long sequences' 
(Riessman 2008:74; Andrews, Squire et al. 2009). Crucially, for the research, as 
already discussed, narratives constituted an essential ingredient of oral historical 
testimonies. Pertinently, organisational studies are increasingly using narrative research 
to understand the life of organisations (GabrieI2000; Reissner 2004; Reissner 2010). 
Narratives are viewed as a way of making sense of experience (Gabriel 2000). They 
provide insights into both meanings and events. GabRel's insights in this field, involving 
his theories regarding the poetics of narrative creation, were particularly helpful for the 
development of the analysis of research data (Gabriel 2000). 
The analytical tools highlighted here were used in a complementary and iterative 
manner. Initially former senior and middle managerial interview data were interrogated 
to enable an overview of the chronology of hospital rundown. Coding of these in-depth 
interviews also provided insights into their subjectivities. Themes of pride, idealism, 
conflict, risk-taking and ethical certitude, for instance, emerged from an embryonic 
application of a thematic approach. Much of the richness of these testimonies, however, 
was embedded in stories, infused with the way tellers voiced other people. Thematic 
17 http://www.researchware.com 
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coding failed to embrace adequately these twin elements of voice and narrative. These 
analytical limitations were re-inforced as further interviews were carried out with those 
critical of deinstitutionalisation. However, as the oral historical data were analysed, 
hand-in-hand with field work, the ideas of Bakhtin regarding polyphonic analysis 
became relevant (Bornat et al 2009; Smith 2009). Employing the notion of inner, and 
external dialogues, provided a dynamic thrust to the research analysis; dialogic analysis 
offered a way at looking at the relationships between voices. Doing this brought out the 
ethical content of the interview data, which was aided by an understanding of 
organisational narratives. Particularly helpful was the research of Gabriel (2000), 
especially his schema of classical narrative modes employed by members of 
organisations to make sense of their experience. Overall, this research process, 
although presented here in a linear fashion, was 'messy' and during the later stages of 
analysis encompassed the thematic, dialogic and narrative approaches in an iterative 
manner as the evidence was continually revisited. This analytical cocktail, as the thesis 
chapters reveal, enabled the richness of the contraction of the Royal Albert and its 
multipliCity of meanings to emerge from the oral and documentary data. 
3.4 Conclusion 
Explicated in this chapter have been the key facets of the qualitative approach 
employed in this research. Mirroring the complexity of the research topic itself, the 
methods chosen embraced an intricate web of relationships between researcher and 
researched, past and present, multiple viewpoints, event and meaning, as well as the 
micro and macro. These relationships were challenging, and, at times, uncomfortable 
but also intensely rewarding. Integral to the latter were the discoveries made during the 
course of the research; these findings are set out in the subsequent chapters of the 
thesis. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
PRESSURES OF CHANGE 
4.1 Introduction 
4.2 Conflicting Pressures 
4.3 Pressures of Cost and Logistics 
4.3.1 Affordable Organisational Change 
4.3.2 Financial Imperatives 
4.3.2.1 Continuing Organisational Costs 
4.3.2.2 Economies of Scale 
4.3.3 Impact of Financial Imperatives 
4.3.3.1 Compromises 
4.3.3.2 Increased Pace of Organisational Change 
4.4 Pressure of Individual Need 
4.4.1 Normalisation and Social Role Valorisation (SRV) 
4.4.2 Public Scrutiny 
4.4.3 Expressions of the Reforming Agenda 
4.5 Conclusion 
4.1 Introduction 
This is the first of the findings chapters. It addresses a key research question, posed in 
Chapter Two, which asked: 
What were the external pressures shaping the rundown of the Royal Albert 
Hospital, Lancaster in the late twentieth century? 
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In reflecting upon the contraction of long-stay institutions in the north west, Gordon 
Greenshields, the first General Manager in 1984 of the North West Regional Health 
Authority (NWRHA), observed that: 
There was a lot of pressure to make it (closure) happen, and it was a lot more 
difficult than people actually realised at the centre. It was more difficult than I 
realised. I think the guys at the sharp end probably were cursing everybody all 
the way up to the top. And I wouldn't blame them. You know the further you are 
from the sharp end the less you actually realise and I think you've got to 
understand that it's never as simple as you think it is. 1 
This chapter explores the contraction of the Royal Albert in terms of this externally 
imposed 'pressure'. This was applied by what can be described as a 'change agency'. 
The latter is defined here as an 'external' organisation (Rogers 2003:27) having 
'sufficient power over the system (or organisation2) to cause it to cease to exist' 
(Checkland and Scholes 1999). The core change agency in the case of the Royal Albert 
was the NWRHA, 'the centre', which was accountable to the Department of Health, and 
crucially was the employer of all the institutional staff. However on occasion, as 
discussed later in the chapter, bodies including the National Development Team, 
General Nursing Council and others could also be construed as change agencies. 
The impact of these outside bodies upon Royal Albert rundown, it is argued in this 
chapter, can be distilled into dual competing agendas relating to 'cost' on the one hand 
and 'individual need' on the other. The former emphasised the primary role of 
organisational finance, logistics, and bureaucracy; while at the nub of the latter was 
'P 
concern for people with learning difficulties, with staff need constituting a secondary 
consideration. Such a dichotomy mirrored, as discussed in Chapter Two, tensions 
which existed nationally. Examination of the imperatives outlined here is based upon 
1 Gordon Greenshields, Interview December 16th 2009. 
2 My addition in parentheses. 
84 
data analysis of a combination of oral and documentary evidence. In particular, the 
perspective of former members of hospital management was instrumental to the 
formulation of a coherent research narrative. 
4.2 Conflicting Pressures 
The tension between pressures of 'cost' and 'needs' was evident, both implicitly and 
explicitly, in the oral testimonies of Royal Albert senior and middle management. The 
most senior figure in the institution during the contraction period was David Jordison. In 
1986 he was appointed by the District Health Authority, as Unit General Manager. His 
arrival reflected the Griffiths Report of 1983, discussed in Chapter Two, and heralded 
the break with tripartite consensus management at the Royal Albert (Griffiths 1983; 
Harrison 1994). According to Jordison he was issued with a very clear remit: 
My job description was ... to resettle the residents of the Royal Albert Hospital 
and to close it. And my contract said I'd got three years to do it in. 3 
Research data indicated that the twin priorities of resettlement and closure, highlighted 
here, were inextricably linked by financing considerations. A point developed later in the 
chapter, such a symbiotic relationship was suggested by another of the hospital senior 
managers, who asserted that: 
(the Regional Health Authority) had this very simple equation that if money was 
transferred from the hospitals at a fast enough rate then they would have 
enough money to be able to fund community care as it was developing. 4 
This managerial perspective is re-inforced by reference to a 1985 NWRHA policy 
document, which stated that: 
Provision of services for mentally handicapped people within the community is 
the statutory responsibility of local authorities ... Given the present financial 
difficulties with which many local authorities are faced, the speed of provision of 
3 David Jordison, Interview February 15th 2008. My emphasis . 
.. Geoff Hopkinson, Interview May 11t 2008. 
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care will be dependent on the speed with which the NHS is able to make 
available sufficient funds related to the number of residents to be discharged 
from hospital (NWRHA 1985:10). 
Making 'available sufficient funds' was dependent upon the closure of wards as the 
Royal Albert contracted. It was in this arena that elements of the tension in the closure 
process are thrown into stark relief. Phi I Morgan, for instance, who was responsible for 
implementing the gradual contraction of the institution's wards, asserted that he and his 
management colleagues had to: 
be very mindful that at the centre of everything that we were doing were the 
clients, not us as the service.5 
At the same time his testimony highlighted decision-making predicated on whether 
hospital wards could be maintained as 'viable units of accommodation,.6 David 
Jordison, in a frank recollection, pinpointed anomalies in implementing resettlement for 
all, based on individual need rather than cost: 
The ward closure order ... had to be based on the needs of the people that lived 
in it (the ward) .. . but I have to say the people with the greatest needs tended to 
be the ones most difficult to resettle, and judging from what I've just said that 
shouldn't have been the case should it really? But it just took longer and there 
were so many blocks out there, and social services would be arguing they 
needed much more money to support them. 7 
It was the testimony of a former middle manager who illuminated how these conflicting 
pressures of political economy and individual need were experienced at the cutting 
edge of resettlement implementation. Dave Spencer recognised that: 
5 Phi I Morgan, Interview March 20lh 2008. My emphasis. 
6 Phi I Morgan. Ibid. 
7 David Jordison, Interview June 12'h 2009. 
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,. 
· .. there was this organisationallogistical difficulty of, We have to close this 
ward'. There comes a point where you can only move so many people off a 
ward without it having any impact on staffing levels or anything else. Eventually 
financially it just doesn't stack up at all, so there does have to be some planning 
- 'Well let's concentrate on these wards. ' And that was rubbing-up against this, 
'We are doing it around individuals and who is most ready to go and friendships 
and compatible groupings and all that kind of stuff. ' B 
He then suggested, however, ways in which these conflicting agendas 'rubbing-up' 
against each other could translate into a challenging managerial dilemma. Reflecting on 
the intensification of hospital contraction during the later years, Spencer recalled that: 
you would be up against a real tight timetable because the wards would be 
scheduled to close, engineers would be coming round to switch things off ... I 
would know that and you would be saying (to families), 'There is no rush and-I 
don't know if we used the phrase at the time - we are being as person-centred in 
this and we would go at everybody's individual pace. ' And you would be 
thinking, Well we can still but that would involve us doing this and closing that 
and we would have to move them from here to there and if this one conversation 
doesn't go right it is going to involve us in all sorts of work and undoing things 
we have already done - because by and large people were moving in groups so 
you were trying to coordinate three or four sets of these conversations as well, it 
wasn't all just about one individual. You would be saying one thing but you 
would be really hoping that they wouldn't take you at your word. I don't know 
that I ever actually told an outright lie in the sense of saying to people you know 
they can stay as long as they want when in fact that wasn't true, I think I did start 
to be honest with people and say this place is going to shut so we are talking 
about how and when not whether or not and those sorts of things. But I am sure 
8 Dave Spencer. Interview April 3111 2009. 
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I sat in many a front room or many a meeting room thinking, I have just said we 
are going to take this slowly and steadily and not rush it knowing damn well that 
if they take me at my word too much then there is going to be hell to pay with 
Phil Morgan9 or somebody else because we have got plans. 10 
This extract provides a flavour of how the pressures of economic viability were recalled 
as playing out. Although, echoing other Royal Albert management oral testimonies, it 
also touches upon the complexities of co-ordinating the interests and wishes of a range 
of individuals, not least people with learning difficulties. 
Examining the relative impact of the twin imperatives of 'cost' and 'need' embodied in 
the rundown dialogue outlined here, and the complexities of their inter-connectedness, 
is the nub of this chapter. Such an analysis deals with the structure of organisational 
change, in particular how imperatives emanating from external change agencies 
shaped hospital contraction; the agency of specific individuals within the institution, and 
their mediation of these agendas, is the primary focus of subsequent chapters. 
4.3 Pressures of Cost and Logistics 
The rhetoric of the NWRHA's key policy document, the Model District Service (MDS), 
was that the reprovision of services for people with learning difficulties from hospital to 
community settings was affordable (NWRHA 1983). However, as will be argued below, 
this seemed to take little account of the economic complexities associated with the 
implementation of such a policy. Within the increasing restraints of regional and district 
health authority budgets, fuelled by the free market ideological zeal of a cost-cutting 
Thatcherite government, releasing funds from the contraction process of the Royal 
Albert, as with the other large Lancashire long stay hospitals, was problematic. 
Ironically, the neo-liberal agenda of the Thatcherite government had imposed rate 
9 Phi! Morgan co-ordinated the ward closure programme. 
10 Cave Spencer, Interview April 3'd 2009. 
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capping on local authorities, limiting their ability to create funding streams (Wertheimer, 
Ineichen et al. 1985). The two main stumbling blocks were: rising revenue and capital 
costs of institutional care; and, financial resources tied up in wards rather than with 
individuals (NWRHA 1989). Although, as will be illustrated later in the analysis, 
managers attempted to overcome these obstacles, nevertheless they did impact on the 
rundown process. People with higher support needs, for instance, and seen as needing 
more resources, seemed to slip down the list of those for resettlement. More generally, 
reflecting the latter point, conflict over funding levels had a detrimental effect on 
transferring finances from health to local authority budgets. In accord with other regions, 
a key area of dispute was over the size of the dowry (explained in Chapter Two) which 
went with each resident as they left the institution (Hudson 1991). From the late 1980s 
onwards the imperative to resolve economic issues of rundown, diverging from the tone 
of the Model District Service, translated into an increasing pressure to close the wards, 
and the institution itself. 
4.3.1 Affordable Organisational Change 
There was a rhetoric in the early 1980s suggesting that the development of community 
based provision in the north west was an affordable option. In 1983 NWRHA adopted 
the Model District Service (MDS) as its blueprint for services for people with learning 
difficulties; a policy document heavily influenced by Wolfensberger's principles of 
normalisation/SRV (NWRHA 1983; Wolfensberger and Tullman 1989). Interwoven into 
its ideological vision MDS, crucially, makes assertions about the resourcing of service 
development. These claims make the case that, to the extent the authors of MDS could 
predict, the new services would be financially efficacious for the NHS, especially as 
other agencies would also provide essential funding. 
The opening page of MDS asserts that: 
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The presence of three large mental handicap hospitals in the north west poses 
particular problems. If the residents of all these hospitals are to be enabled to 
live within the community, substantial developments will be needed in 
community service provision. If properly redeployed, the staff and finance now 
available could go a long way to meet the demands of re-organised services 
(NWRHA 1983:1)11 
However, the report recognises the difficulty of predicting accurately the costs of a new 
community service: 
It is not yet possible to identify with any degree of accuracy the likely costs of 
the full application of the policy recommended in this report (NWRHA 1983:23). 
Having stated this, however, it then presents a number of resettlement case studies, in 
which all except one are cheaper to the NHS for each individual than hospital care. 
Importantly these examples only cost out what the health service would pay. The other 
sources of income are referenced but not costed; in other words the total costs to 
service providers per individual are not highlighted. Extrapolating from these data the 
report concludes that: 
It will be seen that in the long term it may be possible to re-provide services for 
the mentally handicapped in the community at no greater total cost than that 
which now exists in hospitals (NWRHA 1983:25). 
In addition, it underplays two other elements which proved to be critically challenging in 
the transfer of services from hospital to community. Firstly, MDS claims that: 
The faster the development of district based services proceeds, the faster the 
savings will be achieved at the existing hospitals (NWRHA 1983:25)." 
Such a statement implies that community service developments will drive cost cutting in 
hospitals, whereas, as explained below, issues arose because of financial inertia within 
11 My emphasis. 
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the institutions. Secondly the report argues, without apparently anticipating any 
difficulties, that: 
The establishment of services for the mentally handicapped within the 
community will place demands on all the agencies involved in this provision, not 
least the local authorities (social services, education and housing). In the short 
term each provider of services must meet the additional costs incurred in the 
establishment of local services (NWRHA 1983:25). 
What emerged within two or three years, and impacted upon Royal Albert rundown, 
was that these additional costs were not easily met. Overall, the dominant impression 
conveyed by the report was that the development of care in the community in the north 
west was both affordable and logistically achievable. 
However, as already stated, there is an argument to be made for this being a powerful 
rhetorical policy document. The previous regional plan, in 1979, for service 
development in the north west had been, accordingly to CMH, 'cautious in the extreme' 
(Wertheimer, Ineichen et al. 1985:30). This earlier document bore few traces of 
normalisation/SRV thinking. It did not, for instance, envisage the contraction of the long-
stay hospitals in the near future, and any new provision suggested units of between 30-
120 residents (Wertheimer, Ineichen et al. 1985:30). A broad church of academics and 
senior professionals, convened by Tom McLean, at that time divisional Nursing Officer 
at Calderstones, and member of the National Development Team, reacted to this plan 
and produced the Model District Service, described by CMH as 'probably the most far-
reaching and radical Regional plan in existence' (Wertheimer, Ineichen et al. 1985:31). 
Given that this was aimed at 'the newly apPOinted District Health Authorities', and 
needed adoption by the Regional Health Authority, as well as governmental approval, it 
is perhaps not surprising that it presents these innovative service suggestions as 
economically feasible. Also, the authors may have been mindful of another loud critical 
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voice: that of the trade unions. COHSE, the large health service union, had responded 
to the Jay Report of 1979 with claims that the implementation of deinstitutionalisation 
was impractical because of increased resourcing requirements (COHSE 1980). Nikki 
Riley, the shop steward at the Royal Albert, recalled that senior managers always said 
that 'it was not viable' for the hospital to remain open;12 implying that other care choices 
were indeed financially realisable. This was the early 1980s when a cost cutting agenda 
was pervading all of the public services, not least the NHS (Langan 1998). A further hint 
of the rhetorical stance embodied in MDS was given by one of the former middle 
managers, who was a keen advocate of deinstitutionalisation. In conSidering whether 
the closure of institutions was economically motivated, this individual stated that, 
There was not a cost cutting agenda I mean it cost us, not us (NHS), the tax 
payer more, I mean we used to deny this but we aI/ knew that if anybody put two 
and two together they could point out that it cost more to do what we were 
doing. 13 
The suggestion that 'we used to deny this' intimated, like the authors of MDS, that those 
in favour of policy change were perhaps willing to be economical with the truth when it 
was deemed necessary. Moreover, the suggestion that deinstitutionalisation was 
affordable underplayed the intricate logistical challenges which were faced by those 
who implemented Royal Albert contraction; MDS implied that 'the right values' were 
sufficient to drive through service change. 
4.3.2 Financial Imperatives 
4.3.2.1 Continuing Organisational Costs 
Researchers have argued that an instrumental factor in the decision to close institutions 
was the rising costs associated with their continuing maintenance and upgrading 
12 Conversation with Nikki Riley, July 4'm 2011. 
13 Anonymised extract from a research interview. 
(Castellani 1992; God sell 2002). This assertion has already been outlined in Chapter 
Two, but one example of such a rationale is provided by Johnson in her Australian 
deinstitutionalisation case study. She claims that a vital consideration in the decision to 
close Hilltop was that: 
The cost of renovating the institution was believed to be higher than the cost of 
closing it (Johnson 1998:80). 
Collins develops this general point further to suggest that by the early 1990s, in 
England, the direction of funds towards the institutions themselves, as opposed to 
community services, was seriously delaying the rate of hospital closure (Collins 1992). 
It is difficult to determine the exact degree to which this factor impacted upon the rate of 
Royal Albert rundown. However, even though offiCially tied into a contraction strategy, 
as discussed later in the chapter, considerable monies were being spent on 
improvements within the hospital during the 1980s and 1990s; indeed, viewed in this 
light it is possible to see these years, especially those of the earlier period, as ones of 
institutional reform not rundown. Such a state of affairs accorded with the 1971 Better 
Services for the Mentally Handicapped White Paper which had not envisioned hospital 
closure (Walmsley 2006a). 
During the last quarter of the twentieth century capital and revenue investment in the 
institutional environment at the Albert, reflected, as with other institutions nationally, a 
variety of inter-connected factors: the wear and tear of Victorian buildings; critical official 
reports; the growing currency of philosophies of care emphasising the rights and needs 
of people with learning difficulties; and increasing local authority monitoring of health, 
safety and environmental issues. These reforms and renovations, much of which 
signified pressure exerted by external change agencies. including their budgetary 
impact. are covered later in the chapter. 
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4.3.2.2 Economies of Scale 
Outlined earlier in the chapter was the imperative, reflecting the demands of the 
Regional Health Authority and Lancashire County Council, the local authority, to release 
funds as quickly possible from the Royal Albert as it contracted. Similar to institutions 
elsewhere, as intimated in Chapter Two, this financial arrangement was dependent 
upon the closure of whole wards. Such thinking was evident in the testimony of 
managers responsible for ward closures and in the 1988 Royal Albert Hospital 
Contraction Strategy (LDHA 1988). This document outlines a 'suggested ward closure 
order' which reflected the layout of the hospital: main building first; then a site located 
across the road; followed by outlying wards surrounding the main building. According to 
Geoff Hopkinson, the Director of Nursing Services, this plan was about providing 
guidance, rather than being prescriptive and was reviewed every two years.14 At the 
same time he acknowledged that the closure programme intensified in the last few 
years of the hospital's life as pressure was applied from the NWRHA, because of the 
receiving districts, to realise funds. He recollected that: 
The districts were putting pressure on us as well because they wanted to 
receive people because they couldn't do it unless they got money from Region 
so Region were saying, 'We can't give you the money until we get the money 
out of the Royal Albert. We can't get money out of the Royal Albert until they 
close more wards, and faster.' And so on. So it reaUy gathered a pace during the 
last two or three years/lIS 
Phil Morgan, in implementing the 1988 strategy, remembered that he, 
would negotiate transfers unfortunately of clients around the hospital to make 
sure that we had viable units of accommodation because It would have been 
14 Geofl Hopkinson, InteNiew May 1" 2008. 
1~ Geofl Hopkinson, InteNiew Julyl1lh 2009. 
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very easy just to close the hospital piece-meal with clients going from each, all 
of the wards all the time, but physically we couldnY maintain the resource of 
keeping the full hospital open ... You might have a ward that only had fifteen 
clients in now, at that point in time, but in three months time would be down to 
two clients. You couldn't physically keep that resource open with the staffing 
resource that that would tie up. 16 
Arguably 'the needs of the residents' in this instance were being subsumed under the 
greater imperative of maintaining 'viable units of accommodation'. Factored into these 
financial calculations was the idea that as each resident left the hospital, the Royal 
Albert would lose that individual'S annual income, but would still have to maintain the 
same level of staffing, as well as all the other costs tied up in maintaining a ward; in 
other words, there would be negligible reductions in organisational expenditure. In 
addition, the 1988 Royal Albert policy document highlights the importance of 'estate 
management priorities', which include 'economic, building, maintenance and works 
considerations', in determining the contraction of the hospital. Although the document's 
discussion of ward closure order is framed with reference to the needs of residents, 
ultimately one phase of this is dependent upon a number of units remaining 'economical 
to maintain' (LDHA 1988). 
Pivotal to the financial imperative of diminishing ward numbers was the reduction in 'the 
staffing resource'. The contraction strategy for the hospital expressed the desire to 
ensure that 'staff Mures are recognised' (LDHA 1988). Phil Morgan, the manager 
responsible for this side of things, stated that: 
Managing the staff through the contraction process was a completely different 
exercise to the clients because that had to be done in employment law sense so 
that you were fair ... didn't give anybody significant advantages over somebody 
UI Phil Morgan, Interview March 20" 2008. 
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else and had to deal with people on an equal footing. That at times brought 
some very significant challenges17 ... Everybody had to be linked into a particular 
ward closure and the ward closure programme had pretty much been set the 
order in which wards would close, so people knew roughly when they were likely 
to be either made redundant or offered opportunities elsewhere. 18 
Calculating their redundancy or retirement packages was remembered as an important 
feature of demoralised staff life in the early 1990s.19 Tony Dennison, for instance, 
recalled that, as his ward came under increasing threat of closure, nurses were asking: 
'What's going to happen to me? Should I be applying now? Should I wait for 
redundancy?' People were working out their redundancy packages based on 
their ages - everybody became very adept at working out how many weeks and 
years they'd be entitled torO 
Geoff Hopkinson remembered this issue of staff reductions as both a managerial 
logistical challenge and a process which impacted negatively upon hospital residents. 
Particularly during the latter years as contraction gathered pace he recalled an 
increasing reliance upon: 
bank staff and temporary contracts ... There was no concept of permanent 
contracts.21 
With the hospital 'in considerable flux' Hopkinson recollected the impact of contradictory 
pressures: 
It was a strange situation encouraging as many people as possible to apply for 
the new posts coming up. We had our own developing service in Lancaster ... I 
was responsible for that as well. So obviously, no bones about it, I wanted the 
17 Adding to these 'challenges', highlighted elsewhere in his interview. but beyond the scope of 
this thesis. was the regrading of NHS staff which occurred during the late 1980s: Lancaster 
Guardian August 5th, November 11th, 18th 1988. 
18 Phil Morgan. Interview March 20th 2008. 
19 Nursing officer (male). Interview March 11th 2009; Tony Dennison, Interview September 1't 
2009. 
20 Tony Dennison. Ibid. 
21 Geoff Hopkinson. Interview May 1" 2008 
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best people working there. I knew that was going to be at a cost to the residents 
who remained at the hospital until their time came. So that was always a 
juggling act. I gave that role almost totally to Phil (Morgan) because somebody 
simply needed to co-ordinate it and Phil has that sort of mind. He was very good 
at that sort of thing. His was a balancing act. 22 
In this managerial account the memory of complexity, further referenced in Chapter Six, 
is emphasised by the game metaphors of 'juggling' and 'balancing' (Morgan 1997). 
However, the admittance of this 'flux' incurring a cost to the remaining residents 
betrayed a regional positioning. Ignoring concerns expressed by Lancaster and District 
Health Authority, the review working group at the NWRHA stated that: 
If the price of a rapid closure in that hospital (Royal Albert) was a slightly 
reduced quality of life for a short period then it was a price that had to be borne, 
given that the residents would be moving to a much enhanced quality of life in 
the community ... (NWRHA 1989). 
Overall it can be argued that the imperatives of closure often threw up unintended 
consequences which were not always in the best interests of residents or staff; a point 
which is developed in the following section. 
4.3.3 Impact of Financial Imperatives 
The combination of substantial organisational costs along with institutional economies 
of scale, both examined above, had two major impacts on the shape, and pace, of 
Royal Albert contraction: compromises were made as to the order in which people with 
learning diffICulties moved out, with cost rather than individual needs being the key 
determinant; and, particularly in the later years of rundown, pressure was applied by the 
Regional Health Authority to close as quickly as possible, prioritising the criteria of 'cost 
effectiveness' (NWRHA 1989:3). 
22 Geoff Hopkinson. Interview May 1·' 2008. My emphasis. 
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4.3.3.1 Compromises 
Part of the drive to realise funds for resettlement was fuelled by the need for the NHS to 
furnish each resident with a dowry (defined in Chapter Two) upon leaving, but in the 
early part of resettlement the sums involved seem to have been a sticking point 
between the hospital (NHS) and social services (Lancashire County Council), who were 
to receive the monies. David Jordison, the senior manager at the Royal Albert at this 
time, explained this problem: 
The big problem politically was the County Council who felt they'd be landed 
with all the costs. They didn't object to the philosophy but they thought they 
would get all the costs of people in the community and so huge negotiations 
about the dowry that went with each person. And it was an average dowry, I 
think I can even remember it, it might have been eighteen thousand pounds or 
something, it was quite a lot of money, per annum. And some people needed a 
lot more and some people needed a lot less and some argy bargy was a) 
eighteen thousand pounds isn't enough, if that was the figure and b) some 
people will need a hundred thousand and what are you going to do about them? 
So that we got absolutely nowhere for 12 months, so we'd lost a year. 23 
This comment reinforced his earlier quote which implied that costs Issues Impacted 
negatively upon hospital residents with higher support needs. The tension between 
Social Services and Health over dowries also played out at a local level. Paul Kenny, an 
important local social services manager, raised the issue of Inadequate dowry 
financing, at a Lancaster and District Community Health Council meeting, with the 
District Health Authority's Treasurer.24 Nationally, as Collins argues, such funding 
issues were not unusual, and slowed down the pace of resettlement (Collins 1992). 
Indeed in the north west, as explored later in the chapter, the joint local authority and 
23 David Jordison, Interview February 151h 2008. 
24lancaster Guardian, March 20lh, 1987. 
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NWRHA 1989 policy document, Shared Proposals for Shared Problems, attempted to 
address these inter-agency obstacles (NWRHA 1989). 
From 1989 NWRHA, through bridging finance, provided additional funds for 
resettlement; accepting that 'double running costs are inevitable for a period' (NWRHA 
1989:i). However, it is questionable as to what extent this changed the lower priority for 
resettlement generally afforded to those with higher support needs, and therefore 
requiring a proportionally greater slice of monies. From early on in this organisational 
contraction, there were indications that those with higher support needs posed a 
particular challenge to services, and may be resettled later in the process. In the Royal 
Albert's 1988 Hospital Contraction Strategy, for instance, there was a consideration of, 
the needs of the residents who were likely to be in hospital the longest. Only 
subjective judgements were able to be made as to probable numbers, 
dependency and age of the people who would be in hospital during the later 
years of contraction, but it was considered that they would have special needs 
and/or be elderly (LDHA 1988:4). 
Similar approaches seemed to have been replicated elsewhere in England. Godsetl, for 
instance, as discussed in Chapter Two,25 suggested that preferential treatment 
occurred in the relocation process during the 1980s at Stoke Park, to the disadvantage 
of older people, those with 'challenging behaviour' or with 'multiple impairments' 
(GodseIl2002:175-6). Such observations have a strong resonance with a 1990 Royal 
Albert social work document which Is critical of the official resettlement rhetoric, 
suggesting that 'the large majority' of the 400 or residents still to depart have 'additional 
difficulties' (RAH 1990). These include: 
Mental illness; often extreme physical disabilities; increasing age; a history of 
sexual and other offences; those whose damaged childhoods are manifested in 
25 See Chapter Two: 2 3.3. 
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so called 'challenging behaviours'; those who are reluctant to leave the 
institution and those who have already tried and 'failed' in the community (RAH 
1990). 
The conclusion is that as the closure deadline encroaches 'the most vulnerable 
residents are in line for the most stress'. Conversely, the emphasis on those perceived 
as easier to resettle was signified by the dominant expectation of the early 1980s that, 
although the hospital would downsize, possibly upwards of 300 individuals would 
remain.26 The resettlement procedure for the hospital, produced in the mid-1980s, 
indicated, for instance, that older residents could be given leeway to stay: 
It is to be expected that some residents of the hospital, particularly those who 
have been in the hospital for a long time, will wish to spend the rest of their days 
here or within the locality. The Resettlement Team will try to ensure that such 
wishes are respected, and plan to maximise the quality of life for those residents 
(RAH c.1986:1). 
Such a statement reflects an ethos of individual choice; exemplifying the Scandinavian 
rights model of normalisation as opposed to Wolfensberger's SRV.27 However, in 
practice there did appear, as suggested above, to be resourcing issues which could 
work against those with higher support needs; resettlement was not purely about the 
best interests of an individual resident. Difficulties of this nature were recalled by those 
implementing resettlement policies. Steve Mee, the first Resettlement Co-ordinator, for 
instance, during the early period of formalised resettlement was very clear about the 
way some districts were approaching the Royal Albert: 
In those early days (what) was happening was districts were cherry picking the 
least challenging people. And there was NOT (National Development Team) 
categories, people who'd been assessed prior to me going in, and it was one to 
four. And it was baSically how much of a problem you were to support. That's 
28 Geoff Hopkinson, Interview May 1st 2008; Dave Spencer Interview April3rd 2009. 
27 See Chapter Two. 
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what it boiled down to, so it included physical disability and challenging 
behaviour ... Some districts wouldn't even talk to people who were a category 
four ... 28 
Such sentiments are resonant in Johnson's ethnographical study of women on a locked 
ward in Australia in the 1990s. She asserts that when it came to resettlement some of 
these individuals, 
were judged not to be able to live in the community. The explicit reasons given 
for this were those of duty of care to the woman with a disability and danger to 
the community. However, there was also a more pragmatic reason. There were 
only sufficient resources to fund half the residents in supported accommodation 
in the community. The rest had to go to other institutions. The cards were 
stacked (Johnson 1998:72). 
Johnson goes on to argue that, 'in the closure of the institution decisions were made 
which did not really focus upon these women as individuals' (Johnson 1998:75). 
Indications are that such a state of affairs did occur as part of a cost-led agenda 
permeating the Albert contraction, but, as illustrated later in the analysis, was tempered 
by more humane considerations. 
4.3.3.2 Increased Pace of Organisational Change 
The oral testimonies of senior Royal Albert and Lancaster and District Health Authority 
managers suggested that from 1986 onwards there was an imperative to close the 
Albert, thus releasing funds for community service developments. Both in England, and 
further afield, such an imperative was not unusual (Korman and Glennerster 1990; 
Enbar, Morris et al. 2004; Manning 2008). This closure remit, highlighted earlier in the 
chapter, of the new Royal Albert General Manager in 1986 was at odds with the 
prevailing assumptions of the time, already mentioned above, that the institution would 
28 Steve Mee, Interview February 18th 2008. 
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be downsized but not shut. Throughout the period of rundown, the organisation's senior 
management recalled the pressure applied by the Regional Health Authority. Geoff 
Hopkinson, next in seniority to Jordison, recalled that the region 'were continuously 
pushing to close wards and threatening to withdraw money,.29 Even at District Health 
Authority level, Paul Whitfield, the Chief Executive, remembered his encounters, 
probably in the early 1990s, with NWRHA's chairman who would, 
come on his own with somebody carrying a bag. And he'd have a limited brief -
he'd talk about the things he'd want to talk about ... 'I've been to see that big 
hospital, why is it still there?' ... And the detail, whilst he was prepared to listen, it 
was - 'Sort it out. That's what you're there for!' ... Whitfield, you're here to sort 
that out. We want Royal Albert closed. That's what the Secretary of State is 
asking me to do. I report to the Secretary of State, you report to the Region ... ' 
And so there was this real push to deliver on the government policy and so there 
was this very much top down approach of - it wasn1 so much, 'Was the essence 
of the policy the right direction? Because the decision's been made. 030 
It was from the late 1980s that this 'push to deliver on government policy', as recalled 
above by Whitfield, became overtly expressed at a regional level, impacting decisively 
on the pace of Royal Albert contraction. The NWRHA and Lancashire County Council 
(LCC), in response to logistical difficulties restricting the pace of resettlement from its 
three major institutions, reflecting some of the issues already highlighted above in the 
previous section, adopted a far more aggressive strategy towards policy implementation 
than previously. Their joint 1989 document Shared proposals for shared problems 
(SPSP), was dominated by a discourse of targets, economics and closure for 
Calderstones, Brockhall and the Royal Albert (NWRHA 1989). Although being careful to 
reference the principles laid out in the Model District Service, SPSP contrasted radically 
29 Geoff Hopkinson, Interview May 1.12008. 
30 Paul Whitfield, Interview October 28 th 2009. 
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with both the tone of that 'bible'3\ and the Regional Health Authority's 1985 document, 
Run-down of hospitals for people with mental handicap in the N. W. Region (NWRHA 
1983; NWRHA 1985). Pledging itself to bridging finance to help fund community care, 
the NWRHA specified that, rather than each of the institutions closing down 
concurrently, Brockhall would close in 1992, the Royal Albert in 1995 or 1996, 
depending on whether the rate of resettlement was 100 or 120 residents a year, and 
lastly Calderstones would finish in 2003 (NWRHA 1989). The reasons for this particular 
sequence seemed to have very little to do with the needs of people with learning 
difficulties. SPSP specified that there were two reasons, both economic, as to why the 
Royal Albert was specified for closure: it was the smallest of the three institutions with 
450 residents, and through 'a targeted closure programme it would be possible to 
release its costs very rapidly'; and secondly, possibly to the Albert's credit, 'the average 
costs (£14,200) of providing care for a person' were higher than the other three 
institutions and 'thus reduces the gap between cash withdrawals and resettlement 
'dowries" (NWRHA 1989:2). [The latter being £17,100 in 1989, with the expectation that 
this would rise to £18,900 the following year (NWRHA 1989:iv)). Furthermore, for 
Brockhall to close by early 1992, thus enabling increased resources to be directed at 
the Royal Albert, upwards of half of its resident population of around 950 were to be 
transferred to Calderstones, not into community settings, during a period of four years. 
Thirty three of these Brockhall residents went to the Calderstones Medium Secure Unit 
(Peters and Freeman 1992:48-50). SPSP advised, as exemplified in the regional policy 
on Brockhall, that a key mechanism for resettlements, and for the contraction process 
overall, was that wards, not individuals, would be the focus of implementation within the 
respective units. Indeed, as researchers into resettlement in the north west claim, 'the 
shift' in NWRHA policy, only six years after its visionary Model District Service, did 
31 David Jordison, Interview February 15th 2008. 
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seem to be one from 'individual-led to institutional-led resettlement' (Walker, Ryan et al. 
1993:17). 
In many respects the regional targets laid out in 1989 were achieved: Brockhall closed 
in 1992; the Albert in 1996; and Calderstones in 2003, although at the time of writing, in 
2011, there is a still a secure unit on the latter site (estimated in 2008 to have a 
population of 150 people32). For Brockhall, this meant that 414 individuals moved as 
part of whole ward resettlements, with some going in smaller groups, to the 
neighbouring institution of Calderstones, part of the same administrative unit, a factor 
presumably aiding this transfer of individuals (Peters and Freeman 1992:2). Achieving 
institutional closure by transferring residents to other institutions occurred elsewhere in 
England, perhaps because, as a CMH report suggested: 
To move people across from one institution to another is a comparatively easy 
exercise (Wertheimer 1986:17). 
This document cites particular instances where such transfers took place during the 
early 1980s, claiming that: one hospital shut its doors by moving over 100 people with 
learning difficulties to a larger institution, doing this by the use of buses over two days 
(Wertheimer 1986: 17); and Essex Hall's closure in 1985 was facilitated by the majority 
of the remaining 125 people moving to other NHS hospitals, with 'no one moved into 
staffed or unstaffed ordinary housing' (Wertheimer 1986:14). Also when Leavesden and 
Cell Barnes Hospitals closed in 1995 and 1998, respectively, individuals were moved to 
Harperbury, part of the same management group (Brown 2001:27). In 2010 there were 
753 former hospital residents still living on NHS campuses in England suggesting that 
this particular expression of a resource or bureaucratic-led agenda was not unusual 
(OH 2010). 
32 Tom McLean, Interview September 8th 2008. 
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In contrast to the Albert, prior to SPSP Brockhall was already promulgating a policy of 
wards being transferred to Calderstones; two, containing 57 people with learning 
difficulties, having done this in 1988 (Peters and Freeman 1992:49). In the late 1980s 
the pace of resettlement at the Royal Albert33 , as documented in SPSP and the local 
press, was around 12 people per year: 'a significantly lower rate of resettlement than 
Calderstones or Brockhall Hospitals' (NWRHA 1989:2). During the 1990s, especially 
from 1992, the numbers of people leaving the Albert did increase rapidly: 
... planned resettlements from Royal Albert increased from 22 in both 1990/91 
and 1991/2, of which they achieved 19 and 21 respectively, to 75 resettlements 
in 1992193 (Walker, Ryan et al. 1993:26). 
Such a dramatic acceleration, which continued to be maintained until closure, was 
fuelled by the imperative of transferring funds tied up in institutional care, and 
represented a contrast to the earlier phases of Royal Albert rundown. 
4.4 Pressure of Individual Need 
It is possible, as propounded above, to present a coherent case for cost being a 
dominating force in the design, implementation and ultimately the pace of Royal Albert 
contraction. Evaluating the extent to which meeting the needs of people with learning 
difficulties, although placed centre stage in the rhetoric of individual change agents, 
drove this organisational change is more problematic.34 What can be asserted is that 
this motivating force was essentially a reforming and humanising one, which influenced 
the shape of rundown, rather than ultimately pushing it through. During the 1980s and 
90s, as will be charted here, there were important changes in organisational structures, 
as well as a re-direction of resources towards improvements in both care and the 
physical environment. These shifts represented a response to desired and imposed 
33 See Appendix iv. 
34 Phil Morgan, Interview March 20th 2008; Geoff Hopkinson, Interview May 1st 2008; Mary 
Lawrenson, Interview September 9th 2009. 
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pressures upon the organisation from NWRHA, and other change agencies. Core 
elements in these external forces, directed towards the well-being of residents at the 
Royal Albert, were changing philosophies of care and the inter-connected arena of 
public scrutiny. 
4.4.1 Normalisation and Social Role Valorisation (SRV) 
NWRHA's seminal value-based policy document was A Model District Service (MDS) 
which was adopted in 1983 (NWRHA 1983). This strategy paper, referenced earlier in 
the chapter, proposed fundamental changes to services in North West England for all 
people with learning difficulties, including those in long stay institutional care. In creating 
a template for community services MDS touched upon ways of meeting people's needs, 
organisational structures, and resourcing requirements. Infusing its recommendations 
are explicit, and implicit, references to 'the principles of normalisation', which it 
summarised as: 
The use of ordinary means which are valued in the local community in order to 
enable people to live ordinary lives ... The status of people who are mentally 
handicapped should be enhanced by services, both by what is done and the 
ways it is done ... People who are mentally handicapped are individual human 
beings with their own abilities, preferences and needs (NWRHA 1983:5). 
These principles, in turn, were based on the twin 'basic axioms' of: 
People who are mentally handicapped have the same human value as anyone 
else and so the same human rights ... (and) are developing human beings and 
services should assist them towards the greatest independence possible 
(NWRHA 1983:4). 
Further weight is given to the assertion of the rights of people with learning difficulties 
by quoting from the 1971 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Mentally 
Retarded People. In many ways the underpinning principles of MDS appear to be a 
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mixture of the two different strands of normalisation thinking: the emphasis on rights, 
including the UN statement, reflecting the original Scandinavian school of thought; and 
the emphasis on 'value', influenced by Wolfensberger with his focus on deviancy and 
labelling theories (Wolfensberger and Tullman 1989; Mee 2005), and indicated 
particularly by points such as: 
Normalisation presents a great challenge to the designers of services. They 
must develop tools, techniques and styles of service which enhance the ways in 
which their consumers are perceived. An important goal of these services is for 
their users to embody culturally valued and age-appropriate behaviour, to lead 
valued life-styles and to have extended access to the valued experiences and 
resources of society. Personal autonomy and freedom of choice are major 
priorities in achieving that goal (NWRHA 1983). 
This latter statement inadvertently highlighted, as discussed in Chapter Two, what 
some saw as an inherent source of confusion in this approach for practitioners: the 
conflict between 'valued life styles' and 'freedom of choice' (Mee 2005). Nevertheless, 
as illuminated earlier in the chapter, MDS was heralded nationally as a progressive 
policy document (Wertheimer, Ineichen et al. 1985:31; Walker, Ryan et al. 1993:2). 
Although there are dissenting voices, the dominant consensus, as discussed in Chapter 
Two, among researchers is that normalisation and SRV played a principal role in the 
design and philosophy of services for people with learning difficulties during the late 
twentieth century, both in the United Kingdom and beyond (Anninson and Young 1980; 
McCarver and Cavalier 1983 cited in Emerson 1992: 1; Race 1999; Walmsley 2006). 
The regional adoption of MDS supports such an argument, as does the translation of its 
principles into organisational policy at the Royal Albert. The latter's resettlement 
procedure of the mid-1980s, for instance, states that, 
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The guidelines adopted by the (resettlement) team are those of the Region's 
policy document A Model District Service (RAH c.1986: 1). 
At the core of the latter document, and the hospital's resettlement strategy, itself 
reflecting the impact of normalisation, was the mechanism of Individual Programme 
Planning (I PP). The latter, in theory at least, placed the individual person at the heart of 
decision making about their own lives. Involving multi-disciplinary teams, comprising 
families as we" as professionals, this approach was consistent with those aspects of 
normalisation emphasising individual needs, autonomy and choice. 
It was Geoff Hopkinson, one of the senior Royal Albert managers, who, not long after 
his appointment in 1983, introduced IPP: 
One of the things I wanted to implement, before resettlement gathered apace I 
wanted each resident to have an individual plan. So we introduced a policy of 
individual programme planning and this ultimately formed the basis of 
resettlement planning for each individual. But first of aliI wanted staff to get 
used to the idea of devising a plan for each resident so that their lives, even on 
the wards, just weren't aimless, that they had a plan. All of us have a structure 
for our lives, you know! And the residents have the same right. So Steve35 
introduced IPP, just to use the abbreviation, to all of the wards in the hospital. 36 
Not all institutions were as we" advanced in implementing person-centred planning. In 
the south of England, at Harperbury, for instance, it was only in 1991 when: 
Individual care plans replaced the former policy of planning for the general care 
of residents on a block basis. Staff were encouraged to foster the participation of 
the residents in their own welfare (Brown 2001 :28). 
This procedural focus on the individual resident at the Royal Albert was embedded in 
the resettlement process document (RAH c.1986); after which time IPP. which had 
35 Steve Mee, at that point, Nursing Process Co-ordinator. 
36 Geoff Hopkinson, Interview May 1 sI 2008. 
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started out as this more open-ended engagement with individual residents and their 
wishes, was referenced within a resettlement framework: that is moving out of hospital 
or not was not a choice. In these early days, however, there was 'provisional discharge', 
with residents having a three month period during which time if they were unhappy with 
their new home they could return to the hospital. This notwithstanding, both 
resettlement officers talk about residents approaching them on their own initiative to ask 
about moving.37 Illustrating this latter point, and discussing how normalisation impacted 
on the shop floor of the organisation will be considered in Chapters Five and Nine. 
Central to IPP at the Royal Albert, and reflecting MDS, was multi-disciplinary team 
working, elements of which were in place by 1983.38 Although, and explored in 
subsequent chapters, team working was not without its difficulties, documentary and 
oral evidence indicates that this approach was a salient feature of working with 
residents throughout the period of rundown (RAH 1990; RAH c.1986).39 
The appointment of Geoff Hopkinson as divisional Director of Nursing Services in 1983 
was entirely consistent with the Regional Health Authority's adoption of 
normalisation/SRV. On arrival, he completed a tripartite consensus Management Team, 
the norm across the whole NHS at that time, with the other elements being the Senior 
Consultant Psychiatrist and the hospital Administrator (Harrison 1994; Webster 2002). 
As discussed later in the thesis this was a hierarchy heavily influenced by medical 
model thinking. An analysis of the oral testimony reveals that Hopkinson's appointment 
was an ideological counterbalance, reflecting changing policy agendas.4O The new 
appointee's role put him in the front line of organisational change, with responsibility for 
the development of nursing services, both in the institution and the community, in which 
37 Steve Mee, Interview February 18th 2008; Dave Spencer Interview April 3rd 2009. 
38 Norman Woodward and Ron Bettany, November 13th 2006; Gudrun O'Hara, Interview June 
2200 2009; Malcolm Alston, Interview May 19th 2009. 
39 Tony Dennison, Interview September 18t 2009; Dave Spencer Interview April 3rd 2009; Steve 
Mee, Interview February 18th 2008; Gudrun O'Hara, Interview June 2200 2009. 
40 Geoff Hopkinson, Interview May 18t 2008; Steve Mee, Interview February 18th 2008. 
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the design and implementation of resettlement policies comprised a key constituent 
element.41 According to Hopkinson's interview data, he had been in learning disability 
services since 1962, was a very experienced senior nurse, but importantly, given the 
acceptance of MDS as regional policy around the same time, was an experienced 
trainer in normalisation/SRV, an ideology he enthusiastically embraced. Prior to coming 
to the Albert in 1983, he recalled working at Prudhoe Hospital, Northumberland, for 
people with learning difficulties: 
It was there that I was introduced to the concept of normalisation and really my 
whole thinking changed about devalued people ... They arranged a PASS 
workshop, Programme Analysis for Service Systems, right in the middle of 
Northumberland ... We were segregated ourselves (laughs) for a week whilst 
we did this course and it was total immersion and I'm sure that we worked 24-7. 
I can't remember getting very much sleep at all. We were plunged straight into it, 
but I found it enormously stimulating, physically knackering, but enormously 
stimulating. That really changed my whole perspective about how devalued 
people could become valued again ... So I suppose I became a man on a 
mission thereafter ... (What) I saw was that everybody with a learning disability 
has a right to live like most other folks do and our job as a service was to make 
that possible. I didn't want to make it possible in Northumberland. I was 
preparing myself for taking the message somewhere else, and that was the 
Royal Albert.42 
As well as being explicitly stated, Geoff Hopkinson's evangelical tone is also suggested 
by his metaphors: 'total immersion' and 'we were plunged straight into it'. These could 
be describing a baptismal experience, and such a discourse also corresponds to the 
idea that normalisation was the 'new gospel' (Korman and Glennerster 1990:64; Mee 
41 Geoff Hopkinson, Interview May 1 si 2008; David Jordison, Interview February 15th 2008; 
Minutes of the Royal Albert Hospital League of Friends 1983-1995. 
42 Geoff Hopkinson, Interview May 1s1 2008. 
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2005). This ideological positioning was mirrored elsewhere in the NWRHA. Tom 
McLean, in a similar senior post at Calderstones Hospital, and member of the National 
Development Team, recollected that43: 
I did one of those Wolfensberger normalisation courses at the Spastics Society 
as it was called then, at Wokingham in Surrey. If you liked them they were 
seminal, if you didn't like them they were brainwashing sessions. And people 
talked about them in those sort of terms ... It did have a terrific influence on 
Significantly for the Royal Albert, McLean hinted that Hopkinson was appointed 
precisely because of his adherence to normalisation/SRV: 
I remember being an assessor on the appointment panel that appointed Geoff 
and he had the right kind of forward thinking ideas, and wanted to get the place 
shut, so he was appointed. 45 
The recruitment of the new Director of Nursing reflected changing philosophies at 
regional level and was, as touched upon already, instrumental in the implementation of 
a strategy of ideologically infused organisational change. 
4.4.2 Public Scrutiny 
The sharper edge of a pressure to, at the very least, reform the quality of care received 
by residents at the Royal Albert was applied by means of critical appraisals emanating 
from external change agencies. Throughout the institutional rundown period the 
Lancaster Guardian, the local newspaper, carried reports from various sources which 
condemned aspects of Royal Albert living conditions or resettlement practice. These 
critiques originated locally from the Community Health Council,46 Lancaster City 
43 Tom McLean, Interview September 8th 2008. 
44 Tom McLean. Ibid. 
45 Tom McLean, Interview September 8th 2008. 
46 Lancaster Guardian, September 30th , 1988; Lancaster Guardian, January 25th , 1990; February 
2nd 1990. 
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Council47, the District Health Authoritl8 , as well as nationally in the form of the Audit 
Commission49, along with the Mental Health Act Commission50• In addition, in 1984 
David Brandon, the Director of Mind, the mental health charity, and a member of the 
committee which drew up the Model District Service, issued a stinging attack on the 
Royal Albert as an unsuitable form of care; describing it as a 'workhouse hospital,.51 
However, these assessments can be construed as maintaining pressure originally 
generated by three earlier critical reports published in the late 1970s. 
As discussed in Chapter Two, heralded by the Ely Report in 1969, inadequate levels of 
care in long-stay institutions had been exposed in public enquiries throughout the 19705 
(Butler and Drakeford 2005). In the case of the Albert, Wangermann argues that as 
early as 1971 the sensitivities regarding its overcrowding had led to the erection of two 
prefabricated 'villas', each of which became home to thirty residents (Wangermann 
1992:94). Then at the end of that decade the organisation was subject to a number of 
damning public reports. The latter, according to a former member of the clinical 
psychology team meant that, like a truculent child, 'the Royal Albert was dragged 
screaming into the changes,.52 These, as will be charted below, contributed to 
substantial revenue and capital funding being directed towards the care of hospital 
residents, at a time when paradoxically monies were required to develop community 
based provision. 
In 1978 NWRHA was so appalled at the conditions on the hospital's Richard Smith 
Ward that it ordered the ward's immediate closure (Wangermann 1992:94); a decision 
47 Lancaster Guardian, September 16th, 1988. 
48 Lancaster Guardian, July 6th , 1984. 
49 Lancaster Guardian, November 3rd, 1989. 
50 Lancaster Guardian, August 16th , 1991. 
51 Lancaster Guardian, February 3rd, 1984. 
52 Bernadette Hobson, Interview August 26th 2009. 
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probably of no great surprise to those who had seen that area of the Royal Albert. Mrs. 
Ann M. Wilson, the deputy administrator at the time, recalled that: 
Some of the wards, there was a basement one - Richard Smith in the Main 
Building - I mean it was absolutely awful. Most of the patients were doubly 
incontinent so it wasn't just the gloom, it was the smell, the whole ambience, it 
was - I remember that was the one that was that the worst and was one of the 
last to be sorted out. 53 
Making similar observations at other points in his interview, Brian IlIingworth recalled 
that Richard Smith was part of an induction process for porters: 
Some of the wards were what they used to class as 'Iow grade wards' 
depending on residents that were on them. They used to take you round what 
they used to call low grade lock-up wards and I think it was a test, if you could 
stand that you could stand anything, you'd be all right ... And I can remember 
they took us down this corridor . .. there was two wards close together there. One 
was called Richard Smith and the other was called ---. They were both 
male lock-up wards. Believe me if you could stand that you could stand 
anything. 54 
Brian IlIingworth decided that he could 'stand that', and became a porter not long before 
Richard Smith closed in 1978. In response to the closure, Wangermann, the former 
Senior Clinical Psychologist, claims that 'eight prefabricated bungalows were hastily 
erected', as part of what he calls 'a constructive resettlement preparation policy' 
(Wangermann 1992:94). The ward itself, as a further reflection of changing philosophies 
of care, was revamped and in 1979 opened as a Communication Development Centre 
which 'introduced signing systems for people with language impairments' (Wangermann 
1992:97). 
53 Mrs. Ann M. Wilson, Interview November 17'h 2009 
54 Brian lIIingworth, Interview September 8th 2009. 
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At the same time as the closure of that particular unit, the General Nursing Council 
(GNC) withdrew its recognition of the Royal Albert Nursing School (Wangermann 
1992:94). The local paper reported that this was because of poor institutional 
conditions, especially overcrowding.55 Mary lawrenson, then a student nurse, indicated 
that the nursing curriculum itself may also have been the cause: 
We had inspections of the School of Nursing and about the time of the Jay 
Reporf6 ••• we did lose the status to train nurses, because the philosophy 
wasn't up to date, so that's how bad it was. We knew what we should have been 
doing, but nobody put it into action, and we lost our status as a training school. 
We were allowed to train the people that were already going through but they 
couldn't take new students on until they sorted it out. 57 
Furthermore, the Regional Health Authority, because of its concerns, mentioned above, 
invited the National Development Team (NOT) to inspect the institution. Executed in 
1979, this investigation highlighted: serious overcrowding; a lack of adequate training 
for the residents; and a need to develop community based services, as an alternative to 
institutional provision (Wangermann 1992:94-5). However, Wangermann argues that by 
this time, 
the Royal Albert had already turned the corner and in some respects the 
(NOT) report served to reinforce a change in orientation which had taken place 
in the hospital (Wangermann 1992:95). 
Adaptations, he asserts, were already being made to nurse training as a basis for 
restoration of GNC status (Wangermann 1992:95). 
55 Lancaster Guardian September 8th 1978. 
56 See below, and Chapter Two. 
S7 Mary Lawrenson. Interview September 9th 2009. 
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Others are more convinced about the impact of NDT criticisms on internal changes 
within the Albert. Tony Dennison, a Royal Albert nurse during this period, remembered 
that: 
Just after I qualified, the National Development Team had visited. There was a 
need for more decent accommodation, and the bungalow portakabins ordered. 
They wanted to free up staff accommodation for residents so staff corridors 
were cleared. Lathom House was going to be emptied ... and staff were moved 
down to - cottages. 58 
The implication here was that, in response to external coercion, the management 
rapidly prioritised the accommodation needs of residents over those of staff. David 
Jordison, in explaining the institutional culture when appointed in 1986, also hinted at 
the impact of that investigation: 
There had been a big sort of enquiry I think into the Royal Albert ... it was found 
wanting sometimes in the late seventies. I think improvements had been made 
and clearly you know they had drafted people in like Steve Mee and Geoff 
Hopkinson and other champions of people with learning disabilities. 59 
The latter point made by Jordison is developed in the next chapter, where it will be 
argued that key internal appointments were made, during the 1980s, to change the 
culture of the organisation. 
These external criticisms of the organisation in the late 19705, according to a former 
Royal Albert nursing lecturer, came as something of a shock to a bemused senior 
management: 
The world had passed it all by. They were institutions - literally. Nobody went in. 
The people that worked there had worked there for years. There were 
inspections and basically when the inspectors came whoever was the boss 
58 Tony Dennison, Interview September 25th 2005. 
59 David Jordison, Interview February 15th 2008 
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rushed them into the committee room and gave them a few glasses of wine and 
a nice meal. And there would be two wards that had been tarted up especially 
for the occasion. The inspectors would go round, write a nice report... This is 
when things had started to change, they had an inspection and it got a real 
slating did the Albert ... I would think it's the late 70s and it really got a slating. 
And of course the Albert hadn't changed, what had changed was people's 
perceptions, so what ten years ago was good was suddenly not very good at al/. 
But the boss at the time made a very good point, 'What I want to know is for the 
last 25 inspections we've had, everything has been absolutely fantastic, and 
now everything's appalling. Why is it suddenly changed? Because the institution 
hasn't changed.' And the point he was making was valid. It wasn't the institution 
that had changed in any way whatsoever, what was happening was that 
people's expectations were different ... And that was right and that's how change 
happens isn't it-r° 
Echoing Bob Dewhirst's concluding comment, the assertion here is that the changed 
expectations, around the quality of life for people with learning difficulties, impacted 
enormously on the Royal Albert. However, as with other institutions, these reports 
forced the management, as discussed below, to reform the hospital's practices, not to 
close it. 
4.4.3 Expressions of the Reforming Agenda 
The combination of critical reports and shifts in national and regional policy, all of which 
were infused to differing extents by the ideology of normalisation, contributed to the 
strong presence of a reforming agenda during the rundown of the Royal Albert. A 
particular expression of this, referenced earlier in the chapter, was that training, both for 
60 Bob Dewhirst, Interview June 9th 2009. 
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students and existing staff, underwent a radical overhaul. In his interview Hopkinson 
claimed that he, 
developed a staff training role ... because I wanted to introduce the ideas of 
social role valorisation to all of the staff and so, with other people, we devised a 
training programme and we got most people through that training programme. 61 
Oral and written testimonies indicate that this training focus was both delivered and 
received with differing degrees of enthusiasm (Mee 2005);62 a point examined in 
subsequent chapters. However, it was a structural attempt to move away from medical 
model thinking towards a more holistic focus upon the person with a learning difficulty. 
A similar shift had already started to occur in the Royal Albert School of Nursing prior to 
Hopkinson's arrival in 1983. This was initially prompted, as already highlighted, by an 
attempt to regain its status, removed as a result of a critical GNC report. In her third 
year of training in 1980, Mary Lawrenson remembered that, in contrast to the preceding 
blanket emphasis on the 'clinical control model', suddenly student nurses were 
discussing the implications of the Jay Report. She also recalled, with overt excitement, 
the appointment of Jim Bow, a senior nurse brought in to implement changes in nurse 
training: 
Jim Bow came from outside, He came from Wales. It was like, 'Oh this guy's 
come from Wales! Who is he?! What's he doing here?!' Kind of thing. I can 
remember - I can still see his face ... Jim Bow being brought in to sort it out. He 
was the one who had to get our status back as a School of Nursing. 63 
Ironically, during the early 1980s, Bob Oewhirst, one of the Royal Albert training 
lecturers, left for a time to carry out the same trouble-shooting brief at the Turner Village 
School of Nursing in Colchester.64 These attempts to raise training standards reflected 
61 Geoff Hopkinson, Interview May 1 st 2008. 
62 Malcolm Alston, Interview May 19th 2009; Mary Lawrenson, Interview September 9th 2009; 
Tony Dennison, Interview September 1st 2009. 
63 Mary Lawrenson, Interview September 9th 2009. 
64 Steve Mee, Interview February 18th 2008; Bob Dewhirst, Interview June 9th 2009. 
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the changing agendas of the General Nursing Council, as evidenced by the 
introduction, discussed in Chapter Two, of a new curriculum in 1982 (RCN 1989). 
Dewhirst returned to the hospital, taking charge of learning disability student nurse 
training, and recalled the impact of normalisation and other non-medical philosophies of 
care upon the curriculum: 
It was quite difficult at first because people used to teach all about anatomy and 
physiology because it was there, it was a body of knowledge that you passed 
on. Well if you don't pass it on, .. . what body of knowledge have you got? So 
things like normalisation and behaviour modification and philosophies and 
looking at enquiries and looking at people's behaviours were good because it 
did give you a body of knowledge, because you could say, 'What makes you 
special as a nurse? And why are you different to the next person?J65 
This change of emphasis was remembered by Dave Spencer, a Royal Albert student 
nurse in 1983: 
We went from being assessed on whether we could set up a drip stand and a 
tray for doing the flattest tube and make a bed properly to the social model of 
disability and the like and there was lots of discussion about the role of nurses 
just as there is now. 66 
Such reforms based upon changes in dominant philosophies of care, were, as 
illuminated below, echoed elsewhere in the institution's infrastructure. 
During the 1980s when the organisation's budget was being increasingly squeezed by 
the NWRHA, with funding also needing to be released for the development of 
community care services, ironically the Royal Albert was directing increased funding 
into the hospital itself. As already suggested, there is a strong case to be made that at 
the heart of such a state of affairs, emanating from external change agencies, was an 
65 Bob Dewhirst, Interview June 9th 2009. 
66 Dave Spencer Interview April 3rd 2009. 
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agenda based upon concerns for the welfare of people with learning difficulties. Oral 
testimonies, quoted above, the 1988 Hospital Contraction Plan (1988), the Lancaster 
Guardian67 and the former Senior Clinical Psychologist (Wangermann 1992) all 
reference capital and revenue investment in: ward renovations, especially to those that 
would be the last to close; three new blocks of flats, with small living units intended to 
facilitate resettlement preparation; an upgraded hospital phone system; new hospital 
kitchens; as well as replacement fire doors. The latter two items were a response to 
local city council concerns regarding health and safety. In addition, interviews with 
former members of nursing staff suggest that in pockets of the hospital, especially on 
wards for respite care and young people with higher support needs, this period 
witnessed an increase in staffing ratios and resources.68 
In 1991, prior to the surge in the pace of hospital contraction, the overall budgetary 
implications of this expenditure were evident in the Lancaster and District Health 
Authority's Annual Report (1989-90) which stated that: 
In mental handicap and mental health services, the health authority again used 
all its available finance to improve quality of care. The level of spending in these 
services was maintained although there were fewer hospital residents.69 
The ironic state of affairs highlighted as occurring at the Albert did not seem to be 
unusual in studies of institutional rundown. Although it is argued here that the 
investment at the Royal Albert was based upon welfare issues, at least one researcher 
presents an alternative viewpoint. Jean Collins, in analysing why hospital contractions 
in England were stalling at the start of the 1990s, intimates that increased institutional 
investment was actually a deliberate blocking tactic by those meant to be implementing 
67 Lancaster Guardian: August 5th 1988; September 16th 1988; January 24th 1992; June 6th 1992. 
66 See Appendix iv; Tony Dennison, Interview September 1st 2009; Steve Mee, Interview 
Se~tember 2200 2005; Mary Lawrenson, Interview September 9th 2009; Eric R., Interview August 
11t 2009 
69 Lancaster Guardian, February 15th 1991 
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closure (Collins 1992). Whether this was the case or not, other institutions did invest, 
like the Albert, in their infrastructure as they were running down; amongst these were 
Normansfield, Harperbury, Stoke Park and Ida Darwin Hospitals (Malster 1994; Godsell 
2002). With respect to the latter institution, the head of Cambridge Priority Services Unit 
made it clear, that if 'we had spare cash we had to invest it in the institution,.70 At times 
this apparent conflict between the reforming and closure agendas could be revealed in 
quite a blatant fashion. Further afield, for instance, Johnson notes in her case study of 
de institutionalisation at an Australian establishment: 
The closure announcement came on the day that the dormitories in Unit N 
began to be subdivided into more private bedroom spaces. The irony of this was 
not lost on the staff who had fought hard for the renovation (Johnson 1998:89). 
However, and hinting at the pressures faced by those managing such complex 
organisational changes, a study of the closure of the Kimberley Centre, in New 
Zealand, notes: 
that most families commented on their displeasure at the way the institution had 
been left to deteriorate during the lead-in to deinstitutionalisation (Stewart and 
Mirfin-Veitch 2008:21). 
The central problem in the UK, Australia, and New Zealand was that funds for 
community care were seen as being dependent upon the contraction of the Institutions. 
The paradox, as specifically demonstrated in the case of the Albert, was that external 
pressures to improve the quality of life for people with learning difficulties occurred 
within strict budgetary constraints; funding directed into the institution meant there was 
less for the development of community care. So, as previously suggested, NWRHA's 
solution for the Albert, promulgated in 1992, and dependent upon bridging finance, was 
for the institution to close as rapidly as possible (NWRHA 1989). Perversely, according 
to the former estates manager, huge costs associated with asbestos and heating 
70 Stephen Thomton, Interview with Jan Walmsley, March 2005 
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systems meant that ultimately when it was sold, in 1996, the sale was a deficit 
transaction. 71 This, and the other tensions highlighted, suggests a lack of systemic 
thinking at best, or ideological short sightedness at worse, on the part of policy makers 
at the time. 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has charted those pressures, emanating from external change agencies, 
which were present during the contraction of the Royal Albert. Testimonies, particularly 
of those managing this formidable organisational change, re-inforced by documentary 
data, indicated that an intricate mix of ideological, financial, logistical and 
compassionate imperatives all impacted upon hospital rundown. Cost and logistics, it 
has been suggested, ultimately dominated the drive to close the institution, with welfare 
concerns acting as a reforming agenda. The latter at times, because of financial 
demands, undermined the pace of organisational contraction. However, pervading both 
the reality of the push to close, and the need to prioritise the needs of people with 
learning difficulties (as well as staff) in the contraction process was a powerful rhetorical 
framework infused with the ideology of normalisation/SRV. In its focus upon the role 
played by change agents within the institution, Chapter Five provides further 
illumination of this latter point. 
71 Notes from a conversation with Alan Sharples, February ttt, 2007. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
AGENTS OF CHANGE: A HEGEMONIC APPROACH 
5.1 Introduction 
5.2. A Hegemonic Approach 
5.2.1 Hegemonic Dialogue 
5.2.2 Construction of Legitimacy 
5.2.3 Ideological Leadership 
5.2.4 Construction of Authority 
5.2.5 Recruitment 
5.2.6 Opinion Leadership 
5.2.7 Coercion 
5.3 Conclusion 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter Four examined key external pressures, emanating from change agencies, 
which impacted upon the organisational contraction of the Royal Albert Hospital. In 
contrast, the focus here and in Chapter Six is on the second of the key research 
questions: 
How did managers implement the rundown of the Royal Albert Hospital, 
Lancaster? 
In their roles as instigators and implementers of organisational change 'deemed 
desirable by a change agency' members of the institution's senior and middle 
management can be described as 'change agents' (Rogers 2003:27). So attention in 
the thesis now shifts from the structure of Royal Albert change to its agency (King 2009; 
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Wilsford 2010). These constructs constitute ways of interpreting what was an intensely 
complex affair; they are about emphasis, an analysis of the oral testimony, as already 
intimated in Chapter Four, indicating there was considerable interplay between 
elements of agency and structure. 
Policy implementation throughout the rundown period, as outlined in Chapter Four, was 
highly elaborate. Permeating much of the interview data, for example, are references to 
'negotiation'- inter and intra residents, staff, social workers, relatives, councillors, trade 
unions, the public and external agencies - with all the pressures and diplomacy and, at 
times, bloody mindedness that implied. Added to which, those bringing about change 
often referred to the unknown nature of the process. One of the senior managers 
encapsulated such a perspective when he recalled that: 
It was pretty much make it up as you go along. I suppose we had no template 
that we could work to because one didn't exist. 1 
In organisational change terms, and specifically borrowing conceptual paradigms 
employed by soft systems methodology (SSM), this institutional contraction could be 
described as a 'mess' (Checkland and Scholes 1999)? Such a notion presupposes 
ambiguity and uncertainty as inherent in certain problematic human situations. SSM 
thinkers contrast this with a 'difficulty' which can be tackled as a discrete and linear 
matter, with factors knowable from the start. A 'mess' encompasses complexity of 
entanglements, relationships (which includes the researcher), and disparate worldviews 
or weltanschauung as integral to the particular dilemma. This has parallels with what 
Rogers (2003) describes as a 'radical innovation': 
Some innovations are so radical and create such a high degree of uncertainty 
that they must be adopted through an innovation process that is relatively 
unstructured and almost completely unroutine. An unstructured decision process 
1 Phi! Morgan, Interview March 20th 2008. 
2 Systems Thinking and Practice: A Primer (Open University T551) 2005. 
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is one that has not been encountered previously in quite the same form and for 
which no predetermined set of ordered responses and routines exist (Rogers 
2003:426). 
One former member of Royal Albert middle management summarised this notion of 
'mess' or 'unstructured problem'. During the 19805, Dave Spencer recalled feeling that: 
I don't think people ever would have questioned we should do something, if only 
we could get from here to there without any kerfuffle in between it would be 
great but it was the, what is the kerfuffle going to be like, how do we go through 
that process'fl 
This, and the next chapter, focus upon how the kerfuffle of Royal Albert rundown was 
implemented by those members of its senior and middle management who comprised 
the organisation's change agents. While Chapter Six concentrates primarily upon the 
impact of the personal attributes of management, this chapter examines what can be 
construed as the adoption of a value-laden hegemonic approach. 
5.2 A Hegemonic Approach 
The definition of hegemony used here is in essence the one developed by the Italian 
Marxist thinker, Antonio Gramsci. 'The starting point' for the latter, claims Roger Simon, 
is that a class and its representatives exercise power over subordinate classes 
by means of a combination of coercion and persuasion (Simon 1985:21). 
From this conceptual platform Gramsci was able to develop a theory of hegemony 
which went beyond both the original Greek definition, and the one employed by Russian 
revolutionaries, especially Lenin. In the former case hegemony was taken purely to 
mean domination, or leadership, of one group or individual over others; for the latter, 
hegemony was a strategy whereby a revolutionary group could build alliances to 
overthrow the state (Simon 1985:21-23). Although embracing these prior definitions, 
3 Dave Spencer Interview April 3rd 2009. 
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Gramsci was primarily interested in hegemony as a means of understanding how the 
state attains and maintains power. His central argument was that the ruling class did 
this through the organisation of consent (Simon 1985:21). This in turn hinges partly on 
coercion but also crucially on persuasion and rhetoriC, pivotal to which is, as Gramsci 
states, the striving for an 'ideological unity' which 'serves to cement and to unify' the 
diverse social forces and classes (Simon 1985; Forgacs 2000:330).4 The winning of 
hearts and minds, in other words, was instrumental in political domination. Important to 
this hegemonic adoption is that it has an imperceptible, almost invisible, quality; the 
ideological core constitutes a 'common sense', taken for granted, view of the world 
(Simon 1985:58-66; Humphreys and Brown 2002). Around these central, and here 
briefly outlined, ideas Gramsci identified other facets of hegemony, some of which will 
be referenced in an explication of the relevance of this theoretical framework to the 
institutional contraction at the heart of this study. 
Royal Albert Hospital contraction displaced hundreds of individuals - people with 
learning difficulties as well as employees. A major challenge for change agents, as 
discussed in this chapter, was to persuade those essential to enabling hospital 
rundown, such as staff and families, to be supportive of the process. In some 
institutions, referenced in Chapter Two, particularly in North America and Australasia 
closure processes were vehemently resisted by trade unions and family groups 
(Johnson 1998; Enbar, Morris et al. 2004; Malacrida 2008). The wider research implies 
that pre-empting and overcoming opposition was a crucial element in achieving 
institutional contraction. Moreover, it suggests that if staff had guarantees regarding 
future employment then they would be supportive of the moves towards 
deinstitutionalisation. King, for instance, in his Exeter study, stated that: 
4 The quoted phrases are Gramsci's own words taken from Selections from the Prison 
Notebooks (1971). edited and translated by Hoare and Nowell Smith. London, Lawrence and 
Wishart. 
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Offering the hospital staff the guarantee of a place in the new services was an 
essential plank to win their support (King 1991:61-2).5 
In other settings, however, such assurances were not always forthcoming (Enbar, 
Morris et al. 2004). This was the case in the Royal Albert rundown. Geoff Hopkinson, 
one of the former senior managers recalled that jobs were not guaranteed for any 
member of staff in community services; appointments would be made purely upon 
merit.6 In the same interview he was clear that people would lose their jobs, and that 
'redundancies were part of our strategy,.7 However, unlike some other institutional 
closures, this state of affairs did not result in collective resistance. Arguably one of the 
primary reasons why this did not happen, as will be illustrated, was because those 
driving organisational change used an amalgam of hegemonic devices (Simon 1985; 
Forgacs 2000). 
5.2.1 Hegemonic Dialogue 
Oral evidence suggests that core facets of hegemony, defined above, were prevalent in 
the managerial framing of dialogue about Royal Albert institutional contraction. 
Meaningful discussion and exchange of views were managed within strict parameters, 
enabling the change agenda, as defined by the institutional hierarchy, to proceed 
largely uncontested. The tone of the dialogue which occurred at the Royal Albert during 
these years was encapsulated in a 1985 North West Regional Health Authority 
(NWRHA) policy document: 
In considering the proposals for run-down of hospitals it is essentiaf to involve' 
a" the people who have a stake in the situation ... The planning process should 
be an open and continuing dialogue with many and varied channels, both formal 
and informal, for all concerned to use to feed in their contribution ... It means 
5 My emphasis. 
e Geoff Hopkinson. Interview May 1 sI 2008. 
7 Geoff Hopkinson, Ibid. 
e My emphasis. 
126 
more opportunities for making a contribution than is often the case in large 
organisations (NWRHA 1985:3). 
These stakeholders comprised residents, staff, relatives, policy makers, community 
workers, and the public, with all having 'an interest which must be recognised'. 
However, the 'open and continuing dialogue', as the document illustrates elsewhere, 
was limited to details of the contraction planning processes. This appears to be similar 
to what one historian describes as 'effects bargaining' in the context of 
deindustrialisation in North America (High 2005). Steven High laments: 
the narrowing scope of US labour law which once required companies to 
negotiate plant closing decisions with unionized employees, but which now only 
requires bargaining over the effects of these decisions (High 2005:196). 
Where deinstitutionalisation studies reference consultation strategies (Korman and 
Glennerster 1990; King 1991; Peters and Freeman 1992; Johnson 1998; Manning 
2008) the lack of planned involvement of key stakeholders, other than managerial 
professionals, in influencing fundamental aspects of policy agenda does seem to have 
been the usual state of affairs. One exception to this was in New Zealand, where 
deliberations over the future of the last remaining institution for people with learning 
difficulties, the Kimberley Centre, at least nominally, involved the families' organisation 
from the outset (Stewart and Mirfin-Veitch 2008). The regional health planning group, 
with input from the Kimberley Parents and Friends Association, although apparently not 
staff representatives, considered three options: 'status quo with refurbishment of the 
Kimberley Centre; partial deinstitutionalisation; or complete deinstitutionalisation' 
(Stewart and Mirfin-Veitch 2008:7). With various twists and turns the ultimate decision, 
made in 2001, was to opt for full closure, much to the chagrin of some parents (Stewart 
and Mirfin-Veitch 2008:7;29). In contrast, for the Royal Albert, and other similar long-
stay institutions in the north west, there was no involvement of people with learning 
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difficulties, their families or staff in the formulation of overall deinstitutionalisation 
agendas {Peters and Freeman 1992}. This was despite there being, as will be 
illuminated in subsequent chapters, a range of serious misgivings about the direction, 
and impact, of both learning disability policy and its implementation in the case of the 
Albert. 
Although interviews with senior management and rank and file staff illustrated that 
doubts about this specific organisational change were allowed to be expressed, the 
hegemonic nature of the dialogue constrained the degree to which these concerns 
could impact on the overall policy direction. The research data indicated that the 
primary formal forums, in which de institutionalisation issues could be raised, included: 
briefing sessions; and normalisation/SRV training workshops. 
Shortly into his time at the Royal Albert, the new unit manager brought in the Industrial 
Societl to train staff in team briefings. David Jordison recalled that the rationale 
underpinning this initiative was, 
so that people could get facts about the closure from their immediate line 
manager rather than a big meeting in a hall with a thousand people where 
there's no communication backwards or forwards. 10 
These briefings aimed to facilitate 'effective communication' to a body of employees 
numbering upwards of 800 personnel.11 Jordison explained that: 
It is important for all our staff to know and understand what the community care 
policy is, how our services for the mentally handicapped are adapting and how 
staff themselves are affected in their jobS.12 
9 The Industrial Society, now renamed the Work Foundation, was concerned with promoting 
welfare and good relationships in the workplace. 
10 David Jordison, Interview February 15th 2008. 
11 Lancaster Guardian, November 13th 1987. 
12 Lancaster Guardian. Ibid. 
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These sessions, as the Unit General Manager stated explicitly, were about the 
dissemination of information to teams of around ten staff: 
There was not much debate in a sense of two-way communication. The 
manager would stand in front of his team and say this is how it is, this is what's 
going to happen this month and then staff had a chance to come directly to me 
or to go back to their manager outside that half hour. The idea was that the half 
hour wasn't going to interfere with the routine of the work. It was information . .. 13 
The lack of dialogue was recalled with a degree of frustration by former members of 
staff. Mrs Creed, a Royal Albert nurse of over 40 years service, for instance, and on her 
own admission a very active trade unionist, remembered that: 
We had lectures. We didn't want it to close. 
You had lectures? 
We had meetings. We said it wouldn't work. But they said it WOUld ... We had 
meetings with staff - the senior staff, nursing officers - saying, 'Oh we don't think 
it will work. ' 'Oh it will. Oh it'll definitely work. It's got to happen whether you like 
it or not. ' So we had no say in the matter, because we were only staff. It had 
already been sorted that they were going to get them in the community. . .. We 
didn't have a say in the matter, we just had to accept it. 14 
Similarly, a nursing manager said that, at the time, he was 'really, really angry' about 
the way the hospital was closing, and would express this to 'anybody who would listen'. 
However he implied that this had no effect on the overall process, because: 
it was a done deal anyway. They had consultations but the consultation was, 
'We're doing it, that's it'. 15 
The, in many ways commendable, emphasis on keeping stakeholders informed 
extended to the League of Friends. Throughout the rundown period, the two most 
13 David Jordison, Interview February 15th 2008. 
14 Mrs Creed, Interview, June 1 ih 2009. 
15 Ward manager (male), Interview August 2nd 2008. 
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senior managers regularly attended annual general meetings in order to brief relatives 
and answer any questions.16 In contrast, Jordison admitted that staff team briefings, 
because of his own increased responsibilities, had lapsed by the end of the 1980s. 
Normalisation/SRV training workshops, explicitly providing the ideological framing of 
rundown, constituted another seminal formal arena in which issues relating to 
institutional closure were aired. Geoff Hopkinson, the Director of Nursing Services, 
remembered that staff, 
did express their reservations but then we'd wanted an open talking 
environment anyway. That was the nature of our workshops especially, they 
weren't all sort of chalk and talk. There was a lot of discussion that took place in 
those workshops, especially the later ones because we changed the format 
considerably, so we had to be prepared to listen to remarks that weren't 
supportive to the ordinary life model ... To be fair, to their credit the staff who just 
did not believe in it they would say so but they didn't make life particularly 
difficult for the effort, for the mission. 17 
Elsewhere in his interview, Hopkinson implied that a lack of trade union opposition was 
a result of the persuasive impact of this training regime. Although many staff were faced 
with the prospect of losing their job, he recalled that: 
It always amazes me that they (the unions) accepted it without too much 
difficulty. I suppose it came down to how we (the management) approached it 
really ... We had discussions about people's right to live in the community. We 
had to spend some time working with our union people and we got those to 
come through the normalisation workshops as well. They were able to give 
some thought to people being about to live their life, and so there needs to be 
the right sort of staff for it. Not everybody wants to do it, not everybody has the 
16 RAHLOF Minutes 1984-95. 
17 Geoff Hopkinson, Interview, May 151 2008. 
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ability to do it and so fortunately the unions were able to see this and they gave 
us no more hassle after that. 18 
As outlined later in the chapter, the recruitment of trade unionists into change agent 
positions was perhaps also a key factor in undermining collective staff resistance. 
Strong traces of a hegemonic agenda are evident in these extracts in which 
oppositional perspectives, although voiced at the time, ultimately held minimal sway in a 
rundown discourse. The tenor of this argument is further substantiated through 
referencing a recollection from one of the people who trained Royal Albert employees in 
normalisation/SRV. Steve Mee states that: 
My experience of this training was that groups had to reach conclusions 
consistent with the ideology and there was a lot of peer pressure to come to the 
'right' conclusion. The service discourse seemed to change overnight. I have 
been involved in the teaching of the theory to bewildered staff from 1984 to the 
present day (Mee 2005:11). 
A sense of 'rightness', as will be demonstrated below, was a crucial underpinning 
element in developing and maintaining the managerial hegemonic approach; although 
Mee implicitly questions the efficacy of the latter with his allusion to 'bewildered' staff. 
Overall, the research evidence, whether relating to briefings or training, is consistent 
with what Zappen (2000) described as the Aristotelian view of dialogue as a form of 
rhetoric i.e. one voice trying to persuade another of its viewpoint, and in doing this not 
being really interested in the perspective of the other for its own sake. Importantly, 
given the specific context of this study, this rhetorical stance accords with the position 
adopted by Wolfensberger, the architect of SRV. He argues that: 
18 Geoff Hopkinson, Interview, May 1st 2008. 
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SRV relies largely on educational and persuasive strategies that change 
people's mind content about certain classes of other people by changing their 
perceptions, expectations, and attitudes (Wolfensberger 2002:253). 
Such a definition, as with the Aristotelian perspective, contrasts sharply with the 
egalitarian stance of Socrates and Bakhtin, who saw dialogue as an open-ended 
exchange and exploration between voices of equal weight (Bakhtin 1984; Zappen 2000; 
Korritz 2006). 
5.2.2 Construction of Legitimacy 
Analysis of interviews with former members of Royal Albert management, especially 
those with greatest seniority, indicates that integral to hegemonic practices was the 
construction of legitimacy. This latter concept can be applied to organisational change 
when there is: 'a normative acceptance of (its) rightness'; a belief that it is reasonable 
and fair; and a perception that it is 'desirable, proper and appropriate' (Humphreys and 
Brown 2002:423-4). These authors claim that for managers 'to maintain employee 
acquiescence and commitment' they need to nurture perceptions of 'themselves and 
their strategies as legitimate' (Humphreys and Brown 2002:424). In other words: 
legitimisation involves portraying a situation as though it is fair and worthy of 
support (Thompson 1990; Watson 2003:160). 
It has been suggested by researchers that the concept of legitimacy, or fairness, is 
particularly appropriate in the 'downsizing' of organisations. In her Finnish case-study, 
for instance, Lamsa suggests that: 
managing downsizing can be ethically demanding, even a problematiC 
experience for a manager (Lamsa 1999:245). 
Watson argues that in the USA, 'restructuring, through layoffs, has been an accepted 
practice since about the mid-1980s.' However, 
because of its profound impact on people's lives, corporate leaders often 
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find it necessary to justify their restructuring and downsizing pOlicies (Watson 
2003:158).19 
A crucial outcome of such an approach is that resistance is 'effectively silenced' 
(Watson 2003:158). Illuminated below is the argument that Royal Albert management 
created a legitimate account of institutional contraction. 
Amongst those interviewed, with the exception of one of the resettlement officers, 
middle and senior management presented historical meta-narratives which viewed the 
closure of the Albert, along with similar establishments, as an inevitable consequence 
of liberalising attitudes.20 These accounts, infused with a Whiggish idea of historical 
progress (Butterfield 1973) stressed the impact of scandals, legislation such as the 
1959 Mental Health Act, behaviour modification, critiques such as Goffman, the Jay 
Report and normalisation. Phil Morgan captured the moral tone of these viewpoints 
when he suggested that hospitals like the Albert 
closed because they should never have been opened ... It shouldn't have been 
there in the first place. 21 
Likewise, David Jordison, who was from a business not a therapeutic background, 
argued that: 
clearly they're from another time, aren't they these institutions? I think even the 
most unenlightened government minister just would need to walk around and 
see that there was something vaguely Dickensian about the whole thing that 
wasn't fit for even the last century. 22 
19 My emphasis. 
20 Bob Dewhirst, Interview June 9th 2009; Mary Lawrenson, Interview September 9th 2009; Dave 
Spencer Interview April 3rd 2009. 
21 Phil Morgan, Interview March 20th 2008. 
22 David Jordison, Interview February 15th 2008. 
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Furthermore, in the eyes of change agents the emphasis on the 'rightness' of closure 
extended to the process itself. Such a perspective was exemplified by a former middle 
manager, who recalled an interaction with a Lancaster Guardian reporter in which: 
I actually said to him, 'It is really important that you get this bit right. . .. The 
hospital is closing because people were leaving and finding new places to live, it 
isn't that people are having to leave because the hospital is closing. ' The story 
came out the following Friday, and said, '---- says we have to find new 
places for people to live because the hospital is closing. ' He had a tape recorder 
as well and I did all those things you do trying to get in touch with them and say, 
'You weren't listening right. I demand an apology and all this because that ;s 
exactly the opposite of what I said.' Of course nothing ever appeared and I 
refused ever to speak to them again. 23 
This extract, as with the meta-narratives illustrated, exuded a uni-dimensional ethical 
clarity. This viewpoint belied both the complexities of Royal Albert contraction, as 
narrated in the same interviews, and, as discussed in Chapter Two, the broader politics 
of deinstitutionalisation. Importantly, however, these moral accounts helped to legitimise 
the rundown of that particular institution. 
In their interviews, members of institutional management revealed vestiges of 
legitimising their viewpoint of rundown by 'othering' those staff who questioned this 
organisational'downsizing'. This distancing provides insights into a constructed 
hegemonic stance in which hospital contraction, and its embedded ideologies, was the 
only 'right' way; the corollary of which was that any opposition or doubt was 'wrong'. 
Senior and middle management, in their inner interview dialogues, presented these 
other staff 'voices' as ones which viewed the hospital as being there for their own 
interests, rather than those of people with learning difficulties. This latter sentiment was 
23 Anonymised extract from a research interview. 
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expressed very clearly by David Jordison, who described a meeting, prior to his arrival 
as Unit General Manager, involving all the Royal Albert staff. Those present were 
addressed by the District Health Authority's General Manager, Paul Whitfield, who: 
quite courageously stood up and said, 'We're going to close the Royal Albert. 
We're getting a general manager in and the target time is three years.' I think he 
was reported as having said, quite rightly, 'We're only here because of the 
residents. ' I think that surprised many people, because I think many people in 
their hearts felt they were there because they were there and the hospital was 
there for them. So he got a fairly good message across there. But it didn't go 
down too well in al/ quarters. 24 
In addition, Jordison's extract intimated that Whitfield's action bordered on heroic, 
facing the body of hospital employees 'quite courageously' (GabrieI2000). Traces of a 
similar theme, expressed conversely, was evident in the oral testimonies of members of 
middle management. They implied that individuals who opposed change were 
cowardly, because, in contrast to those implementing change, they were not prepared 
to openly express their views. Such a stance is exemplified by the following interview 
extract: 
I know we always rubbed up against the ones that didn't quite believe in it. They 
weren't brave enough to speak out against us, but they weren't brave enough to 
speak out against the rest of the staff either. 25 
Likewise, Dave Spencer suggested that the reason why one former staff critic of 
institutional closure would not talk with me on tape was because the individual knew 
that, contrary to his claims, he would be exposed as representing a minority viewpoint; 
he was not prepared to take that risk. However, elsewhere in the interviews of the 
change agents cited here, there was an acknowledgement that some staff did indeed 
24 David Jordison, Interview February 15th 2008. 
25 Anonymised extract from a research interview. 
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'speak out'. The suggestion was, as in the recollection of Hopkinson, quoted earlier, 
that this was 'to their credit'. 
The prevailing implication in senior managerial interviews was that opposition to 
institutional contraction was ultimately entwined with staffs own personal limitations, 
rather than a considered assessment of what was best for hospital residents. One of 
the senior managers, for instance, argued that closure for some staff, 
didn't fit in with their life plan. It meant that they would have to change their 
comfort zone I suppose. There were quite a lot of people like that, some more 
than others, depends how comfortable you were there I suppose. Some people 
managed it quite well. Some people actually thrived on the change and went 
into the community and worked with clients in the community and they thought 
they were contributing more in the community, they were very happy, but there 
were people who didn't want the place to close in their hearts. 26 
In this extract these 'other' staff are positioned vis-a-vis those employees who 'actually 
thrived on the change'. Elsewhere, in the same interview, the interviewee developed 
this dichotomy between nursing viewpoints, even describing some of his staff who were 
implementing change as 'crusaders' or 'champions'. Likewise, the suggestion of an 
inability to change is evident in this extract from an interview with another senior 
manager: 
I know that there were some casualties among the staff. Some staff I know 
found it difficult to become re-established after the Royal Albert closed, after 
their redundancy, because they were sort of older and felt they couldn't adjust to 
the new way of doing things as it were. 27 
26 Anonymised extract from a research interview. 
27 Anonymised extract from a research interview. 
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Overall the tone of these extracts is what Thompson (Thompson 1990), quoted by 
Watson (Watson 2003), defines as 'rationalisation', a prime legitimisation strategy. Such 
a viewpoint is regretful about the negative impact which justifiable change, especially 
contraction, has on employees. A comparative example, in theme if not scale, from the 
corporate world is cited by Watson: 
When Christopher Galvin, Chief Executive officer of Motorola, announced the 
loss of 15,000 jobs he commented: 'While we regret the impact this will have on 
certain of our employees, we must adjust our production capacity to the reality 
of the current market ... ' (Brown 1998: 1). The relative importance of adjusting 
production capacity despite the loss of jobs is presented as an assumed 
imperative (Watson 2003:160). 
In the case of the Royal Albert change agents, the 'assumed imperative' was the shift to 
community care through the closure of the Albert, which, unfortunately, did incur 
'casualties' amongst 'some staff. Reflecting upon the latter, one of the senior 
managers, already quoted, expressed genuine compassion for their plight: 
I felt sorry for the staff, many of them, 'cause I know that a lot of them were 
disillusioned, many of them did believe that when they went there they could 
have a job until they retired and they saw that opportunity being forcibly taken 
away from them.2B 
However, in an emotionally charged statement, made at the time of the global financial 
crisis, this individual went on to assert that: 
When it closed I didn't experience one tinge of regret at all. Absolutely none. 
'Cause I do feel in the case of the staff we gave them years notice. How often 
do you get that in industry? How much notice did staff get who have worked in 
the car industry, in the housing industry in the last year? Some of those in the 
28 Anonymised extract from a research interview. 
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banking industry were told to clear their desk on the same day. Our staff had 
years, years notice. So I feel that we did it very maturely. 29 
Strongly intimated here was another strand of a managerial perspective which 
emphasised the legitimacy of contraction. The cost of a necessary and right 
organisational change was mitigated by an emphasis on procedural justice, which 
ensured that the organisation treated displaced employees in a fair manner. The 
veracity of the latter claim, which included official ceremonies (reported in the local 
press30) marking the departure of long-serving hospital employees, resonated with 
myriad oral and documentary research data.31 In a study of downsizing in an Australian 
company, however, the researchers suggest that a similar focus on procedural justice 
'arguably served less to ensure ethicality and more to secure the organizations' 
instrumental goals' (Rhodes et al. 2010: 536). 
Interwoven into these managerial testimonies was the sentiment that 'they', these 'other 
staff, regarded people with learning difficulties as being less than equal in status to 
themselves. This is the impliCit message of a statement made by the senior manager, 
just quoted, that: 
It's always been a mystery to me why, why people didn't understand what 
ordinary living was all about, 'cause I mean that's what they do themselves, so I 
don't know why they could never apply it to people who were in their care. 32 
This assertion is interesting not only because it alludes to staff seeing residents as 
'different', but also to failures in persuading staff to embrace a new mind set, a fresh 
ideology, and laying the responsibility for these shortcomings firmly with them. 
Problematising the latter assertion, however, were assertions made by change agents 
29 Anonymised extract from a research interview. 
30 Lancaster Guardian, April 26th 1991, March 12th 1993, March 4th 1994, October 7th 1994. 
31 Lancaster Guardian, January 22nd 1993, April 16th 1993. Male Ward Manager, Interview 
August 2nd 2009. Tony Dennison, Interview September 1st 2009. 
32 Anonymised extract from a research interview. 
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themselves that adopting normalisation/SRV, and its implications, could require a 
profound leap of 'blind faith' .33 
The inner dialogues of the senior managerial accounts do encompass a moral 
dimension, a moral distancing in relationship to these 'other' staff. As referenced above, 
there were remarks referring to staff lacking imagination, struggling to adapt, unwilling 
to move out of their comfort zone - all of which may suggest some degree of moral 
judgement on the part of the tellers. In other words, it was felt that it was incumbent 
upon these staff to adapt, and it was their own failure if they were unable to do so. 
These managers, in this instance, were claiming to be on the side of the residents, 
espousing an egalitarian perspective, and importantly expressing willingness to move 
out of their own 'comfort zones', to be imaginative, to dream of a changed future which 
would improve the lot of people with learning difficulties at that time residing within a 
closed community. It is possible to detect a hegemonic theme focussed upon risk and 
safety. Those opposed to change were doing it purely because they wanted 
themselves, and their clients, to remain protected and safe, as implied in a senior 
managerial interview: 
Many of the staff were firmly of the belief that many people with learning 
disabilities could not live outSide, just could not live outside, and that the hospital 
was the best place for them.34 
This viewpoint is in juxtaposition to those who, whether professionals or clients, took 
risks. The latter viewpoint was entirely consistent with the ideological stance of the 1983 
regional policy document, discussed in Chapter Four, the Model District Service: 
In changing over to a developmental approach it becomes clear that some 
element of risk is inevitable as people move towards a greater degree of 
independence (NWRHA 1983). 
33 Mary Lawrenson, Interview September 9th 2009. See Chapter Nine: 9.2.5 Liberation. 
34 Anonymised extract from a research interview. 
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Such positioning by senior agents of change can be construed as hegemonic, 
legitimising the community care agenda and distancing, and devaluing, the viewpoints 
of staff who did not concur. This othering could justify alternative perspectives to the 
dominant community care narrative not being heard as 'fully valid voices', in what 
Bakhtin would describe as a polyphonic dialogue: their concerns were not taken on 
board as authentic (Bakhtin 1984; Dentith 1995). It provided an important ethical 
dimension to legitimising the rhetoric of normalisation, and the agenda of organisational 
downsizing. The dominant ideology, and orthodoxy (Rolph and Walmsley 2006) 
replaced other viewpoints which were held by people whose stance was viewed as 
ethically dubious, as not being 'right'. Similar to other organisational changes, these 
findings indicate that; 
ethics can be regarded as the domain through which power asserts legitimacy 
(Byers and Rhodes 2007; Rhodes, Pullen et al. 2010:356). 
In the hegemonic dynamic of Royal Albert rundown it is arguable that the varied voices 
of dissatisfied staff, illustrated in Chapters Seven and Nine, concerning their future, 
genuine concerns about residents, the meaning that the institution had as a community. 
as a workplace, became lost as the hospital ran down. These 'other staff' could be 
viewed primarily as 'objects', rather than the subjects, of a community care narrative. 
5.2.3 Ideological Leadership 
Crucial to management's construction of a legitimate account of institutional rundown 
was its ethical reliance upon normalisation/SRV. Reflecting the stated ethos of regional 
health policy both the former Director of Nursing Services and Unit General Manager, in 
their oral testimonies, were explicit about the core impact these ideologies had on their 
mind set at the very start of their respective tenures. Hopkinson, as demonstrated in 
Chapter Four, was a man on an ideological 'mission'. In contrast, Jordison did not arrive 
with such evangelical zeal. He recalled a background in private and public accountancy, 
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and finance management, albeit including employment in the NHS in the years 
preceding the Royal Albert. For him, coming to the hospital, 
was just a career move. I wanted to get into general management. I was never a 
natural accountant. And I saw it as a way into general management. 35 
By 1986, when he was appointed, general management had already been introduced at 
district and regional level in the north west, reflecting the implementation of 
recommendations made by Griffiths in 1983 (Griffiths 1983; Harrison 1994).36 In a 
departure from the tripartite consensus management structure, of which Geoff 
Hopkinson had been a part, David Jordison as the Unit General Manager had sole 
executive decision making powers, although, ironically, for some staff the new 
arrangements actually felt more consensual than the previous system.37 The world of 
learning disability services was completely new to Jordison, but crucially he recalled 
that he was receptive to learning, including the enthusiastic adoption of normalisation. 
Shortly after his arrival, he remembered that: 
People started to educate me, there's no doubt about it. People like Steve Mee, 
Olive Carol, Geoff (Hopkinson) in his own sort of gentle way, you know. I would 
say something that was clearly outrageous and Geoff would just sort of say, 
'Yes you could say that, but let's look at another way.' And they'd all been on 
these PASS courses and they'd got their minds right and gradually they worked 
on my sort of block of stone and got me thinking straight. 38 
Such an experience may not have been unusual. In their seminal study of the closure of 
Darenth Park Hospital in Kent, for instance, Korman and Glennerster note that: 
The coming of general management introduced a new group of managers to 
many districts, some of whom came with the conviction that normalisation 
35 David Jordison, Interview February 15th 2008. 
36 Paul Whitfield, Interview October 28th 2009; Gordon Greenshields, Interview December 16th 
2009. 
37 Phil Morgan, Interview March 20th 2008; Mary Lawrenson, Interview September 9th 2009. 
36 David Jordison, Interview February 15th 2008. My emphasis. 
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should be the driving force behind reprovision. Others came largely ignorant of 
the whole field of mental handicap but quickly learned the new gospel (Korman 
and Glennerster 1990:64). 
The latter sentiment accords with the account presented by Jordison, although 
Hopkinson's testimony, as well as that of Tom McLean (discussed in Chapter Four), 
suggests that ideological conviction at a senior level was not related purely to the 
introduction of general management. 
In their remembered accounts of the rundown both Hopkinson and Jordison imply that 
the principles of normalisation played a crucial role in opposing escalating NWRHA 
pressures to prioritise hospital closure. Geoff Hopkinson recalled, and this probably 
relates to the 1990s, that he was, 
a thorn in the side of the Regional Health Authority sometimes because they 
were continuously pushing to close wards and threatening to withdraw money 
from it. And I've said that, 'This is not the right way to do it; the right way to do is 
to put as much effort as possible into resettling everybody who lives here. If you 
be patient the wards will close as a result of that and you'll get the money. 139 
In this extract he emphasised closing the hospital 'in the right way'. Echoing this 
sentiment, Jordison remembered that: 
It wasn't an option that it was going to stay open, so our line was, 'Well let's 
close it well. Let's do it properly. What's the point in going out In a bedraggled 
retreating shambles. 140 
In contrast to Hopkinson's natural metaphor of 'a thorn', Jordison employed imagery, 
echoed elsewhere in his testimony, which suggested that he viewed the management 
of this process as being akin to a military campaign. Although, like his Director of 
39 Geoff Hopkinson, Interview May 1st 2008. 
40 David Jordison, Interview February 15th 2008. 
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Nursing, he claimed that he was willing to confront the regional authorities on this 
matter, initially in relation to his original remit of hospital closure within three years: 
It became obvious fairly early on that three years wasn't viable. We got all kinds 
of big cheeses from the region coming up piling pressure on. And the response 
that we gave was, 'Yeah we can close it in three years. Managers can manage, 
they can manage anything you want but there's always a huge price. And the 
quicker it goes the higher the price. And the price is unhappy clients, unhappy 
members of the public, unhappy politicians' - and that was the one that got them 
really. So we managed to stretch it - I marvel at it sometimes, because at one 
stage there were about fifty people left in that huge place but we weren't bussing 
them out in lumps. And so I was quite proud of people like Phil (Morgan) and 
Geoff who sort of hung on to that principle. 41 
At the centre of this resistance, it was claimed, was the notion of closing the hospital 
'properly', in the 'right' manner, an ethical position underpinned by the ideologies of 
normalisation and social role valorisation. 
While his approach was imbued with normalisation thinking, David Jordison, in the 
extract above, suggested that tactically he was open to using diplomatic persuasion to 
resist the pressures coming from the Regional Health Authority: their fear of 'unhappy 
politicians' was a key bargaining tool. Geoff Hopkinson, on the other hand, possibly 
reflecting a nursing as opposed to an accountancy background, used 'the emotional 
blackmail' of their own policy statements regarding normalisation. He remembered that: 
We had a strategy document for the hospital which showed when wards would 
close but as far as we were concerned these were only ever estimates you see. 
And some of the discussions that we had with them [NWRHA] became pretty 
hairy sometimes because there was a little bit of emotional blackmail. We had to 
41 David Jordison. Interview February 15th 2008. 
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say, 'We are resettling people, this is our number one priority. We are working 
with all of the areas that people are going to be resettled to, but we can't just 
push people out. We want to ensure that they are going to valued living 
schemes. Your own strategy document, the Model District Service, says this. ' 
So we had to use their own material. 42 
In 1994, a conflict of values, such as intimated here, was reported in the local press: 
In what could be described as a complete u-turn, the chairman of the North 
West Regional Health Authority has suggested that surplus NHS properties 
could be used to provide services for ex-residents,"3 rather than residents being 
accommodated in houses within the community."" 
This 'u-turn' was based upon concerns over 'cost effectiveness'. The reply of the 
Morecambe Bay Health Authority, that represented the Albert, accorded with Geoff 
Hopkinson's stated position. The Lancaster Guardian reported that Barrie Abram, the 
Chief Executive, 
expressed the HA's opposition to reverting back to institutional care. 'Our 
commitment to transfer people from institutional to community care is important 
and shall continue.'45 
On one occasion Hopkinson remembered turning his ethical rhetoric on one of his 
senior managerial colleagues, in order to prevent the closure of specific wards in the 
Main Building. This occurrence would have been well into the 1990s, towards the end of 
the Royal Albert's existence, and exemplified the mounting pressure from the Regional 
Health Authority to secure the sale of the main hospital site. Hopkinson recalled that the 
Chief Executive of the local Priority Services Trust, 
"2 Geoff Hopkinson, Interview May 1 sI 2008. 
43 In the introduction to the article, the residents are defined as being those living at the Royal 
Albert and Lancaster Moor Hospitals. The latter was the local psychiatric institution. 
« Lancaster Guardian September 23rd 1994. 
45 Lancaster Guardian. Ibid. 
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wanted me to close the two remaining wards to enable the university (of 
Lancaster) to acquire it. I expressed my opposition to this ... Not them acquiring 
it. .. The idea was to close one of those wards and enable them to move into the 
one that we'd vacated whilst we emptied the other one and that was what I was 
opposed to because we weren't ready to close it at that time ... We had this 
closure plan, (the Chief Executive) approved the closure plan, that was what we 
sent to Region, so Region knew what our closure plan was, and there he was 
trying to change it. So I wasn't very happy about it. I put al/ of the good value 
stuff in my opposition speech and we didn't close it before time and the 
university didn't acquire it. So I'm bloody pleased about thatr'6 
In what Geoff Hopkinson presented as a heroic tale, he was clearly very proud of the 
fact that what was 'right'. heavily influenced by principles of normalisation ('the good 
value stuff). won out against economic imperatives (GabrieI2000). 
Integral to the Model District Service, and its normalisation approach, was the emphasis 
on the individual person with a learning difficulty, and their needs and abilities, in 
opposition to the congregate living environment of institutional care (NWRHA 1983). In 
David Jordison's interview extract. mentioned above, he reflected this dialogue. with his 
statement that 'we weren't bussing them out in lumps'. This may have demonstrated an 
informed view of hospital closures elsewhere; earlier in the same interview, for instance, 
he recounted what had happened in the United States: 
One of the things that had gone wrong in America was that they'd say, 'Okay 
tomorrow this institution is closing and a thousand people are coming your way'. 
And they'd played the trumpets and a huge sort of fanfare and it's al/ okay. 47 
Perhaps in making this statement he was aware of a national report, published at the 
time of his appointment, which reported that a hospital, 
46 Geoff Hopkinson, Interview July17'h 2009. 
47 David Jordison. Interview February 15th 2008. 
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which had over a hundred residents, when it was due to close was able to move 
them all out in two days by bussing them to another (larger) hospital 
(Wertheimer 1986:17). 
Further evidence of congregate responses was evident nearer to home, when during 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, 490 residents, just over half of the residents at 
Brockhall, one large long stay institution in Lancashire, transferred to the neighbouring 
hospital of Calderstones (Peters and Freeman 1992:48). 
David Jordison's focus on the individual was implied in an interview with one of his 
middle managers. Dave Spencer, the Resettlement Co-ordinator in the 1990s, 
remembered his fury at finding out that there was a regional directive to increase the 
pace of resettlement. He recalled bursting into Jordison's room to confront him with this 
discovery: 
'So this is true then is it?' And he (David Jordison) said, 'Yes. Just calm down a 
bit. ' And started to explain. And I said, 'So do we need to change all our poliCies 
then? Because we have got policies and staffing levels and everything else 
about resettling about 20 odd people a year.' And he said, '/ am hoping Dave 
that we have got policies that tell us how to resettle one person at a time, and it 
doesn't matter whether we are doing 100 a year or 200 a year or one person, if 
we have got a policy that tells us how to do it right for each person. ' Which put 
me in my place. 48 
What the above extract, along with the others quoted in this section, implied is that at 
the senior level of Royal Albert leadership there was considerable homage paid to the 
ideologies of normalisation and SRV. This provides further support for the argument 
48 Dave Spencer, Interview April 3fd 2009. 
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that such ideologically framed rhetoric was a central facet of a hegemonic strategy 
being applied during the years of Royal Albert rundown. 
5.2.4 Construction of Authority 
Studies charting the introduction of general managers into the NHS, and learning 
disability institutions specifically, tend to emphasise their executive power. Less is 
written about their authority (Korman and Glennerster 1990; Webster 2002). An 
analysis of oral, and documentary material relating to the Royal Albert in the late 
twentieth century hints at attempts by the senior leader to establish his authority. These 
endeavours, it will be argued here, constituted a important strand in the hegemonic 
strategy adopted during that particular organisational change. 
Baldwin and Williams distinguish the concepts of power and authority thus: 
The difference between authority and power ... is that power is inherent in the 
person, or in their situation, whereas authority is afforded to you by other 
people. It is a decision that they make for themselves: whether to grant you 
authority or not (Baldwin and Williams 1988:26). 
Although this comment is made by trainers wishing to achieve the active participation of 
learners, nevertheless the distinction is pertinent to the focus of this research. In both 
contexts there was a perceived need to persuade a group of people about the 
desirability of change. Further clarification is provided by one of the trainers, who 
asserted that: 'Power is what you start with. It's how you use it that will give you 
authority or not' (Baldwin and Williams 1988:27). 
Although not overtly using the concept of 'authority' Rogers (2003), in looking at 
organisational change, offers the framework of credibility, arguing that: 
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Change agents' success in securing the adoption of innovations by clients49 is 
positively related to credibility in the clients' eyes (Rogers 2003:385). 
Like the idea of authority, the notion of credibility is something bestowed on the change 
agent by others. Rogers suggests that this credibility can take two forms: 'safety 
credibility' and 'competence credibility'. The former is defined as 'the degree to which a 
communication source is perceived as trustworthy' (Rogers 2003:384-5). Such a state 
of affairs is easiest to achieve when the change agent is perceived as being 
homophifius, that is having similar attributes to those they are leading; a peer, for 
example. Competence credibility is 
the degree to which a communication source or channel is perceived as 
knowledgeable and expert (Rogers 2003:385). 
Often, Rogers argues, this is the type of credibility external change agents have to 
attain. These individuals in many instances do not have key attributes in common with 
the members of the organisation to which they are introduced; in other words they are 
heterophilius. This concept, along with the others discussed here, proved useful in 
making sense of the relationship between the Royal Albert's senior manager and his 
staff. 
The indications, as examined in Chapter Seven, are that David Jordison on his arrival 
as the hospital's first Unit General Manager was viewed with great mistrust by many of 
the staff. In their eyes, as an accountant, he represented a business culture, and was 
neither part of the nursing profession nor had any speCific links with learning disability 
services. He was, both by objective criteria, as well as in the perceptions of others, a 
heterophilius agent of change. Jordison's own testimony intimated that this was not 
necessarily an issue with other members of senior management who had, 
49 'Clients' for the purposes of this study can be defined as the employees and others involved 
with the Royal Albert. 
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been waiting for a few months for, not a messiah, someone so that everything 
could centre on a leader. They'd all got ideas and thoughts. 50 
The suggestion was that they were keen to welcome someone who had power to make 
things happen. However, Jordison recalled that early in his tenure he had evidence that 
he had a few bridges to build with the wider body of hospital employees. He invited the 
Industrial Society to carry out a survey of staff attitudes, and recalled that they 
uncovered some, 
amazing urban myths going round: one of which was that - I don't know if you 
remember but the whole thing about general management was produced by one 
of the Sainsbury's ... So they asked what the staff knew about me and they said, 
'Oh well he's employed by Sainsbury's and he's coming here to close the 
hospital. And for every resident that he gets out he gets a hundred pounds. ' So 
you wonder how that goes from you know, from the truth to that. But that's what 
they believed and so there were one or two myths to get rid of. 51 
An analysis of the oral testimony indicates that, whether consciously or not, in order to 
'get rid' of these myths Jordison adopted a number of strategies which could be 
construed as attempts to establish his authority at the Royal Albert. At the heart of 
these was a sense that he humanised his presence. He did this through a number of 
interconnected avenues, which included: treating people and situations on an individual 
basis; being visible and available; exuding a sense of his own vulnerability, as well as 
power; and acting quickly. Taken as a whole these approaches were entirely consistent 
with attempts to win the 'hearts and minds' of staff, in particular, as an integral part of a 
rhetorical strategy. 
Conveyed by Jordison himself was that he made efforts to make contact with staff face-
to-face. He recalled that, from early on in his appointment: 'I did get around. I went to 
50 David Jordison, Interview June 1ih 2009. 
51 David Jordison, Interview February 15th 2008. 
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see them all, or as many as I possibly could'.52 One of the former staff, although initially 
sceptical of a non-nursing manager, nevertheless remembered Jordison being, 
as a person very likeable, very approachable, presented himself well. I can only 
remember being with him two or three times. One, when he arrived, introduced 
himself, he went round various departments. Also, probably to do with 
resettlement, I went to his office once or twice. He was human, he listened and 
gave you a sensible answer. 53 
Similarly another senior nurse, although at odds with the General Manager's remit to 
close that place down', recollected that: 
I dealt with Mr. Jordison on quite a few occasions and we were always on first 
name terms and ... he was a nice fellow. 64 
Bernadette Hobson, who worked in the Clinical Psychology Department at the Albert, 
echoed such a viewpoint: 
He could remember everybody's name after the first time ... It gave him an edge, 
because everyone took to him. 55 
This 'edge' around the use of first names was illustrated by a former ward nurse when 
she compared Jordison to a previous senior manager: 
Jordison came then. But it was this other bloke before-hand. I don't remember 
his name to be honest because he wasn't that personal with staff - it was 'them' 
and 'us' again. And he stayed in his office and just shouted things from above 
and you had to get on with it... This other he was Mister 'So and So' ... And 
David Jordison, you knew his first name. It got better again then. 56 
62 David Jordison, Interview February 15th 2008. 
63 Tony Dennison, Interview September 1st 2009. 
64 Ward Manager (Male), Interview August 2nd 2009. 
55 Bernadette Hobson, Interview August 26th 2009. 
56 Freda Dennison, Interview May 31 st 2006. 
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These quotations suggest that David Jordison made efforts to establish contact with 
individuals in what may have appeared to be an homogeneous alien organisational 
culture. There are similarities to that described by a trainer who, as an outsider, 
engaged with a group of police officers, arguably another example of an institutionalised 
culture. Williams recalls being 'quite anxious about doing it, worried about what they 
would be like, and whether they would reject me' (Baldwin and Williams 1988:28). 
However, in an endeavour to earn authority with the group he went early to the venue to 
'have time around the group'. This preparation, as is suggested in the memories of 
Jordison, was spent breaking down the homogeneity of the group. Williams recalls that: 
I forced myself to become aware of them as individuals, to focus on the 
differences57 within the group, the different faces, the different clothes, the 
different accents, to stop me from lumping them together in one big stereotype 
(Baldwin and Williams 1988:28). 
The outcome was that he felt 'much more relaxed' and importantly gained 'a sense of 
my own authority in relation to the group.' As is implied about Jordison and his first 
actions at the Albert, Williams suggests that his strategy was employed from the outset. 
Intimated in the above extracts relating to David Jordison is that linked with developing 
authority, was the notion of building trust, establishing a rapport with the staff. Rogers 
argues that: 
A change agent must develop rapport with his or her clients. The change agents 
can enhance these relationships with clients by being perceived as credible, 
competent, and trustworthy, and by empathising with the clients' needs and 
problems. Clients often must accept the change agent before they will accept 
the innovations that he or she is promoting. The innovations are judged, in part, 
on the basis of how the change agent is perceived (Rogers 2003:369). 
57 My emphasis. 
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As cited earlier, Tony Dennison's memory of Jordison was that he 'listened and gave 
you a sensible answer'. The suggestion here is that his authority was not merely based 
upon approachability, but on treating staff concerns seriously, and on their individual 
merits; in other words, on being empathetic. Jordison himself remembered having a 
respect towards staff, regardless of their viewpoint: 
I was very impressed with most people, you know even the ones that weren't 
crusaders, many of them still had a great affinity with the residents. So I didn't 
feel any sort of animosity. 68 
When the Unit General Manager arrived Steve Mee claimed that, as will be explained in 
more detail in Chapter Eight, the adoption of a resettlement strategy was being held up 
due to internal hospital politics. He recalled that: 
When I first met with him, I'll be honest, 'cause we got an accountant leading a 
principled process it's bound to be a disaster. So I went to him to say, and his 
usual approach was, 'Right, how do you see your job?' First meeting, and, What 
are your problems?' And I said, 'Getting this implemented'. And he said, 'Right'. 
And I just remember it, it was so clear. 'What do you need me to do? Who are 
the blocks?' And then he said, 'Would you please write it in a more coherent 
way?' So suddenly - 'Whoa Christ! Somebody's taking this seriously. 169 
According to Mee, shortly after that, with the help of the hospital's Senior Clinical 
Psychologist, the strategy was adopted. Although explicitly stated in that recollection, 
the idea of being taken 'seriously' is impliCit in the oral testimony of one of the primary 
hospital trade unionists during the contraction period. In 1996, MJ Kiernan, who was a 
storeman at Lancaster Moor Hospital, decided that it was time to finish: 
I saw the Chief Executive, David Jordison, in the pub one night with a couple of 
other senior figures in the local NHS. And I waltzed up to him, just getting on for 
closing time, and I said, 'Hey Dave! I'm sick to death of working for your cock-a-
58 David Jordison, Interview Februa~ 15th, 2008. 
59 Steve Mee, Interview February 18 h 2008. 
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minnie bloody outfit, where's my redundancy?!' And everybody - you know lots 
of laughter all round. Two days later he turned up at my little stores, and said, 
'Did you mean what you said the other night?' And I said, 'Yes'. He said, 'Can 
we talk?' I said, 'Yes'. Did the deal. 60 
As with Mee's extract, the implication here is that Jordison responded to Kiernan's 
concerns, taking the initiative to come down from on high to the latter's 'little stores'. 
Intimated in Kiernan's story was a sense that David Jordison had authority because he 
did not flaunt his power. There is no suggestion in the trade unionist's account that the 
Chief Executive was put out by being accosted in a pub. Jordison himself also implied 
that he made efforts to extend this personal touch to people with learning difficulties. In 
his testimony, amidst other fond memories of former residents at the Albert, he recalled 
that: 
Some of the residents took the piss out of me on a regular basis really ... I was 
leaving one day and a lad called S- used to hang about the steps. I always 
used to say, 'Cheerio S-. Are you all right?' And he'd go, 'Yeah, Yeah.' And 
get in my car and go. We'd got this new initiative on quality and it was a very 
good initiative and I thought this evening I'd try and extend the conversation a 
bit. 'Hi S-, you all right?' 'Yeah.' I said, 'Have you had your tea?' He said, 
'Yeah. ' I said, 'Was it warm enough?' Because one of the complaints living in 
the Flats (away from the main kitchens) was that the food was cold by the time 
they got it. He said, 'Yeah, Yeah. It was.' So, I'm not getting anywhere here, so I 
headed across to the car and he shouted after me, 'It was salad!' It felt like an 
arrow going between my shoulder blades, you know saying, 'I've got you!!' Yeah 
- beautyf1 
60 M.J. Kiernan, Interview September 23rd 2009. 
61 David Jordison, Interview February 15th 2008. 
153 
In addition to humour being an integral element in both that story and the earlier one of 
Kiernan's, was a sense of the 'boss' making himself vulnerable. Again referencing 
Baldwin and Williams, they indicate that revealing vulnerability, not weakness, is 
important in establishing a rapport with a group (Baldwin and Williams 1988-3). From 
the start of his tenure Jordison indicates that he was willing to learn, that he recognised 
he was in a new situation and did not know it all: 
I gradually met people and got a feel for it. And people started to educate me, 
there's no doubt about it. 62 
Mary Lawrenson re-inforced the sentiment of that memory, when she recalled that: 
I think that we, 'we' not just me, the people that were linked to the project, 
instilled some very strong values in him that he either had already or we re-
inforced them and actually throughout his time at the Royal Albert he was 
regarded as somebody who was a people's person. 63 
This sense of Jordison being regarded as a 'people's person' was, it has been argued 
here, partly a result of efforts on his part to construct his own authority as a change 
agent. Having authority, or, in Rogers' terms, credibility, can be construed as a 
predominant element in a rhetorical hegemonic strategy. 
5.2.5 Recruitment 
Already highlighted in this chapter have been the changes in personnel, and posts, 
which occurred during the final fifteen to twenty years of the Royal Albert's existence. 
While not arguing that it offers an all encompassing explanation, a key interpretation of 
some of these shifts is that they reflected a hegemonic strategy of organisational 
change. Such a viewpoint has already been touched upon in relation to the senior 
management of the hospital, but can be extended to include the manner in which 
student nurses, in particular, were recruited to lead the development of new services. 
62 David Jordison, Interview February 15th 2008. 
63 Mary Lawrenson, Interview September 9th 2009. 
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This claim of hegemonic recruitment practices is predicated upon the Gramscian 
concept of 'intellectuals' (Forgacs 2000). Although one commentator suggests that at 
times Gramsci himself was unclear about elements of this notion, nevertheless there is 
sufficient clarity to make it pertinent to the organisational contraction under the spotlight 
in this study (Simon 1985:96-98). For hegemony to be developed and maintained, the 
Italian Marxist argued, there had to be 'leaders', whom he termed 'intellectuals'. The 
latter were not defined by their ability to think, because: 
All men (sic) are intellectuals ... but not all men have in society the social 
function of intellectuals (Coben 1998:19). 
His emphasis was on the 'social function' of an intellectual, who was a 'constructor, 
organiser, permanent persuader'; these individuals were the moral and intellectual 
'organisers and leaders', charged with 'the task of articulating and disseminating the 
hegemony of their class over society as a whole' (Coben 1998:20). Gramsci 
differentiated between traditional and organic intellectuals (Simon 1985; Coben 1998). 
The former group he saw as deputies of the ruling class and instrumental in ensuring its 
hegemony over the people, through both civil society and the state. Roger Simon 
implies that the 'superiors', those instructing the traditional intellectuals in this instance, 
can be described as 'leading intellectuals' (Simon 1985:98). Gramsci defined organic 
intellectuals as those who were allied with the oppressed working class. In early 
twentieth century Italy the latter primarily included industrial workers and peasants; in 
the context of an institution such as the Royal Albert, those wanting radical change 
viewed the 'oppressed' as being people with learning difficulties (Collins 1992; 
Malacrida 2008). Gramsci also argued that 'the working class must produce its own 
organic intellectuals' (Coben 1998:20). Furthermore, the latter, unlike those who were 
traditional, had a reciprocal, and democratic, relationship with those they were leading. 
This leadership in turn needed to be collectively expressed, according to Gramsci, in 
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the form of a revolutionary party, forming the vanguard of fundamental moral and 
intellectual change. 
Strands of this Gramscian conceptual framework of 'intellectuals', albeit summarised 
briefly, can be applied to the organisational contraction of the Royal Albert in the closing 
years of the twentieth century. The 'intellectual leadership' in the 1980s was changing 
with the apPOintments, already mentioned, of Geoff Hopkinson in 1983 as Director of 
Nursing Services, David Jordison as Unit General Manager in 1986 and at the start of 
the 1980s, according to the oral testimony, individuals such as Steve Wade as a 
nursing officer and Jim Bow. The latter, discussed in Chapter Four, was brought in to 
implement changes to the curriculum at the Royal Albert School of Nursing, in response 
to a heavily critical report from the GNC. A former charge nurse recalled that at the 
senior level during the early 1980s, 'there was a reorganisation. A lot had to re-apply for 
their own jobS.'64 Crucially, a casualty of this process was the previous divisional 
Director of Nursing Services who 'didn't get it.' According to another former employee: 
The regime, as I call them, that we had before were people who were comp/icit 
in the system. Those senior managers were complicit in the system, so they 
weren't ever going to change anything. But when you got new people coming in, 
seeing it with different eyes, you could see things starting - not change, but the 
debate starting to happen. 65 
And, as part of the senior management hegemonic strategy to influence outmoded care 
practices in the institution, student nurses were seen as having a core role in carrying 
'the debate' forward. These can be viewed, in Gramscian terms as the 'intellectuals' of 
a movement of change. (Although as discussed later in this section, this is not an 
64 Tony Dennison. Interview September 25th 2005. 
65 Anonymised extract from a research interview. 
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unproblematic concept when applied to the Albert.) Geoff Hopkinson, the Director of 
Nursing, made the claim that: 
We had the nurse training school for the district actually on the Royal Albert 
campus ... We had a lot of students and although I wasn't responsible for them, 
I was responsible for ensuring that they had a good experience in their 
allocations on the wards and that was enormously helpful because these were 
the new people. And because we had so many of them it was good to be able to 
capitalise upon fresh minds who wouldn't be too contaminated, and I'm not 
afraid of using that word, by the hospital system. 66 
This statement re-inforces the point, as discussed in the previous chapter, that in the 
early 1980s the nursing curriculum was moving away from a medical model emphasis. 
It implies that this shift was crucial in a political sense; it created 'new people' who were 
not 'contaminated' by traditional institutional philosophies of care. Dave Spencer 
remembered the impact of these ideological changes on these 'new people'. Starting 
his nurse training in 1983, he recalled that a pivotal moment in his approach to people 
with learning difficulties, 
was when we started to get the right language to use - when we started hearing 
things like normalisation and hearing people talk about things being age 
inappropriate. 'That's what is wrong and all these toys and these middle aged 
men.' Vel}' strange experience to walk round a place and think there is 
something wrong but I donY know what it is. It is kind of a parallel universe with 
a different set of rules and you couldn Y quite put your finger on why those rules 
are wrong. Then later, not necessarily through the official training but through 
things you picked up and other courses you went on you realised that you were 
being given a way of analysing and a language that you could use that could 
explain why. I think there was a lot of things sort of coming together that 
66 Geoff Hopkinson, Interview May 1 sI 2008. 
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encouraged a critical way of looking at something that people had just accepted 
would always be there. 67 
The 'right language' enabled this young nurse to make sense of 'a parallel universe'. 
The former head of learning disability nursing at the Albert during the 1980s, Bob 
Dewhirst, in an impassioned testimony, recalled the young student nurses coming 
through: 
What you needed was young people with ideas, that was what you needed. you 
didn't need a boring old fart who'd worked there for 25 years, you know like the 
lads that I've mentioned. These young lads, they were aggressive, they had their 
ideas they had the philosophy, they knew what they wanted ... We didn't need 
boring old tarts. We needed to change things. You don't change things by 
appointing boring old people. You change things by getting the young lads in 
who've got ideas. 68 
An insight into how these 'lads' (sic) could make an impact whilst training was 
remembered by a manager involved in a smaller institutional setting in the Lancaster 
District. For instance, Jenny Dunkeld, the Officer-in-Charge at Lancaster's Riverview 
Hostel, recalled that when students came on placement, 
at first I used to get a bit uptight about it, not them coming on placement, 
because I liked student nurses coming, but they'd say, 'Why do you do so and 
so?' 'Well because da di da!' 'Yes, but why?' And I'd think, 'Because we've 
always bloody done it.' That's the honest answer! No good reason at all. So it 
was good. They brought new ideas in, did student nurses. 69 
According to Geoff Hopkinson there were 'so many' of these individuals, who were 
'enormously helpful' and it was good 'to capitalise' on their 'fresh minds'.7o Given that 
his agenda, as claimed elsewhere in this chapter, was to implement ideologically fuelled 
67 Dave Spencer, Interview April 3rd 2009. 
68 Bob Dewhirst. Interview June 9th 2009. 
69 Jenny Dunkeld. Interview August 12th 2009. 
70 Geoff Hopkinson. Interview May 1 sI 2008. 
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change, it is entirely plausible to argue that this mass of individuals were being used as 
'intellectuals', and as such were persuasive elements in a hegemonic strategy. 
These student nurses, moreover, were being groomed to lead the radical organisational 
changes demanded by senior management. The Director of Nursing Services saw them 
as being people who would go on to hold vital managerial posts in the developing 
service: 
One of the beautiful things about .. , having so many student nurses on the 
wards is that one knew that many of those were going to occupy key positions in 
the new service. 71 
This was the case for Steve Mee, Mary Lawrenson, Dave Spencer and Eric R. who, 
according to their testimonies were all outspoken critics of the institutional system, but 
all went on to middle management roles, as charted elsewhere, which carried a remit of 
change.72 In addition, particularly in the case of Mary Lawrenson, they then used their 
position to continue the cycle of recruiting other individuals who 'were not complicit with 
the system,.73 As illustrated in Chapter Nine the testimonies of these 'intellectuals' 
convey a col/ective sense of being at the forefront of a new dawn. A flavour of this was 
provided by two interview extracts from those who viewed themselves as change 
agents. Eric R., as cited in Chapter Three, recalled intense conversations in the early 
1980s with other young nurses (including Steve Mee) in which the appropriateness of 
institutional care was questioned: 
I think I was at the beginning of a generation who began to think, 'Hang on a 
minute, is this aI/ good?74 
71 Geoff Hopkinson, Interview May 1 st 2008. 
72 Steve Mee, Interview Februa:;y 18th 2008; Mary Lawrenson, Interview September 9th 2009; 
Dave Spencer Interview April 3 2009; Eric R., Interview August 11th 2009. 
73 Mary Lawrenson. Interview September 9th 2009. 
74 Eric R., Interview August 11th 2009. 
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Moreover, in her testimony, Lawrenson recalled a seminal moment, which can be 
construed as symbolising a core facet of the shifting hegemony of these years of 
contraction. She remembered her entry, during the mid-1980s, into the organisation's 
middle management: 
I became a nursing officer when I was only 26 1's old and I was line managing 
people who were 50, 60 years old ... And I remember supervising Sister-. 
And she terrorised me when I was a student nurse ... I remember her tearing a 
strip off me for not wearing my hat, and me being rude to her and saying, 'Well 
I'm not wearing a hat anyway, it just gets pulled off!' And she gave me a heck of 
a time but I became her supervisor at twenty six .... And I remember sitting down 
and having to have to do these appraisals thinking, 'This is bizarre'. 75 
However, there are problems with the argument that the recruitment of these student 
nurses, allied with shifts in the higher echelons of the organisation, represented a 
Gramscian notion of revolutionary change. For one thing, as pointed out, Gramsci 
argued that the 'organic intellectuals' were recruited from the 'oppressed' masses. In 
the case of the Royal Albert, during these years, the oppressed, in the eyes of its 
change agents, were people with learning difficulties who resided at the hospital; the 
'intellectuals' described above were either students or employees, not hospital 
residents. Mee, in his PhD thesis highlights this anomaly: 
Normalisation and SRV encourage professionals to 'do' things to and for people 
with a learning disability ... language used suggests directly, or indirectly, that 
power is vested with professionals and others. Those of us who have worked for 
services which support people with a learning disability are commonly thrust into 
the role of 'architects' for the lives of the people we support (Mee 2005:17-18). 
75 Mary Lawrenson, Interview September 9th 2009. 
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These 'life architects' described in this section were a" appointed by the organisation 
itself. They were paid professionals; they did not rise from the ranks of the 'oppressed'. 
Furthermore, involvement in hospital rundown contributed to enhanced career 
prospects. David Jordison, as discussed in the previous chapter, saw his appointment 
as a way of establishing a career in general management. Through embracing the 
demands of the post of Royal Albert General Manager, he went on to become the first 
Chief Executive in 1992 of the new Priority Services Trust, beyond which he advanced 
even further into a career as an NHS trust chief executive. Similarly, Mary Lawrenson 
and Steve Mee left the Albert in the early 1990s, becoming involved with Social 
Services as managers overseeing resettlement in the community. Dave Spencer, 
another of the resettlement officers, left about a year before closure, and in 2010 was a 
senior regional figure in Valuing People. As is clear in other sections of this chapter 
these individuals invested a great deal of personal commitment and energies into the 
rundown of the hospital. Nevertheless, in contrast to some other hospital staff, arguably 
their careers were improved as a result. 
The Gramscian dichotomy between 'organic' and 'traditional' intellectual is problematic 
in relationship to the contraction of the Royal Albert. As argued in Chapter Four, the 
dominant driver for institutional closure, not reform, originated in the neo-liberal 
agendas of a Thatcher Conservative Government. Viewed through this prism, those 
agents of change whose actions were pushing through the closing of the institution 
were deputies of the ruling class at that time. In other words, people like Mee, 
Lawrenson and the others alluded to here, can be seen as predominantly 'traditional' 
not 'organic inte"ectuals'. This is not to assert that their interventions on behalf of 
people with learning difficulties were without considerable merit, but it is to say that 
politically their position was more problematic than was intimated in the oral 
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testimonies. The movement to shut the Royal Albert was imposed from outside the 
organisation; it was a 'top down' change. 
5.2.6 Opinion Leadership 
Illustrated in the preceding sections are ways in which key members of senior and 
middle management, as part of a hegemonic strategy, engaged directly with those they 
wished to influence. On occasions, however, it was suggested that a more indirect 
approach was employed. In his testimony, Dave Spencer recalled the difficulty of 
persuading sceptical relatives of the potential benefits to their learning disabled family 
member in leaving the Royal Albert: 
One family actually put it in a nutshell for me ... I went on a home visit to talk 
through the process ... They were very polite, a very nice family, and I had 
finished explaining what was going to happen and they said, 'It is 42 years since 
somebody who looked not a lot different from you sat down in this same room 
and said all the same things about why we should admit him to the Hospital, 
about how things were going to be much better and it was really going to be 
much easier for us. ' And she said, 'I am not calling you a liar but why are you 
any different and why is what you are saying right?' And we did expect a lot of 
people to take a lot of stuff on faith because it hadn't by and large (been done), 
because we were kind of starting things off nationally in the north. 76 
Expressed here, along with the notion of the pioneering role of the north west in 
deinstitutionalisation, was a sympathetic perspective on families having 'to take a lot of 
stuff on faith'. However, for the purposes of the present discussion, the important paint 
is the reference to Spencer's limited credibility as a persuasive change agent. He 
reinforced such a notion when he admitted in his interview that: 
76 Dave Spencer, Interview April 3rd 2009. 
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I had never known anybody who had been admitted to a long-stay hospital, let 
alone had a family member admitted to one. I couldn't talk through what that felt 
like. 77 
Overcoming this rhetorical dilemma, because of his heterophilius78 standing, required a 
less direct approach: 
Eventually of course there were lots of other people you could talk to and say, 
'Don't listen to me go and talk to Mrs. 'So-and-So'. She was really worried about 
her son or her brother or whatever. ' And some of the people who had been most 
opposed to us resettling people ... became some of the best advocates for us, 
for the (resettlement) process, because they could go and talk to people and 
say, "was worried sick, I couldn't sleep ... ' But they said, 'It is fantastic now. ,79 
The crucial reassuring role played by certain relatives was possible because they were 
what Rogers describes as 'opinion leaders'; that is, members 'of a social system in 
which they exert their influence' (Rogers 2003:27). In addition, Dave Spencer's claim 
that he deliberately used these individuals as 'best advocates' accords with Roger's 
assertion that: 
Change agents often use opinion leaders in a social system as their lieutenants 
in diffusion activities (Rogers 2003:27). 
Diffusing the resettlement agenda in this manner can be construed as an essential 
element in the execution of a hegemonic strategy. Consent for organisational change 
was manufactured via what were considered to be the most appropriate channels. 
5.2.7 Coercion 
Evidence suggests that the hegemonic strategy at the heart of Royal Albert rundown 
relied upon a potent mixture of both rhetoric and force. When necessary, coercion was 
77 Dave Spencer, Interview April 3rd 2009. 
78 Defined earlier in the chapter. 
79 Dave Spencer, Interview April 3rd 2009. 
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applied by agents of change to push through organisational contraction. Former 
members of management claimed that they were conscious of the power vested in 
them. Mary Lawrenson, for instance, newly qualified in the early 1980s, recalled her first 
post as acting sister on what was regarded as one of the most challenging male wards 
in the hospital. Her remit set by her line manager was to improve clients' standard of 
living. Her memory was that: 
It probably took me a good six months to find my feet but in those six months I 
realised that I had the power, and it was about power, to make some changes. 
And I didn't like what I saw and it kind of threw me back I suppose to where I 
was when I stalted that, 'This just isn't right'. 80 
This sense of having 'power to make changes' was intimated in the testimony of the 
institution's Chief Executive. David Jordison recalled that: 
Coming to the Royal Albeit (in 1986) was a wonderful thing for me because . .. 
people before that had asked for advice, but once you're in that kind of job 
people want you to make decisions, and that was new. And it was quite 
liberating really because you were taking advice and you had a lot of good 
advisors around and you were actually at that time able to make decisions ... In 
the NHS you never make a decision entirely on your own, you've got to take 
advice and weigh things up ... But it was possible to take decisions. 81 
Examining the data indicates that an early, and crucial, expression of this decision 
making power was in relationship to the hospital consultants.B2 
Touched upon here, but examined in more detail in Chapter Eight, is the strong 
suggestion, based upon the oral testimony, that certain consultants behaved in ways 
80 Mary Lawrenson, Interview September 9th 2009. 
81 David Jordison, Interview June 12th 2009. 
82 The consultant psychiatrist in learning disability hospitals had, prior to the 1980s, carried 'the 
final medical responsibility for admission, treatment and discharge' (Mittler:193). This role 
definition, as discussed later in Chapter Eight, became increasingly unclear, both nationally and 
at the Royal Albert, during the 19805 and 19905. 
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which impacted negatively on a resettlement agenda. Steve Mee, as the first 
Resettlement Co-ordinator, argued that it was the executive powers of Jordison, as 
General Manager, which enabled these issues to be resolved. One of the sticking 
points, under the previous consensus management regime, was that the consultants 
were delaying the release of residents' medical notes, an essential prerequisite for an 
individual leaving the hospital. Mee recalled that, at a meeting, Jordison told the 
consultants that these medical documents would be released because it was 
demanded by the Regional Health Authority, their employers.83 In addition, the 
resettlement strategy itself was also, according to Mee, being held up by the 
consultants. They had assumed, it was claimed, a power of veto within the multi-
disciplinary Royal Albert Hospital Resettlement Team. However, Jordison, again at a 
meeting, exerted his power as hospital Chief Executive and told one of the consultants, 
in Mee's words, that the delay to the adoption of formalised resettlement guidelines 
had: 
'Been long enough now, we can always amend it in the future if it's not seen to 
be working. ' And it never was. 84 
Overall, Mee argued that David Jordison's use of his power meant that the negative 
influence, particularly of the Senior Consultant, gradually withered away during the 
1980s. Such a viewpoint is supported by other oral and documentary data. Dave 
Spencer for instance, who succeeded Mee in post in the early 1990s, in stark contrast 
to his predecessor, did not mention the consultants in his testimony at al1.85 Likewise, 
although the hospital's social work department in 1985 documented major concerns, in 
line with Mee's own memories, by 1990 the consultants (in particular the Senior 
Consultant) were not highlighted in the list of issues they faced (RAH 1985; RAH 1990). 
83 Steve Mee, Interview February 18th 2008. 
84 Steve Mee, Ibid. 
85 Dave Spencer, Interview April 3rd 2009. 
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Having introduced 'consultants' to the research narrative, certain sensitivities need to 
be noted and observed. Although they are often referenced in the study data, as Mee 
did in his testimony, as though they were a homogenous body, such an impression is 
perhaps misleading. One of the other interviewees depicted the individual consultants 
during the 1980s, suggesting that within a hierarchy, overseen by the Senior 
Consultant, there were considerable differences in attitudes.88 Furthermore, this former 
senior nurse's testimony intimated that, as the decade unfolded, professionals were 
recruited who had a greater respect for the rights of people with learning disabilities 
than their predecessors. This new wave of appointments included Dr. Prasad, who was 
interviewed for the research, and another man who were both adjudged to be 'lovely 
guys,.87 These descriptions have added weight because they originate from an 
individual, who was both a strong advocate of de institutionalisation, and who, in a 
middle management capacity, had clashed vehemently with the Senior Consultant Over 
issues of care. However, in general, the documentary and oral data, tended not to 
discern between individual consultants. In what, as examined in Chapters Seven and 
Eight, were trenchant criticisms of their actions, they were referred to merely as 'the 
consultants'. This thesis also uses this catch-all definition but does not presume that 
such an epithet implies that all the consultants, at any given time, either engaged in, or 
agreed with, the actions being recounted. 
The drive to persuade staff to adopt the ideologies of normalisation and SRV was, as 
has already been intimated, a complex one. Staff, and families, were exposed to a 
hegemonic dialogue, in which views counter to the dominant one of community care 
being a 'good thing' were given little currency. However, the dialogue did provide a 
semblance of a rhetorical exchange in an attempt to win over the hearts and minds of 
those involved in supporting people with learning difficulties at the Royal Albert. On 
86 Anonymised extract from an interview with a former member of nursing staff. 
87 Ibid. 
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other occasions, an analysis of the oral testimony suggests that management used their 
power in a more direct way to push through ideological change. As nursing officer, in 
the mid to late 1980s, Mary Lawrenson 'stopped Father Christmas coming round the 
wards,88. According to another member of staff at the time, this was done because, in 
line with normalisation, it was not 'age appropriate' for adults. She became known as 
'the woman that murdered Father Christmas,.89 It is claimed by Malcolm Alston, the 
nurse in charge, that the annual hospital summer camp was also ended upon 
ideological grounds. He recalled that because the camp catered for upwards of 40 
residents it was viewed by the hospital authorities as a congregate institutionalised 
activity. However, Alston remembered that: 
The residents themselves got together because they were feeling concerned. I 
arranged a meeting with their spokesman to talk to the hospital management. 
We sat down and they (hospital management) were saying, 'Why do you want to 
keep camp?' And this bloke was doing so good, and he said, 'We help to look 
after the low grades.' And I thought, 'Oh God! Why did you say that?' Because 
he just set fire to the whole thing. So camp went ... I thought that's it gone, gone 
in a couple of words and it was a shame because what they had built up in 
Silverdale (the vii/age local to the camp) was a real good rapport with the 
population. 90 
The clear suggestion here is that the decision to terminate this activity was carried out 
contrary to the wishes of some of those with learning difficulties. Although Alston 
emphasised that overtly the reason was ideological, in particular the use of institutional 
language, he also argued that this cessation was partly due to the resentment 
harboured by some of the hospital staff. This latter emotion, he claimed, was because 
88 Mary Lawrenson, Interview September 9th 2009. 
89 Winnie Buczynski, contributor to Malcolm Alston, Interview May 19th 2009. 
90 Malcolm Alston. Ibid. 
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they (staff) were booking holidays on the continent and going to America and 
things like that, but they (residents) wanted to go to camp and people couldn't 
understand that and I could see that was causing resentment. 91 
Examining the nature of this annual camp is beyond the scope of this thesis; however it 
was, as indicated in the quotes above, symbolic of a complex relationship between 
'institution' and 'community'. In the end its demise, like 'Father Christmas', appears to 
have been the casualty of an ideologically based decision by management. 
Indicated in interviews by those who implemented change was that the 1980s and 
1990s saw an increasing effectiveness at dealing with abusive practices by staff. This, 
as will be illustrated below, was claimed to be a fundamental shift from practices 
prevalent prior to the years of rundown. One interviewee asserted that in this earlier 
period: 
the hospital was run for the staff ... and they didn't want that to stop did they? 
They got overtime. They drank on duty ... All sorts of bad things were going on. 92 
However, dealing with these 'bad things' was problematic. Bob Dewhirst argued that, 
'nobody ever got the sack from the Royal Albert'. Oral testimonies indicated that the 
1980s witnessed a radical departure from this lax disciplinary culture. 
Mary Lawrenson claimed that during the years of contraction, she was 'part of a group 
of managers who tackled (staff) culture through discipline'. This caused a great deal of 
consternation on the part of the hospital trade unions, who she recalled exclaiming: 
'Disciplinary hearing because you hit somebody? This is mad! What are you 
thinking about? Sacking somebody because they've stole somebody's clothing?' 
91 Malcolm Alston, Interview May 19th 2009 
92 Anonymised extract from a research interview. 
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And I remember it being like this - 'You must be mad. You can't sack someone 
for doing that kind of thing! >93 
Concerning this matter, Lawrenson intimated that recruitment practices may have been 
critical in quietening opposition. Echoing the discussion above regarding opinion 
leaders, she recalled her appointment of a senior Royal Albert trade unionist to play a 
key nursing role: 
He actually helped us union wise to turn things round, because of course he 
was the manager having to tell staff not to do it, so he couldn't then come and 
say, 'I'm going to defend them'. 94 
Mee, also a strong trade unionist recruited into a managerial role, implied that this 
disciplinary culture emanated from the top of the organisation during the early 1980s: 
There were a couple of senior people there who actively encouraged reporting -
Jim Bow and Geoff Hopkinson - they wanted to know, and Steve Wade as 
nursing officer, they were more visible, they'd suddenly turn up and comment 
and criticise. 95 
Particularly in dealing with other staff, the indications are that change agents were able 
to complement a rhetorical approach with a cutting edge. Such a combination provided 
a powerful hegemonic framework for the contraction of the Royal Albert, particularly 
from the mid-1980s onwards. 
5.3 Conclusion 
Evidenced in this chapter has been the argument that Royal Albert management, 
whether deliberately or not, pushed through hospital contraction with the assistance of a 
hegemonic approach. The latter, imbued with the ideologies of normalisation/SRV, 
embraced powerful political, rhetorical and ethical dimensions. However, as examined 
93 Mary Lawrenson, Interview September 9th 2009. 
94 Mary Lawrenson. Ibid. 
95 Steve Mee, Interview September 2200 2005. 
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in Chapter Six, this is only a partial explanation of the ways in which managers 
impacted upon Royal Albert rundown. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
AGENTS OF CHANGE: Personalities and Providence 
6.1 Introduction 
6.2 Personal Qualities 
6.2.1 Personality 
6.2.2 Commitment 
6.2.3 Creativity and Problem Solving 
6.2.4 Complexity Management 
6.3 Providence 
6.4 Conclusion 
6.1 Introduction 
It is possible, as argued in the previous chapter, to discern powerful elements of a 
hegemonic approach in the way Royal Albert contraction was implemented by the 
organisation's agents of change. This, however, offers an incomplete depiction of 
middle and senior managerial influence during these years at the end of the twentieth 
century. Touched upon in Chapter Five, but developed here, is the assertion that these 
individuals demonstrated a range of personal qualities to enable hospital rundown to 
proceed. In addition, the chapter, to a lesser degree, examines the role played by good 
fortune or providence. 
6.2 Personal Qualities 
Senior and middle managers' oral testimonies illustrate the relative inexperience of 
these individuals when faced by the daunting and complex task of hospital rundown. 
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Many of those interviewed who played leading roles were from a therapeutic, not a 
managerial, background; their experience and training resided predominantly in 
nursing. Geoff Hopkinson, with a touch of ironic humour, recalled that the challenge of 
recruiting community staff: 
contrast(ed) radically with the role, the non-existent role specification which I 
was given when I was interviewed at the end of 1962!1 
Evident elsewhere in his testimony, but, similarly, in that of managers such as Mary 
Lawrenson and Dave Spencer and, at regional level, Tom McLean, was their 
commitment to values which promoted the rights of residents; their recollections were 
predominantly of a moral hue. This dichotomy between principles and managerial 
expertise was epitomised by Steve Mee who recalled being fast-tracked into the new 
middle management role of Nursing Process Co-ordinator. His memory was that: 
I got that job because they thought I would do it in a principled way, wouldn't 
waver, that sort of thing. But I'd no experience. I'd never been a manager of 
anybody. I'd never managed a process and I'd never been involved in 
resettlement! ... So you're saying, what was I drawing on? Nothing! But on the 
other hand there was no precedent for it so nobody really knew how to do it. 2 
Although not a nurse, the new General Manager appointed in 1986 was, as the DHA 
Chief Executive recalled, coming 'from a finance background rather than a 
management background,.3 The decision to appoint David Jordison was based upon 
'the strength of personality and the ability of the individual'.4 Allied to which, according 
to Paul Whitfield, he had an excellent team of staff to help him 'get up to speed very 
quickly,.5 Jordison himself remembered that 'I was a backroom boy until I came' to the 
1 When he started his training as a student nurse at Balderton Hospital, Newark. 
2 Steve Mee, Interview February 18th 2008 
3 Paul Whitfield, Interview October 28th 2009 
4 Paul Whitfield. Ibid. 
5 Paul Whitfield. Ibid. 
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Albert. Although motivated to take on the task of contraction, he did recall some degree 
of trepidation: 
I'd always been fairly good at managing my own group of finance staff and I 
used to get down and see them and talk to them and I thought. 'Christ how am I 
going to do that with 600 staff or whatever?,(j 
An analysis of research data suggests that personal qualities constituted an integral 
element in the way that Jordison, and other managers, overcame their relative lack of 
experience. In particular, allusions were made by a broad range of interviewees to the 
personalities of managers, as well as their commitment, creativity and ability to handle 
highly complex tasks. These facets are now dealt with in turn. 
6.2.1 Personality 
In discussing the hegemonic approach, the themes of authority and power, especially 
that of position, were touched upon vis-a-vis agents of change. However, commentators 
suggest that those attempting to elicit transformations can draw upon their 'power of 
personality', a trait which is inherent to an individual (Baldwin and Williams 1988). Such 
a perspective seemed to resonate with that of two Royal Albert managers who 
theorised about the process of that particular institutional contraction. Mary Lawrenson, 
for instance, argued that: 
my personal view is that the changes that happened at the Albert were to do 
with individual personalities. 7 
Dave Spencer, in echoing that sentiment, illuminated what it meant for him, comparing 
the power of personality with that of position. He reflected that: 
I have thought about this quite a lot: what was it that made that (the closure of 
the Alberl) happen and why did I sign up for it? And it was about leadership. It 
6 David Jordison, Interview February 151h 2008 
7 Mary Lawrenson, Interview September 91h 2009. 
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was 'I am the chief exec or I am the nursing manager or whatever, and I am 
making the decision' kind of leadership; but it was also the leadership of 
individuals and their personality ... You start off being a young student nurse or 
staff nurse and see people and think this is actually as much about him as a 
person as it is about his position. You could see that there were people who 
eventually something would push them to say, 'I am having nothing to do with 
that. I resign or you do it, but I am not and don't put my name to it .... That is 
leadership of a different kind from, as opposed to management I suppose. We 
were very fortunate in the north west at that time that there were people who 
took that perspective; that said, 'No. I am going to make a nuisance of myself on 
this issue rather than do the thing I have been told to do, , or, 'I am doing this 
because I believe in it not because someone is perfonnance managing me'. B 
The conflation in this extract is of 'leadership' and 'personality', with the stress on 
leadership accruing from the qualities of the ·person'. In other words, Spencer, like 
Lawrenson, was signifying the impact of the power which resided in an individual: it was 
as much about who, as it was about what the person was. This emphasis will be 
examined, drawing upon other oral testimony, by looking at two inter-related elements 
of this particular form of power: charisma; and forcefulness, or bloody-mindedness. 
Already discussed have been the ways in which David Jordison attempted to establish 
his authority, as part of a hegemonic narrative. However, there are indications that such 
a viewpoint only provides a partial explanation of his impact as a senior change agent. 
Suggested in the oral testimony of others is that a significant dimension of his power lay 
in his personal charisma. The latter was a key factor in his appointment, according to 
8 Dave Spencer Interview April 3n! 2009. 
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the General Manager of the District Health Authority.9 Likewise, one of the staff on the 
ground talked in her oral history interview of his, 
wonderful personality, a youngish man, very go-getting ... He didn't have to bully 
or do anything. He could make things happen. He was a wonderful manager ... 
And I think that his personality got this change through. " He looked nice. 
Everything was right. So al/ the women were fine, you know. He could get away 
with it. 10 
In his theorising on organisational change, Rogers recognises the importance of 
charismatic individuals, describing them as 'champions', 
who throw his or her weight behind an innovation, thus overcoming indifference 
or resistance that the new idea may provoke in an organisation. An innovation 
champion can play an important role in boosting a new idea in an organisation 
(Rogers 2003:414). 
Such an individual, ironically given her own emphasis on the importance of 
personalities, appeared to have been Mary Lawrenson. As a recently qualified staff 
nurse, Steve Mee recalled in his interview that he was on the verge of leaving the 
hospital.11 He was recruited, however, to Lathom House (Ward) where, 
I worked for Mary. She was inspirational, a level of professionalism that was 
unheard of in the hospital ... And a great manager. 12 
This experience was pivotal in persuading Mee to remain at the hospital and ultimately 
become Resettlement Co-ordinator. Likewise, another interviewee, whom Lawrenson 
line-managed in the community in the 19905, described her as being 'wonderful' .13 
9 Discussed earlier in the chapter. 
10 Bemadette Hobson, Interview August 26th 2009. 
11 Discussed in more detail in Chapter Nine. 
12 Steve Mee, Interview September 22nd 2005. 
13 Jenny Dunkeld, Interview August 121h 2009. 
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Charted in the oral testimonies, and possibly contributing to the charismatic appeal of 
certain managers were expressions of assertiveness and bloody-mindedness in the 
face of opposition to change. Bernadette Hobson, for instance, talking about her boss, 
Otto Wangermann, the Royal Albert Clinical Psychologist, remembered that, 'He wasn't 
a threatening person'. However in attempting to push through changes vis-a-vis nursing 
and social services, although: 
very charming ... (He was) stubborn as a mule ... He wouldn't bend ... He wasn't 
a threat but determined to be a pin in the side. 14 
Likewise, this sense of persistence was conveyed by Mee in a story about himself, and 
the way he was 'fast-tracked' into the post of Nursing Process Co-ordinator in the mid 
19805: 
I was up against people who'd been qualified for years and actually done more 
planning than I had ... I'd been on strike the year before, there'd been health 
strikes, while I was still a student. And it was Bob Oewhirst, who was in charge 
of the School of Nursing, who had watched how two of us students had stood on 
the picket line and got quite a lot of abuse. And he'd wondered about, 'He's 
taking his finals next year and wants a job'. He spoke to me about it afterwards. 
I basically said, 'Well a principle'S a principle'. And so the ironic thing ... was that 
six months into qualifying, Bob was on the interview panel for that new job. 
Geoff (Hopkinson) had said to him, Well he's only just qualified, he's young, 
what's going to happen if he goes on a ward and people tell him to piss off?' 
And he says, Well he'll just go back the next day! He doesn't seem to mind 
what people think of him.' Bob told me that afterwards, 'You know the reason 
you got that job. ' And when I checked it out with Geoff he was actually very 
embarrassed but, yeah, 'cause we did talk about that. 15 
Although Dewhirst himself did not recall this specific memory, he admitted that: 
14 Bernadette Hobson, Interview Au~ust 26th 2009. 
15 Steve Mee, Interview February 18 h 2008. 
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I probably would have given Steve it if he'd been what I saw as a young and 
aggressive lad with the right ideas. 16 
The claims made in these recollections were that the personality traits of bloody-
mindedness and assertiveness were both prevalent and valued in times of change. 
Overall such assertions, especially when taken with the memories cited earlier in this 
section, hint at the importance of the power of personalities in that period of 
organisational change. 
6.2.2 Commitment 
As part of its 1986 evaluation of the progress made in England by regional health 
authorities in progressing a deinstitutionalisation agenda, CMH invited the views of 
those involved in such a process. It reported that one respondent: 
felt that in her region a continuity of staff who were committed to change in 
mental handicap services had been a Significant factor in ensuring that the 
situation was not allowed to stagnate (Wertheimer, Ineichen et al. 1985:65). 
Such sentiments are replicated in other studies of institutional closures in the UK 
(Korman and Glennerster 1990; King 1991). A data analysis for the Royal Albert, 
moreover, indicated that such a statement may have some currency when examining 
the contribution made by agents of change to its contraction. In illuminating this point, 
there is an awareness that the analysis probably excludes a number of 'unsung heroes' 
at a managerial level. This state of affairs merely reflects the pragmatic limitations of the 
study, not the potential significance of their efforts. This caveat notwithstanding, it is 
possible to identify key figures at a senior level, for instance, who were involved 
throughout most of the rundown period. Geoff Hopkinson, for instance, as divisional 
Director of Nursing Services was in post from 1983 to the end of November 1995; 
likewise, Phi I Morgan, a nurse from the late 1960s, was responsible for the ward 
16 Bob Dewhirst, Interview June 9th 2009. 
177 
closure strategy from the mid 1980s into the 1990s. Furthermore, he was the hands-on 
senior figure, after the departure of Geoff Hopkinson. overseeing the hospital's final 
months. David Jordison, from his introduction as Unit General Manager in 1986, was 
still involved as Chief Executive of the Priority Services Trust in 1996. Arguably such 
commitment at a senior level provided a significant degree of stability amidst such 
organisational upheaval. 
Similarly, there were signs of continuity amongst Royal Albert change agents, other 
than those operating at the top of the hierarchy. From its inception in 1985. the 
organisation only had three principal Resettlement Co-ordinators: the first of these, 
Steve Mee was in post until the early 1990s: and the second, Dave Spencer, who had 
worked as an assistant to Mee for a number of years, took over until leaving less than a 
year before closure. Another significant member of the team of people actively involved 
in resettlement, as well as other aspects of the changing agendas of these years, was 
the Senior Clinical Psychologist, Otto Wangermann, present from the late 1970s 
onwards. In addition. documentary and oral evidence suggests that many of the social 
workers were present throughout most of the years of rundown. 
Referenced in the oral testimonies was the contribution of hospital staff departing to 
work with former hospital residents in their new homes. At a managerial level, for 
instance, this was the case for Steve Mee, Eric R., Mary Lawrenson, Dave Spencer -
all committed to promulgating a deinstitutionalisation agenda while working in the 
hospital. The importance of this personnel bridge between Institution and community for 
the closure process, which included key contributions from rank and file staff, was 
highlighted by Spencer. In his testimony he intimated that resettlement. which was 
crucial to the running down of the hospital, could, 
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never have worked if people who had lived and grown up in Lancaster hadn't 
decided that they were going to go and work in Manchester or Liverpool or 
wherever ... The knowledge and skills both about individuals and about people 
with learning disabilities in general sat in a few locations and if people hadn't 
been prepared to get up and move and take some fairly big life decisions of their 
own; which I didn't do. I never lived more than 12 or 15 miles away from the 
Royal Albert Hospital and it was fairly easy for me. I didn't have to uproot my 
family, but there were people who did and I think that they are the ones that 
made the biggest difference in the end. Because if they hadn't I don't know what 
we would have done. I think we would have had people being supported by 
people who had no idea what they were doing, which did occasionally happen, 
staff being recruited in a rush because there was a deadline to meet. 17 
Although the primary focus of this study is on what happened within the institution 
during the 1980s and 1990s, the clear implication of the above statement is that the 
rundown process was also shaped by staff willing to leave and ensure that a 
resettlement agenda could thrive; minimising the negative impact of staff recruited in a 
hurry because of 'deadline(s) to meet'. While difficult to evaluate its scale and impact, 
the research findings indicate that those final years at the Royal Albert witnessed to 
some degree at least 'a continuity of staff who were committed to change in mental 
handicap services'(Wertheimer, Ineichen et al. 1985:65). 
6.2.3 Creativity and Problem Solving 
As referenced in Chapter Two, Castellani in his study of institutional closures in New 
York pinpoints the importance of creative leadership skills (Castellani 1992:208). Such 
an observation was echoed by Tony Dennison, one of the Albert's charge nurses, when 
he recalled the advent of the general manager in the mid-1980s: 
17 Dave Spencer. Interview April 3rd 2009. 
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I always felt that nursing should be a profession and we should make our minds 
up about things, but I'd realised by then that it wasn't a profession, it was some 
sort of semi-profession populated by people who dithered and couldn't manage 
their way out of a paper bag . ... The management tends to be a style akin to 
ticking boxes for nurses very often, so not too bad at managing people but they 
tend to over-manage and under-lead - so not very many leaders in nursing. So 
we probably did need somebody in ... 18 
Made explicit in Dennison's extract is the distinction between management and 
leadership. AnalYSis, particularly of the oral history data, suggests that in the 'rough and 
tumble' of Royal Albert organisational change, the General Manager along with other 
senior and middle managers often had to think and act in creative, innovative and risk 
taking ways. In other words, they had to display personal qualities of 'leadership', which 
went beyond a bureaucratic notion of management and, as explained in Chapter Five, a 
considered hegemonic approach. 
In the midst of this contraction with major implications for their relatives residing in the 
institution, and explored in Chapter Seven, many families had fears about an uncertain 
future. Documentary and oral evidence indicates that, for those implementing change, 
working with these families on occasion proved a challenging task, requiring creativity 
and flexibility. 
Mee, when Resettlement Co-ordinator, recalled a potentially difficult situation in which a 
social worker had already had contact with a resident's family. According to Mee, this 
social worker, 
presented as rather the stereotype of social worker and this family were as 
working class as it's possible to be and were proud of what they were, took no 
18 Tony Dennison, Interview September 1st 2009. 
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bullshit, took no prisoners. And the first I'd heard of this family was they'd sent a 
letter to the hospital saying, 'Don't send that hippy round to my house again. 
And if you make any attempts to resettle my son /'11 go straight to the 
newspapers and the MP. ' So leave him alone basically. And this had sort of 
stayed on the back burner. 19 
However, 'it had come round to his son's time'. At this point another social worker was 
involved who, in contrast to the previous one, 'was very straight, very working class 
himself. He wanted Mee's help, asking him: 
Would you come round, just be like a normal bloke and see if we can get him on 
board. Swear a bit, do that sort of thing. ' (Laughs) So we went round ... 'You're 
the one in charge are you?' He said to me, 'You'd better get it fucking right. 
What are you going to do with him?' So I thought, 'We've got to get this right, we 
really have. ' And he came on board. I discovered afterwards (from the social 
worker) that he thought I was all right, no bullshit, I wasn't hippy. I had gone on 
my bike, myoid Bonneville, and that was a succ(ess) - in the Army he'd ridden 
an old Triumph as a dispatch rider and so we talked motorbikes. 20 
Persuasion, not coercion, was at the core of this interaction between professional 
workers and the family. The task for the former, in order to advance the resettlement of 
a hospital resident. was to 'see if we can get him (the father) on board'. Achieving this 
state of affairs was presented by Mee as predicated upon the father viewing him as 'a 
normal bloke', not a 'hippy'. Moreover, the recollection is of a spontaneous attempt at 
image manipulation, heavily gendered, on the part of the change agents. The incident is 
recalled as an example of a high risk strategy, involving lateral and creative thinking. 
Missing from this testimony is any mention of what was said, or promised, about the 
son's resettlement, the implication is that any re-assurances ultimately hinged upon the 
19 Steve Mee, Interview February 18th 2008. 
20 Steve Mee. Ibid. 
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quality of relationship between the parent and the Resettlement Co-ordinator. Mee 
implied that such a free-thinking approach was not unusual, citing this as 'an example 
of how we tried to work with a family'. Sadly, Steve Mee recalled that in that instance: 
the resettlement was an absolute disaster ... The fellow died not directly through 
the resettlement but that could have been interpreted that way. He had a heart 
defect which had come with the Down's Syndrome that hadn't been detected 
and he had heart failure not long after resettling. But it was a very poor 
resettlement. It was a new model we were trying with a private provider and it 
was rubbish. And when I went to see the family, when he'd died I thought, 'I am, 
we are going to get roasted'. And he basically said, 'No you're good lads, you 
tried your best. It didn't work out' So we actually got him on side. 21 
So, even though the parents, as Mee said elsewhere in his testimony, 'were fiercely 
protective' of their son, the assertion here is that the father, at least, did not blame the 
hospital for the death of his child. The implication is that the personal agency of the 
professional workers which 'got him on side' was vital to the management of a very 
difficult situation; in the father's eyes, according to Mee, he and the social worker were 
'good lads'. However, the former Resettlement Co-ordinator intimated that there may 
have been strong grounds for complaint because, not only had the son had an 
'undetected' heart defect, but also a 'new model' of resettlement was being attempted, 
which 'was rubbish'. 
Picking up on the latter pOint, throughout this organisational change, but particularly in 
the early days, there was a need for change agents to embrace trial and error as they 
developed procedures. Phi I Morgan, a senior nursing officer at the time, intimated that: 
21 Steve Mee, Interview February 18th 2008. 
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It was pretty much learn as you go along and what we did was learn by our own 
mistakes. 22 
The problem, and pressure, was, as highlighted in Mee's narrative extract, that this 
experiential process could impact on vulnerable people; 'they're not', as one social 
worker stated, 'cans of beans'.23 Mee provided an example of where an error of 
judgement resulted in a tightening of procedures for dealing with families. In his early 
days as Resettlement Co-ordinator he recalled a situation in which the family contacted 
the hospital to see their brother only to discover that he had been resettled without their 
knowledge. Understandably they were irate, threatening, as with the family quoted 
above, to take the matter to their MP. So, 
David (Jordison) said,' What are we going to do about this?' I said, 'Welll'lI write 
to them. ' I actually laid the cards on the table and said, This must have been 
dreadful for you but there is a resettlement taking place and we believe that 
where he has gone to now will benefit him. Can't apologise enough ... As a result 
of this happening we've put contact with the parents as the very first stage ... 
And it's not much help in your case but it has actually helped us to tighten up. ' 
And he wrote back saying, 'Oh thank you for being honest. ,24 
According to Mee's account, instrumental to the dissipation of tension in this situation 
was a willingness of the middle manager to openly admit the mistake; reducing the 
conflict to a human dimension. This concern to involve families was re-inforced by the 
senior manager being very clear that if the hospital ever became embroiled in a legal 
battle with relatives, the institution would lose. Arguably such a perspective gave an 
edge to the persuasive efforts made with families. After the particular incident quoted 
above, Steve Mee claimed that 'families were always invited to planning meetings' and 
22 Phil Morgan, Interview March 20th 2008. 
23 Gudrun O'Hara, Interview June 22nd 2009. 
24 Steve Mee, Interview February 18th 2008. 
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that such a critical break down in communication 'almost never ended up as a 
problem,.25 
6.2.4 Complexity Management 
As outlined earlier in this chapter, and in Chapter Four, the contraction of the Royal 
Albert was, like other institutional contractions, a highly intricate affair. The core 
rundown activities occurred over a period of ten to fifteen years and involved hundreds 
of people, as well as an array of different stakeholders. At the core of this maelstrom 
were people with learning difficulties, who needed support and guidance through 
extremely challenging times. This situation required individual change agents who were 
personally attuned to handling complex and often open-ended situations heavily reliant 
upon the ability to negotiate. 
Those entrusted with developing, and implementing new procedures recalled the 
uncertainty with which they were confronted. Steve Mee, for instance, remembered 
teething problems with apparently 'simple things' in the formalisation of resettlement 
processes in the mid-1980s: 
It was logistically fairly complex at the time because there was no precedent for 
it, so even simple things like when do you let the person (the Client) know. 
Because we'd had the experience of working with somebody about 
resettlement ... We asked the person first, got to negotiating, 18 months later we 
hadn't managed to get the receiving district to get online. So we worked out you 
started talking to districts in principle about how many they'd resettle. It seems 
obvious in hindsight but we got a lot of it back to front. 26 
Us . ~ teve Mee, Interview February 18 2008 
26 Steve Mee. Ibid. 
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In addition, as touched upon in Chapter Four, devising and implementing the ward 
closure programme presented elaborate managerial challenges. Phil Morgan, in charge 
of this facet of hospital contraction, recalled that: 
In practice it was pretty much finger in the air and hope there was a good 
following wind! It was an awful lot of negotiation with nursing officers, clients' 
relatives, the Resettlement Department - because obviously what was guiding 
us was the speed of resettlement as people moved out, then we found we 
hadn't got viable units to accommodate people in the hospital ... What we had to 
do was to plan how we were going to accommodate the people that were still 
living there for the short period of time that they'd still be there in the most 
appropriate manner, without putting anybody at risk and trying not to move 
people too often ... Logistically it was like playing eight games of chess at the 
same time and trying to keep all the pieces in the right squares! Which was a 
nightmare! A nightmare! I remember some very sleepless nights. And some very 
difficult negotiations. Because nurse managers and nursing officers were quite 
protective, quite rightly, of their services and wanted to minimise the impact on 
the clients but I had to take an almost objective view and say, 'Look we've got a 
service to manage. We've got to maximise the input to the clients so we can't 
employ people for which we don't have the income. ,27 
Conveyed here is a strong indication of the various stakeholders, the continuing 
requirement to negotiate, the vulnerability of people with learning difficulties caught up 
in this major change, and the impact on Morgan himself who recalled 'some very 
sleepless nights'. Also, although having spent most of his working life as a nurse at the 
Albert, his reference to maximising the input indicated the influence of a managerial 
business discourse (Johnson 1998). Later on in the same interview he added that this 
complex manoeuvring was further complicated by taking account of all the individual 
27 Phil Morgan, Interview March 20th 2008. 
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districts across the north west. In his eyes the challenges amounted to that posed by an 
incredibly complex game of chess; later in the interview extending this game metaphor 
to describe the process as one of 'juggling'. 
6.3 Providence 
In their interviews a number of former Royal Albert change agents highlighted that for 
all their purposeful plans, they believed that they relied on providential fortune on 
occasions. Steve Mee highlighted the fear which could surround the resettlement 
process: 
Every time it seemed like an act of faith, a leap in the dark . .. . Alan Cohen, one 
social worker I got on really well with, we used to say, 'It feels like flying by the 
seat of your pants. And something is going to go horribly wrong at some point -
either something horrible will happen to the client or a member of the public or a 
house go up in flames ... What happens if they start a fire and the staff donY 
notice. 'Cause unlike a ward where you can see everybody, people could be all 
over the house and you don't really know what's going on.' And so we always 
worked under that fear. 'And then what will happen? Will there be an outcry in 
the media? And there '11 be a thousand people wanting to say, '/ told you so'. 028 
In this extract Mee communicated not only the sense of being exposed to forces 
beyond one's control, but also the risk-taking aptitude required on the part of change 
agents. Involved at the forefront of that hospital contraction was recalled as feeling like 
'flying by the seat of your pants'. In the same interview he recollected a particular 
instance which represented a resettlement which 'could have really gone horribly 
wrong'. Three men, who were former Albert residents, lived next door to 'an old lady'. 
who had 'been very friendly'. His recollection was that: 
28 Steve Mee, Interview February 18th 2008. 
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The three people who lived there, I mean this sounds almost like a situation 
comedy. There's one little man who was frightened the police were going to pick 
him up. There's one fella who used to work at the horticultural project, and one 
who liked to dress up in women's clothing. And he was at home doing that and 
the fella who was at work came back from work and the little fella was out with 
the staff and they were just as it happened coming back in a taxi. And the fella 
who'd been at work got back to the house and he'd forgotten his key, so he was 
knocking on the door. And the guy who was dressing up upstairs never heard 
him. And the woman next door heard the commotion, 'cause he was getting 
crosser and crosser 'cause he couldn't get in. And the old lady asked him in, 'Oh 
come and have a cup of tea and they'll be back soon. ' And he thumped her. And 
knocked her over. And she wasn't exactly frail but this fella was twice her size. 
And she rung the police. So the police arrived and frog-marched this bloke out, 
just as the fella arrived back who was frightened of police. He started crying 
because he thought the police had come for him. And with all the commotion 
going on the guy arrived in his dress at the front door to see what was going on. 
And this member of staff, Why am I in this job?! What am I going to do?' But 
nothing happened and the woman didn't want to press charges and she was 
completely sympathetic despite the fact that she'd got a bruised face . ... She 
kept a key in case it ever happened again. But that could have gone completely 
horribly wrong, couldn't it-r9 
Although taking place outside the organisation, incidents such as this, particularly in the 
early days of contraction, could have affected the shape and pace of the latter. The 
successful outcome of this narrative hinged upon the generosity of the neighbour, which 
may have reflected carefully nurtured good relations, but was nevertheless, given the 
assault, perceived by Mee as a fortuitous act of goodwill. As is touched upon in Chapter 
29 Steve Mee, Interview February 18th 2008. 
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Eight, there were instances of neighbourhood opposition in Lancaster, and 
internationally public resistance did impact upon deinstitutionalisation agendas (Enbar, 
Morris et al. 2004; Malacrida 2008). 
Discussed in Chapter Five is the specific way that, as Resettlement Co-ordinator, Dave 
Spencer encouraged relatives to talk with other individuals, whose family member had 
moved out of the institution. This, it was argued, exemplified a change agent using 
opinion leaders to advance an agenda of resettlement. However, Spencer recalled that, 
at a critical stage, potential opposition from families was dissipated in a more 
providential manner: 
I remember there being one meeting in the Board Room (at the Royal Albert) of 
probably only about fifteen families, one or two of whom were very strong. They 
had been in touch with Rescare30 and other organisations. They had brought 
information proving that if you moved people out they die ... It had taken quite a 
while for this meeting to actually come about ... It had taken that long that 
somebody who was wanting the meeting, her son had been resettled in the 
meantime ... She was at the meeting and it got going and there was a few 
people all a bit aerated. And she said, 'Can I just say something? .. I was part of 
this group and I wanted this meeting and this is what I wanted for our (son), but 
since he has moved out he is so much happier.' I could have written it for her 
and I didn't know she was going to say it. She said, '/ am still worried about this 
and I am still worried about that ... But you only have to look at him to see that it 
was the right thing to do. ' It was like that was the end of the meeting, it never 
came up again ... It sucked the wind right out of everybody's arguing. 31 
30 Referenced in Chapter Two. 
31 Dave Spencer, Interview April 3rd 2009. 
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In this instance the mother was portrayed as acting as an opinion leader, with her 
message having a powerful impact upon other members of what was the Royal Albert 
Hospital League of Friends. The implication is that her intervention, although 
unexpected. was enthusiastically welcomed by Spencer: 'I could have written it for her'. 
Her contribution was providential, although, as with Mee's testimony, the efficacy of the 
resettlement itself may have relied upon a range of other more intentional factors. 
6.4 Conclusion 
In this and the previous chapter consideration has been given to those change agents 
at 'the sharp end' of the rundown of the Royal Albert Hospital during the 1980s and 
1990s. These senior and middle managers had to deal with the complexity of 
implementation. Their qualities of personality, of leadership, were undoubtedly 
instrumental in these years of immense organisational upheaval. However, at the core 
of the change mechanisms it is possible, as explicated in Chapter Five, to discern the 
adoption of a hegemonic approach. It is a combination of this hegemony and personal 
qualities, such as creativity and problem solving, which constituted the contribution 
made by change agents to Royal Albert contraction. However, embedded in the multi-
dimensional management narrative were the viewpoints of those who were critical of 
facets of deinstitutionalisation. These voices of resistance constitute the main focus of 
the next two chapters. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
VOICES OF RESISTANCE 
7.1 Introduction 
7.2 Rhetoric of Resistance 
7.2.1 Lack of Choice 
7.2.2 Selling the Hospital Estate 
7.2.3 Cutting Corners 
7.2.4 Business Culture 
7.2.5 'Special Needs' 
7.2.6 Segregation Options 
7.2.7 Trauma 
7.2.8 Professional Advancement 
7.3 Conclusion 
7.1 Introduction 
In contrast to the two preceding chapters which concentrated upon the agency of those 
implementing organisational contraction, this chapter will focus upon the research 
question: 
What were the viewpoints of those who resisted the closure of the Royal Albert? 
The primary gaze is on those voices who were critical of key elements in the Royal 
Albert rundown agenda of the 1980s and 1990s. This enables a consideration of 
oppositional viewpoints in their own right, rather than being viewed as merely reflecting 
the self interest of those who were losing out in the organisational change. The latter 
perspective, as depicted in Chapter Five, may be construed as an important dimension 
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of a hegemonic approach which othered those who questioned the rundown agenda of 
the Royal Albert. Moreover, a focus upon voice acknowledges that some change 
agents, although broadly sympathetic to deinstitutionalisation, nevertheless harboured 
profound reservations about specific features of policy and practice during the 
institution's later years. Complementing this chapter's emphasis on what was said, 
Chapter Eight will then focus upon what was done to resist institutional contraction. 
7.2 Rhetoric of Resistance 
The central argument propounded here is that, as with the agents of change, those who 
were critical of aspects of Royal Albert Hospital rundown claimed their position was 
predicated upon a profound concern for the well-being of people with learning 
difficulties. The latter, as will be illustrated, were viewed as victims in a community care 
narrative which ultimately prioritised the imperatives of finance, professional 
advancement, bureaucracy and logistics over the best interests of individuals residing in 
the hospital. 
7.2.1 Lack of Choice 
Interwoven into a critique of the contraction of the Albert was the assertion that it was a 
policy imposed upon the residents, its most vulnerable members.1 One of the ward 
managers exemplified this point by referencing a person with a learning difficulty who 
was forced to leave against his will. His memory was that: 
One guy went back to his town of origin. But apparently he'd been in this home, 
he started thumping people. Well, you see, we knew he used to do that anyway 
under certain circumstances. So they decided they wanted to bring him back to 
show him how bad things were at the Albert ... The idea was if he didn't behave 
himself he would be coming back. It was a bit of psychology on their part. 
1 An altemative perspective is discussed in Chapter Nine: 9.2.5 liberation. 
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Anyway they brought him back and he settled straight back in! He just wanted to 
stop at the Albert. He was straight back to his old chair, TV on ... They had a hell 
of a job to drag him back out again and get it back to where he'd resettled. So it 
hadn't worked - it back fired. 2 
Integral to this rhetorical anecdote is the assertion that 'we - the teller and the Royal 
Albert staff - knew' the individual whereas 'they' - the community staff - did not. More 
than that, in this tale presented as a tragi-comedy, the fools are the community staff, 
although the victim is the person with a learning difficulty who 'just wanted to stop at the 
Albert' (GabrieI2004). The implication was that ultimately his choice was denied 
through forcible eviction. Such a tale resonates with the observation of a cook at a 
similar institution, Gogarburn Hospital (Edinburgh). He described the institution's final 
months as being, in terms of lack of choice, like 'ethnic cleansing' (Ingham 2003). A 
former member of Royal Albert middle management also implied that underhand tactics 
were employed in persuading residents to leave the hospital. He claimed that: 
When they had this job of discharging everybody in the hospital, first of all they 
fibbed. Let me just say management because you can't identify people with that. 
Management had fibbed to the patients because they said, 'There's this massive 
opportunity that you'll never get again to get out into the community and be like 
ordinary people. ' In other words offering the big sweetie. They said, 'Oh yes, yes 
please, yes please. ' So they got them out and got them into things like sheltered 
housing and this and that and the other and then eventually they found, after all 
the volunteers had gone, for those who were very comfortable in the hospital, 
'Thank you very much, did not want to go out. ' They were frightened, they were 
angry. 3 
2 Ward Manager (Male), Interview August 2nd 2009. 
3 Nursing Officer (Male), Interview March 11th 2009. 
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This discourse around lack of choice extended to one of the primary change agents at 
the organisation during the 1980s. Steve Mee, in his PhD thesis, argues that: 
Wolfensberger's theories (of Normalisation and SRV)4 have been adopted by 
those responsible for service delivery and have been used to justify major 
changes in services, with consequent impact on the lives of people with a 
learning disability. These have included a change from hospital to community 
care. For those people with a learning disability supported by services at this 
time, the changes were not optional. Some individuals were made to leave the 
(Royal Albert) hospital against their will (Mee 2005:18-19). 
Although the tenor of the findings intimates, as Mee asserts, that the desire of residents 
to remain was not respected, there was one notable exception. Bill Lamb, who had 
arrived as a small boy at the Royal Albert in the early part of the twentieth century, had 
been granted permission to continue living at the institution. Dave Spencer recalled, 
with full knowledge of what life could be like on the outside (Bill) decided it 
wasn't for him. The kind of humanity which was making sure he could stay 
where he was and we had quite high level discussions about making sure, how 
is he going to get fed and watered ... That went right to the very top. The 
Chairman of the Hospital Trust was involved in the discussions about the 
kitchens to make sure that he got a hot meal three times a day despite the fact 
that he was living in a converted pig sty which sounds awful but it had been 
used as a scout hut and he was supported to do that until he died (in 1994). 
However, the prevailing wisdom was, as presented in Chapter Two, determined by 
Wolfensberger's argument which propounds that for many people with learning 
difficulties valued social roles is of greater importance than their own self-determination 
(Wolfensberger 2002). The ward manager, quoted above, extended the discourse 
around lack of choice to include senior management: 
<4 Discussed in Chapters Two, Four and Five. 
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I don't think David Jordison had much of a voice to be honest. I think he was 
told. It came from above. It came from whichever maggot was in charge of the 
health service at the time. 5 
This comment notwithstanding, the primary thrust of this critical perspective was that it 
was people with learning difficulties who suffered the most through not being able to 
choose to remain in the hospital. 
7.2.2 Selling the Hospital Estate 
Early in 1986 the local paper reported that Lancaster City Council was considering the 
potential cost benefits that the closure of local hospital estates, including the Royal 
Albert, could have for the city.6 This story in the Lancaster Guardian provoked an angry 
response from one of the parents, who, although writing in a personal capacity, was the 
Vice-Chair of the Royal Albert Hospital League of Friends (RAHLOF). In her letter, 
published under the heading, 'Royal Albert future: Who cares?' Mabel Smith articulated 
her position: 
The article 'Query on hospital sites' shows the concern of councillors and a 
prospective MP for the future of the market, but no word in protest at the 
rundown and eventual closure of the Royal Albert Hospital. What will happen to 
its residents, and who cares?7 
She went on to say that: 
Developers and entrepreneurs may cast longing eyes on the Royal Albert 
Hospital site. Surely the Royal Albert Hospital residents have first claim?8 
This claim, she argued in another letter a month later, was based upon her concern, 
that the hospital and its grounds shall continue to be used for the benefit of 
those for whom they were given, not taken over for the development of the city, 
5 Ward Manager (Male), Interview August t ld 2009. 
6 Lancaster Guardian, January 31 st 1986. 
7 Lancaster Guardian, February 7th 1986. 
8 Lancaster Guardian. Ibid. 
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as the policy and resources committee January discussion would seem to 
suggest.9 
Her suggested use for the site, examined later in this chapter, was for a 'village 
community'. Implied in Mabel Smith's argument is that she does indeed care about the 
hospital residents both by raising the issue of 'who cares' and, with her rhetorical 
question, indicating that they should have 'first claim' on the institutional site. 
Furthermore, part of this claim is predicated upon a historic right: the hospital was 
'given' to them. The assertion intimates the idea of a family, or community, of people 
with learning difficulties deserving of recognition. However, crucial to Mabel Smith's 
rhetoric is that it 'others' those who have an interest in the site. The latter, representing 
'the market', are 'developers and entrepreneurs', who, with their 'longing eyes' can be 
construed as the big bad wolf waiting for the opportunity to take what is not rightfully 
theirs. These implicit neo-liberal references are expanded by Mabel Smith in a letter 
written just over a year later to the Lancaster Guardian. In a critique of the move to care 
in the community for all people with learning difficulties, she says that: 
It appears to me that many advocates of community care, spurred on by 
Whitehall, are actuated by shifting costs from the NHS to local authorities. On a 
purely financial basis what does it matter to the tax/rate payer? It must be paid 
for from one pocket or another. Again it would be appear to me that giving 
adequate care to the severely handicapped in small groups in the community 
must be more costly but then I'm not an economist.10 
As well as implying that those 'advocates of community care' had less than honourable 
motives, she implied, in a tongue in cheek fashion, that institutional closure appeared to 
make no sense even in economic terms; community care was not cheaper than 
institutional care. 
9 Lancaster Guardian, March ih 1986. 
10 Lancaster Guardian, April 241h 1987. 
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Echoes of the sentiments expressed in Mabel Smith's letters appeared in interviews 
with former members of Royal Albert staff. A nursing officer recalled the District Health 
Authority General Manager's remarks on his first visit to the Royal Albert in the mid 
1980s, when he remarked, 
'Look at this wonderful estate.' And he was, we all thought, thinking of the 
financial worth of this bloody estate. 11 
Presumably, in this extract, 'we' were the nursing staff. In a similar vein, Tony Dennison 
implied that although there may have been elements of a caring agenda behind 
institutional closure, there were other powerful determinants: 
Moneywise and policy wise I guess it has got to be the Thatcher government 
administrations of the 80s who were trying to roll back the welfare state, 
encourage private monetary provision and get a handle on the money, the 
bottomless pit that was sucking the budget away.'2 
In this testimony, as with others highlighted in this section, rundown symbolised 
financial expediency rather than humanitarian concern. 
7.2.3 Cutting Corners 
As organisational contraction proceeded, a financial discourse became further entwined 
with organisational logistics. Interviewees referenced, in particular, the impact of a 
significant quickening of Royal Albert contraction. As charted in Chapter Four, by the 
end of the 1980s the North West Regional Health Authority had decided upon a 
sequential order of closure for its three large institutions, and, as part of this planning, 
the pace of resettlement from the Albert was to increase enormously from 1992 
onwards. Although this acceleration, as intimated by documentary data, did occur from 
that point, oral history evidence suggests that on the ground people remembered an 
increasing logistical pressure prior to that date. This was viewed by some as being 
11 NurSing Officer (Male), Interview July 23rd 2009. 
12 Tony Dennison, Interview September 151 2009. 
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detrimental to the interests of people with learning difficulties. Included in these critical 
voices were professionals involved, in one capacity or another, in the resettlement 
agenda. 
Gudrun Q'Hara, a member of the Social Work Team, commented that the process 
whereby residents left, 
was very careful in the beginning. It was later on we had to put our skates on. 13 
Such sentiments were echoed by Malcolm Alston, a former charge nurse, who 
remembered that in the 1980s, 
it was done very slowly and very thoughtfully but as it started to speed up you 
could see the financial restraints or commitments becoming paramount. 14 
Carrying out resettlements 'slowly' was because, 
it was done, groups of friends ... groups of compatible people going out together 
as recognised groups. 15 
However, towards the end of the 1980s, another Charge Nurse, who, like Alston, left in 
1992, recalled that as the imperatives of closing 'date and money' took hold, 
worries surfaced about people being put with people they didn't necessarily get 
on with. So in the early days we were looking at people who got on with folk; so 
if you're looking at a two bedroomed house you'd be looking at two people who 
got on very well, same with a three bedroomed house. It became clear it was 
less and less like that - it was a matter of, 'We've got this house here, you're 
from this area, you can live there, you'll make friends with so and so, there's 
nothing to say you won't so off you go. ' I don't think it was spelt out like that but 
it felt like that, it felt less human, less individualised. And more a case of, 'We've 
got to close this place. We've got three people from HUll. They can go and live in 
13 Gudrun O'Hara, Interview June 2200 2009. 
14 Malcolm Alston, Interview May 19th 2009. 
15 Malcolm Alston. Ibid 
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a house in Hull. So we'll gather their histories, make sure there's no great 
animosity there, but we couldn't care less if there's any friendship. 116 
This claim of a move to a 'less individualised' way of carrying out resettlements was 
exemplified by Alston when he described how a former resident, 
came to me and said that he was very distraught because he had been put into 
a house with two other people who were friendly and he was left out on his own. 
And he felt very much out on his own. I said, 'Surely J- you can make friends 
now in your new environment. ' He said, 'Well I put it to you this way Malcolm, 
when I was in the Royal Albert out of all the residents there, there was about 50 
residents that I liked and of those 50 residents half of them liked me. So out of 
that 25 I could pick and choose who I was with. ' And he said, 'Now I have got to 
get on with these other two and I feel out of it.' And I thought, 'What a shame 
that this hadn't been worked through before, just because the money was 
available and it fitted public financial credentials then that should go. ,17 
According to Alston, his realisation about this individual's predicament was something 
of an epiphany. He recounted, 
That was a real smack because I thought, What am I doing?' Because I'm 
working to try and get people into these group homes and now hearing 
something like that. But it was a good thing because it woke me up to say, 
'Things aren't black and white ... and when we are resettling into groups ... we've 
got to be dead careful that we're not putting people who are going to clash and 
can't stand each other ... ' I started saying then that old friendships were more 
important than where the funding was coming from. 18 
The emphasis here, and in the other oral extracts above, is that. as rundown intensified, 
the needs of people with learning difficulties were of secondary importance to those of 
16 Anonymised extract from a research interview. 
17 Malcolm Alston, Interview May 19th 2009. 
18 Malcolm Alston, Interview September 13th 2005. 
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finance and organisational targets. Alston's testimony, in particular, conveyed a 
closeness of relationship with a former resident, whose pleas resulted in a change of 
attitude on his part. Such a story presents an ethical stance extolling the virtues of 
listening and flexibility, against the rigid, inhumane and finance driven approach of the 
authorities. 
7.2.4 Business Culture 
A symbolic focus of the oppositional rhetoric regarding targets and finance revolved 
around the advent of general management at the Albert in 1986. One former ward 
manager recalled that: 
The guy who was chief exec ... David Jordison, the man who shut the place 
down, I mean his previous experience of management had been as an 
accountant at a biscuit factory in Blackpool. But they brought this bloke in, 
ostensibly to run the place and then close it down. I just thought it stank. There 
was no empathy there with the patients, the clients. There was no empathy 
there from people like that. In fact some of the senior nurses there was no 
empathy from them either, you know. I do get very cynical about senior 
management, I'm afraid that I bore the NHS a grudge for a long time because of 
that. 19 
In the same interview, he went on to say that: 
At the time we felt, as one of the other nurses said to me, 'He's just a hatchet 
man'. And I thought, 'Yeah, you're right'. Don1 get me wrong I dealt with Mr. 
Jordison on quite a few occasions and we were always on first name terms ... 
He was a nice fella, but that was his agenda, was to close that place down. 20 
19 Ward Manager (Male). Interview August 2nd 2009. 
20 Ward Manager (Male). Ibid. 
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Similarly a former charge nurse in his interview referred to the unit manager as having 
'come from Sainsbury's,.21 It was also claimed by another charge nurse that Jordison 
was receiving £3,000 bonus for every ward he closed.22 The sentiments expressed in 
these testimonies, including the caricature of 'hatchet man', re-inforced the claim made 
by Jordison, referenced in Chapter Five, that there were some 'amazing urban myths' 
going round.23 Although the origins of the reference to Blackpool, a nearby seaside 
town, are not known, the link with a 'biscuit factory' perhaps reflected the presence of 
the Chairman of United Biscuits on the panel, chaired by Roy Griffiths, which produced 
the 1983 report (Griffiths 1983). However, the importance of these extracts is that they 
personified aspects of the rhetoric which hinged upon the arrival at the Royal Albert of 
an alien business model of management. Here was an outsider, with strong links to, or 
even employed by, the business world, motivated by profit to close down the 
organisation. According to the testimony of the ward manager, 'they' brought in this 
individual from the private sector, against the wishes, it is implied, of 'we' nurses. As 
argued in Chapter Five, it was this antipathy which Jordison attempted to counter in 
order to develop his authority as a senior change agent. 
This 'othering' of David Jordison as an accountant not a nurse, epitomised a wider 
concern about the Thatcher government's introduction of a business culture in general, 
and managerialism in particular, into the National Health Service (Newman 1998; 
Webster 2002).24 In Lancaster, for instance, during the mid eighties those involved in 
general nursing expressed their disquiet. At a public meeting, the local Royal College of 
Nursing chairman was concerned that the plan, 
21 Malcolm Alston, Interview May 19th 2009. 
22 Charge Nurse, Interview January 28th 2009. 
23 David Jordison, Interview February 15th 2008. 
24 For further discussion about general management, see Chapters Two, Four and Five. 
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is to do away with nurses as part of the management structure. I want to make 
sure that the person running the wards is a nurse - not a former manager of 
Hepworth's or somewhere.25 
The implication here, as with the ward manager's testimony, is that nurses understand 
the care needs of their 'patients, or clients'; business managers do not. 
This critique of the onset of managerialism was extended in the Royal Albert, as 
elsewhere, to include the perspective of psychiatrists (Harrison and Um 2003; Adams 
2009). In his testimony, Dr Prasad, one of the institution's consultants during the 
rundown period, was concerned: 
when the managerial came, and there were so many managers ... Nursing 
manager, this manager, domestic manager, this manager, that manager. I had 
to write a memo to the domestic manager for anything, something wrong, and 
the memo will go from there, they will decide and then the memo will go back, 
there's a lot of memof6 
He suggested that the organisation, headed by a general manager, 'started to work like 
a commercial sort of thing'. In this new climate, he argued that there was little 
understanding of the needs of people with learning difficulties, who were often non-
verbal, and 
time consuming ... required several sessions ... These things general managers 
didn't realise. 27 
The ethical nature of this rhetoric resonated elsewhere. In his examination of the arrival 
of general management to Fulbourn Hospital, a psychiatric hospital, during the 19805, 
John Adams argues that: 
25 Lancaster Guardian, February 211111986. Hepworth's was a large-scale High Street clothing 
store. 
26 Dr. Prasad, Interview August 12th 2009. 
27 Dr. Prasad. Ibid. 
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both parties to this power struggle between psychiatrists and managers 
portrayed themselves as acting in the interests of the patients of Fulbourn 
(Adams 2009:320). 
Although elsewhere in his testimony he described Jordison as 'a nice guy', the ward 
manager referenced earlier argued that this managerial lack of empathy led directly to 
demoralisation amongst the staff. He did this through a narrative within which he 
emphasised the voices of nursing assistants and student nurses. Their low morale, the 
blame for which rested with senior management, impacted negatively upon him, and on 
the quality of care for residents. As he said, 
I got to the stage of thinking, 'What's the point in doing something? What's the 
point of making the ward look nice? What's the point of, you know, sort of like 
getting new, getting the lads new clothes, and that sort of thing because all 
they're going to be doing is going into some community home. ,28 
As well as this extract implying a viewpoint strongly at odds with the community care 
agenda, implicit in his positioning is that he (and other nurses) did care, unlike the 
management who had 'no empathy'. 
7.2.5 'Special Needs' 
Underpinning this empathy from nurses like the ward manager, quoted above, 
according to his oral testimony, was an assumption that the 'patients' or 'clients' had 
'special needs', 'special diets' as well as syndromes; in other words, they were 
'different' .29 Their nursing backgrounds meant, in contrast to the senior management of 
the hospital, that they understood these individuals. In this rhetorical framing, as 
depicted later in this chapter, the latter were often traumatised by resettlement 
processes. Nevertheless, those critical voices did recognise that for some hospital 
28 Ward Manager (Male), Interview August 2nd 2009. 
29 Ward Manager (Male). Ibid. 
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residents community living may constitute a viable option. Such a viewpoint was 
summarised by Mabel Smith, who, as referenced earlier in the chapter, was an 
important figure in RAHLOF with trenchant concerns regarding resettlement policy. In 
her letters to the local press during the mid-eighties she acknowledged that: 
With the help of rehabilitation programmes run by the hospital some of the 
'higher-grade' residents have already moved out successfully. 30 
Furthermore, she emphasised that: 
Parents are not against a well ordered policy of community care and self 
advocacy where this is appropriate and adequately catered for.31 
The tenor of the latter resonates with COHSE's position, regarding the radical changes 
advocated by the Jay Report in 1980, which expressed sympathy with the idea that: 
There should be as much interaction with, and in, the community as possible, 
whether residents live at home, in group homes, hostels or hospitals, and we 
stress that the latter must be part of the community, too (COHSE 1980:9). 
However, this nursing union had serious doubts, as did others, including Mabel Smith 
and the ward manager, about the feasibility of community care for all people with 
learning difficulties. Intermingled with concerns over 'lack of resources' (COHSE 
1980:8). a principal sticking point hinged on the perceived 'exceptional' (COHSE 
1980:7) or 'special needs' of many hospital residents. 
Anxieties about the 'special needs' of hospital residents were expressed by Mrs Creed, 
a former staff nurse of over 40 years service. Positioning herself as part of a collective 
nursing 'we' in opposition to 'they'. the senior managers. she recalled that: 
We said it wouldn't work. But they said it WOUld. And then we thought of the 
people that were bed-ridden - where would they go? The violent. Where were 
they going? ... Now don't misunderstand me, some could definitely be great in 
30 Lancaster Guardian. March 7th 1986. 
31 Lancaster Guardian, February 7t1 1986. 
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the community at things. But we were wo"ied about quite a lot of them that 
were, bed ridden and how do, where do, who was going to take them in the 
community? But there must have been places for them, so - We didn't have a 
say in the matter, we just had to accept it. 32 
The implied threat of 'the violent' to 'society' was also echoed by other staff. The former 
ward manager, quoted earlier, pinpointed those, 
who'd had criminal involvement with children, and the ones who were 
unreasonably violent ... I mean sometimes like psychotic overlay ... He'd be a 
schizophrenic as well being learning disabled. 33 
He suggested that these would not 'fit back into society'. This appeared to be an official 
COHSE view: 
Many mentally handicapped patients have severe behavioural disorders and are 
unlikely to be socially acceptable to the outside community (COHSE 1980:6). 
Much of the critical discourse about deinstitionalisation, however, focussed upon the 
vulnerability of people with learning difficulties when exposed to a wider world. Mabel 
Smith, chair of the hospital's league of Friends, forcibly expressed this viewpoint in a 
series of letters to the local press during the mid-to-Iate 1980s. These missives 
emphasised a frightening world, 
where mugged pensioners are afraid to leave their homes, which holds baby-
bashing and sexual abuse at all levels.34 
In the face of this, individuals, 'of whom my son is one' required 
a necessary modicum of protection and the freedom from being ridiculed, 
condemned as 'different'. 35 
32 Mrs Creed, Interview June 17'h 2009. 
33 Ward Manager (Male), Interview August 2nd 2009. 
34 Lancaster Guardian, February 7th 1986. 
35 Lancaster Guardian. Ibid. 
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Their 'right to lead a normal life' needed to be tempered because of the limitations of 
'their mental disability'. She implied, contrary to the dominant rhetoric of the time, that it 
was not fair to take risks on behalf of people with learning difficulties. Often framed in 
the correspondence as an adversarial dialogue with those 'officers responsible for 
getting residents into community care', Smith challenged the officers' claim to have 
privileged knowledge regarding the needs of people with learning difficulties.36 'In fact' 
she argued: 
our opposition is motivated by love of our children and concern for their future 
when we are no longer here to keep an eye on them.37 
Such a perspective resonates with an Australian institutional study. Gleeson argues that 
the Kew Cottages' family group constituted an 'affective community' (Gleeson 2010). 
Underpinning the latter were relationships based upon care 'practised and received as 
a form of love not simply an act of duty' (Gleeson 2010:12). The group's presence, he 
argues, had contributed significantly to their relative's quality of life and mitigated the 
worse excesses of institutionalisation. According to Gleeson, although as with the Albert 
these critical voices were marginalised, this 'affectiveness' added considerable 
legitimacy to the families' critique of deinstitutionalisation. 
7.2.6 Segregation Options 
The corollary of this particular 'special needs' rhetoric was that for some people with 
learning difficulties a segregated setting was required. In the eyes of Mrs Creed this 
constituted the Royal Albert itself because, 
it was such a happy place. I don't think any patient was unhappy there. They 
had everything. They had the cinema, the concert ... We took them out in town, 
we took them on holidays ... I mean it was a lovely place and the staff were 
36 Lancaster Guardian, April 24th 1987 
37 Lancaster Guardian. Ibid. 
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fantastic, you know it was one big family. And I don't care who you talk to who 
worked there they will tell you same. Everybody gel/ed.38 
Moreover, a senior local NHS trade union figure in his oral testimony argued that, 
compared with 'the community', the Royal Albert offered a certain degree of freedom, 
and happiness, for people with learning difficulties: 
There were many stories (from staff) about the relatively contented lives that 
patients at the Royal Albert led. They had a degree of freedom there and they 
could mix with each other, and there were stories about the fields where they 
were relatively secluded, summer evenings patients from the Royal Albert would 
be rutting like rabbits! ... And then they were moved out into these small homes 
in the community where there would be just two or three of them and staff in and 
out all the time. They'd lost all that freedom. 39 
The emphasis here was that the hospital represented a safe, happy environment which 
had 'everything', including the potential of sexual expression. In contrast the 
'community' was viewed as a lonely, cruel and restrictive environment. Such a 
viewpoint was particularly exemplified with reference to people who had moved in the 
early 1980s, prior to the establishment of more formal resettlement procedures, to bed 
and breakfast establishments in nearby Morecambe. These individuals had nowhere to 
go during the day and, as is corroborated by other interview sources.40 would sit in the 
local shopping centre. Mrs. Ann M. Wilson recalled that: 
living in the area when people started to be returned to the community you only 
had to go to the Arndale Centre in Morecambe and see half a dozen sat around 
all day looking lost and lonely, being ridiculed by the local yobS. 41 
38 Mrs Creed, Interview June 1 th 2009 
39 M.J. Kiernan, Interview September 23rd 2009. 
40 Geoff Hopkinson, Interview May 1st 2008; Steve Mee. Interview February 18th 2008. 
41 Mrs. Ann M. Wilson. Interview November 17'h 2009. 
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Other than the institution as it stood, one of the key segregation options proposed was 
some sort of 'village community'. Even professionals who were keen advocates of 
community care for most people with learning difficulties sympathised with elements of 
such a concept. 42 In her testimony, for instance, a former Royal Albert social worker, 
was particularly critical of the all encompassing nature of organisational contraction: 
I would have kept the bungalows open and I would have kept, not the main 
complex, but various things outside where people still have a sense of 
belonging, and a sense of social interaction, what they haven't got now. And not 
as a hospital but as a normal living _ 43 
In considering this alternative vision, Gudrun O'Hara recalled that at the hospital: 
Our farm was fantastic. They (the residents) all loved it. Originally you know they 
had the farm, and they had the cobbler, and they had the butcher. They were 
literally self sufficient ... From a Rudolph Steiner Home where I worked in 
Switzerland, we were trying to be self sufficient ... And it worked. And it was an 
interaction - people want to live in a commune. And living on a farm ... It's lovely 
to have that contact with nature. 44 
During the course of an impassioned interview, reinforced by many photographs, about 
the people she knew at the hospital, this alternative viewpoint was juxtaposed with a 
soulless picture of what community care can mean: 
What do they do, they sit in flats here, being lonely. If they go to staff, always 
socialise, we have dinner in the pub, they sit there, have their dinner then the 
staff having a giggle and a laugh, and the client still sits there and doesn't know 
what to do. We need to look more to nature, with everything. 45 
As well as emphasising a degree of sanctuary for people with learning difficulties, 
interwoven with a notion of a rural idyll, the rhetorical visions presented here hinged 
42 Jenny Dunkeld, Interview August 12th 2009; Gudrun O'Hara, Interview June 22nd 2009. 
43 Gudrun O'Hara, Interview June 22nd 2009. 
44 Gudrun O'Hara. Ibid. 
45 Gudrun O'Hara. Ibid. 
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upon their striving for 'a sense of belonging', a sense of 'community'. This viewpoint 
accords with critics elsewhere who, though sympathetic to the human rights of people 
with learning difficulties, nevertheless have grave concerns about the neo-liberal, 
individualised agenda associated with deinstitutionalisation (Gleeson 2010). 
RAHLOF was an advocate of a 'village' option for the hospital site. The family group's 
vice-chair argued, in a 1986 letter to the local press, that the Royal Albert, 
is eminently suited to the well proven village community concept, which would 
provide an element of self determination, protection, companionship; yielding to 
each according to their need and from each according to their ability.46 
The rhetorical nature of this statement meant that the reader had to take it on trust that 
the village idea is 'well proven'. By the late 1980s this positioning translated into active 
support for Rescare47 in their campaign to retain a form of congregate residential care. 
Responding to a request from the national campaigning group, RAHLOF wrote to the 
local Lancaster MP, Elaine Kellet-Bowman, asking her to support the House of 
Commons Early Day Motion: 
Mental Handicap and Village Communities: 
That this House joins with the relatives of severely handicapped people in 
welcoming the policy aims and service objectives of the Secretary of State's 
Circular HC (88)43; notes the statement that the closure of mental hospitals is 
not a primary aim of the community care policy, and expresses its support 
instead for the evolution of suitable hospitals into village communities serving 
both in-patients and out-patients who suffer from mental handicap.48 
The letter to Kellet-Bowman preCipitated a flurry of correspondence involving the local 
MP, the Department of Health, and the Regional Health Authority. In essence, the MP 
46 Lancaster Guardian, February 7th 1986. 
47 See Chapter Two. 
48 Letter (copy) from Mrs. Ann M. Wilson, Secretary of RAHLOF to Dame Elaine Kellet-Bowman 
MP, February 10th 1989. 
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argued that Early Day Motions were futile, but was sympathetic to RAHLOF's pleas, 
and so contacted the Department of Health directly.49 The outcome was that the 
government itself expressed measured support for the notion of 'village communities,50 
but the Regional Health Authority did not;51 after which point the RAHLOF protest was 
somewhat dissipated. However, the rhetoric of the families' group had viewed 'residents 
who are often profoundly handicapped' as a special case requiring segregated care. 
The latter could be provided in the form of 'a village community, utilising the 'facilities 
and support' available at the Royal Albert.52 
In contrast to the views outlined, members of former staff were less prescriptive in their 
stance on segregated care. Phil Morgan, for instance, a senior member of the 
management team which closed the Albert, stated that: 
I did believe there was a need, and this has been subsequently been born out, 
for some sort of local provision for people who need structured care and support 
because of their individual complex needs .... It didn't need to be part of that 
site. 53 
Likewise, one of the ward managers concurred with the tone of that statement, and 
argued for some sort of segregated units for people who were either a danger to 
society, or were particularly vulnerable.54 Such a model was adopted for Calderstones, 
as part of its closure plan. The largest of the three long-stay establishments in 
Lancashire, Calderstones retained secure units on site, estimated in 2008 to be home 
49 Letter from Dame Elaine Kellet-Bowman MP to Mrs. Ann M. Wilson, February 15th , 1989; 
Letter from Dame Elaine Kellet-Bowman MP to Roger Freeman MP, Parliamentary Under-
Secretary of State, Department of Health, February 15th 1989. 
50 Letter from Roger Freeman MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of 
Health to Dame Elaine Kellet-Bowman MP, March 14th 1989. 
51 Letter from Bruce Martin, North West Regional Health Authority Chairman to Dame Elaine 
Kellet-Bowman MP, April 18th 1989. 
52 Letter (copy) from Mrs. Ann M. Wilson, Secretary of RAHLOF to Dame Elaine Kellet-Bowman 
MP, February 10th 1989. 
53 Phil Morgan, Interview March 20th 2008. 
54 Male Ward Manager, Interview August 2nd 2009. 
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to upwards of 150 people with learning difficulties.55 However, neither of the former 
Royal Albert staff, in their oral accounts, pressed for the retention of the hospital itself, 
nor a form of village community. 
The rhetoric which questioned elements of deinstitutionalisation becomes further 
complicated when account is taken of an interview with Steve Mee, the former 
Resettlement Co-ordinator. He recalled that, during the 1980s, he thought that: 
'The hospital's clearly wrong and abusive in my opinion, but is this (community 
care) necessarily the alternative?' And it was always presented as this or that. , 
used to often have doubts about whether it was really the right thing. It was 
better than what was there but was it what we should have been pursuing 
really't6 
His core question was: 
What's the best way of providing support to people? Because I think it's almost 
become a cliche really but I think that all that happened was at times that we put 
people into mini-institutions. 57 
What concerned Mee in particular was that in the congregate setting of the hospital 
'there had to be collusion for abuse ... 'cause there are so many people about'. He 
contrasted this with the relative isolation of a house in a community where, as a social 
services housing manager after leaving the Albert, he recalled that: 
There would be one person on a sleep-in with particularly vulnerable people and 
that's what used to wake me up at night thinking it could be happening now and 
there's no way, they're smart enough, you're just not quite happy about them, 
but nothing you can pin down, nothing you can quite pin down. 58 
55 Tom McLean, Interview September 8th 2008. 
56 Steve Mee, Interview February 18th 2008. 
57 Steve Mee. Ibid. 
58 Steve Mee. Ibid. 
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Such observations, as made by the former Resettlement Co-ordinator, extended the 
oppositional rhetoric beyond 'bricks and mortar' into one focussed upon relationships 
and accountability. 
7.2.7 Trauma 
Integral to the rhetoric of those critical of the organisational contraction are claims 
regarding its traumatic consequences for hospital residents. Narratives are of a tragic 
nature, portraying the person with a learning difficulty as a victim of uncaring services. 
An extreme instance of this is the assertion that the disruption of these years, and the 
way the changes were implemented, directly contributed to premature, and unhappy, 
deaths of people with learning difficulties. In his interview, a former ward manager, for 
instance, did not think 'the actual (overall) resettlement itself was done very 
sympathetically', and cited two instances to support this claim: 
Not off my ward, but there was a woman there and she was resettled with 
terminal breast cancer. She died about three or four weeks later. . .. Most of her 
adult life she'd lived there, she loved the Royal Albert. She was a real character. 
She used to wander around everywhere. She used to come on any ward, you'd 
make her a brew, that sort of thing, give her a bite to eat - consequently she was 
quite a big woman! But she was happy. And she was diagnosed with this breast 
cancer. And they sent her out to some community home or other that had staff 
that didn't know her and she died about a month after she'd gone. 59 
In addition the same member of staff remembered that, 
I used to know a little guy called - . I worked with him extensively over the 
years, right from being a student, and they resettled him, or unsettled him as I 
said, and they sent him to a place ... I think he popped his clogs after about two 
months. There was quite a few went out and died, quite a few that all of a 
59 Ward Manager (Male), Interview August 2nd 2008. 
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sudden found they had these stresses and strains they'd never had before -
Yeah, OK it was their right to be able to pay a mortgage or to be able to pay rent 
but they'd never had to bother with it before. To my mind that was cruel. 60 
This was the viewpoint of a professional who was angry about the agenda of total 
closure and the indiscriminate resettlement (or 'unsettlement') of all residents. He 
stayed to the final week-end of closure, losing his job in the process. His is a critical 
voice, imbued, even in this short extract, with suggestions that resettlement was neither 
about individual choice, nor executed in a caring manner: both individuals were 'sent', 
suggesting they were treated as some inanimate parcel; the organisation itself was a 
happy and loving place, with freedom of movement, cups of tea, staff who knew you; for 
the woman, in particular, this contrasted with 'some community home or other that had 
staff that didn't know her'. Ultimately the message conveyed is that resettlement, for 
'quite a few' was 'cruel', leading to premature fatalities either from increased 
responsibilities or inadequate support. 
Such a perspective, that trauma associated with migrations within and beyond the 
hospital could contribute to death, does resonate with some other commentaries on 
deinstitutionalisation (Blackhurst 1995; Smith and Crome 2000; Hamlin and Oakes 
2008). Furthermore, Steve Mee, who was highly critical of the institutional model, 
claimed that the death rate among older hospital residents did increase during these 
years as a result of the trauma of inter-ward moves: 
Some people ended up moving quite a lot. And one thing that was predicted and 
it actually happened, the death rate shot up amongst elderly people ... /t was 
probably dramatic. It rose significantly, and it was noted. And at regional/evel, 
and this is very dark, but you can imagine this being talked about in a meeting in 
Manchester remote from the people we're talking about ... In the early days we 
60 Ward Manager (Male). Interview August 2nd 2008. 
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slipped behind a bit all across the board because it was new ... so numbers 
were low on resettlement but the deaths rose and it was noted, it meant that the 
numbers remained on target. So I remember 'some people being permanently 
resettled' became a euphemism for death! All vel}' dark but it happens doesn't 
it? I know when they've had to close some elderly people's homes in Lancaster 
a lot of people just die, because of the change. ,,(if 
However, as will be illustrated in Chapter Nine, there were members of middle 
management who vehemently contested a discourse linking hospital rundown to the 
death of people with learning difficulties. 
7.2.8 Professional Advancement 
Running through the rhetoric of resistance was the theme that the best interests of 
people with learning difficulties, particularly those seen as the most vulnerable, were iII-
served by a Royal Albert deinstitutionalisation agenda. A further expression of this was 
the argument that the organisational contraction was carried out for reasons of self 
aggrandisement by certain individual employees.62 A former charge nurse, for instance, 
angrily stated that: 
Too many people (staff) jumped on the bandwagon for their own career 
advancement. 63 
Anecdotally, a ward manager, illuminated a similar point: 
I told anybody who'd listen that like -I won't go into names - but the senior 
managers there, I said, 'I think it sucks, I think it stinks'. The guy that came down 
and gave me my redundancy notice I gave him a right earful. I said, 'It's all right 
for you 'cause,' I said, 'You're like Mr. Teflon. You'll just slide across into another 
61 Steve Mee, Interview February 18th 2008. 
62 This provides an alternative perspective on the theme of commitment examined in Chapter 
Six. 
63 Charge Nurse, Interview January 28th 2009. 
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job. You'll slide into the community job, you know.' And I said, 'What do we do?' 
And he couldn't answer it. 64 
Previously, examined earlier in the chapter, this same former member of staff had 
referred to the Unit General Manager as 'hatchet man'. Here another manager is 
described as 'Mr Teflon' suggesting a propensity for nicknames to distil the essence of 
a rhetorical position. Although juxtaposed with a decline in his own job prospects, the 
implication of this extract, and the previous one, is that the rundown of the Royal Albert 
was personally advantageous to those prepared to support that change. 
7.3 Conclusion 
The emphasis in this chapter has been on unpicking the key threads of a resistance 
rhetoric to the organisational contraction of the Royal Albert Hospital during the 19808 
and 19905. In Chapter Eight the focus shifts to identifying, through the oral and 
documentary data, ways in which those voices were translated into acts of resistance. 
64 Ward Manager (Male), Interview August 2nd 2009 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
ACTS OF RESISTANCE 
8.1 Introduction 
8.2 Formal Avenues of Resistance 
8.2.1.Meetings involving Organisational Management 
8.2.1.1 Hospital Staff Meetings 
8.2.1.2 Senior Managerial Meetings 
8.2.1.3 Resettlement Team Meetings 
8.2.2 Client Case Conferences 
8.2.3 Resettlements 
8.3 Informal Avenues of Resistance 
8.4 External Avenues of Resistance 
8.5 Impact of Resistance 
8.6 Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
Complementing the rhetorical focus of the previous chapter, here attention shifts to an 
analysiS of acts of resistance. In doing this it will answer the research question: 
How did they (i.e. resisters) express their resistance? 
There was a consensus amongst senior management that those members of staff or 
families who questioned facets of organisational change at the Albert were unable to 
present an effective response. This viewpoint was expressed by the General Manager, 
in relationship to disgruntled staff: 
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If there was any deliberate attempt to hold anything up they must have been 
spitting in the wind ... Any staff action didn't hold It up. Little bits of mischief but 
that's all. There was nothing significant that worked for that school of 
thought ... There was no mounted opposition. Some people were difficult. And 
some people constantly said that they didn't think it would work and they were 
unhappy about it and what a waste you know when we've got this lovely place to 
- But that was just words ... It was just a moan.' 
Similarly, the former nursing director, although recognising that the actions of 'individual 
families' may have slowed resettlement down at times, suggested that there was 
insubstantial collective opposition from the hospital's League of Friends. He recalled 
that: 
They never caused us too many problems, they didn1 go public on it and after a 
while the League of Friends just folded up really ... I don't think we ever had a 
public protest. 2 
These managerial claims that significant collective resistance to institutional contraction 
was lacking are substantiated with reference to other research data. The latter, 
however, provided rich insights into micro-acts of resistance. These 'little bits of 
mischief, as illustrated in this chapter, were expressed in myriad ways via formal, 
informal and external avenues. 
1 David Jordison, Interview February 15th 2008. 
2 Geoff Hopkinson, Interview May 1st 2008. 
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8.2 Formal Avenues of Resistance 
8.2.1 Meetings involving Management 
8.2.1.1 Hospital Staff Meetings 
Staff concern, anger, and confusion relating to hospital contraction was, as intimated in 
Chapter Five, voiced in ongoing meetings with senior and middle management. 
Arguably, based upon oral data, a pivotal moment in this process of exchanging views 
was a meeting in the mid-1980s involving all the Royal Albert staff. Already highlighted 
in Chapter Five,3 it was claimed that this was the occasion when Paul Whitfield, the 
District Health Authority's General Manager, formally announced that the hospital would 
close in three years.4 According to one who was present, Bob Dewhirst, this message 
was 'met from some quarters with a lot of hostility'. In particular, he recalled that the 
Albert had 'a lot of painters and decorators' and: 
I remember distinctly standing in this meeting and this man shouting and 
bawling, 'You're not going to do this, we won't let you do it.' ... I think he was a 
painter and decorator. He was telling everyone, 'We're not going to stand for 
this! We're not having this! It's wrong!O 
Although, in his testimony, Steve Mee admitted that the agenda to close was stated, he 
also claimed that there was some vagueness: 
I'd been at the meeting and he (Paul Whitfield) was a little bit fluffy the way he 
talked, a little bit ambiguous. But it was clear that resettlement was going to take 
place and he'd said at that point it was closing.6 
This ambiguity, Mee argued, resulted in some staff misinterpreting what was being said: 
3 See Chapter Five: 5.2.2. 
4 David Jordison, Interview February 15th 2008. 
5 Bob Dewhirst, Interview June 9th 2009. 
6 Steve Mee, Interview February 18th 2008. 
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After that meeting a couple of women actually were really angry with me, saying, 
'Paul Whitfield said that it isn't going to definitely close, so you aren't going to get 
your own way after all. ,7 
However, regardless of the apparent mixed message, both Mee and Dewhirst recalled 
staff expressing their oppositional feelings in a direct and unequivocal manner. 
8.2.1.2 Senior Managerial Meetings 
As highlighted in Chapters Four and Five, prior to the introduction of a unit general 
manager, the organisation was managed by a tripartite Unit Management Team 
comprising the Senior Consultant Psychiatrist, Administrator and Director of Nursing. 
The latter, Geoff Hopkinson, remembered two areas of frustration, during the early to 
mid 1980s, with the medical branch of this senior managerial structure: the difficulties in 
recruiting nursing staff; and complaints about nurses who questioned the decisions of 
the consultants. Concerning the first of these issues he recalled that at a time when the 
hospital was under pressure, from central government, to save costs, 
'had to seek the permission of the Unit Management Team to recruit staff. I'd 
got vacancies, you see ... And' clearly remember the Consultant Psychiatrist 
saying that it's not right that I should be recruiting staff when we are supposed to 
be making these costs savings. And I was saying, 'Oh you know it's not right 
that we should have vacancies on the wards and people aren't going to receive 
an adequate service as a result of that. ' And that became a long protracted 
argument.8 
The Senior Consultant, in this inner dialogue, was claimed to be impeding moves 
designed to promote the welfare of hospital residents. The final sentiment In his 
interview extract resonates with that of a former Resettlement Co-ordinator, who 
7 Steve Mee, Interview February 18th 2008. 
8 Geoff Hopkinson, Interview February 18th 2008. 
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recalled that, at this point of change at the Royal Albert, the consultants9 engaged in 'a 
desperate power struggle ... over a period of time'. In addition, elsewhere in his 
interview, the Director of Nursing recalled that 'the consultants used to complain to me 
about my staff. According to Geoff Hopkinson, this was because, 
Some of my nursing staff were quite opinionated and that didn't bother me. I 
wanted them to be opinionated. I wanted them to speak up for the rights of their 
residents but the consultant psychiatrists didn't always want to hear that. 10 
So, similar to the previous extract, he presented a case in which the behaviour of the 
consultants is construed as running counter to the well-being of people with learning 
difficulties. The outcome of these complaints was that, 
I had to find out what had happened ... And I really was satisfied in most cases. 
It wasn't rootless at all. It was staff speaking up for the rights of their residents. 11 
At this time of major organisational change, senior managerial time and energy had to 
be diverted, it is implied unnecessarily, towards investigating complaints. 
However, the claims regarding the actions of the consultants, made here and later in 
the section, largely originate from change agents themselves. In the previous chapter 
the rhetoric of Or Prasad, one of the Royal Albert psychiatrists during the contraction 
period, suggested that, from his own viewpoint, this was a period of great professional 
challenge. As examined further below, evidence suggests that consultants themselves 
believed that, like the student nurses referenced in Geoff Hopkinson's interview, they 
also spoke up for 'the rights of their residents'. In addition, researchers of organisational 
change argue that, in their sense-making, change agents have a vested interest in 
9 The use of the epithet 'consultants' does not necessarily signify that all the consultants either 
engaged in, or agreed with, the actions being recounted. For a fuller explanation of this point 
~Iease see Chapter Five, Section 5.2.7. 
o Geoff Hopkinson, Interview February 18th 2008. 
11 Geoff Hopkinson. Ibid. 
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constructing an account which is a 'self-justifying explanation(s) of events and activities' 
(Ford, Ford et al. 2008:364). The argument propounded is that: 
Change agents' accounts of unexpected problems in a change process can 
safely attribute those problems to resistance as a way to divert attention from 
other factors, including their own failings (Meston and King 1996). Change 
agents are therefore encouraged to engage in sense making that entails 
scapegoating and sloughing off responsibility by blaming difficulties on 
resistance (Ford, Ford et al. 2008:364). 
Additional complications can arise because change agents in their sense making 
process can convey a sense of independent objectivity, in which, 
events and meanings become commingled, resulting in what Bohm (Bohm 
1996) terms a net presentation, in which events and meanings are treated as a 
single, seamless reality (Ford, Ford et al. 2008:364-5). 
These theoretical caveats, along with comments authored by consultants themselves, 
provide a cautionary prism through which to evaluate assertions about the ways in 
which consultants, and indeed others, resisted elements of organisational contraction. 
8.2.1.3 Resettlement Team Meetings 
Steve Mee argued, as referenced in Chapter Five, that the refusal of consultants to 
engage actively with multi-disciplinary team working held up the formulation of a 
coherent Royal Albert resettlement strategy.12In 1985, under tripartite consensus 
management he, as the organisation's first Resettlement Co-ordinator, had been 
drafting a resettlement policy document, drawing upon the experience of Resettlement 
Team members. He recalled that consultants attempted to delay official acceptance 
through exercising a veto, predicated upon a mistaken assumption: 
12 Steve Mee, Interview February 18th 2008. 
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People couldn't veto, which is what had been happening, a decision made by 
the Resettlement Team. As long as the team was quorate they couldn't veto it 
by saying, 'Well we weren't there, we weren't of the decision' - which had been 
going on. 13 
These actions, claimed Mee, had meant delays for the resettlement procedures policy 
paper: 
We'd never managed to get it accepted, never got it through. We'd been 
months, we met once a month, trying to get it through. 14 
Ultimately the advent of general management in the form of David Jordison pushed the 
policy through, with Jordison, according to Mee, refusing to accept that the consultants 
had a power of veto, although even at this stage there was a final attempt to sabotage 
the process. The draft document had been circulated to all members of the multi-
disciplinary Resettlement Team but, at the feedback meeting, the consultant said, 
'I've never received it so I haven't had a chance to read it.' ... They hadn't been 
at one of the meetings. David (Jordison) said, 'Well you were given the 
opportunity. You were asked to send in your comments.' And that's when he 
said, well he'd sent in his comments. And it was David that said, 'So you didn't 
receive it, but you sent in your comments. ' And it was actually passed that day. 15 
Significant to the debate about the alleged responses of consultants is that traditionally 
they had wielded enormous organisational power within the NHS (Harrison 1994; 
Harrison and Um 2003). In the years preceding the arrival of general management at 
the Albert, for instance, the Senior Consultant along with the Director of Nursing 
Services, and the hospital Administrator comprised the senior management of the 
institution. However, it was claimed by those opposing their influence that by the 1980s 
13 Steve Mee, Interview February 18th 2008. 
14 Steve Mee. Ibid. 
15 Steve Mee. Ibid. 
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in the context of learning disability institutions the consultants' responsibilities, as 
responsible medical officers, lay purely with those individuals who were detained 
('sectioned') under the Mental Health Acts of 1959 and 1983 (HMSO 1983).16 In the 
case of the Royal Albert this meant a minority of people with learning difficulties, not the 
whole residential population. Although, in practice, it was claimed that in multi-
disciplinary meetings the consultants assumed a clinical leadership, and power of veto, 
regardless of the mental health status of any individual client; a point explicated later in 
the chapter. Where one of the consultants was named, the criticism tended to focus 
upon the actions of the Senior Consultant. However, the oral testimony of one of his 
colleagues, Or Prasad, along with documentary data from other psychiatrists, perhaps 
sheds some light upon their viewpoint. 
In his interview, Or Prasad expressed concern about his role In a multi-disciplinary set-
up during the changing times of the 1980s. He believed that: 
Traditionally patient came to hospital under consultant not under psychologist ... 
But you are responsible at the same time you're saying, "'m not responsible'. 
That's not right because if anything goes wrong what am' doing?17 
His allusion here is to the shared decision making of a multi-disciplinary team, but 
complicated by a sense that as a consultant he had ultimate responsibility for a 
resident. In his own words, this confusion made his job, 
a bit difficult. If I make you responsible and you are not allowed to do what you 
think then you shouldn't be responsible ... The consultant is in charge. It's my 
patient. 18 
He was particularly concerned that: 
16 Steve Mee, Interview February 18th 2008. 
17 Dr. Prasad, Interview August 12'h 2009. 
18 Dr. Prasad. Ibid. 
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If anything goes wrong, I said, 'If anything goes wrong.' That's why I asked in 
multi-disciplinary team everything minuted ... what I say minuted ... 'If anything 
went wrong it's not me.' It's minuted I said that. 19 
This is someone who, as quoted earlier, disliked the formality associated with the 
introduction of general management. However, in this instance, with his claim that he 
insisted on his views being minuted, ironically he used a management tool as an act of 
resistance. Overall, the consultant's rhetoric highlighted a tension between 
responsibility and power, which resonated with other psychiatrists working in hospitals 
for people with learning difficulties. Writing in 1983, for instance, one of the consultants 
at Hensol Hospital, Glamorgan, opines that: 
The role of the consultant psychiatrist in mental handicap has always been 
precarious and seems to be more ambiguous and confused with the changing 
trends and policy in this field (Singh 1983). 
Furthermore, six years later, another consultant, drawing upon a 1977 definitive 
statement by the Royal College of Psychiatrists, echoed the sentiments of Or Prasad 
(RCPsych 1977). In a letter, entitled 'the role of the consultant in mental handicap', GC 
Kanjilal, based at Cranage Hospital, Cheshire, raised the following issues: 
The consultant has professional, ethical and legal responsibility which cannot be 
devolved. Other disciplines within the NHS are not so clearly legally 
defined ... While most people acknowledge the responsibilities vested with 
consultants, consultants are rarely given the authority to pursue their 
responsibility (Kanjilal 1989). 
However, and re-inforcing the idea of clinical leadership, this letter concludes with a 
1989 statement from Lord Henley, a government spokesman, who said: 
19 Dr. Prasad, Interview August 12'h 2009. 
223 
the question of discharge of a patient into the community Is entirellO a matter 
for the consultant psychiatrist who must be happy that the patient will benefit 
from a more independent living environment.21 
Emanating from this, and the other statements, including the testimony of Dr Prasad, is 
a powerful rationale as to why the consultants at the Royal Albert may have viewed 
hospital residents as 'my people' (Adams 2009:320). Such a perspective, leaving aside 
claims of abuse of power, may have brought them unwittingly into confrontation with 
other senior members of the organisation. 
8.2.2 Client Case Conferences 
Those charged with enabling individual residents to resettle assert that staff often 
attempted to block particular resettlements by deliberately 'instilling fears' in either the 
person with a learning difficulty, their family or the receiving authorities. This form of 
sabotage, it was claimed, often occurred in case conferences, where all key 
stakeholders were present. Mary Lawrenson, for instance, recalled that: 
You were sitting in a meeting to plan a resettlement. Everyone, like Steve (Mee), 
would be really positive about what's going to happen, and you'd get staff 
saying, 'Oh no you can't have that male with a female, they'll just abuse them'. 
Or- 'No you can't have him near a busy road he'll just run on the road and get 
run over and then that'l/ be that.' Just instilling fears I suppose in the receiving 
authorities that this is just too much. 22 
Similarly, Steve Mee remembered attending a case conference which involved 
'one charge nurse who is mentioned by lots of clients as a rough man'. On this 
individual's ward, 
20 My emphasis. 
21 Hansard. April27'h 1989 quoted in Kanjilal, G. C. (1989). "The role of the consultant in mental 
handicap." Psychiatric Bulletin 13(12): 705-706. 
22 Mary Lawrenson, Interview September 9th 2009. 
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was somebody who used to go outside and smash up garden furniture. That 
was his way of venting his anger. And at this meeting the family were there and 
it was a resettlement that clearly could go very, very wrong. And this particular 
charge nurse said, with the family there, 'He'll resettle over my dead body. 
Because what he needs is acres of ground to run around in. He needs things to 
smash up. And if he goes and lives in a small house and they won't have people 
like me and my staff who know about these things, they'll have unqualified 
people and so he mustn't go. ' And I was in the position, I said, 'Well he will be 
going somewhere and we have to make sure we get it right. 123 
Mee then recalled walking back with the family to their car, 
and one was in tears, saying, 'We don't know who to believe and that particular 
charge nurse has had him for a long time and seems to do alright.' Now I didn1 
say what I could have said, 'Well the only reason he's going out smashing up 
furniture is because he's living in a hellhole. ,24 
Underpinning the vulnerability experienced by relatives could be a sense of 
indebtedness, as implied in an extract from a letter written, on the cusp of closure in late 
1995, by a mother to RAHLOF: 
It will be a sad day when the 'Royal Albert' closes its doors. I am sure so many 
parents, like myself, owe the hospital, and staff, a debt we can never repay, for 
their care of our children, over so many years.25 
In his narrative, Mee recollected attempting 'to reassure' the family, and, 
this guy went out (of hospital) and in no time at al/ he'd calmed down. Mum 
actually rang me to thank me ... She said it was the first time she'd ever seen 
him relax. 26 
23 Steve Mee, Interview February 18th 2008. 
24 Steve Mee. Ibid. 
25 Anonymised extract from a letter written by a parent to the League of Friends, November 1 st 
1995. 
26 Steve Mee, Interview February 18th 2008 
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This transformation, it was claimed, was achieved despite the endeavours of somebody 
who was very powerful in the place 'actively trying to undermine things,.27 According to 
Mee, there was a rumour that this 'sabotage' extended to the actual day of the 
resettlement: 
The social worker who ended up taking this fellow down to resettle reckoned 
that the charge nurse had been winding the guy up, and to get him into the car 
and down there he had to be tranquilised. So that was his welcome to the 
community, arriving in the car. It was a fact he was tranquilised but I don't know 
to what extent you could say he'd been deliberately wound up. You couldn't 
could you really? But that's what the social worker thought because she'd been 
to see the guy the day before and he'd been alright.28 
However, without condoning such alleged behaviour, from the perspective of the nurse, 
here portrayed as the 'villain', it can be argued that he had little formal influence over 
this particular resettlement. It went ahead despite his knowing the Individual resident 
'for a long time', and who, according to a family member, seemed 'to do alright'. Added 
to this, Mee himself intimated that it was potentially a very challenging move. He himself 
had genuine worries about the resident: 
Part of me thought how entrenched is that behaviour (smashing up furniture) 
going to be. Is it all going to go tits up? We had no idea at all really.29 
Also, as argued in Chapter Five, the strong drive to contract the hospital was facilitated 
by a hegemonic approach espousing community care. The political framing of the 
contraction dialogue meant that individual voices of resistance were heard but not 
allowed to impact. In such an environment, as referenced in other organisational 
settings (Benyon 1978; Jermier, Knights et al. 1994), it is perhaps unsurprising that 
27 Steve Mee, Interview February 18th 2008. 
28 Steve Mee, Ibid. 
29 Steve Mee. Ibid. 
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shop floor workers resorted to what the Unit General Manager described as 'little bits of 
mischief. In a telephone interview, the nurse in question expressed strong critical views 
of resettlement policy, claiming that 'the politics stank'. He suggested that those 
advancing a community care agenda knew that he did not believe it was right for some 
clients to leave, so their resettlements would be organised when he was 'on holiday'. 30 
Other members of staff provided clues as to why nurses may have had passionate 
concerns regarding the transfer of care from hospital to community. For example, a 
ward manager talked of a process with clients, in which 'we would just hand him 
over ... to the person who was coming in from the receiving area.'31 However, 
I found with some of them you'd say, 'Such and such has got quite challenging 
behaviours. ' And they'd sort of be going, 'Yeah. Right.' You know you get this 
attitude, this rather arrogant attitude of, 'We're going to change everything'. And 
of course it backfired in a lot of cases because some of the guys were quite 
violent, they could be quite disruptive, destructive as well you know, pulling 
doors off and all sorts, fingers behind electrics and whatever, you know. 
So after they left the Albert did that continue to happen in their new setting? 
I don't know, basically. Because once they'd gone they'd gone. It's just there 
was some feedback, particularly of the guy they brought back, tried to persuade 
to stay, there was some feedback from the receiving areas but of course their 
agenda was not to see that it was failing, to show that it was failing, you know, 
their agenda was to show that it was a success, 'Oh yeah B--'s been al/ 
right'. You know. B-- might have ripped the bloody light fittings out but BH---
has been all right, you know!iJ2 
30 Charge Nurse, Interview January 28th 2009. 
31 Ward Manager (Male), Interview August 2nd 2009. 
32 Ward Manager (Male). Ibid. 
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Although this was the perspective of a member of staff who had strong criticisms of 
aspects of resettlement policy, elements in his narrative are echoed by those with a 
more sympathetic attitude. The Unit General Manager, for instance, in a tongue in 
cheek manner, suggested that: 
Most of the feedback I got was positive from people that left, but maybe people 
were trying to encourage me to do the job I was doing. Who knows! (Laughs) 
You never know what goes on behind the scenes ... 'Ring David Jordison up 
and tell him that you're really happy now that you've been resettled. ' (Laughs)33 
A former charge nurse, Tony Dennison, worked over a number of years with a handful 
of young people with high support needs. He described developing very close 
relationships with those in his care, even though he was supportive of their moves out 
of the institution. However, like the ward manager quoted above, he recalled issues 
arising because of the sceptical attitudes of community-based workers: 
And the care staff they appointed came along and spent some time with us on 
the ward and read the notes and got to know the person. And then it was 
evident when they moved out that they disregarded most of what we'd said. 34 
In contrast to the memory of the ward manager, Tony Dennison's assertion was 
supported by specific information regarding the individual after he had left the Albert. 
According to the nurse, the former resident had cerebral palsy which meant that at night 
his arms and legs could go 'anywhere', so: 
What we did for him at night we put cot sides on his bed. So he didn1 hurl 
himself we put padding on them ... and he slept fine. What they decided was that 
cot sides were a form of restraint. They wouldn't be having them at al/ and they'd 
put some pillows for him to fall on to when he fell out of bed! So I wasn't happy 
with that! And sure enough the poor chap did fall out of bed and eventually they 
33 David Jordison, Interview June 1ih 2009. 
34 Tony Dennison, Interview September 1'12009. 
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did review and they did put cot sides on with padding on. But we told them and 
they decided that we were institutionalised, didn't know what we were talking 
about ... At one review ... I was really annoyed that he'd fallen out of bed and yet 
I'd told them. I asked them why they'd ignored us. The person in charge of the 
staff team, at a fairly low level, said it was, 'because he came from an institution 
and we thought there might be institutionalised thinking there. So we wanted to 
get rid of all regimes and treat him as an individual.' 'We put those regimes in 
place having tret him as an individual and found out his needs. ' 'Well we realise 
that now . .:35 
As explored in Chapter Seven, resistance to aspects of community care could embrace 
a multi-faceted weltanschauung, of which one part included anxieties about the well-
being of people with learning difficulties. However, with regard just to that dimension, 
these extracts, particularly the latter one, indicated the dangers in applying a 
hegemonic ideology, which could be reduced to that of bricks and mortar: 'institution' is 
bad; 'community' is good. Such concerns were noted elsewhere in the United Kingdom 
at the time (Jackson 1988). These observations do not condone the remembered 
behaviour of the charge nurse in Steve Mee's narrative, but they do offer insights into 
why some staff had frustrations with the resettlement process. 
Attribution of intention on the part of some staff to sabotage resettlements was 
theorised by Mary Lawrenson, who argued that: 
I sti/l firmly believe that anything that happened to a person with learning 
disabilities in the Royal Albert was all about the staff. So if you got in a meeting 
some staff saying, 'Harry doesn't want to leave', that's because the staff had 
made them think that they don't want to leave or they haven't given them the 
benefit of the choice or the experience; It's aI/about informed choice isn't it? 
35 Tony Dennison, Interview September 11' 2009. 
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And I don't ever believe that anyone who lived at the Albeit would genuinely 
say, 'I want to still live here,' once they knew what the alternative was ... 36 
In the wider literature it was noted by a research interviewee in a report on Iowa, 
although relating to community staff, that the latter 
have set up individuals for failure, with the result that many are forced to retum 
to an institutional setting (Enbar, Morris et al. 2004:50). 
Traces of the sort of staff intervention intimated above are evident in memories of 
people with learning difficulties themselves. A former Royal Albert resident who left in 
the early-ta-mid 1980s recalled that: 
It was a Wednesday I think and everybody (Royal Albeit staff) was saying, 'I 
wouldn't leave. I wouldn't leave'. And they got a fright when I did leave. 37 
These staff, according to this woman, 'didn't like me'. She remembered that they 
'pushed' her to do things that she did not want to do, such as having a bath at a certain 
time, or tidying her room or making her bed. However, she was determined and told 
them, 'I'm going to leave', despite many staff saying that this would not happen. There 
was a 'very nice' member of staff, however, who told her, 'You'll leave all right --. 
You've got the brains up here.' This individual left 'eventually' but felt that nobody 
helped her leave, they let her go in 'rags and tatters ... old clothes,.38 In a similar 
fashion, Mary Ball, when leaving Gogarburn Hospital in Edinburgh, recalled being 
confronted by negative staff expectations: 
One of the staff said to me when I did get out of hospital, 'You'll no' last a day.' 
See if they were still there today I would say, 'I've been out mair than a 
day' ... There were a lot of them on my back, but I got through (Ingham 
2003:114). 
36 Mary Lawrenson, Interview September 9th 2009. 
37 Former Hospital Resident (Anon), Interview May 28th 2009. 
38 Former Hospital Resident (Anon). Ibid. 
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In both these accounts the tellers, while recognising the disruptive impact of staff 
attitudes, turn their tales into heroic ones: they overcame the odds and, in Mary Ball's 
words, 'got through'. 
Mary Lawrenson's assertion that, with reference to residents, 'staff had made them 
think they don't want to leave' does, however, resonate with studies elsewhere. Kelley 
Johnson, when closure was announced at an Australian institution, noted the way that 
one or two of the women on a locked ward were adversely affected by the anxieties of 
staff: 
Joyce said happily: 'Hilltop's gone, so I'll be going home.' N. (staff member) 
said: 'No, you won't be going home, Joyce. You'll have to live in a community 
house with lots of people you don't know.' Joyce looked anxious and walked 
away (Johnson 1998:88). 
The content of such a message, exacerbating understandable fears of the unknown, is 
not dissimilar to that attributed to the charge nurse in Mee's testimony, quoted above. 
Johnson also recalled another member of staff saying to Jodie, one of the residents: 
'You don't want to leave us and go into the community do you?' Jodie said 'No' 
(Johnson 1998:88). 
Likewise, Dave Spencer, a core member of the Resettlement team for most of the 
rundown period, referenced staff who expressed doubts about individual resettlements. 
He suggested that direct expressions of resistance, exemplified by the extracts quoted 
above, had a redeeming feature: 
If people wem actively saying, 'I don't think this will work', and they would say so 
in meetings, and talk to families and say, Well I know that everybody is telling 
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you how wonderful it is going to be but actually in my view it is not going work 
for your son or whatever', you could deal with that and that is kind of honest. 39 
More problematic, however, for resettlement procedures were when staff would 
deliberately withhold pertinent information. so. 
after people had moved on and something had happened - they'd say, 'I told 
you that would happen, that has happened before· ... o 
Spencer recalled. 
talking to a group of staff explaining about the process and saying we are 
moving on to your wards next and this is what is going to be happening. And I 
said, 'If anybody says that to me afterwards I am going to be reporting you for 
keeping information back. Because the whole process is built on the premise 
that if we give people the amount of support that they need at the times when 
they need it then they can live anywhere. And if you are denying us the 
information that says he needs this kind of support at these kinds of times then it 
is not going to work is it? And it is not us that is suffering it is them. ' There was a 
bit of bloody mindedness, 'Well go on make it work but I am not having anything 
to do with it. ' But by and large that was as much as it got. There were a few 
meetings that you'd turn up expecting a nice friendly chat with a family and 
realise that somebody had been feeding them a line about how someone has 
been neglected or abused ... , 
The assertion that on occasion hospital staff kept information back is echoed elsewhere 
in England in the 1990s. Collins argues that 'several resettlement officers' at other 
learning disability hospitals claimed that 'quite often' attempts were made to deliberately 
'sabotage' resettlements by withholding crucial pieces of information until 'the eleventh 
hour' (Collins 1993:50). Moreover, Spencer's belief that staff were capable of 'feeding a 
39 Dave Spencer, Interview April 3rd 2009 
40 Dave Spencer. Ibid. 
41 Dave Spencer. Ibid. 
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line' to families resonates with a Royal Albert social work document, written in 1990, 
which stated that, 
Lancaster based families ... are bombarded with negative images of 
resettlement by members of the local community (some of them present and 
former hospital staff) (RAH 1990). 
Furthermore, at that time, the Social Work Team was especially concerned about the 
remaining years of the organisation's existence, because, 
our increasingly vulnerable resident population will be left in the hands of those 
staff holding out for redundancy, awaiting their pensions and/or actively opposed 
to resettlement. The latter group have always attempted to sabotage 
resettlement plans, often by mis-informing and/or dis-informing relatives (RAH 
1990). 
Client conferences, referenced in Chapter Four, were pivotal to the decision making 
process regarding the resettlement of people with learning difficulties from the Royal 
Albert. The operational process of these meetings hinged upon multi-disciplinary 
working, in which 'no individual profeSSion would hold sway,.42 However, a 1985 internal 
Social Work Team paper entitled 'Problems of team work at the Royal Albert', as well 
as the oral testimonies of one or two of those involved in resettlement at that time, claim 
that consultant psychiatrists,43 fuelled by a mistaken notion of their 'pre-eminence' 
employed a range of strategies to undermine such a collaborative ethos (RAH 1985). 
One of the social workers, Gudrun Q'Hara, recalled in an interview that: 
You had somebody there having a case conference, the final one for 
resettlement. The consultant finally turns up and he says, 'I don't agree with it. 
There's something wrong with that man, he can't go out. He has to stay in 
42 Steve Mee, Interview February 18th 2008. 
43 The use of the epithet 'consultants' does not necessarily signify that all the consultants either 
engaged in. or agreed with, the actions being recounted. For further explanation of this point 
please see Chapter Five, Section 5.2.7. 
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hospital.' And you think, 'Oh God!' All your work and everything, and parents 
and everything else. And you find out he has an enlarged prostate. There's no 
reason why he has to stay in hospital. I mean the man moved out and they had 
a very good time. 44 
Such a memory, emphasising the attempted final veto by the consultant, fits with the 
assertion of the 1985 social work document that: 
Non-medical decisions have been taken unilaterally and against the advice of 
colleagues who have carried out the major responsibility for working with a 
particular resident. 
Also in Gudrun O'Hara's recollection her comment that 'the consultant finally turns up' 
suggests that he had not been party to previous consultations and negotiations. This 
theme of absence, as a deliberate strategy to hold up proceedings, Is present 
elsewhere in the same document, as well as in other oral testimony. Steve Mee, for 
instance, recalled that during the 1980s: 
Deciding who went and when they went would all be multi-disciplinary ... So 
they (the consultants) stayed away from those meetings. 4~ 
And the 1985 social work paper likewise claimed that consultant psychiatrists 
'subverted the team approach' by, 
absenting themselves from a client conference and then refusing to accept the 
conference decision (RAH 1985). 
Sometimes, it was argued, this absence occurred during the meeting itself with the 
consultant, 
walking out of a client conference when the discussion takes a turn (he) does 
not agree with (RAH 1985). 
44 Gudrun Q'Hara, Interview June 2200 2009. 
45 Steve Mee, Interview February 18th 2008. 
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On other occasions, according to the social work perspective, the 'subversion' was 
expressed in more subtle ways. Endeavouring to assume control of the client 
conference, for example, was one of these: 
After the Chairperson of a client conference has already summarised the 
conference decisions the consultant will list them again as if to suggest he has 
the final word and has the responsibility of accrediting or legitimising the 
decisions (RAH 1985). 
In addition, there were occasions, it was alleged, when the consultant would engage in, 
the ostentatious perusal of medical notes when other members of the 
conference are speaking - and when (he) eventually emerges from the medical 
notes he makes a contribution which does not connect with the previous 
discussion (RAH 1985). 
This accusation, along with the others mentioned above, led the author of 'Problems of 
team work at the Royal Albert Hospital' to conclude that, because of the behaviour of 
the consultant psychiatrists, 'client conferences have been battlegrounds'. 
8.2.3 Resettlements 
Steve Mee recalled that, during the mid 1980s, this subversion extended beyond the 
client conferences themselves. Consultants, he argued, as touched upon in Chapter 
Five, used their control of a resident's medical notes to stall a resettlement. The 
forwarding of this documentation to the appropriate community GP was an essential 
bureaucratic requirement, without which the resettlement of a person with a learning 
difficulty could not proceed. But, Mee claimed, 
in order to register with a GP the consultants had to release their medical notes, 
and they wouldn't. And they would say they would and a year later - and in 
some areas GPs said they weren't going to accept anybody else on their books. 
I know that happened in Rochda/e for example, wouldn't have anybody else on 
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their books unless the notes went ahead of the person and the consultants just 
wouldn1 play ball with that. And that was, that became a sort of preoccupation of 
mine chasing up the notes, trying to work out how to get them to release them. 
And they would say they were going to and then wouldn1, or say they had sent 
them. They'd say that and the GP must have lost them, all that sort of stuff. 46 
Issues with the release of medical notes seemed to be a feature of resettlement 
elsewhere in England, one researcher suggesting that: 
By retaining records hospitals retain some element of control over people, just 
as they seek to continue to control their living conditions and activities (Collins 
1993:66). 
However, as in the case of delays with the resettlement policy document, the executive 
leadership exerted by David Jordison at the Royal Albert was, according to Mee, 
instrumental in changing this state of affairs, and paving a way for easier resettlements: 
... they (the consultants) didn't want to be told when they were going to be 
releasing the notes. And that was one of the issues, from my memory anyway, 
that became something we explicitly argued in the resettlement meeting and 
Jordison ended up saying, 'No it will happen. Region say it will happen', and 
Region were the employers of the consultants, it wasn1 the hospital so, their 
employing body wanted this to happen and that's sort of, I think that's the way 
he argued it. 47 
Viewed from the perspective of the consultants in the Royal Albert, however, even that 
attributed argument of the Unit General Manager may have been problematic. 
According to a 1977 professional directive from the Royal College of Psychiatrists: 
The Consultant is responsible to his employers in all matters except clinical 
professional standards and responsibilities ... (RCPsych 1977:6). 48 
46 Steve Mee, Interview February 18th 2008 
47 Steve Mee. Ibid. 
48 M h' yemp aSls. 
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Nevertheless, as intimated in Chapter Five, the over-riding impression is that, as the 
years of contraction unfolded, it was the will of senior management which prevailed. 
8.3 Informal Avenues of Resistance 
Those advocating resettlement in the early years of the 1980s recalled encountering 
scepticism, and ridicule, enunciated directly by staff in everyday organisational settings. 
Mary Lawrenson, for instance, a young student nurse at the time, remembered being 
inspired by the Jay Report of 1979 (Mitchell 2003): 
It was like this kind of light came on for everybody. It said that people shouldn't 
be institutionalised, they should be out in the community. 49 
However, although this document, offering a radical critique of learning disability 
nursing, led to animated discussions in the School of Nursing, 
it wasn't happening on the wards that discussion ... And you had young 
inexperienced people like me going out and trying to fly the flag for this change 
of philosophy and the older staff just laughing at you saying, 'You must be mad. 
You think (so and so) is going to live in a house.' And it was like this, 'Don't be 
stupid', kind of thing. 060 
As with the wards, similar views, it was claimed, were voiced in the organisation's staff 
social club. Eric R., in the years following the Jay Report, was involved in the 
resettlement of residents who, according to some of the other nursing staff, were 'the 
most disturbed' young people in the Royal Albert. This male nurse, who had qualified in 
the late 19705, recalled that, 
I did like a pint, so I used to go to the club every night where I was guaranteed 
to see somebody I knew in their social time. We didn't talk about work that 
much, but people did express in loud voices what their opinion was of 
community caTe. What a load of shite Eric! How are you going to get - and they 
49 Mary Lawrenson, Interview September 9th 2009. 
50 Mary Lawrenson. Ibid. 
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used to reel off the name of someone who was very dirty or difficult to care for -
who's going to live next to such and such? Who's going to -?' That's where that 
kind of opinion was mostly expressed, probably under the influence of alcohol 
as well! And it was a popular view to express in the Social Club anyway. Nobody 
wanted to believe in community care. 5' 
A feature of some angry outbursts at the time, claimed Steve Mee, Is that they were 
'personal'. He recalled that: 
I'd just started as the Resettlement Co-ordinator. And it was quite an odd 
experience actually 'cause with my role came quite a lot of personal threat and 
aggression. I think part of the problem is that people in institutions like that ... the 
limits of their line of authority are what they can see ... (So) a lot of people 
thought resettlement was my idea and, 'You're not going to get your way about 
this, 'cause the government aren't supporting it.' I remember one person 
saying. 52 
On another occasion Mee recounted that a case conference had decided to go ahead 
with the resettlement of a resident, although such a move was vehemently opposed by 
a member of nursing staff. The anger of the latter, it was claimed, spilled over: 
I got a personal threat from this charge nurse after the meeting. It was very 
direct, almost along the lines of: 'We know where you live' sort of threat'. 53 
In addition, Mee remembered that after he had left and was working 'on the community 
side in Lancaster District', he was confronted by a member of the Royal Albert staff over 
job prospects: 
Several people were applying for jobs who realistically they'd been anti-
resettlement all the way through ... And again that got personal a couple of 
51 Eric R., Interview August 11th 2009. 
52 Steve Mee, Interview February 18th 2008 
53 Steve Mee. Ibid. 
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times. I remember being shouted at in a pub once. Bloke saying, 'Unless you 
drank in the right pub, unless your face fitted you weren't going to get a job.' I 
suppose people think that don't they? 54 
Although there was no evidence for this at the Royal Albert, it has been alleged that a 
resettlement officer at another institution in the north west had their car tyres slashed.55 
8.4 External Avenues of Resistance 
On occasion, arenas and bodies external to the organisation were important loci or 
avenues for the expression of oppositional voices. An analysis of documentary data 
reveals the formal involvement of a number of outside agencies. The National 
Development Team, for instance, after its damning report of 1979, referenced in 
Chapter Four, revisited the hospital in 1984. Whilst there it met with the League of 
Friends, who were able to enquire about the future of their relatives, resident in the 
institution, as well as plans for the organisation itself. 56 Likewise, in 1989, the league, as 
referenced in Chapter Seven, called upon the local MP to advocate on their behalf 
regarding the proposal to adapt the Royal Albert into a 'community village'. 
Furthermore, throughout the 1980s and 90s members of the District Health Authority 
and the Community Health Council raised questions, often on the back of visits to the 
Royal Albert, about aspects of the institutional rundown.57 Recurrent themes in the 
meetings of these watchdog organisations, as reported in the local press, included 
concerns about lack of adequate community resources, over ambitious resettlement 
rates, living conditions at the Albert during rundown, and community facilities for those 
residents perceived as having 'challenging behaviour.58 
54 Steve Mee, Interview February 18th 2008. 
55 Conversation with Duncan Mitchell, March 14111 2009. 
56 Minutes ofthe Visit ofthe Development Team for the Mentally Handicapped, March 1984. 
57 Lancaster Guardian: July 6111 1984: February 2nd 1990: June 14111 1991: September 17111 1993: 
March 4111 1994; May 19th 1995. 
58 Lancaster Guardian, July 14th 1995. 
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However, the oral testimony indicated that voices of resistance emerged in a more 
informal, spontaneous manner at a neighbourhood level. One of the Royal Albert senior 
managers recalled that: 
The house that I live in was originally owned by social services ... Before I came 
into the area social services wanted to buy it to put people with learning 
disabilities in it. And a person who lived further down the street, who worked at 
the Royal Albert, and was a union steward, protested, didn't want people with 
learning disabilities, people who she works with aI/ day, living down her street. 
And I moved into it! I've always considered that to be an irony. I don't know what 
she thought of that/59 
On another occasion the involvement of a nurse who was 'against community care' 
was, according to Hopkinson, instrumental in fomenting successful resistance by the 
local neighbourhood. He recalled that: 
We wanted to resettle a couple of people into a house in one area of Lancaster 
and there was a protest from the neighbours ... It came to our attention that they 
had heard that some people from the Royal Albert were going to be resettled 
into an empty house, in their cul-de-sac. They didn't like it. So we arranged to 
meet them ... We had a meeting in somebody's house in that street ... We 
listened to what they were saying. I was quite appal/ed actually when I realised 
that there was a member of my staff there, who lived in that street. I stiJ/ feel 
very angry about that, it was one of our very first resettlement attempts into 
Lancaster, after the pace of resettlement increased. And it was very obvious that 
she was against community care. She didn't want it to happen in her street, she 
told her neighbours about it, and that was the reason why we had this protest. 60 
59 Geoff Hopkinson, Interview May 1 st 2008. 
60 Geoff Hopkinson, Interview May 1st 2008. 
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." 
This could be construed as an instance of 'opinion leadership' which, unlike the 
examples quoted in Chapter Five, worked against a change agenda (Rogers 2003). 
The nurse had influence within her own neighbourhood system, and as Rogers argues: 
Influential persons can lead in the spread of new ideas, or they can head an 
active opposition (Rogers 2003:27). 
A former charge nurse who remembered this particular incident, suggested that 'all the 
people in this drive got a petition to stop it, and they stopped it. ,61 Geoff Hopkinson 
intimated that it was purely by chance that the member of staff, 
had got wind of it. So I can only imagine that she must have been vel}', very 
close to the people, you know the residents who are going to move into that 
house. She must either have worked on that ward or knew somebody who 
worked on that ward who said that a house was being identified down her street 
for these residents. 62 
Given the level of resistance, it was felt that withdrawing was the best option for 'the 
clients' who could be, 
up against it right from the vel}' beginning. The neighbours could well not be 
supporlive. And we didn't want them to be made to feel uncomforlable, so we 
found somewhere else for them. 63 
Elsewhere, in North America for instance, alliances between parental groups and trade 
unions were recorded as being effective in profoundly disrupting institutional closures 
(Enbar, Morris et al. 2004; Malacrida 2006). In the case of the Albert it was asserted 
that this experience resulted in a change in resettlement procedures; from then on there 
would be no consultation with neighbours because when, 
81 Malcolm Alston, Interview May 19th 2009. 
82 Geoff Hopkinson, Interview May 111 2008. 
83 Geoff Hopkinson. Ibid. 
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anybody ... moves into a house somewhere, you don't consult with the 
neighbours and ask them if I can come in, you just go in. So that's what we 
decided to do. 64 
Although the rationale is couched in 'ordinary living' terms, the roots of this managerial 
response, as intimated here, could also be construed as resting in the politics of 
expediency. 
8.5 Impact of Resistance 
Although the impact of resistance is difficult to assess with any degree of accuracy, a 
number of salient observations can be made. Recalcitrant staff, including consultants, 
as identified earlier in the chapter, were claimed to have effectively undermined 
resettlement processes at different times. It was also intimated that short-staffing 
issues65 could be exacerbated by the direct actions of employees. One former male 
nursing officer, for example, asserted that, when faced with what they regarded as 
unacceptable practices during the rundown period, members of senior staff would 
leave. In his interview, he recalled that an experienced nursing officer reported 
dangerously low nursing levels to a senior manager: 
And the boss said to him, 'Get away with you. You don't know what you are 
talking about.' And the man was silent for a moment and then he said, 'If I don't 
know what I am talking about now I never Will.' And turned round and walked 
out. 6B 
As an outcome of this disrespectful exchange, the teller recalled that the senior staff 
member, 'took an early retirement'. Such an action was given added weight by the 
latter's impeccable credentials: 
64 Geoff Hopkinson, Interview May 15\2008. 
65 Lancaster Guardian, June 14th 1991. 
66 Nursing Officer (Male), Interview July 23rd 2009. 
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He was one of the strongest and most-liked characters in the whole hospital. 
One of the most trustworthy able men that you could meet. 67 
In this account, the failure of communication on the part of a senior manager resulted in 
an act of defiance by a key member of nursing staff. It was implied that the latter's 
leaving worsened the provision of hospital care. 
Oral testimonies of those implementing change indicated that on occasion deeds were 
executed in order to prove a point to detractors of resettlement. Spontaneously 
referenced, for instance, by a number of interviewees was a deliberate decision early in 
the 1980s to move people out who were viewed by many staff as being impossible to 
resettle. Mary Lawrenson recalled that her line manager Steve Wade, 
said to me, 'Look Mary the resettlement programme is starting but they (critical 
staff) are saying that we can't resettle people with challenging behaviour, 
because they're too difficult and it won't work. What are we going to do about it?' 
I remember Steve and I sitting down and saying, 'Well what we'll do - I mean its 
mad now thinking about it - We're going to take the five most challenging people 
in the hospital and we're going to put them in ordihary housing and make it work, 
and prove to them that it can work. ' 68 
Importantly this extract highlights that It was not just about moving people out of 
hospital, it was about showing staff that 'ordinary' living could work. At least one other 
study referenced such a strategy as being important early on in a formalised process of 
resettlement (Shumway 1996). Less speCifically, oral evidence intimated that managers 
were extremely mindful of the vulnerability of change agendas to damaging criticism.69 
The investment by managers in staff training, meetings, involvement with RAHLOF, as 
well as the local press, suggested that the need to keep various stakeholders on-side 
87 Nursing Officer (Male), Interview July 23111 2009. 
88 Mary Lawrenson, Interview September 9th 2009. 
89 David Jordison, Interview February 15th 2008; Steve Mee, Interview February 18111 2008. 
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required a considerable investment of time and energy. In the case of one hospital, for 
instance, it was intimated that: 
The management has remained committed to resettlement into the community, 
and has expended considerable time, energy and resources on dissuading 
some relatives and staff from pursuing a village70 campaign (Collins 1992:21). 
Significantly, the outcome of 'the need to do this has inevitably slowed down the 
general progress of resettlement plans' (Collins 1992:21). Although problematic to 
discern the degree to which the broader sentiments of such a statement resonated with 
the Royal Albert, it does hint at a covert dimension to the impact of resistance. 
8.6 Conclusion 
Discussed here and in Chapter Seven, has been the presence of individuals during 
Royal Albert contraction .who were critical of the dominant community care rhetoric. Like 
proponents of the latter, however, these voices of resistance espoused a privileged 
ethical position in relationship to people with learning difficulties. Senior managerial 
testimonies marginalised these alternative perspectives and their impact upon rundown. 
Although there was little evidence of a coherent and sustained collective resistance, 
these chapters intimated that at a micro-organisational level an intense political and 
ethical conflict was enacted. Chapter Nine examines the personal meanings which were 
entwined with the viewpoints of those positioned on either side of this struggle. 
70 See Chapter Seven. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
MEANINGS OF CHANGE 
9.1 Introduction 
9.2 Redemption 
9.2.1 Injustice 
9.2.2 Collusion 
9.2.3 Rebellion 
9.2.4 Recruitment 
9.2.5 Liberation 
9.3 Loss 
9.3.1 Loss of Meaning 
9.3.2 Loss of the Good Old Days 
9.3.3 Loss of Employment 
9.3.4 Loss of Community 
9.4 Avenues of Expression 
9.5 Conclusion 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the ways in which stakeholders, particularly staff, 
made sense of the organisational rundown of the Royal Albert. It will address the 
research question: 
What meanings did Royal Albert rundown have for implementers and resisters 
of change? 
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The primary emphasis here, especially in contrast to Chapters Four, Five and Seven, is 
not on the rhetoric of change, but on how individuals, in their oral narratives, attempted 
'to recreate reality poetically' (Gabriel 2000:31). In other words, how these actors in the 
contraction narrative made sense of the changes for themselves. Analysis indicated 
that there was a critical difference of meaning between on the one hand the change 
agents and those who resisted the rundown agenda. Particular members of middle 
management implementing change presented narratives infused with a sense of epic 
struggle and redemption. In contrast, those individuals with a greater institutional 
identity narrated a sense of loss and tragedy. The latter group emphasised 
deindustrialisation as much as deinstitutionalisation. This dichotomy of meaning 
between advocates and opponents of hospital rundown, for instance, resonates with a 
study into the impact of a car factory closure in Wisconsin. It is asserted that: 
For blue collar workers, the closing of the auto plant represented the end 
of an era. For white collar workers, however, the plant closing was seen as 
progress (High 2004:4). 
However, as intimated in this chapter, for stakeholders of whatever persuasion the 
years of Royal Albert rundown were emblematic of acute personal emotional 
investment. 
9.2 Redemption 
The argument propounded in Chapter Five was that during the 1980s and 1990s 
student nurses were fast-tracked into the Royal Albert's middle management to push 
through organisational change. In Gramscian terms these individuals were described as 
intellectuals, providing vital moral and intellectual leadership in a radically changing 
political landscape. Weaving through their narratives were themes of institutional 
injustice and collusion, rebellion, recruitment as agents of change, and ultimately 
redemption and liberation. 
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9.2.1 Injustice 
Underpinning the oral testimonies of Dave Spencer, Mary Lawrenson, and Steve Mee 
was a critical consciousness regarding the appropriateness of institutional care for 
anyone labelled as having a learning difficulty. Although Mee, for instance, was an 
instrumental figure in the Resettlement Team at the Royal Albert, he first encountered 
an institutional setting as a care assistant at Turner Village in the late 1970s. In a 
narrative which critiqued oppressive elements of congregate living he pinpointed his 
very first day at the Colchester-located hospital as being an initiation into the injustices 
of this system of care. He arrived on a ward for men, and was shocked to discover that 
control of residents by staff, often with the support of other reSidents, was enacted with 
high levels of physical violence: 
One man (a reSident) who managed to slip away was literally chased and rugby 
tackled down, taken back to the ward and the charge nurse kicked him and 
thumped him from one end of the ward to the other. And I'd probably been there 
a couple of hours at that point. What the fuck's going on here. What's this?' And 
he said, my first lesson ever in leaming disability, he says, 'What you've got to 
realise lad is no brain, no pain. Unless you treat them like this you'll never get 
'em to do what you want 'em to do. ' And he says, 'He actually won't feel it like 
you or I would. ' 1 
As with observations made about women in an Australian institution's locked ward, this 
extract epitomised a taken-for-granted negative discourse of learning difficulties in 
which the men were 'othered'; such a viewpoint legitimised abusive and degrading 
behaviour (John son 1998:78). Similarly, Dave Spencer at the Royal Albert in the late 
1980s recalled a conversation with the hospital dentist who was refusing to give 
residents an anaesthetic for tooth extraction because, 
1 Steve Mee, Interview September 2200 2005. 
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'Where there is no sense there is no feeling. We won't be bothering with any of 
that nonsense. ,2 
After his initial encounter, Mee recalled that he continued to witness abuse, even being 
taught by the charge nurse how to hurt someone without leaving any visible signs. As a 
young man new to this institutional world he remembered his moral dilemma: 
I kept thinking maybe he's right, maybe this is how it needs to be, because I'd 
never been in anything like that in my life before.3 
After five weeks, however, the Resettlement Co-ordinator 'went with my first instincts 
and reported it and had another member of staff support me on it.'4 Very clearly through 
this story, in which he gives voice to the charge nurse, Mee has actively positioned 
himself on the side of the resident; his 'instincts' indicating that the practices on this 
ward were wrong. 
However, the implication that hospital residents were the victims in a tragic institutional 
narrative was given a more sinister twist in the oral testimonies of Mary Lawrenson and 
Dave Spencer. The latter argued, in contradiction to an oppositional perspective,5 that it 
was institutional, not community, care which contributed to the premature death of 
people with learning difficulties: 
We just didn't have deaths of people that had been resettled for years. Every 
now and again you would be going to a funeral of somebody that had once lived 
at the Royal Albert; it would be few and far between. Whereas when you worked 
at the Royal Albert all the time the funeral director's car was never away from 
the front drive. 6 
In an impassioned interview, Lawrenson echoed these sentiments. She asse,!ed that: 
2 Dave Spencer, Interview April 3rd 2009. 
3 Steve Mee, Interview September 22"d 2005. 
4 Steve Mee. Ibid. . 
5 Discussed in Chapter Seven. 
S Dave Spencer, Interview April 3rd 2009. 
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When I worked at the Royal Albert there weren't many people who had physical 
care needs ... But in these days people are surviving a lot longer ... So just an 
observation there weren't that many people with physical care needs in 
institutions probably because they didn't live that long 'cause the medical 
practice wouldn't treat them - I think that was one of the things I remember, 
having arguments about people who were ill at the Royal Albert not having 
access to good medical treatment for cancer, for heart problems, things that we 
would expect to be treated for. 7 
Furthermore, in the same interview, she appeared to be almost caught unawares by the 
poignant memory of the negative impact of the Royal Albert on the quality of life for 
some of the younger people with whom she worked: 
The wards I didn't like working on were the children's wards, you know because 
that particularly upset me. You'd - (pause) - still upsets me now - You'd be on a 
ward ( ... ) and there'd be about 30 boys, a third of them maybe under 16 years 
old, some of them even under ten years old, and them just sitting around, just 
being bewildered, you could see they were institutionalised, just in shock I think 
personally. And they would get bullied by the staff and the big boys on the ward. 
I can remember P- and some of the other lads from when they were about 10 
years old, A-, 0-, they were all around as children when I was a student 
nurse. I can remember 0- coming in from home, S- when she came from 
home - they were 14 year old girls ... Having a particular persona, a personal 
identity, and six weeks later they were drugged up, they were In institutional 
clothes, they'd lost that sense of individuality and I think they became mentally ill 
just because they were there. Throughout my career I tracked people like S--
. and D-- and P- and I know what happened to them. D--'s dead, P-'s 
7 Mary Lawrenson, Interview September 9th 2009. 
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dead. They're younger than me and it was just the life they led didn't care for 
them really. 8 
Mary Lawrenson was visibly upset as she remembered what had happened to these 
individuals, some of whom she was involved with for a number of years. Moreover, as 
emphasised in her overall narrative, these comments were linked to a simmering 
resentment against 'the system' (her term) which allowed such things to happen. 
Running through these extracts from Steve Mee, Dave Spencer and Mary Lawrenson's 
interviews was the theme of an institutional system of care, which, either through the 
agency of individuals or in a more impersonal systemic manner, traumatised people 
with learning difficulties. The latter were viewed as the tragic victims, with the institution 
cast in the role of villain. 
9.2.2 Collusion 
A key element in the narratives of these three former members of Royal Albert middle 
management, however, was an admittance of their own collusion in an institutional 
system which victimised people with learning difficulties. Dave Spencer summarised the 
paradox: 
I mean you were doing things that you knew weren't right. You were doing them 
because the altemative was that things wouldn't get done at all. It might be 
being done in a slapdash and uncomfortable and difficult way like lining 15 
blokes up and they are all sharing the one set of bath water but the alternative 
. was that nobody would get - Well if you said that, 'This is ridiculous. I am not 
doing it. ' Nobody would have a bath. Well at least they had got a chance of 
being at least semi-clean and a bit more comfortable. 9 
8 Mary Lawrenson, Interview September 9th 2009. 
9 Dave Spencer, Interview April 3rd 2009. 
250 
Mee also recalled a similar rationalisation of institutional care, in his case providing him 
with the impetus to continue working as a care assistant. An Essex University graduate, 
he remembered taking the job, referenced earlier in the chapter, simply because it was 
the only one available at the job centre. He recalled that he 'didn't think I'd be sticking it 
for very long.'10 However, having witnessed, what he described as, cruel practices on 
his very first day he decided to remain: 
I think it was partly political motivation (to stay) because I'd done sociology at 
university, and I couldn't see what job you would do that wouldn't be supporting 
the status quo; I couldn't see what I could do that was politically acceptable. But 
I remember the actual conversation I had with -- (partner) at the time was, 
'There's a group of people here who are below any level of politics' - as I 
understood it then - 'that were just being treated like shit, being treated like 
animals. And you don't have to do vel}' much to make it better, and at one level 
you're not supporting the status quo. ' And she said, 'Well you're still supporting 
the institution and perpetuating that. ' But it didn't feel like that. It felt like, 'Well 
it's going to be there anyway. ' Not vel}' sophisticated political idea but that was 
the motivation, 'There's something I can do here. And I don't have to question 
what I am doing here particularly. I'll 
Here Steve Mee used an inner dialogue to highlight a broader debate about complicity, 
embraCing both a critique and a justification for involvement in institutional care. Later in 
the same interview he suddenly recalled a specific moment of professional 
compromise, which occurred at the Albert. On one of the male lock-up wards although 
residents had their own clothes labelled, in practice: 
which clothes you ended up wearing was pot luck. So yes they did have their 
. clothes but it never ended up as people wearing their own clothes. 12 
10 Steve Mea, Interview September 22nd 2005. 
11 Steve Mee. Ibid. 
12 Steve Mee. Ibid. 
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However if the charge nurse, Steve Hothersall, was on duty: 
He used to insist that people wore their own clothes, but you see this is where 
my standards weren't up to scratch 'cause I remember trying to sort it some 
days and there'd never be a full set for everybody. And I ended up thinking, 'Oh 
fuck it, they're only clothes. So as long as they more or less fit. ' So I did that. 13 
Likewise, Mary Lawrenson was critical about aspects of institutional care, but confessed 
that early on in her nurse training in the late 1970s she was 'complicit with the system', 
having been 'indoctrinated' into the clinical model.14 However, she along with Mee and 
Spencer, narrated their professional involvement in the Royal Albert as being one in 
which they had the opportunity, as change agents in later years, to redeem themselves. 
Whether this was true for all staff, with similar views, is debateable: one former nurse 
was reported as having been very traumatised by his collusion, these feelings only 
emerging in an acute form after the closure of the Albert.15 
9.2.3 Rebellion 
Alongside admissions of complicity with the 'bizarre,16 institutional system, both Mary 
Lawrenson and Steve Mee positioned themselves as rebels who fought back. Such a 
rebellious identity can be construed as an integral element in a narrative sense-making 
process. As one researcher argues: 
organisational storytelling allows people to try out and develop identities for 
themselves (GabrieI2000:129). 
However, although Gabriel suggests that in doing this 'the pleasure principle prevails 
over the requirements of veracity and accuracy', other narrative analysts are more 
circumspect. Ezzy. drawing upon the work of Ricoeur. asserts that the creation of an 
13 Steve Mee, Interview September 2200 2005. 
14 Mary Lawrenson, Interview September 9th 2009. 
15 Conversation with Steve Mee, January 29th, 2009. 
16 Steve Mee, Interview September 2200 2005. 
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identity through narration is a mixture of historical 'fact' and fiction (Ricoeur 1991; Ezzy 
1998). Such a viewpoint is summarised thus: 
Narrative identity is ... historically grounded but ''fictively'' reinterpreted, 
constructed by an individual but constructed in interaction and dialogue with 
other people (Ezzy 1998:246). 
In their narrated rebel identities both Lawrenson and Mee bear out this relationship 
between actual events, their interpretation and the importance of an inner dialogue. 
Running through his narrative, and already touched upon, is that, whether at Turner 
Village or at the Royal Albert, Mee reported colleagues for abusive practices. In the 
stories of his time at the Essex institution he intimated that he was constantly rubbing 
up against the authorities through comments such as • again I got in hot water with the 
Sister' and 'I was challenging - I wouldn't accept it, as usuaf.17 This theme was echoed 
in a more collective manner when narrating his early career experiences on one of the 
male lock-up wards at the Albert. In his interview he distanced himself from the, 
idiot staff on there, thugs really. And they weren't doing the blatant hitting but 
there was all the shouting and verbal abuse, herd treatment and - There was still 
one guy doing the old thing ... of, 'Oh they don't know any different. ' So he put 
dinner, pudding and custard all in one dish. 18 
This contrasted with other staff: 
Absolutely excellent people (who were) fantastic - and there were these thugs. 
Like oil and water really. And It just depended who the majority was on a shift as 
to what sort of shift it was. 19 
17 Steve Mee. Interview September 22nd 2005. My emphasiS. 
18 Steve Mee. Ibid. 
19 Steve Mee.lbid. 
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Often, around the humanisation of daily routines, he described a constant battle 
between these 'two bunches of staff. In this struggle, Mee aligned himself with those 
'on the hopeless hippy side'. 
Similarly, in her narrative, Mary Lawrenson presented herself as someone, as a student 
nurse, who was prepared to speak out against injustices in the dominant institutional 
culture. In one anecdote, in which she questioned the judgement of the ward sister, she 
recalled being 'sent off the ward for being insubordinate'. On another occasion, there 
was, 
a charge nurse who told me off for wasting my time talking to people instead of 
getting the laundry done. We used to get reports at the end of our placement 
and he wrote in my report that I wasted a lot of my time talking to people and not 
doing the jobs I was supposed to do. They had a little box on the bottom that 
you could write a comment and I wrote that this charge nurse was lazy, that he 
wasn't fit to run his ward, and that somebody should look at his practice. And I 
remember it causing this furore. It had gone into the School of NurSing that a 
student nurse was questioning the practice of a charge nurse. Nothing 
happened about it, but I got a lot of satisfaction that he wrote about me, and I 
wrote about him. But that's as far as it went, nothing· I was never ever given 
any feedback about whether anything would change or not. 20 
In this extract Lawrenson constructed a narrative in which she displayed solidarity with 
the residents, and 'othered' the charge nurse, who was 'lazy' and incompetent. This 
ethically fuelled story is consistent with key twin themes of her overall professional 
narrative: individuals with learning difficulties had a right to be treated as people first 
and foremost; and that she would stand up to anyone, regardless of status, for what she 
20 Mary Lawrenson, Interview September 9th 2009. 
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thought was right - which included her professional integrity. As a young student nurse, 
this assertiveness resulted in her being viewed as 
a troublemaker and the longer I was there the more I was seen as a 
troublemaker. 21 
However, implicit in the oral testimonies discussed here is that these two rebels at this 
point in the early 1980s were estranged from the institutional philosophy of care. In the 
light of this, the unfolding of their respective narratives hinged on unexpected and 
dramatic plot twists. 
9.2.4 Recruitment 
Mary Lawrenson and Steve Mee asserted that during their nurse training, or not long 
after completion, they decided to leave the Royal Albert. For the former student nurse, 
she recalled that: 
I didn't want to support people with learning disabilities. I wanted to be a general 
nurse. But because I couldn't get in I had an option of doing my training at the 
Royal Albert and then doing another year after the end of it. What I decided was 
that I liked the clinical nursing. I loved it. I worked on the Medical Ward. And I 
wanted to be a staff nurse on (the Medical Ward) when I qualified because (after 
a year) I was gOing to do my general nursing. I wanted the uniform. I knew all 
about drugs and procedures, I could save somebody's life.22 
Underlying this intent however, and resonating with the outcome of her challenge to the 
charge nurse, was a strong sense of impotence: 
It never dawned on me that you should actually try and challenge the system 
'cause it was too big. I knew it wasn't right the way people were being treated, 
21 Mary Lawrence, Interview September 9'" 2009. 
22 Mary Lawrence. Ibid. 
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but I just felt that I couldn't do anything about it. And if the senior managers 
weren't going to do anything about it, what could I do'f3 
Likewise, Mee did not see a future at the hospital: 
I'd gone from Barlow (Ward), where I thought, I am going to look for teacher 
training. I really don't want to be a ward charge nurse, really don't want that at 
all. To go on to Welch (Ward) thinking, I really don't want to do this at all, this is 
an awful job. 24 
These extracts implied that not only were these self proclaimed rebels on the margins 
of the organisation they were close to disappearing out of sight. Yet, within four to five 
years both were at the institution's heart, in middle management positions implementing 
a hospital rundown agenda. Their respective narratives endeavoured to explain this 
radical shift in their professional fortunes, in doing so, suggesting that a degree of 
providential intervention prevailed. 
Early in her post-qualifying year Mary Lawrenson recalled that: 
A sister's post came up and I thought, 'What shall I do?' Because I had only just 
qualified. I was 21, I'd had three months experience as a staff nurse and these 
sisters' posts came up. And I thought, 'Well it's going to be another year before I 
go to do my general, ,.11 earn a bit of money and I'll be a sister. • That was all it 
was. '1'1/ become a sister.' I remember putting in for a job. And in our (student 
nursing) group there were three of us put in for jobs and we all thought we were 
being a bit cheeky but we went for it anyway. 25 
Because of lack of experience she was offered an acting sister's post. However at this 
point her narrative revealed the seeds of an epic twist: 
23 Mary Lawrence, Interview September 9th 2009. 
24 Steve Mee, Interview September 22"d 2005. 
25 Mary Lawrenson, Interview September 9th 2009. 
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But I was told to report to Jim Bow and Steve Wade about where I was going. 
And I thought, Well why do they want to ask me that? I want to be acting sister 
on the Infirmary Wald and I'm good. ' And I remember sitting there and Jim 
saying, 'Right Mary you've not got enough experience to be a sister but you're 
going to be an acting sister and you're on Mr. Wade's section. ' I knew straight 
away that he didn't have the Infirmary Wald. My heart just sank, I could feel it. I 
looked at Steve and he said, 'Come and see me tomorrow and ,.11 show you 
where you're going'. And I said, 'But the Infirmary Wald isn't on your section. ' He 
said, 'You're not going to the Infirmary Wald, you're coming to one of my 
walds . .26 
In this tale the protagonist, the young female nurse, with a sinking heart is being called 
out of her comfort zone; her expectations for seeing out her time at the Albert had been 
radically undermined. Her youthful exuberance in 'being a bit cheeky' had led to 
unexpected consequences, and an emotional response: 
I actually burst out crying and I said to Jim Bow, , I don't want to go on that 
section. I want to be a nurse on this - . And Jim Bow said, 'Oh pull yourself 
together woman! Go and see Steve Wade in the moming. ' So al/ night' 
remember talking to my partner, saying, 'Oh I've got myself in a right problem 
now, because' don't want to go on there and yet I've got this promotion. ' I 
worried about it all night long. 27 
The full extent of the 'right problem' in this epic narration was revealed in graphic form 
the following morning. Mary Lawrenson went to see: 
Steve Wade, and he said, I'm going to put you on --. Which was the lock-up 
men's ward. They'd never had a female sister up there, ever. I remember 
thinking, 'You must be mad'. I remember saying to him, 'You think I'm going on -
28 Mary Lawrence, Interview September 9th 2009. 
27 Mary Lawrence. Ibid. 
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--?!' He said, 'I'm going to show you round now.' I'd never set foot on --. 
And he took me up there and it was the locked doors. I could see through the 
window pane, there were men in the nude, there was a lot of screaming going 
on. And we walked on the ward, it stank, there was a seclusion room almost as 
you came on to the ward ... There was no furniture, it had all been 
smashed ... And there was a guy laying in the corridor, nude, wrapped around 
the radiator. And Steve Wade said to me, 'Right Mary. You're appalled by this. 
I'm putting you up here to do something about it. If you're appalled by it, do 
something about it. I said, 'Look at that guy there he's just in the nude. ' He said, 
'Well that's why I'm putting you here. You're going to do something about it, or 
you'll have to leave and do something else. >28 
The senior member of staff, in this gendered narrative, had thrown down the gauntlet. 
The choice was to pick it up 'or you'll have to leave and do something else'. This 
prospective challenge pushed Lawrenson's courage, identity and career plans to the 
limit. She remembered that: 
I went home and cried again. I thought,' I'm not going on there. I can't wear my 
uniform and be a nurse. ' And I went back to see Steve to say, 'I'm not going, I 
can't hack it.' And he said, 'This is about making lives better for people and we 
haven't got many qualified staff in this hospital who want to do it. Now if you're 
up to anything I'm challenging you to do something about it. Have a think about 
it. ' So anyway the ego got the better of me in the end and I said, 'Right I am 
going to try it. ' And that was actually the making of me. Because I went up there 
as a young acting ward sister. It was all male staff, they were all the big boys. 
They were all about two foot taller than me. 29 
In this alien and threatening landscape her narrative unfolded to illustrate how it was 
'the making of me'. She had been chosen to play a special role in changing the culture 
28 Mary Lawrence, Interview September 9th 2009. 
29 Mary Lawrence. Ibid. 
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of the organisation: to become a leader rather than a rebel. Importantly, as discussed in 
Chapter Five, and in contrast to her experiences of being 'a troublemaker', she was 
given 'power to make changes' to a system 'that just isn't right'.3o Although admitting 
that her 'ego got the better of me', the overall tone of this story is one of selflessness; a 
moral tale. In making sense of this period in her professional life, Mary Lawrenson 
identified herself as a reluctant hero (GabrieI2000:73-77), who sacrificed the more 
comfortable option of general nursing. She had little doubt that she would be 'good' at 
the latter, but opted to remain at the institution and help make 'lives better for people 
(with learning difficulties)'. 
This emotional narrative of promotion represented a leap from rebel to leader, and 
symbolically, as discussed in Chapter Five, recruitment as an intellectual in a 
hegemonic change process. After a period on the lock-up ward, Lawrenson 
remembered that she was given the responsibility of setting up a new assessment unit: 
I had a hand-picked group of staff who didn't want to be complicit with the 
system and we were at Lathom House (Assessment Unit) for three months 
before it opened doing training.31 
At this point her narrative intersects with that of Mee, who became one of the staff on 
this unit. This represented a pivotal point in his career testimony, pinpointing the 
'inspirational' management of Mary Lawrenson, who had instigated a culture in which, 
people were treated with respect, rights were recognised, individuality, 
everybody had meals together - it was the first time ever that I had been 
anywhere where everybody ate together ... It felt like a proper job somehow, like 
we were doing something.32 
30 Mary Lawrence, Interview September 9th 2009. 
31 Mary Lawrence. Ibid. 
32 Steve Mee, Interview September 22nd 2005. 
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From this experience Mee concluded that 'I can do something here (at the hospital)'. He 
progressed to become the first Nursing Process Co-ordinator with a hospital wide remit 
of introducing individual care plans; after which he was appointed Resettlement Co-
ordinator. So from being on the cusp of leaving, like Lawrenson, he was recruited, and 
empowered, to implement the changing agendas of those years. This provided him with 
purpose and meaning, resulting in a career in learning disability services. 
9.2.5 Liberation 
Typified by Mary Lawrenson's story of recruitment into the challenging atmosphere on a 
male locked ward was the theme that, for herself and other newly appointed leaders, 
these years represented entry into an unknown and frightening organisational 
landscape. She reflected that in introducing changes, 
there was some blind faith that treating people as people would actually prove 
that was the way to do it, and it was but you didn't know it at the time. It was a 
risk because actually if it hadn't worked what would people have said'f3 
Likewise, for Steve Mee, these years represented, 
a vel}', vel}' intense period. I've always preferred working in places at times like 
that ... We'd no idea really whether it would work or not and all of us involved at 
that stage had a passion for doing it, the dislike of the institutions, and that was 
across the board ... It was a very invigorating atmosphere to work in, and a great 
sense of solidarity amongst people.34 
The implication was that there was no map for this huge organisational change, and so 
'blind faith', 'passion' and 'solidarity' were prerequisites for progression. However, for 
Mee the intensity and unknown nature of the quest were both 'very invigorating' and 
desirable. 
33 Mary Lawrenson, Interview September 9th 2009. 
34 Steve Mee, Interview September 2200 2005. 
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Although qualifying later than Mee or Lawrenson, after the formalisation of key change 
systems were embedded, Dave Spencer encapsulated the exhilaration of hospital 
rundown for these young professionals. Like the other two, his narrative embraced an 
inner struggle as to whether to stay in an institution which he thought was 'weird and 
not nice,.35 However by the time he had qualified in 1985, 'people (senior managers) 
were saying, "No it isn't always going to be here"'; so he decided to stay and assist with 
the Royal Albert's demise. His excitement then hinged on the transformational impact of 
change on individual hospital residents. In his narrative, as with those of his colleagues, 
people with learning difficulties assumed agency, switching from victims to heroes. He 
recalled that: 
I thought at the time that it was fantastic ... I would say to people, 'Look treasure 
this ... The Royal Albert has been here al/ these years and people have come, 
worked, gone home, retired, died and it has just been the same as it was before 
they went. We are going through a massive social change, it is dead exciting 
and you are seeing people come to life almost and that is a privilege.' And it 
was. And I used to say, 'It won't happen again' . ... It was kind of a hidden WOrld, 
, 
like releasing people into a bright new - It sort of sounds a bit pretentious, but it 
was really, really exciting to see. And I was particularly privileged as were a few 
people in that particular sphere. 36 
Implied in this extract and elsewhere in his testimony is the sense that people moving 
out represented acts of liberation: residents were 'com(ing) to life' by being released, by 
being freed. In the process of entering the 'bright new (world), of the community, 
Spencer proclaimed, in an animated fashion, that: 
It was fantastic to see people so excited about new possibilities. People had 
decorated their own house and it would be ho"'ible but they had done it 
themselves and were so thrilled with it and you would think, 'Oh that colour is 
35 Dave Spencer, Interview April 3rd 2009. 
38 Dave Spencer. Ibid. 
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going to give me a migraine in a minute'. But people were leaming about, Well 
actually those two colours don't go together but I will go and get another colour 
tomorrow and repaint it. ' And they can do that. You couldn't have done that on -
- Ward. It was very, very exciting. People used to tell me to shut up about 
how much I enjoyed my jobf7 
These extracts reinforce the notion, as suggested above by Mee, that those directly 
involved in leading the changing agendas of these times remembered it as 'an 
invigorating atmosphere'. Furthermore, an additional nostalgic dimension appears to be 
present in Dave Spencer's testimony in that times of such professional excitement are 
gone for ever (Gabriel 2000). His remembered dialogue warns colleagues that the time 
of 'massive social change ... won't happen again' that they need to 'treasure' it. He 
continued to re-emphasise such a sentiment, later in his interview recalling that: 
I knew that it wasn't going to go on forever but it was thrilling really to be part of 
seeing that time and time again people feeling like they had been given a new 
lease of life or in some cases the first lease of life. 38 
The message conveyed by Dave Spencer was that, through the resettlement process, 
he was energised by the realisation of dreams for people with learning difficulties. This 
is exemplified particularly through his almost apocalyptic story of one specific individual, 
which occurred after, 
I got the chance of working on the Flats, I could see where I might fit in, helping 
people move on and move out. And as soon as I started really, I realised that 
was where the excitement was, in that buzz ... you would see people drive off to 
a new fife somewhere. And I have probably told you this story before but not on 
tape about T- disappearing ... Somebody in their wisdom had decided that 
part of being prepared for fife in the community meant that T - had to have 
37 Dave Spencer, Interview April 3rd 2009. 
38 Dave Spencer. Ibid. 
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some teeth, because he had them removed like a lot of people, particularly 
people with Down's Syndrome... The National Health all-purpose one-size-fits 
all NHS teeth are rattling round in his head and he hated the things and they did 
make him look ridiculous with this enormous set of teeth that didn't fit his head 
and he couldn't talk, he couldn't eat with them. So he had to take them out to 
eat, take them out to talk. And somebody from the social work department had 
said, To fit in he will have to have a set of teeth ... If you see T- around and 
he hasn't got his teeth in can you remind him to put his teeth in.' So everywhere 
he went somebody was saying to him, 'T- put your teeth in, T- put your 
teeth in. ' Anyway, as his sister was driving him out of the hospital grounds and 
we were all stood there to wave goodbye to him, the window came down and a 
set of false teeth came flying out of the window into Ashton Road. It was brilliant! 
I got that kind of buzz. And then I used to go and see people in the flats and the 
houses that they were moving into, checking to see whether people were still 
happy ... And the number of different ways I got told to fuck off and, 'You can 
stuff it and you know what do you want us to do with your bed at the Royal 
Albert, you can shove it up your arse .. And it was brilliant! I used to get the same 
kind of buzz and realise that there was nothing quite like it really. 39 
Using an epic-comic narration, Spencer conveyed the buzz gained from his involvement 
in the liberation of people with learning difficulties from an institutional environment; 
ultimately they had the agency, not the professionals. In fact it was the latter who were 
the fools in this tale, with former hospital residents having the last laugh, or the final 
word. The exhilaration of liberation is conveyed by the symbolic description of the point 
when 'a set of false teeth came flying out of the window into Ashton Road'. The mantle 
of rebel had passed from those workers, like Spencer, who had critiqued institutional 
39 Dave Spencer, Interview April31'd 2009. 
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care, onto people with learning difficulties. Such a narrative represented a vindication of 
a professional decision to stay. 
Steve Mee, the first Resettlement Co-ordinator, also recalled one individual, who, on 
behalf of his three friends, took the initiative in organising resettlement meetings: 
I remember K- in particular as well as introducing all of the others and saying 
that they all wanted to go together, he took some control of the agenda as well. 
So when things were brought up he decided when enough had been said. I 
remember him doing that a couple of times, 'Shall we move on?' It was that sort 
of thing. I can't remember his exact words. 'Oh that's enough of that!' I think he 
said . ... 'Cause it was my responsibility to get the meeting - I sent out a letter to 
everybody and messages coming back, 'K-'s already invited me. ' I remember 
that. 'Are you coming to my meeting?' And it really did matter to them. They 
really did want to leave the hospital. 40 
As with Dave Spencer's narrative, the satisfaction here is that, in contrast to an 
institutional regime, the person with a learning difficulty was in control. Moreover, the 
collective energy, and momentum, of such a state of affairs was highlighted elsewhere 
in Dave Spencer's interview: 
When we did have provisional discharge, it was called, and people would come 
back for a meeting to say, 'No, I am happy ... ' They would go and visit people 
they had been living with previously and tell them what life was like outside, and 
that they get their own room and they get their own this, and they could watch 
what they wanted to on the telly, and they could eat what they wanted. And 
there were queues forming of people saying, 'I want some of that. That is what I 
would like. ' I mean even down to a lady knocking on my door, and she was 97, 
40 Steve Mee, Interview July ih 2007. 
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and said, ~re you the man that is in charge of getting out because I think I have 
been here long enough?' And she was 99 when she left.41 
This, along with the other resettlement stories quoted, emphasised autonomy, 
empowerment and exuberance, rather than the 'rightness' of SRV, as explained in 
Chapter Two. Importantly, it was implied that, by stepping back, the professionals were 
able to be supportive and effective. The liberation narrative embraced hospital residents 
and the member of staff; the latter being freed from the taint of past collusive practices. 
However, in contrast to these tales of liberation narrated by members of the 
Resettlement Team, direct-care staff recalled a sadness when young people with 
learning difficulties moved out of the Royal Albert. Their narratives can be construed as 
primarily romantic, with the residents the object of this love (Gabriel 2000). Almost akin 
to a parent as their child flies the nest, these staff wanted individuals to leave, but were 
equally sad at having to end their day-tO-day involvement with them. In his narrative, for 
instance, Eric R. recalled the emotional wrench of the departure of children with whom 
he had developed a close relationship. Because of an anomaly in qualifications 
required, he was unable to leave the Albert and go with them. This, 
disappointed me quite a lot because I had a really good relationship with two of 
those three boys who ended up going to that place, and I was quite hurt and 
upset when they went, so I cried you know 'cause I felt that strong about them 
and I was upset that they had gone out of my life. 42 
A similar sadness was recounted by Tony Dennison, who remembered that: 
We didn't argue against them being seen as a priority for resettlement, it 
seemed right that they should go and have a better life in the community .... I 
can remember waving them off actually, when those young lads were collected 
and taken off to Preston it was like getting rid of my own kids in a way, because 
41 Dave Spencer, Interview April 3rd 2009 
42 Eric R., Interview August 11th 2009. 
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I stood on the steps of Sturton Lower and waved and cried! Little friends. 
Because I'd know them from about '87 so I'd known them five years - lovely little 
kids. 43 
Such an emotional story by this former charge nurse is not surprising given his overall 
narrative which, as with Eric R., was one of dedication to those he supported. Also Tony 
Dennison's discourse was, quite matter of factly, one of equality: these residents were 
'kids', similar to his own. 
Further complications were added to the liberation narratives of resettlement officers by 
the tellers themselves. In their interviews, Dave Spencer and Steve Mee suggested that 
their power to make a difference may, on occasion, have been inadvertently used to the 
detriment of people with learning difficulties. In his interview Mee intimated that, as the 
push to close the hospital intensified during the later years of rundown, the resettlement 
focus had 'got past the people who had come knocking on the door'. During the late 
1980s, and into the 19908: 
we were getting to the sort of more anonymous people in the hospital who 
wouldn't have understood the notion (of resettlement) and we had no idea who 
their friends were and what their links with family were ... (And) when somebody 
can barely communicate with you how do you ever find out what they want. 44 
These sentiments were echoed by his colleague: 
We just knew that there were people with significant friendships, relationships. 
There were people who were important to them that we would never know about 
because you couldn't, they wouldn't be written down anywhere. There would be 
people who had grown up together and they mightn1 see each other for months 
at a time but they would see each other going past on the way to an occupation 
centre and they might nod or say hello or acknowledge each other in whatever 
43 Tony Dennison, Interview September 1 sI 2009. 
44 Steve Mee, Interview February 18th 2008. 
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way they did or they could and nobody would know how important knowing that 
person was still there or still safe, or whatever, still alive how important that was 
to people. And we did spend a lot of time agonising, myself and Steve Mee, 
about how can we ever find out if we are splitting up a lifelong friendship or a 
really significant relationship, or that we have not uncovered a relationship that 
people aren't comfortable with: the vocal person in the relationship is saying, 'He 
is my friend. I really like him. I want him to come and live with me. ' And he is not 
saying anything and everybody is saying, 'Isn't that nice - ah.' And it tums out 
that it is an abusive relationship and we didn't know it. We had to just kind of 
reconcile ourselves to the fact that we were doing our best to find that out ... 45 
The 'agonising' referenced here reinforces the point made by Mee that workers, such 
as those involved in resettlement, were 'life architects' for people with learning 
difficulties; integral to the sense-making of these change agents was a recognition that 
they were vested with enormous power.46 At times, as illustrated earlier, the latter 
constituted a vital constituent element in an epic tale of redemption. However, as these 
self-critical extracts indicate, equally this power was viewed as a potential contribution 
towards a tragic narrative, especially in relationship to the most vulnerable members of 
the institutional community. The only redeeming feature was, according to Spencer, that 
at least 'we were doing our best' to establish whether harmful relationships existed 
between residents. 
However, these reservations about their interventions notwithstanding, the narratives of 
Mary Lawrenson, Dave Spencer and Steve Mee overall can be construed as ones in 
which they were given the opportunity to redeem their own complicity in, what they 
regarded as, a system of harm not care. In doing this there are strong suggestions that 
they displayed what Rogers identifies as a necessary quality for pushing through 
45 Dave Spencer, Interview April 3rd 2009. 
46 See Chapter Five: 5.2.5 Recruitment. 
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change: 'venturesomeness ... a desire for the rash, the daring and the risky' (Rogers 
2003:282-3). Furthermore, their recollections tally with a description of others involved 
in an epic struggle during the 1980s in the United Kingdom. Adeney and Lloyd record 
some of the miners active in the national strike of 1984-5 as saying that they 
had clearly enjoyed the experience: they had lived at a pitch, physically, 
intellectually, morally even, which they could not expect to emulate ... {Adeney 
and Lloyd 1986:7). 
9.3 Loss 
Integral to a managerial perspective, as outlined in Chapter Five, was that an 
unfortunate consequence of the organisational contraction of the Albert was that it 
resulted in 'casualties'. However, Gordon Greenshields, former Chief Executive of the 
North West Regional Health Authority, the key change agency for the Albert, 
emphasised that these were inevitable. He theorised that: 
When you have change there '11 always be casualties ... That's life. I think the 
NHS is no different from any other organisation. If you want to achieve change 
you've got to get the right people in the right place at the right time, with the right 
sort of support if you want to achieve the results. It doesn't matter where you 
are. I mean I've been through mergers in the private sector - Deloitte's and 
Coopers ... That was a blood bath. You think two accounting firms coming 
together, 'This will be vety genteel. Well let's have sherry together. ' Jesus 
Christ! The knives were out everywhere. That's where you begin to see 
ruthlessness really and you've got to understand it and work with it. 47 
Along with references to a cut-throat business culture, this extract, with its 'bloodbath' 
metaphor, presents deinstitutionalisation as a military conflict. The implication is that in 
either of these arenas, for both combatants and civilians, they are inevitable casualties 
47 Gordon Greenshields, Interview December 16th 2009. 
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and so why not in the case of hospital closure; the 'NHS' after all 'is no different from 
any other organisation'. Unsurprisingly, and in contrast to the overall heroic narrations 
of change agents, this meant that many oral testimonies relating to the contraction of 
the Royal Albert were imbued with a sense of loss, and of tragedy. These remembered 
accounts emanated primarily, but not exclusively, from those staff who were critical of 
aspects of the ethos or practice of rundown. 
9.3.1 Loss of Meaning 
As examined in Chapter Seven, voices of opposition highlighted the loss of life and 
relationships for people with learning difficulties, contributing to a tragic 
deinstitutionalisation narrative. For some hospital residents, according to one 
interviewee, there could be an additional poignant dimension. After nearly an hour into 
a measured account of her time at the Royal Albert, Bernadette Hobson, former 
Voluntary Services Co-ordinator, suddenly recalled a particular incident: 
I went into the (Royal Albert) office one day and an old woman had died and her 
possessions were on the desk. And it was a black plastic bin liner and in it - oh 
and it still makes me weep - and there was a plastic flower and a plastic hand 
bag and about three little jewels, and that was the end of her life, she'd been 
there all that time - terrible. 48 
At this point in the interview Bernadette was tearful, but equally determined to make the 
point that this experience was instrumental in her wanting to do something to rectify this 
sense of a life without meaning. 
I thought they can't all leave this hospital and actually say, 'My life's wiped out. ' 
'Cause a seventy, eighty year old and say, That's what I've got. I've come out of 
this and people are saying to me, 'You're in a rotten place and you've to go out 
into the community. ' Because what it's actually saying is your life is negated. So 
48 Bemadette Hobson, Interview August 26th 2009. 
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I thought, 'Can't have this. We need to do something to give people histories 
here, to recognise it and say, 'You have done this and you have done that.' 
Particularly the old ones who had been there quite a time. 49 
Triggering these sentiments was the sense of someone's life being reduced to paltry 
items in a black plastic disposable rubbish bag. The latter, in other institutions as well, 
was often seen as symbolising the impoverishment of institutional life. Jean Collins 
exemplifies such a perspective, quoting a community support worker who said, 
after twenty, thirty of forty years people walk out of hospital clutching a black 
bin-bag containing the whole of their life history (Collins 1993:79). 
For Bernadette Hobson, such concerns resulted in her own professional life being given 
added meaning by setting up a reminiscence project, which involved residents and, as 
discussed later, hospital staff. 
9.3.2 Loss of the Good Old Days 
Pervading interviews of former members of Royal Albert staff, and implying a profound 
disquiet with the all encompassing contraction of the hospital, was a nostalgic yearning 
for an institutional past. In this form of narrative sense-making this past has: 
irrevocably gone; it is part of a 'world we have lost'. In organisational nostalgia, 
the past is frequently separated from the present through a radical discontinuity, 
a symbolic watershed, which cannot be undone (GabrieI2000:173). 
In the case of those remembering the Albert, 'the present' can be understood as 
beginning with the vigorous implementation of organisational downsizing during the 
1980s. Moreover, and indicating the value of a study of nostalgia for this research, 
Gabriel argues that: 
Nostalgia is not a way of coming to terms with the past (as mourning and grief 
are), but an attempt to come to terms with the present (GabrieI2000:183-4). 
49 Bernadette Hobson, Interview August 26th 2009. 
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So, in other words, nostalgic recollections can provide insights into how people felt 
about hospital rundown, rather than necessarily providing a plausible historical account. 
Brian IlIingworth, whose father and sister also worked at the Albert, was a porter from 
the late 1970s until the mid 1990s. In his testimony he yearned for an earlier time in his 
employment, prior to the acceleration of contraction, when the hospital 'emptied out'. He 
recalled what it felt like as the portering staff dwindled from a team of twelve down to 
just himself and one other, working opposite shifts: 
I used to like the days when we were all there ... /tjust wasn't same because all 
biggest part of people that you'd known, that you were used to, they just slowly 
went until you were just going round seeing to a few here and there - to me that 
was beginning of the end ... There was good days at the Royal Albert wasn't 
they? And they was. It was the sort of place at one stage when it was al/ 
running, all the departments and everything were there, you sort of worked your 
own system out with your job and you looked after all these different folk on the 
wards and what not and got on with everybody, it were grand. I used to look 
forward to getting up in the morning and going to work, and I can't honestly say 
that now, 'cause with job I'm on now I'd sooner see back of it. 50 
For Brian IlIingworth the rundown of the hospital incurred a personal cost. When he 
said, 'It was the beginning of the end', in many ways he was referring to the end for him 
of a meaningful working life, an important element of which was having a fulfilling role in 
which he 'looked after all these different folk'. He emphasised such an impression 
through his negative assessment of work now; and later in the same interview he said, 
'I'm on the heap now'. Conversely his nostalgia for the Royal Albert was further 
articulated a few months after the interview. At that point he spontaneously stated that, 
50 Brian IlIingworth, Interview September 8th 2009. 
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'I'd go back there like a shot if things could be as they were.'51 The demise of the Royal 
Albert, and its personal consequences, was viewed as a seminal turning point in this 
man's life. 
Hinted at in Brian IlIingworth's recollection, but made more explicit by Mrs Creed was 
the suggestion that the 'old days', prior to its contraction, were 'good' for all at the 
institution: staff and residents. As already cited in Chapter Seven, this former nurse 
recalled the concerts, the films, the holidays available to patients and that everybody, 
including the staff, got on with each other in 'one big (happy) family'. Mrs Creed was 
adamant that: 
I loved it. To me it was my life. It was hard when I had my babies, but I stuck it. 
I'd do it again. I'd do it again. 52 
The nostalgic potency of this testimony is given particular emphasis because 
elsewhere, in her interviews, she referenced instances where patients were unhappy, 
and where staff did not 'gel' .53 Like Brian IlIingworth there was a poignant desire to 
return to this imagined past. Moreover, this nostalgic recollection hinged upon the 
concept of family. This accords, as Gabriel argues, with other organisational research: 
The image of the organisation as a family seemed to be at the heart of many 
nostalgic feelings (GabrieI2000:175). 
Similar to Mrs Creed, a male nursing officer recalled that the Royal Albert was 'like a 
family but that was diSSipated as the hospital broke down, as it was dismantled. ,54 The 
significance lies in the use of a human metaphor to illustrate what the hospital meant to 
him and a mechanical one, arguably more impersonal and distant, to describe its 
rundown. 
51 Conversation with Brian lIIingworth, January 21 st 2010. 
52 Mrs Creed, Interview June 17'h 2009. 
53 Mrs. Creed. Ibid. 
54 Nursing Officer (Male), Interview March 11th 2009. 
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In his interview the nursing officer, just referenced, developed this image of family, 
aided by other nostalgic constructs. Similar to Steve Mee, he had worked at another 
learning disability institution prior to the Royal Albert. However, unlike this other 
hospital, he recalled that the Royal Albert 
had a tremendous reputation. It was internationally famous before the National 
Health Service took it over, it was considered to be a world class example of 
how to deal with handicapped people ... They'd become very good at it, and 
they'd become very excellently self regulating. They'd found rules that worked 
and stuck to them. 55 
In a testimony critical of, and mystified about, aspects of contraction and resettlement, 
this extract accords with a feature of nostalgic narrative identified by Gabriel. The latter 
observes that: 
In contrast to chaotic and organisational rules and procedures of the present, 
the organisation's golden past is seen as one of order and reason (Gabriel 
2000:181). 
However, the crucial attribute of the Royal Albert was that it used to be, 
more of a family place. There were some people when I first went to work there 
whose parents and grandfathers had actually worked there and they had a 
tremendous family feeling in the place. And if you were in any trouble, sorrow, 
need, sickness or any other adversity to quote the church ... if you went to the 
Matron or the Medical Superintendent or one of the senior nursing assistant 
matrons (nursing officers) they would treat you as a member of the family and 
say, 'Right what can we do to help you?' ... It worked really until the Matron and 
the Medical Superintendent retired, I think, and after that it tended to thin out 
because unfortunately the quality of nursing officers was altered. The quality of 
nursing officers when I first started was tremendously high. .. They were people 
55 Nursing Officer (Male), Interview March 11th 2009. 
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who had been charge nurses or sisters for a long time ... knew everybody - knew 
their names, their ages, what was wrong with them, what was likely to be wrong 
with them. If a sister rang up, 'I've got little Johnny so and so on such and such 
a ward and he's got a bit of a temperature and I don't know why. And there's 
something else the matter with him as well.' The nursing officer might say, 'Oh 
yes he had pneumonia 14 years ago, didn't he?' Or something like that, you 
know .... It was more than personal know/edge, it was care and affection as you 
have in a family. And that disappeared as we got newer, less experienced 
nursing officers. 56 
As with Brian IlIingworth, and interviews with a former clinical psychiatrist and Chief 
Engineer,57 important to this memory is that in the past the hospital was an informal, 
caring and altruistic place; in other words, an idealised family. In the nursing officer's 
account this was further embellished by reference to the maternal and paternal figures 
at its head. However, although the retirements of the Matron and Medical 
Superintendent marked a significant point in the family's fortunes, its break up was 
ultimately linked to the 'dismantling' of the institution. 
The use of nostalgia, as illustrated here, can have an important role in organisational 
accounts, as long as it is perceived as a critique of the present, rather than a historical 
account of the 'good old days'. Such a perspective accords with Steven High in his 
deindustrialisation research. This Canadian oral historian has been 'interviewing 
displaced industrial workers about job loss since the mid-1990s.' He identifies, in North 
America terminology, 'smokestack nostalgia'. There are inherent dangers as a historian, 
High argues, in taking displaced workers' nostalgic accounts as a true reflection of what 
actually happened in the mill or factory. In his view: 
66 Nursing Officer (Male), Interview March 11th 2009. 
57 Dr. Prasad, Interview August 12'h 2009; Mr S Webb, Interview August 28th 2009. 
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Nostalgia empties out history of meaning and, ironically, serves to de-politicize 
the past. Nostalgia invokes the past only to bury it alive (High 2004:4-5). 
However, as with Gabriel, he implies that nostalgia has a place, because oral historians 
must work on both the factual and narrative planes, as well as on the past and 
on the present (High 2004:5). 
The narrative extracts of former Royal Albert staff examined here if identified as 
essentially nostalgic provide a valuable insight into sense-making. Implied in the stories 
are powerful antagonistic feelings about changes in the later years of the organisation, 
in which the tellers felt marginalised. As suggested by Gabriel: 
Individuals who are too disillusioned, too inquisitive, too rational, or simply too 
old to 'buy' the organisation's own ideal, to internalise it. .. may create an 
alternative ideal, one built around not galvanising utopias for the future, but 
around the warm and loving reconstructions of the past (Gabriel 2000:187). 
These nostalgic discourses provided an alternative voice in the overarching 
deinstitutionalisation narrative of the Albert. 
9.3.3 Loss of Employment 
In a tragic discourse, examined in Chapter Seven, people with learning difficulties were 
regarded as the victims of organisational rundown. However, as the above discussion 
on nostalgia intimates, an additional thread woven into this deinstitutionalisation 
narrative was one relating to deindustrialisation. In the 1980s, as neo-liberal and 
monetarist policies took hold, large scale primary and manufacturing industries were 
decimated in Lancaster, across the UK, and further afield (Adeney and Lloyd 1986; 
Fevre 1989; Chatterleyand Rouverol2000; White 2001; High 2005). From this 
perspective, and reflected in the oral testimonies, the Royal Albert, along with other 
institutions, was just another workplace being downsized. Similar to the closure of 
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factories and mines, it was the paid workforce who could be viewed as casualties of 
such an organisational change. 
The most obvious effect of hospital contraction was loss of employment. In 1982, the 
organisation employed 631 nurses as well as a range of other staff, employed in trades, 
ancillary work, administration, management, and professional roles; it was a massive 
organisation (DHSS 1985). By late 1995, months before closure, it was reported that: 
The RAH has said goodbye to more than 500 staff, with 50 being redeployed 
elsewhere in the trust. Some 20-30 work for other trusts, 50-60 with social 
services, while 100 have taken other employment or further education. Dozens 
decided to take retirement while more than 100 are estimated as still redundant. 
The RAH currently employs around 170 staff though not all are permanent.58 
The suggestion in this extract that the hospital 'said goodbye' personalises the 
institution, echoing a deindustrialisation study which suggested that, in their narratives, 
former workers perceived the mill as 'an actor' (High 2004:6). In the instance of 'the 
Albert' the journalist's sentiment, as evidenced in a series of rundown reports, was 
indicative of an underlying sympathy for the hospital.59 
As the employment statistics imply, not everyone who left the Royal Albert found 
employment. Part of the issue for direct care staff was that, as Geoff Hopkinson, the 
nursing services director, remembered saying: 
We've got about 600 staff at the hospital and only 200 staff, shall we say, will be 
required for the Lancaster service. 60 
Moreover, unlike some other institutional closures, hospital staff were not given 
privileged status as regards work (Johnson 1998; Enbar, Morris et al. 2004). Although 
58 Lancaster Guardian November 17th 1995. 
59 Lancaster Guardian: June 2nd 1995, November 17th 1995, February 23rd 1996. 
60 Geoff Hopkinson, Interview July16th 2009. 
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the oral testimonies indicate exceptions to this, the general rule was that community 
staff were recruited on merit. In practice, particularly as rundown gathered pace during 
the 1990s, some staff discovered that they were rejected as suitable candidates for 
working in non-hospital settings.61 What the contraction meant for ancillary staff at the 
Royal Albert is partly summarised by the Secretary of the Hospital Shop Stewards 
Committee: 
There was a lot of demoralisation ... There was a lot of wony about what they're 
going to do, where they are going to find some other employment ... There 
weren't the factory jobs, they were all closed in the early days of Thatcherism, 
well in the early 80s in the main, Storey's went and Williamson's went, all those 
other great employers so they were as worried as hell about where and how 
they were going to be able to make a living once they left the Albeit ... Once they 
left the hospital they were no longer members of my union (NUPE) branch 
obviously ... Quite a lot I'd see people in town and they'd collar me about this 
that and the other. And some people would say they'd managed to find a job 
here or there, and other people I'm sure never did get jobs. 62 
Implied in this testimony is that in the 1980s, the Royal Albert merely represented 
another local large employer, all established during Victorian times, that was being 
down sized (Warde 1981; Urry 1986; White 2001). In this sense the hospital's demise 
was deeply embedded in a deindustrialisation and neo-IiberaI discourse, reflecting the 
drive to privatise public services (Hughes and Lewis 1998). 
61 Geoff Hopkinson, Interview July16th 2009; Tony Dennison, Interview September 1st 2009; 
Mary Lawrenson, Interview September 9th 2009; Steve Mee, Interview February 18th 2008. 
62 M.J. Kiernan, Interview September 23rd 2009. 
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Like other large employers in lancaster, such as Storeys, Williamsons63 and lansil 
(White 2001), the contraction of the Royal Albert signified a radical break in the cycle of 
employment of families at the organisation. A ward manager, for instance, whose 
mother also worked at the Albert recalled that: 
All our wives worked there and I got married, and you may have heard of the big 
families there, there was the B- , the biggest family there, and the R-- that 
was us and of course when I married my wife, she was one of the B - so we 
joined up the two biggest families there! You had to be very careful who you 
slagged off there because - 'That's my cousin!' 'That's my brother'~4 
These sentiments are not dissimilar to those emanating from an oral history study of 
workers at Sturgeon Falls, a Canadian paper mill, which eventually closed around the 
turn of this century. This study suggests that: 
The connection to the mill ran deep in many families. These bonds were so 
deep that interviewees frequently referred to themselves as 'mill families' in their 
oral narratives (High 2004:10). 
In that instance this family link was associated with security of employment and an 
almost closed shop to outsiders. While the latter did not appear to be the case at the 
Royal Albert, the institution did offer longevity of employment. 
Through family connections, Tony Dennison decided that being a nurse at the Royal 
Albert was an attractive proposition. Starting as a cadet nurse in his teens in the 1970s, 
he remembered that: 
It seemed at that time it would be a vel}' secure job. I went into it thinking, 'Well 
that'11 be me for life then'. 65 
63 Ironically, the founders of Storeys and Williamsons had been benefactors of the Royal Albert 
when it was a charitable institution Alston, J. and E. Roberts (1992). The Royal Albert Hospital: 
Chronicles of an era Centre for North-West Regional Studies, University of Lancaster 
64 Ward Manager (Male), Interview August 2nd 2009 
65 Tony Dennison, Interview September 25th 2005. 
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Similarly, this sense of anticipated security was evident in a dialogue between two 
former nurses, Beryl-Ann Foxcroft and Lesley Alston. The former recalled that after she 
married, 
I wanted a secure career really and a secure future. And as it happened with the 
changes that came it wasn't as secure as 1- because people went to the Royal 
Albert and I think they thought this is a job for life -
Lesley: Yeah, yeah. Oh yes, definitely. 
Beryl-Ann: - you know, 'We're secure here', you know, but times change. 66 
It was with a resigned air that this latter sentiment was uttered, suggesting that she had 
had to accept her fate and get on with her life. The promise of life-long security had 
disappeared with the rundown of the organisation. 
As with other themes, there is a hint of a resonance with the experience of workers who 
underwent mill closure. In his Canadian study, High notes that: 
A profound sense of loss permeated the oral testimonies. Marcel Boudreau, like 
many others, once thought that he had a job for life: 'I can remember lying in 
bed and wondering what the hell I was going to do .... When I got hired in the 
mill I was told by the guys that were working there that 'this was a job for life' 
(High 2004:13). 
In connection with the Albert, this 'profound sense of loss' was intimated by Mrs Creed. 
After nearly 50 years of nursing service, she remembered being almost inconsolable 
after leaving the hospital, only coming to terms with this when it finally closed.57 
Likewise, one of the other nurses recalled that: 
There was some people dealt with it (closure) really badly. I know one guy went 
working into the community, he'd been a staff nurse there, and he used to go 
back. And they put all these iron railings, all these big barriers around the site to 
66 Beryl-Ann Foxcroft and Lesle~ Alston, Interview June 5th 2006. 
67 Mrs Creed, Interview June 17 2009. 
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keep people out, and he used to go back sneaking in there, walk around the 
place, closed down. He couldn't handle it, you know. And he had to be retired on 
stress and anxiety grounds in the end - bad news, so it affected some staff 
really badly. 68 
A sense of grief on the part of staff was documented in relationship to an institutional 
closure in New Zealand: 
Many staff admitted they were grieving for the residents, the loss of friends, and 
the loss of a workplace (Gates 2008:31). 
In these staff narratives, whether from a Canadian paper mill, or an institution in New 
Zealand or England, it was the workers who constituted the victims. 
9.3.4 Loss of Community 
However, the Royal Albert represented more to the workers than merely a place where 
they earned their living, and were guaranteed security of tenure. One of those 
enthusiastically implementing organisational change at the Albert in the late twentieth 
century highlighted the importance of the hospital for staff as a community. Such an 
assertion accords with High's (2004) research into deindustrialisation in Canada. Long 
service workers, in particular, emphasised 'strong attachment to the industrial 
workplace and to workplace communities' (High 2004:4). In the case of the Albert, Mary 
Lawrenson remembered that: 
My colleagues in my student group became my best friends, my very best friend 
now is somebody that I did my training with and we as a group, because we 
were all women, grew up together. 69 
Partly echoing the theme of families, already mentioned, Mary Lawrenson went on to 
say that: 
68 Ward Manager (Male), Interview August 2nd 2009. 
69 Mary Lawrenson, Interview September 9th 2009. 
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We had the Social Club so we went to the discos together, a lot of us met 
partners through work, I didn't because I already had a partner then, but we 
grew up together with various people, got married to other people in the 
service. 70 
However, when she became a manager she withdrew from aspects of this social side 
because, 
I always had a view that if you were going to be a manager you had to make 
tough decisions. You couldn't socialise with the staff as well, didn't work ... (So) I 
lost that social contact because I was a manager and I made that decision but 
that social camaraderie was very important to people who worked at the Royal 
Albert.71 
She concluded that the high degree of 'social camaraderie', which included involvement 
in pantomimes and shows, was, 
one of the reasons they (staff) felt bad about the hospital shutting 'cause they 
lost that social contact, and the social club was the hub of it all, and the discos 
that went on. 72 
Beryl-Ann Foxcroft, in her interview, implied that this social contact was expressed 
amidst working routines. As a mother of small children, she found it 'exhausting' 
working nights, but this was offset at times by, 
the camaraderie and the laughs we used to have, at the night sister's expense 
sometimes. You know we used to laugh and giggle and play tricks, not at the 
detriment to any of the clients, I mean they'd probably be asleep and settled. 
And we'd creep around the corner on Siviour you know, and say, 'Pssst, Are you 
coming for a natter?' And we'd sit on the steps listening out for sister. Then 
70 Mary Lawrenson, Interview September 9th 2009. 
71 Mary Lawrenson. Ibid. 
72 Mary Lawrenson. Ibid. 
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when we heard the door at the far end clank we'd all scatter off, you know. But 
we did have a laugh. We did. 73 
Others, besides former staff, conveyed a sense of a lost feeling of community. On the 
occasion of the final League of Friends meeting, for instance, an active parental 
member of the committee wrote to its secretary: 
For the first and last time in 27 years I am unable to attend LOFRAH AGM and 
send my apologies. Our committee has been unique in the ties of friendship 
uniting us, is forged by our mutual understanding of the concern we each feel for 
our particular relative, our sympathy with each other's problems and our wish to 
do as much as possible for the welfare of all the residents. It has not merely 
been "nice to know you" it has been a heart-warming experience for which I am 
grateful. 74 
However, the concept of community is not unproblematic (Mooney and Hughes 2001). 
One commentator who critiques its 'romance' describes it as being constantly invoked 
asan, 
unequivocal good, an indicator of a high quality of life, a life of human 
understanding, caring, selflessness and belonging (Joseph 2002:vii). 
Such a sentiment resonates with the extracts highlighted here, but equally a critical 
discourse was evident in relationship to the Albert. In the interview with Beryl-Ann 
Foxcroft and Lesley Alston, for instance, they also recalled divisions and mistrust 
between night and day stafes Similarly, the staff club, heralded above as the heart of 
the staff community, was the scene of an internecine conflict in 1978 between those for 
and against people with learning difficulties being allowed to drink there. Aired in the 
local press, and referenced by one of the oral history interviewees, this incident 
73 Beryl-Ann Foxcroft and Lesley Alston, Interview June 5th 2006. 
74 Letter (Anonymous) November 1st 1995. 
7S Beryl-Ann Foxcroft and Lesley Alston, Interview June 5th 2006. 
282 
provoked an intensity of conflicting viewpoints amongst club members.76 Developing 
this latter observation about exclusivity, one former nurse suggested that the staff 
community had powerful institutional, in her eyes, reactionary components. The nurse 
claimed that: 
The hospital was run for the staff when I first went there and they didn't want 
that to stop, did they? They got overtime. They drank on duty. And at Christmas 
they had parties and the people they were supporting weren't involved in those 
parties. All sorts of bad things were going on. 77 
One specific example of a 'bad thing' related to the requisition of residents' money for 
sweets. This occurred on a ward, recalled by others as well, that was notorious for its 
dehumanising environment: 
The clients used to have what was called provisions. They had spending money 
but it was never given to them, the staff bought things for them. We had a 
hospital shop so you ordered the basket of provisions, and it was massive 
baskets of sweets. And I remember walking on (the ward) and the charge nurse 
throwing the sweets al/ over the day room, where the clients were, half of them 
in the nude, there was faeces everywhere, and the clients running to get them 
like animals actually, they were treated like animals. And the staff laughing 
about who was going to get something and who wasn't. But only about a third of 
the basket was given out, the rest of it went to the staff and they put it in their 
lockers and they took it home. 78 
This extract clearly charts not only financial exploitation, but more general abuse of a 
duty of care, epitomised by the appalling living environment. In the same interview, 
moreover, the nurse alluded to the sexual mores which operated amongst some 
members of Royal Albert nursing staff: 
76 Malcolm Alston, Interview May 19111 2009; Lancaster Guardian: February 17111,2411.., March 3n1, 
10111 , 17\1l 1978. 
77 Anonymised extract from a research interview. 
78 Ibid. 
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You could see nursing officers who came, who had relationships with married 
nurses and it was the downfall of them really, I believed it anyway in terms of 
integrity, but it happened and that's what happens in a big institution like that. 79 
Such an observation was repeated by other former staff,80 including the specific 
intimation that senior male nurses sometimes exploited their position with younger 
female ones. The implication is that, whether related to financial or sexual gain, certain 
members of staff were able to abuse their power and status. This could have provided 
them with a strong investment in the status quo, and a sense of loss, which went 
beyond feelings of mere camaraderie. 
9.4 Avenues of Expression 
Organisational rundown, as illustrated both in this chapter and Chapter Seven, 
generated a multiplicity of meanings and emotions for Royal Albert staff, families and 
residents. The extent to which formalised structures were available at the time to 
support staff emotionally through this change is unclear from the data, other than 
references to an NHS in-service counselling service being set up in the early 19905. 
However it was suggested at a Community Health Council meeting that this was under-
used because the culture of the NHS was about coping.81 
Although limited in scope, the research evidence intimated that other ad-hoc 
opportunities for emotional expression did exist. In the early 1990s, as discussed 
earlier, Bernadette Hobson, the Voluntary Services Co-ordinator, initiated a 
reminiscence project.82 Involving residents, this was also very much directed towards 
staff, to help them remember and grieve: 
79 Anonymised extract from a research interview. 
80 Gudrun O'Hara, Interview June 2200 2009; Mrs. Ann M. Wilson. Interview November 1 ih 
2009; Anonymised extract from"a conversation (prior to the research) with a former nurse. 
81 Lancaster Guardian May 10th 1991. 
82 Lancaster Guardian June ih 1991. 
284 
I think it was a very healing thing - for nurses as well to sum up what their lives 
had been, it helped it to close, it helped it to say, 'No, we are going'. 83 
In the year or two immediately preceding the closure the local press referenced two 
other events in which reminiscence, or storytelling, played a role. In December 1994 
there was the final staff dance held in Winmarleigh Hall, the symbolic venue at the 
institution, since Victorian times, for dances and concerts. More than 250 people 
attended, with the organiser commenting that: 
It was an excellent opportunity to meet old friends and reminisce. Many staff 
were pleased to be able to see people they had worked with in the past. Many 
had left years ago.84 
During the following year a Royal Albert story-telling project was carried out. Although 
the primary focus was upon the reminiscences of residents, the project involved staff, 
and represented a collaboration between the hospital, Lancaster's adult education 
college and the local professional theatre company. The culmination was a multi-media 
dramatisation, performed publicly in the autumn of 1995, which, according to the local 
press, portrayed the Albert 'as a living breathing community and not just bricks and 
mortar. ,85 
In addition to these intermittent reminiscence opportunities, a 1990 hospital social work 
document intimated that social workers offered ongoing therapeutic support to staff: 
Over the years, members of the Department have offered advice and 
counselling to individual staff members informally on a great variety of personal 
problems. Since morale amongst hospital staff is becoming lower, as the date 
for closure draws nearer, it is likely that this need for personal support will 
83 Bemadette Hobson. Interview Au~ust 26th 2009. 
84 Lancaster Guardian. December 9 1994. 
85 Lancaster Guardian. October 27th 1995. 
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increase, in spite of the recent development of a staff counselling service within 
the Health Authority (RAH 1990). 
The need to recognise the psychological needs of direct care staff working with people 
with learning difficulties is emphasised by one counselling service in the south of 
England. Writing on the behalf of Respond, O'Driscoll implies that deinstitutionalisation 
processes took little account of the emotional needs of staff who, as a consequence, 
were left feeling angry and resistant to change. He concludes that: 
The management of change and organisational transitions depends upon our 
ability to articulate the process of grieving as well as exploring and 
understanding our unconscious feelings and attitudes towards people with 
learning difficulties (O'DriscoIl2006:19). 
The hegemonic approach, explicated in Chapter Five, along with research data 
references to staff demoralisation and shortages,86 cast doubt upon the degree to which 
such an articulation took place during the years of Royal Albert contraction. 
9.5 Conclusion 
Focussing primarily on staff memories of Royal Albert rundown, the picture painted here 
has been one comprising multiple meanings and emotions. For those staff 
enthusiastically implementing a deinstitutionalisation agenda these years were framed 
in terms of exciting and intense professional development, in the midst of which some 
degree of redemption, for earlier collusive practices, can be construed as having been 
achieved. However, set against this are the meanings, invariably ones of tragedy and 
nostalgia, generated by staff who were at times bewildered and resistant to an all 
embracing organisational rundown. For this latter group of employees the closure had 
86 Geoff Hopkinson, Interview July16th 2009; M.J. Kiernan, Interview September 23rd 2009; Mrs. 
Ann M. Wilson, Interview November 17th 2009; Ward Manager (Male), Interview August 2nd 
2009; Lancaster Guardian: April 4th 1986, December 12'h 1988, April 7'h 1989, October 13th 
1989. 
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as much in common with processes of deindustrialisation as it did with 
deinstitutionalisation; it was indeed 'the end of an era' (High 2004:4). 
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CHAPTER TEN 
CONCLUSION 
10.1 Introduction 
10.2 The Research Questions 
10.2.1 How did the Royal Albert Hospital contract? 
10.2.2 What did rundown mean for key stakeholders? 
10.3 Research Methodology 
10.4 Research Journey 
10.5 Avenues for Further Research 
10.6 Conclusion 
10.1 Introduction 
This concluding chapter summarises and discusses core facets of the research. Initially 
the focus is on the key questions articulated earlier in the thesis. The chapter then 
reflects upon the methods employed by the study, followed by a consideration of the 
research journey itself. Finally, there is a review of potential avenues for further study. 
10.2 The Research Questions 
Focussing upon institutional closure as a core facet of deinstitutionalisation, I chose the 
rundown process of the Royal Albert Hospital in the north west of England as a case 
study. I asked two overarching, and linked, research questions: How did the Royal 
Albert contract? What did the rundown of the Royal A/bert mean for key stakeholders? 
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10.2.1 How did the Royal Albert Hospital contract? 
Examined in Chapters Four through to Eight, this query was broken down into three 
sets of sub-questions: What were the external pressures shaping the rundown of the 
Royal Albert Hospital, Lancaster in the late twentieth century? How did managers 
implement Royal Albert rundown? And regarded as one line of enquiry: What were the 
viewpoints of those who resisted the closure of the Royal Albert? How did they express 
their resistance? Each of these areas is considered in turn. 
10.2.1.1 What were the external pressures shaping the rundown of the Royal 
Albert Hospital, Lancaster in the late twentieth century? 
Deinstitutionalisation and rundown tensions 
This study highlighted the point that tensions inherent in the drivers of 
deinstitutionalisation as a national policy translated into pressures upon the institutional 
contraction of the Royal Albert. The literature review identified the interplay between 
forces driving the move towards deinstitutionalisation in the late twentieth century: the 
impact of campaigns; ideas and ideology; hospital scandals; and political economy. As 
examined in Chapter Four, the findings indicated that, with the exception of campaigns, 
these elements were all mirrored at the micro-level of Royal Albert contraction. Critical 
external reports, for instance, forced improvements in living conditions, capital 
investment and a radical shift in the nurse training curriculum away from the medical 
model. The ideas of normalisation were transmitted by the North West Regional Health 
Authority (NWRHA) with its adoption of the Model District Service in 1983, reflected at 
the Albert in the aPPOintment of a senior manager infused with these ways of thinking. 
The introduction of IPP for all residents and PASS training for staff ensued, as well as 
the establishment of a Resettlement Team promulgating a model of community care 
reflecting the values expressed in the MDS. Furthermore, and depicted particularly in 
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Chapter Four, political economic pressures stemming from the NWRHA pervaded the 
contraction process. Outcomes of these included internal movements for residents as 
wards closed, and a more ruthless emphasis on targets, with an increased pace of 
rundown in the last four years of the hospital. Particularly in these later years, oral and 
written testimonies from both advocates and critics suggested that, despite their best 
efforts, those managing resettlements occasionally had to make compromises. One of 
the procedural casualties of these years, for instance, was the removal of a 
probationary period for those who had moved out. In addition it was claimed that some 
residents were moved into wards in psychiatric and general hospitals, friendship 
groupings were undermined, and that stop-gap measures were adopted as 
accommodation was prepared.1 Overall these research findings add to those studies 
which problematise aspects of hospital rundown (Collins 1992; Johnson 1998; Bigby 
and Fyffe 2006). However, under-represented in previous research is the sense of how 
those managing change experienced and dealt with the pressures outlined above. The 
managerial discourse running through this thesis, and elucidated particularly in 
Chapters Five and Six, helps to provide insights into tensions, particularly between 
'cost' and 'the needs of people with learning difficulties', inherent in the change process. 
Political economic pressures 
Ultimately considerations of political economy rather than the needs of people with 
learning difficulties determined the pace of closure of the Royal Albert. By the early 
1990s in England and Wales, as outlined in Chapter Two, some analysts at the time 
suggested that the programme of deinstitutionalisation was running into serious 
problems because of fiscal issues involved in closing hospitals (Collins 1992; Felce, 
Grant et al. 1998). Although large long-stay institutions, such as Starcross and Darenth 
Park, had shut, many more were still open with little sign of impending closure (Korman 
1 Mrs. Ann M. Wilson, Interview November 1 rth 2009; Dr. Prasad, Interview August 12'h 2009; 
Dave Spencer Interview April 3rd 2009. 
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and Glennerster 1990; King 1991). The case of the Royal Albert, in its regional context, 
provides key insights into how a reforming agenda was translated into actual closure by 
early 1996. 
Discussed in Chapter Four was the assertion that by the late 1980s the 
deinstitutionalisation programme in the north west (as elsewhere) was faltering largely 
because of the logistical and financial issues associated with the transfer of funds from 
the NHS to the local authority. The development of community services was predicated 
predominantly upon the release of monies from the institutions as they contracted, with 
the ultimate prize being the generation of capital from the sale of hospital estates. 
However, for the Royal Albert, oral testimonies and documentary evidence suggested 
that economies of scale linked to the downsizing of wards, continued investment in 
institutional infrastructure, heated negotiations over the dowry for each resident, as well 
as care with resettlement processes, were all undermining the fulfilment of NWRHA's 
need for financial solvency (NWRHA 1989).2 Ironically, on the local authority side the 
neo-liberal agenda of the Thatcherite government had imposed rate capping, limiting 
their ability to create funding streams (Wertheimer, Ineichen et al. 1985). In 1989, as 
argued in Chapter Four, in the midst of this fiscal crisis the NWRHA asserted the priority 
of hospital closures, including the Royal Albert (NWRHA 1989). This would be achieved 
primarily by health releasing monies through bridging finance thus enabling 
deinstitutionalisation to proceed. Increased targets for resettlement were set to achieve 
the closure of the Albert by at least early 1996. Contrary to management rhetoric, the 
1990s witnessed the bureaucratic imperative of contraction as the ultimate determinant 
of the pace of resettlements, not the needs and rights of people with learning difficulties. 
This is Significant when assessing why Royal Albert closure was realised, when other 
contractions nationally faltered. 
2 David Jordison, Interview February 15th 2008 
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Affordability rhetoric 
Contested in the literature, and raised in Chapter Two, is the degree to which 
deinstitutionalisation was pursued as a policy goal because it was thought to be a 
cheaper option than retention and essential upgrading of the large long-stay institutions. 
Although it was beyond the scope of this study to analyse the minutiae of government 
policy, its findings do present a pertinent perspective on this issue. As discussed in 
Chapter Four the NWRHA's seminal 1983 document, the Model District Service, 
intimated that the move away from institutional towards community care was an 
economically viable, and cheaper, alternative. However this contrasted with the oral 
testimonies of Royal Albert change agents who claimed that the support offered by 
community services was always going to be more expensive than the segregated and 
congregated model. One former manager, for instance, used this assertion as proof that 
the closure of the Albert was predicated upon values not cost considerations: 
Everyone knew that it was going to cost more money so therefore it was about 
values and not money. 3 
However, as argued earlier, the importance of the claims of MDS may rest in their 
rhetorical significance. It is possible to argue that, in times of fiscal stress, the NWRHA 
had to convince the district health authorities, the government, and the critical nursing 
unions that their idealistic aspirations were economically viable. 
10.2.1.2 How did managers implement the rundown of the Royal Albert 
Hospital, Lancaster? 
Leadership qualities 
The research findings indicated that the change agency NWRHA exerted enormous 
adverse pressure upon the implementation of rights based agendas at the Royal Albert. 
3 An anonymised extract from a research interview. 
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Even staff antagonistic to the all embracing contraction agenda suggested that local 
managers had their hands tied by the demands of 'higher echelons'. 4 However, in their 
own oral testimonies, senior managers presented a narrative in which they claimed 
agency, including ethical manoeuvrability. As pinpointed in the literature review, first 
hand managerial accounts are under-researched, so the findings examined in this 
thesis contribute important insights to an understanding of the dynamics of rundown. In 
the case of the Royal Albert the interviews with both the former General Manager and 
Director of Nursing Services, as documented particularly in Chapters Five and Six, were 
interlaced with tales of resistance to externally driven political economic pressures.s 
These stories partly support the view that because of their 'independence' general 
managers 'were not worried by what their political bosses might say' (Korman and 
Glennerster 1990:63). 
In their seminal work on the closure of Darenth Park the authors assert that: 
Unit general managers became key figures. Though a great deal turned on the 
capacity of the particular individual involved, in many instances it created clearer 
lines of responsibility (Korman and Glennerster 1990:27). 
The oral and documentary data on the Royal Albert provides significant support for 
such claims. As referenced earlier in the thesis,6 the testimonies of various members of 
management and staff, as well as that of the General Manager himself, all attest to the 
impact of David Jordison in providing efficacious organisational leadership. However, 
and recognised by Jordison, the oral histories depicted the considerable leadership 
contributed by other individuals who constituted the body of senior and middle 
management at the time. Importantly, and under-represented elsewhere, through 
memories this study illuminates the recalled dialogues, interactions and incidents which 
4 Male Ward Manager, Interview August 2nd 2009; Conversation with Nikki Riley, July 4111 2011 
5 David Jordison, Interviews February 15111 2008, June 12th 2009; Geoff Hopkinson, Interviews 
May 1st 2008, July 16th 2009. 
6 See Chapters Five and Six. 
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make up a nuanced narrative of leadership. The analysis emphasises the myriad ways 
in which individual 'capacity' was expressed by senior and middle management; the 
ability to lead rested on more than power of position (Saldwin and Williams 1988). 
Overall the oral testimonies at the core of the research offer critical insights into how the 
rundown was managed. 
Embracing complexity 
A powerful overarching theme of the thesis is that the years of Royal Albert contraction 
represented a highly complex task, comprising a range of interconnected human, 
logistical, political, and economical variables. This re-inforces the important contention, 
borne out by other studies highlighted in Chapter Two, that social policy implementation 
is a 'messy' business. However, this study's oral history findings evidence the relative 
inexperience of senior and middle managers in organisational change management. 
Their backgrounds were predominantly therapeutic or of management on a much 
smaller scale. Management interview data provide 'more history' (Frisch 1979); they 
suggest that the 'right' values, strength of personality, a willingness to learn rather than 
any expertise in change management were the attributes which would bring about the 
contraction of the Albert. These observations constitute important, and little 
documented, insights into the human and professional dimension of closing a large 
long-stay institution for people with learning difficulties in late twentieth century UK. 
Hegemonic leadership 
Unlike some other institutional closures, the lack of guaranteed employment for staff 
forcibly displaced by the rundown of the Royal Albert did not result in collective 
resistance. Certain clues as to why this was the case may lie in matters beyond the 
scope of the study, such as the financial details of individual redundancy or early 
retirement packages, or, more broadly, Lancaster working class and NHS politics. 
However, the findings do provide a partial explanation. Management at the Royal 
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Albert, whether unwittingly or not, employed a hegemonic approach combining 
persuasion and coercion to enlist staff, family and public support. In making and 
supporting this argument, detailed in Chapter Five, the thesis makes an innovative 
contribution to the research on institutional closures. 
Significantly, the thesis has unpicked the otherwise under-researched ethical 
dimensions of a hegemonic approach in the closure of a large long-stay institution. In 
contrast to other studies, this research has evidenced the political, rather than 
therapeutic, attributes of normalisation/SRV. These ideas provided an overt ethical 
framework to those charged with the task of implementing the immensely complex 
rundown of the Royal Albert. Normalisation/SRV could be construed as offering the 
moral glue of 'rightness' which held together the disparate and, for some, unwelcome 
strands of change. Analysis of the managerial oral history testimonies reveals how 
these philosophies legitimised institutional contraction through contributing a critical 
conceptual language, the taken-for-granted 'rightness' of change, and with SRV the 
'rightness' of closure, as well as a body of work which informed student nurse and 
professional training. However, the findings discussed in Chapter Five suggested a 
more hidden, and less well documented, ethical dimension to the contraction of this 
hospital. Infused with the 'rightness' of normalisation/SRV, the oral histories of senior 
and middle management indicated that they legitimised institutional contraction by 
discrediting the viewpoints of those who questioned facets of the ethos and practice of 
Royal Albert rundown. This thesis has developed this point to situate the ethical 
positioning of Royal Albert senior and middle management within a hegemonic 
framework. This is definitely not an argument which doubts the ethics, principles or 
compassion of individual managers who prosecuted change. It is one, however, 
propounding that in terms of organisational politics there was a pervading and intricate 
hegemonic weltanschauung which marginalised critical voices and constituted an 
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essential facet of downsizing. Such a research perspective provides insights under-
represented in other studies of institutional closure and deinstitutionalisation. 
10.2.1.3 What were the viewpoints of those who resisted the closing of the 
Royal Albert? How did they express their resistance? 
Valid critical perspectives 
The findings of this study intimate that those individuals critical of elements of Royal 
Albert contraction were expressing tensions which resided at the core of the process. 
Chapter Four pinpointed conflicting pressures which shaped institutional closure at the 
Royal Albert. Overall the research indicates that the exigencies of political economy 
were present throughout the rundown period, although their impact was particularly 
apparent during the final five or six years. This assertion is in contrast to the hegemonic 
rhetoric of change agents which emphasised the engine of Royal Albert closure being 
driven predominantly by the needs, and rights, of people with learning difficulties. 
Entwined in this weltanschauung, and highlighted earlier in the thesis and in this 
chapter, was a complexity of ethical perspectives which 'athered' critical voices. The net 
result was that those who resisted the changes of these years were discredited; they 
did not present a cogent viewpoint in the contraction narrative. 
This research, however, has suggested that elements in a resistance viewpoint 
represented a valid perspective on the rundown of the Royal Albert. As discussed in 
Chapter Seven, critiques highlighted issues associated with political economy, concerns 
over those people with learning difficulties regarded as the most vulnerable, the degree 
of choice possible in the process, collective as opposed to individualised living options, 
and the professional benefits accruing to those staff who promoted change. The 
findings, including the oral histories of those implementing change, intimated that these 
themes were prevalent both during and after the process of downsizing. They did not 
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comprise the whole story of the last 10 to 15 years of the Albert's existence, but were 
an integral part of it. This with the odd exception (Gleeson 2010), as highlighted in 
Chapter Two, is a historical perspective lacking from the research literature; as such the 
findings of this study offer an 'anti-historical' account (Frisch 1979). 
Micro-politics of resistance 
Gleeson, discussed in Chapter Two, argues that the small scenes of moral and political 
struggle associated with institutional closures are in danger of being lost forever 
(Gleeson 2010). In this under-researched area, the findings of this thesis retrieve the 
micro-political elements of resistance within one organisation. Oral histories, along with 
organisational documents, provide 'more history' (Frisch 1979) by illuminating the 
myriad acts of resistance associated with the contraction of the Albert. Data analysis 
reveals a web of informal and formal avenues through which individuals expressed their 
dissatisfactions about hospital contraction. These micro-political acts, examined in 
Chapter Eight, provide a historical narrative which has frequently been passed over by 
other researchers. As referenced in the literature review, there are one or two 
exceptions to this trend, but generally the nature of resistance has either been unpicked 
or seen in terms of overtly political collective actions. 
Summary 
This section has covered the component parts of the overarching research question: 
How did the Royal Albert Hospital contract? Using oral histories primarily of former 
management and staff, supported by a selection of documentary evidence, the findings 
have suggested that there was an intricate amalgam of ethical and political factors in 
the contraction of the Royal Albert. Integral to this blend, and emblematic of deeper 
tensions within the policies and practices of deinstitutionalisation, was a conflict 
between critics and implementers of change. Managing this discord was crucial to 
297 
hospital closure and was achieved through the adoption of a hegemonic approach by 
those managing the change. 
10.2.2 What did the contraction of the Royal Albert mean for key 
stakeholders? 
In Chapter Two it is argued that missing from the research literature overall are studies 
illuminating the multiple and rich meanings that institutional rundown had for both 
change agents and those staff and relatives who expressed resistance. This thesis, 
based largely upon narrative, dialogic and thematic analysis of oral histories, provides 
insights into these areas. The contention, illustrated in Chapter Seven, is that for 
individuals critical of the rundown of the Royal Albert those years represented a sense 
of loss and bewilderment. Their feelings were resonant of workers undergoing 
deindustrialisation. In contrast, for some change agents the contraction offered 
opportunities for redemption, and an exciting and intense involvement in transforming 
the lives of people with learning difficulties. As documented in Chapters Five and 
Seven, either side of this divide could construe the other's sense-making as being 
merely about career or job self-interest. The oral histories examined in this study depict 
a far richer interpretation, and one which is largely absent from existing research. 
10.3 Research Methodology 
Oral history methodology was pivotal to this qualitative research. In turn, both the 
choice of interviewees and the analYSis of their oral data relied heavily upon a 
polyphonic approach, designed to elicit a diversity of voices involved in the closure 
process of the Royal Albert. Reliance upon remembered accounts, supported with 
limited documentary data, at times meant that establishing the precise chronology of 
the event was problematic. However, it was possible, by triangulating data, to identify a 
sufficient authentically sequenced account. Moreover, any gaps in this area were more 
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than adequately compensated by the insights gleaned from the oral, and documentary, 
evidence. 
The interviewees provided a rich, nuanced multi-voiced human account of 
organisational change. In using their testimonies to depict institutional rundown, Frisch's 
concepts of 'more-' and 'anti-history' proved invaluable. The dynamics, challenges, 
relationships, personalities, conflicts, emotions and perspectives of Royal Albert 
contraction were illuminated through the memories of key stakeholders. In their 
interviews individuals told not only their own stories but in their inner dialogues revealed 
the viewpoints of others (Schrager 1998). Furthermore, individual testimonies were then 
compared with others to add to this kaleidoscope of voices. A critical outcome of this 
approach was 'more history'. At an organisational level, facilitated predominantly by oral 
historical testimony, this thesis provides fresh insights into the complex human 
dimension of the rundown of a large long-stay institution for people with learning 
difficulties. 
Importantly, however, the polyphonic oral historical methodology has offered an 'anti-
historical' narrative of institutional contraction. Through an analysis of the oral 
testimony, aided by reference to documentation, it was possible to acknowledge and 
explore a counter-community care viewpoint. Interviews with former managers, for 
instance, revealed inconsistencies in the rundown process. Arguably such revelations 
would be less forthcoming in a more formal, deliberately constructed statement. 
Additionally, amongst those critical of facets of Royal Albert contraction perhaps it was 
safer, and easier, to express these views years after the event, especially when no 
longer employed by the NHS. Oral history interviews could offer what Gabriel defines as 
an 'unmanaged space' where, 
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all kinds of organisational controls (including ideological, administrative, spatial 
and technical) are evaded, dodged or side-stepped ... (Gabriel 2000:125). 
Alternative voices generated in such an arena challenged orthodoxies regarding 
deinstitutionalisation. In amplifying and examining these largely hidden perspectives, 
provided through oral testimony, the research offered an 'anti-historical' account. This 
enriched the narrative of Royal Albert rundown, and of research into institutional 
closures in general. through enabling a rigorous consideration of acts and viewpoints of 
resistance. 
Inextricably linked to a historical reconstruction of institutional rundown were the 
meanings this dramatic event had for those involved. Oral historical testimony, situated 
within a polyphonic framework, and assisted by dialogic, thematic and narrative 
analytical tools proved invaluable in explicating the ways in which individuals made 
sense of the downsizing of the Royal Albert. In their inner dialogues, for example, 
interviewees provided clues as to their values, ethical positioning, their relationship to 
the Albert, to its closure and to people with learning difficulties. Devices such as tragic 
or epic narratives, moreover, revealed as much about respondents' own perspectives 
as they did about any 'objective' historical truth. Aided enormously by the oral historical 
evidence. the study was able to illustrate, to an extent largely absent from existing 
literature, the multiple-meanings evoked by the contraction of a long-stay institution for 
people with learning difficulties. 
10.4 Research Journey 
Informing the choice of the Royal Albert Hospital rundown as a case study were my 
own links with the institution as it contracted during the 1980s. As discussed in earlier 
chapters,7 being an insider, albeit to a limited extent, was a mixed blessing for the 
7 Chapters One and Three. 
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research. Overall, however, revisiting the event as a historian rather than as a 
participant was an illuminating experience. Delving deeper into the research presented 
the possibility of standing back and re-examining attitudes held both by my younger and 
older selves. Such a process was exemplified by attempting to hear the perspectives of 
those critical of deinstitutionalisation, especially since, at the time, I would have adopted 
a dismissive attitude towards these individuals. Endeavouring to make sense of the 
event in a dispassionate manner helped me see that the move to community care was 
riddled with anomalies. Many of the latter, despite the best intentions of those 
implementing change, had little to do either with the needs of people with learning 
difficulties or those supporting them. An awareness of this state of affairs partly fuelled 
the anxieties and anger of those resistant to the pOlicies and practice of 
deinstitutionalisation. Furthermore, although the study has not undermined my belief 
that many practices in long-stay institutions were physically and emotionally abusive, it 
did highlight the profound and complex relationship many members of staff, families 
and people with learning difficulties had with the hospital. As a researcher, rather than 
as an adult educator, this understanding has complicated, and deepened, my 
perspective on this organisational transition. It does not signal agreement with all the 
attitudes encountered in the course of the research, but has reaffirmed the notion that a 
humane process of change needs to find ways of engaging diverse needs and 
viewpoints in a genuine dialogue. 
10.5 Avenues for Further Research 
Further light could be shed on the tensions impacting on Royal Albert contraction, 
particularly those which stemmed from the conflicting pressures of cost and human 
need, by a closer examination of actual resettlements. Drawing on oral histories and 
documentary material this would embrace the voices of all those involved, including 
people with learning difficulties, at that micro-level. This attention to the detailed ethical 
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and political dynamics associated with particular individuals moving out of the Albert 
may provide additional valuable and informed insights into themes raised in this study. 
This research, however, has raised broader ethical and political issues meriting 
attention. These relate both to institutional closures and the wider field of organisational 
change. The contraction of the Albert was imposed upon the organisation, and 
enthusiastically adopted by some, less so by others. The lack of zeal of the latter was 
bound up with concerns for people with learning difficulties, a critique of contraction 
politics and ideologies, and with the profound meanings, for both staff and families, that 
association with the institution held for them as a place. Was it right that these voices 
were marginalised both in policy creation and in its implementation? Are there ways of 
generating and implementing change which embrace a polyphony of viewpoints, and 
enable a genuinely democratic dialogue? There is clearly an important place in the 
scope of these questions for people with learning difficulties. However, that is not the 
prism through which this research has viewed institutional closure. Furthermore, it is 
through recognising and considering the legitimacy of the viewpoints of others that this 
thesis complicates the ethical narrative of contraction and prompts questions worthy of 
investigation. 
Salient lines of further enquiry hinge upon a more profound understanding of 
viewpoints. To recap, this study has touched upon the importance of sense-making by 
key stakeholders in the organisational change associated with an institutional closure. It 
has implied that at the heart of the disparate weltanschauung of individual managers, 
and members of staff, were narratives, and inner-dialogues, through which they 
interpreted their involvement in such a tumultuous service transformation. Enmeshed in 
these narratives was a complex multi-layered mixture of ethics, dialogue, Identity, 
emotion and meaning. The research, however, has also intimated that proponents and 
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opponents of institutional closure became encamped on either side of a moral divide, 
across which it appeared to be very difficult to reach and fully acknowledge alternative 
viewpoints. Integral to this polarisation, from a managerial perspective, was that 
institutional closure was predicated upon a taken-for-granted stance, ethically infused 
with normalisation/SRV, of what was best for people with learning difficulties. This uni-
dimensional positioning effectively marginalised critical voices; it did not recognise, or 
embrace, the diverse subjective realities experienced by those at the heart of that 
organisational change. However, this thesis merely touched upon, for instance, the 
consequences of such a state of affairs for the lives of people with learning difficulties. 
Overall, the findings of the study indicate that further research is needed to investigate 
the nature, significance, acknowledgement and impact of sense-making upon the 
mission of institutional rundown, and the well-being of its key stakeholders. In other 
words, the primary focus would rest upon the multiple ways in which way people imbue 
their world with meaning. This emphaSis would build upon, and, particularly with its 
innovative application of oral history, contribute towards studies which have recognised 
the central importance of story-telling, and moral viewpoints, in the political and ethical 
life of organisations (GabrieI2000; Reissner 2004; Conroy 2009). 
In concentrating upon the case study of the rundown process of a single institution the 
thesis has provided a rich account of organisational change, embracing a polyphony of 
perspectives. However, this has meant a more restricted assessment of the respective 
influence of differing elements than may have been possible with a detailed 
comparative study (Rolph 2000; Tilley 2006). Attempts were made to 'benchmark' 
(Tilley 2006) the contraction of the Albert with other research but were limited by the 
lack of comparable in-depth studies. A multi-case study approach has the potential to 
make tacit issues explicit (Reissner 2004). Evaluating the impact, for instance, of Royal 
Albert leadership on its rundown is difficult without an analysis of similar phenomena 
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elsewhere. Likewise, investigating political and ethical issues, pinpointed here as 
warranting further study, could be assisted by focussing upon the change processes at 
other large institutions, or non-therapeutic organisations. 
10.6 Conclusion 
Focussed upon a case study of a single institutional rundown, this study has depicted 
'the kerfuffle,8 of learning disability social policy implementation during the later years of 
the twentieth century. Analysis of oral history testimony of key stakeholders in the 
contraction of the Royal Albert Hospital, Lancaster revealed a messy, intense 
organisational change infused with a powerful ideological rhetoric. A polyphonic 
approach enabled the thesis to embrace a wealth of diverse viewpoints, some of which 
complicated and questioned a dominant and oversimplified community care narrative. 
Constructs, and examples, adopted from organisational, political, deindustrialisation 
and oral historical studies, as well as those specific to the social history of learning 
disability, enhanced and underpinned the study. The latter, furthermore, was enriched 
by the employment of a mixture of thematic, dialogic and narrative analytical tools. 
Ultimately the value of the thesis lies in the insights into institutional contraction 
generated by this eclectic fusion of methodology and voice. 
8 Dave Spencer, Interview April 3rd 2009. Also see Chapter Five. 
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Appendix i: List of Abbreviations 
CMH 
COHSE 
DHSS 
GNC 
IPP 
LDHA 
MDS 
NDT 
NHS 
NUPE 
NWRHA 
PASS 
RA 
RAH 
RAHLOF 
RCN 
RMN 
RN MS 
SPSP 
SRN 
SRV 
VIA 
Campaign for the Mentally Handicapped 
Confederation of Health Service Employees 
Department of Health and Social Security 
General Nursing Council 
Individual Programme Planning 
Lancaster and District Health Authority 
Model District Service (NWRHA) 
National Development Team 
National Health Service 
National Union of Public Employees 
North West Regional Health Authority 
Programme Analysis for Service Systems 
Royal Albert (Hospital) 
Royal Albert Hospital 
Royal Albert Hospital League of Friends 
Royal College of Nursing 
Registered Mental Nurse 
Registered Nurse Mental Subnormality 
Shared Proposals for Shared Problems (NWRHA) 
State Registered Nurse 
Social Role Valorisation 
Values into Action (previously CMH) 
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Appendix ii: Brief biographies of oral history 
interviewees9 
Alston, Malcolm 
Interview: September 13th 2005; May 19th 2009 
Born 1940 
Royal Albert Charge Nurse (before and) during late 1970s until 1992: managed the 
Independence Training Unit (preparing residents for leaving hospital, including finding 
them outside employment) in 19805; and ran the annual summer camp and the 
Pathfinders, the Royal Albert equivalent of an adult Scout Troop. 
[Started at the Royal Albert in 1964; and qualified as a Registered Nurse, eventually attaining 
Charge Nurse status.] 
Alston, Lesley 
Interview: June 5th 2006 
Born mid 19505 
Royal Albert Night Sister during 19805 until c.1993; Royal Albert Deputy Team 
Leader c.1993 - 1996 (present on last day). 
[Royal Albert Cadet Nurse 1971-73; Student Nurse 1973-6, qualifying as a Registered Nurse; 
becoming a Staff Nurse then Sister.] 
Charge Nurse 
Interview: January 28th 200910 
Born late 19305 
Royal Albert Nurse, then Charge Nurse late 1950s to 1990s. 
Creed, Mrs. E. 
Interview: March 21 5t 2007; June 17'h 2009 
Born 1925 
Royal Albert Nurse, then Staff Nurse 1949-19905. 
[Initially employed as Matron's Assistant, then eventually becoming, through service, a State 
Enrolled Nurse i.e. Staff Nurse; Night Nurse from c.1964 to retirement in 1990; then into 1990s 
was a bank nurse at the Royal Albert.] 
Dennison, Tony 
Interview: September 20th 2005; September 15t 2009 
Born 1956. 
Royal Albert Charge Nurse 19805: worked with profoundly disabled young people (on 
Graham House and Sturton Lower). 
[Started at the Royal Albert in 1973 as a Cadet Nurse; qualified as RNMS 1977; qualified as 
RMN 1979; late 1980s - Qualified Assessor in Clinical Practice as well as Diploma in Nursing; 
left Royal Albert in 1992; 1994 BA in Applied Social Sciences.] 
9 For an explanation of abbreviations please see Appendix i. 
10 This was a telephone conversation. 
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Dewhirst, Bob 
Interview: June 9th 2009 
Born 1948 
Royal Albert Staff Nurse, then Charge Nurse early to mid 1970s; Nursing Tutor at 
Royal Albert School of Nursing mid to late 1970s; 1980s Royal Albert Senior Nursing 
Tutor (head of nurse training in learning disability and mental health); 1980s National 
Exam Moderator (GNC). 
[Qualified as: RMN c.1969; SRN c.1971; RNMH c.1972. Late 1970s: Senior Nursing Tutor at 
Turner Village, Colchester11 .] 
Dunkeld, Jenny 
Interview: August 1ih 2009 
Born 1949 
Royal Albert Nurse 1964-74 (Cadet Nurse; Student Nurse; Sister) 
Deputy Manager of Polntfield Hostel (Lancaster) for children with learning difficulties 
1974-76; OffIcer in Charge of Rivervlew Hostel (Lancaster) for adults with learning 
difficulties 1976-92. 
[A Lancashire Social Services Inspector of Care Homes 1992-2008.] 
Former Hospital Resident (Anon) 
Interview: May 28th 2009 
Royal Albert Resident c. 1950s - early 1980s. She left prior to the setting up of the 
formal multi-disciplinary Resettlement Team. 
Former Hospital Resident (Anonymous) 
Interview: May 1 ih 2009; May 28th 2009 
Royal Albert Resident 1940s - early 1980s. She left prior to the setting up of a formal 
multi-disciplinary Resettlement Team. 
Foxcroft, Beryl-Ann 
Interview: June 5th 2006 
Born 1953 
Royal Albert Staff Nurse (Nights) late 1970s to 1995. 
[Cadet Nurse at Lancaster Moor Hospital 1969-71 ; office work 1971-76; 1976 started at Royal 
Albert; 1978 qualified as State Enrolled Nurse with people with learning difficulties.] 
Greenshields, Gordon 
Interview: December 16th 2009 
Born 1946 
Finance Director NWRHA 1983-4; Chief Executive NWRHA 1984-6; National 
Finance Director NHS 1990-93. 
[Qualified as an Accountant; early career in Local Authority and Housing; from 1976 in NHS, 
initially Lothian Health Board as Assistant Director of Finance, then Director of Finance in 
London based HAs until 1983; from 1986 a Partner in Price Waterhouse Coopers, from where 
seconded to NHS Financial Directorship.] 
11 Turner Village was a large long-stay institution for people with learning difficulties 
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Hobson, Bernadette 
Interview: August 26th 2009 
Born 1947 
Royal Albert Clinical Psychology Administrator (after initially employed as 
Secretary) 1978 to late 1980s; Royal Albert Voluntary Services Co-ordinator late 
1980s - 1994. 
[Whilst at the Royal Albert studied successfully for an Open University degree in Psychology; 
then after leaving the hospital acquired a Masters in Public Health at Manchester University; 
became an Higher Education Lecturer in Psychology.] 
Hopkinson, Geoff 
Interview: May 1 st 2008; July 23rd 2009 
Born 1940 
Royal Albert Divisional Director of Nursing Services 1983-95: responsibility for 
services at the hospital and in the Lancaster District. 
[Worked in NHS learning disability nursing since 1962: Student Nurse, Staff Nurse, Charge 
Nurse at Balderton Hospital, Newark 1962-72; Nursing Officer, Earls House Hospital, Durham 
1972-76; Senior Nursing Officer, Stoke Park Hospital, Bristol 1976-81; Senior Nursing Officer, 
Prudhoe Hospital, Northumberland 1981-83. Retired from NHS in 1995.] 
IIlingworth, Brian 
Interview: September 8th 2009 
Born 1951 
Royal Albert Porter 1978 - 1995 
[When joined the Royal Albert his father worked there as a porter, with his sister, and future 
brother-in-law employed as nurses. In 1995 transferred to Lancaster Moor Hospital, where 
worked, with a short period of unemployment, until he was laid off in the late 1990s when the 
main site was closed.] 
Jordison, David 
Interview: February 15th 2008; June 12th 2009 
Born 1949 
Royal Albert Unit General Manager 1986-92; General Manager of Mental Health Unit 
c.1987-1992; Chief Executive Lancaster NHS Priority Services Trust (Learning 
Disabilities, Mental Health, Community Services) 1992 - late 1990s; then Chief 
Executive, Bay Community NHS Trust; retired 2003. 
[BA Geography at Leeds University; qualified as an accountant with Coopers and Lybrand in 
Sheffield; then short period as an accountant in industry; NHS Assistant Treasurer in 
Northumberland; NHS Deputy Treasurer, North Tees; NHS Deputy Treasurer in South Wales, 
prior to arrival at the Royal Albert.] 
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Kiernan, MJ 
Interview: September 23rd 2009 
Born 1950 
NHS Lancaster Branch Secretary of NUPE 1980 - c.1996; Lancaster Hospitals 
Joint Shop Stewards Committee Secretary 1982 - c.1996; NUPE National 
Committee member 3 years during 19805. 
[Storeman at Lancaster Moor Hospital from late 1970s to c.1996; during 1970s left after 2 years 
at Lancaster University studying BA in Sociology (major) and Theatre Studies (minor).] 
Lawrenson, Mary 
Interview: September 9th 2009 
Born c.1959 
Royal Albert Student Nurse 1977-80; Staff Nurse; Acting Ward Sister c.1981-3; 
Ward Sister c.1984-5; Nursing Officer c.1985 - c1990; then Lancaster District 
Manager (NHS and Social Services) for people with learning difficulties. 
[At the time of interview: County Manager of Lancashire County Council Social Services 
provision for people with learning difficulties.] 
McLean, Tom 
Interview: September 8th 2008 
Calderstones Hospital Principal Nursing Officer from 1972; Founder Member 
National Development Team in early 19705; Member of North West Regional 
Health Authority Advisory Group for people with learning difficulties (seminal figure in 
the production of key policy documents throughout the 19805). 
[Student Nurse at Cell Barnes Hospital, St. Albans; Senior Nursing Officer at Stoke Park 
Hospital, Bristol prior to arrival in the North West in 1972.] 
Mee, Steve 
Interview: September 22"d 2005; July 11th 2007; February 18th 2008 
Born 1955 
Royal Albert's first Nursing Process Co-ordinator, implementing Individual 
Programme Planning c. 1984-85; the hospital's first Resettlement Co-ordinator: 1985 
to c.1991. 
[BA Sociology, University of Essex 1976; Started as Care Assistant at Turner Village in 1977; 
began Nurse Training at latter institution; qualified at Royal Albert in early 1980s; 'fast tracked' to 
Nursing Process Co-ordinator; left Royal Albert c.1991 to work for Social Services in Lancaster 
area as a manager of housing into which former hospital residents resettled.] 
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Morgan, Phil 
Interview: March 20th 2008 
Born c. 1953. 
Royal Albert Senior Nursing Officer 1985-1995: responsible for the design and 
implementation of the Ward Contraction Strategy; Acting Divisional Manager 1995-
96: the senior hands-on manager overseeing the final months of Royal Albert closure. 
[Started at the Royal Albert in 1969 as a Cadet Nurse; qualified as a Registered Nurse in 1974; 
Staff Nurse until 1976; Charge Nurse 1976-83; Nursing Officer 1983-85; after Royal Albert 
closure, became a senior NHS manager in Lancaster and district community services; retired in 
2008.] 
Nursing Officer (Ma/e) 
Interview: March 11 th 2009; July 23rd 2009 
Born 1930s 
Royal Albert Student Nurse, Staff Nurse, then Charge Nurse 1970s into the 1980s; 
Nursing Officer 1980s to early 1990s. 
O'Hara, Gudrun 
Interview: June 22nd 2009 
Born 1942 
Royal Albert Social Worker 1980 -1996 
[As a young woman had worked with people with learning difficulties in a Rudolph Steiner Home 
in Switzerland; prior to arrival at the Royal Albert was a Social Worker in the Freeman Hospital, 
Newcastle; after the Royal Albert continued as a Social Worker in the Lancaster area, working 
with people with learning difficulties, and their families; retired 2002.] 
Prasad, Doctor 
Interview: August 12'h 2009 
Born c.1938 
Royal Albert Consultant Psychiatrist 1982 to mid-1990s. 
[His leaving was a consequence of the contraction process, being transferred to Lancaster Moor 
Hospital.] 
R., Eric 
Interview: August 11 th 2009 
Born 1957 
Royal Albert Nurse 1 976 - 1985: Student, then as Staff Nurse working predominantly 
with young people and children - including those moving out; 1985-88 Charge Nurse-
Manager of Community Houses for former Royal Albert residents. 
[1990 - present: working for NHS with learning disabled people with high support needs.] 
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Spencer, Dave 
Interview: April 3rd 2009 
Born c.1960 
Royal Albert Charge Nurse mid-1980s, working with residents preparing to leave 
hospital; Assistant Resettlement Co-ordinator late 19805 - c.1991; Resettlement 
Co-ordinator c.1991 -1995. 
[BA Degree Course in Social Science at Trent Polytechnic in the late 1970s - left prior to 
completion; qualified at the Royal Albert as a Registered Nurse to work with people with leaming 
difficulties in 1985; 'fast tracked' to Charge Nurse; left Royal Albert in 1995 to take up a post in 
community services in the Blackpool area] 
Ward Manager (Male) 
Interview: August 2nd 2009 
Born 1953 
Royal Albert Staff Nurse early 1980s; Royal Albert Charge Nurse, and then Ward 
Manager (post re-grading late 1980s) until closure. 
[Started at Royal Albert in late 1970s; then qualified as RNMH] 
Webb, Mr. S. 
Interview: August 28th 2009 
Born 1925 
Royal Albert Chief Engineer 1968 - 88. 
[Engineer at Williamson's in Lancaster 1947-67.] 
Whitfield, Paul 
Interview: October 28th 2009 
Born 1940 
General Manager Lancaster District Health Authority 1985 - 1992; Chief Executive 
Lancaster Acute Hospitals NHS Trust 1992 onwards. 
[Originally trained in cost accountancy, then from 1959 worked for the NHS in the North West, 
initially in finance, then as Personnel Officer, Deputy Administrator and Administrator for different 
Health Authorities, prior to arriving in Lancaster in 1985] 
Wilson, Mrs Ann M. 
Interview: November 17'h 2009 
Born 1949 
Royal Albert Deputy Administrator 1975-8; Secretary of the Royal Albert Hospital 
League of Friends 1985 - 1995; Royal Albert Volunteer 1980s - 1990s. 
[Deputy Administrator at the Royal Lancaster Infirmary 1971-75, then promoted to a similar role 
at Lancaster Moor Hospital12.] 
12 Lancaster Moor Hospital: a large long stay psychiatric institution 
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Appendix iii: Timeline of Royal Albert Hospital 
rundown13 
Years Royal Albert Hospital Regional and National 
Events 
1870 Opened as a charitable institution: 1913 Mental Deficiency Act Royal Albert Asylum for Idiots and 
Imbeciles of the Northern Counties. 
1910 Renamed Royal Albert Institution. 
1948 Lost independent status - incorporated into NHS, as Royal Albert Hospital. 1959 Mental Health Act 
1970s 
1974: NHS re-organisation: end of 1971: Better Services for the Mentally 
Matron/Medical Superintendent; Handicapped White Paper 
introduction of tripartite consensus 
management: medical, nursing and 
administration. 
Late 1970s: Critical external reports 1979: NWRHA Planning of Services for 
(NOT, GNC, NWRHA) - overcrowding the Mentally Handicapped 
and poor living conditions. GNC 
withdrew recognition of RA Nurse 
Training School. 
1980s Early 1980s: ad-hoc resettlements 1983 NWRHA A Model District Service increased; GNC restored RA nursing - stating eventual closure of institutions for 
school status. people with learning difficulties in region. 
Early to mid-1980s: Individual 1983 Health and Social Security 
Programme Planning (IPP) for all Adjustments Act: DHSS benefits could 
hospital residents introduced; RA finance resettlement to private and 
Hospital Resettlement Team voluntary community accommodation. 
established. 
1983 Griffiths Report - introduction of 
1985: All under 19 year olds resettled. general management in NHS. 
1986: First RA General Manager - end 1985: NWRHA Run-Down of Hospitals for 
of tripartite consensus management. People with Mental Handicap in the North 
Mid-1980s: RA resettlement strategy. 
West 
1989: NWRHAlLCC Shared Proposals for 
1988: RA contraction strategy. Shared Problems: Timetable for closure of 
RA and other institutions in the North 
West. 
1990s 
Increased pace of resettlement from 1990 NHS and Community Care Act 
RA. 1992 Brockhall Hospital (one of three large 
1996 RA closes. New owners: Jamea institutions in North West) closes on 
AI Kauthur Islamic College for girls. schedule. 
13 For an explanation of abbreviations please see Appendix i. 
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Appendix iv - Royal Albert Rundown Statistics 14 
Year Numbers Details 
1973 955 residents 
399 nursing staff 
1981 15 residents to Eaves Lane Hospital, Chorley; 9 residents 
moved to a house in Morecambe. 
1982 749 residents 21 residents moved to 7 houses provided by MIND in 
631 nursing staff 
Preston; residents moved on a trial basis to Blackpool. 
1983 750 residents 22 individuals of over 5 years residence moved out; 4 
boys to a house in Lancaster; 120 residents now resettled. 
1984 721 residents 27 individuals of over 5 years residence moved out; 9 
(Including: 75 from children under 16 years old remained; 13 residents 
Lancaster; 96 from already moved to Chorley 
Cumbria; 89 from Places for 53 residents at Royal Albert Flats opened in 
Blackpool) January; NWRHA to provide 12 places p.a. in Lancaster. 
1985 40 individuals of over 5 years residence resettled. 
1986 Over 600 residents NWRHA (October) reported no children 'from Region' 
living in large institutions. 
1987 800 staff Since 1979: 270 residents moved to various communities 
(predominantly North West). 
1986-87: 30 resettled (mainly Lancaster area). 
28 former residents now lived in Lancaster area. 
1988 Lancaster district: 80% of people with learning difficulties 
already lived in the community; aim by closure (in 2003) 
78 RA residents will live in the area; 31 already resettled. 
RA resident population estimated to be reducing at 35-60 
p.a. Rate expected to continue. 
1989 506 residents (March) 27 residents resettled during the year. 
460 residents (July) 
720 full time 
equivalent jobs at RA. 
14 Sources for statistical information: Lancaster Guardian 1984-96; RAHLOF Minutes 1981-95; 
Hansard (April22nd 1987); RAH (1988) Ward Contraction Strategy Policy Document; DHSS 
(1976), The facilities and services of mental illness and mental handicap hospitals in England 
1973; and DHSS (1985), The facilities and services of mental illness and mental handicap 
hospitals in England 1982. 
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Year Numbers Details 
1990 411 residents 22 residents resettled. 
(November) 
1991 355 residents . Dowry a minimum of £21,000 but could be £60,000 if 
(November) 'degree of disability is high'. 
Since 1984, 12 residents resettled in Blackpool, with 
another 80 to resettle. 
1992 650 staff From April resettlement rate to increase from 25 to 75 p.a. 
for 4 years. 
1994 180-90 residents 100 job losses were predicted in 1994. 
(January) Lancaster NHS Priority Services Trust won contract to 
165 residents support 50 RA resettled residents. 
(September) 
141 residents 
(November) 
500 staff (January) 
1995 65 residents In September Lancaster NHS Priority Services Trust won 
(September) contract to support 21 RA residents, and create 40 new 
55 residents and 5 
jobs, in Lancaster District 
wards open NHS, by November, provided support to 41 former 
(November) residents in 21 'domiciles' in Lancaster District; employed 70 full and part-time staff. 
170 staff (November) RA claimed that between 1983 and 1995 no more than 10 
residents retumed, and most of those gone back into 
'community'. 
500 RA staff left by November: 50 redeployed in 
Lancaster NHS Priority Services Trust; 20-30 worked for 
other trusts; 50-60 in Social Services; 100 took other 
employment or further education; 'dozens' took early 
retirement; 200 members of staff made redundant. 
1996 Closed (March) In total at least 120 residents resettled into Lancaster 
district. 
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Appendix v: Interview questions 
The ethos of the interviewing approach, adopted in the research, was discussed in 
Chapter Three. In terms of practicalities this usually translated into two index cards: one 
with 6-8 stock open-ended questions (see below); and the other with prompts or 
questions of specific relevance to the individual interviewee. Writing both these cards 
constituted a critical element in preparing for each interview. The information on the 
cards would be minimal, usually written in block capitals, with key text coloured with a 
highlighter pen. This format was used so that, if necessary, they could be glanced at, 
rather than followed to the letter. However, the time spent drawing up the cards meant 
that by the time of the interview I was au fait with intended questions or prompts. In the 
vast majority of interviews, because of this preparation, little direct reference was made 
to these aide memoirs. 
Examples of stock interview questions used in the study: 
GenerallRAH background? 
Role/Remit re-resettlement/rundown? 
How RAH rundown/resettle? e.g. pace (early/later); creativity; general 
management; ward closures ... 
Impact of rundown? e.g. residents; families; you; other staff 
Factors helping/hindering rundown/resettlement? e.g. SRV; staff; 
community; economics ... 
Why closure? At what point did you believe it would close? 
Is there anything you would like to add? 
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Appendix vi: Information Sheet 
An oral history of the closure of the Royal Albert Hospital: a 
large long-stay institution for people with learning difficulties. 
A PhD Research Project 
Nigel Ingham 
Faculty of Health and Social Care, The Open University 
What is the study? 
I am studying the process of closing The Royal Albert 
Hospital, Lancaster which ended its existence in 1996, 
after nearly 130 years as a large long stay institution for 
people with learning difficulties. The decision to close 
this enormous edifice (in the 1970s home to nearly a 
thousand residents), along with other NHS hospitals of a 
similar nature, marked a significant sea change in policy 
direction, reflecting the growing rhetoric of community 
care. Explaining and exploring the closure process of the 
Royal Albert through the narratives of some of those who 
were involved will be the main focus of my research. 
What and who is involved? 
This study rests on a number of recorded interviews with 
former residents, staff (including senior management) , 
families who had relatives in the Albert, as well as key 
NHS and Social Services decision makers at a district and 
regional level. Memories, stories and meanings of the 
closure process generated in these interviews are cross 
referenced both with each other and other historical 
sources. 
Interpretation of the closure process data ultimately rests 
with myself as a researcher although participants are 
encouraged to offer their own insights. The most obvious 
outcome of this.work will be a PhD thesis, but I will be 
looking to share findings through presentations and 
articles, as well as ensuring that some of the recorded 
material - with the permission of those involved - can be 
deposited in public archives. 
My research is has been reviewed and approved by the Open 
University Human Participants and Materials Ethics 
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Committee, as well as being conducted in accordance with 
the Oral History Society's ethical guidelines. 
Why is this study important? 
By looking closely at the dynamics of one institution for 
people with learning difficulties, this study provides an 
opportunity to gain insights into the reality of social 
policy implementation. More specifically, the research can 
contribute to an understanding of deinstitutionalisation, a 
key aspect of late twentieth and early twenty first century 
social policy which has impacted upon the lives of 
thousands of people with learning difficulties, their 
families, staff and local communities through the UK, 
Western Europe, the United States and Australasia. 
Importantly the study will actively challenge the 
marginalisation that people with learning difficulties, and 
their history, often experience by: placing their stories 
and concerns at the heart of the research process; and 
relating the rundown of this particular institution to 
broader societal and political themes of closure. 
Finally the Royal Albert itself has a particularly 
significant part in the institutional landscape of the 
United Kingdom. It was one of only five charitable large 
asylums set up nationally in the Victorian era, purpose 
built for people with learning difficulties, representing a 
radical departure from available generic institutional 
provision. A number of histories have been written about 
the inception of these voluntary establishments, few, if 
any, about their demise. 
How to get in touch? 15 
My phone number is ------
The best time to contact me is 9-6 Monday to Friday. You 
can always leave a message and I will return your call. 
My email addressisn.w.ingham@open.ac.uk 
If I cannot answer your questions, then you can contact one 
of my supervisors: 
Professor Dorothy Atkinson 
Faculty of Health and Social Care, 
The Open University 
Milton Keynes MK7 6AA 
15 Selected email and telephone number details removed (here) for reasons of confidentiality. 
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Dr. Sheena Rolph 
Faculty of Health and Social Care 
The Open University 
Milton Keynes MK7 6AA 
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Appendix vii: Copyright Form 
An Oral History of the Closure of the Royal Albert Hospital, Lancaster 
A PhD Research Project with the Open University 
Clearance Form 16 
1. I confirm that any items (e.g. photographs, documents, recordings) contributed to Nigel 
Ingham belong to me and that to the best of my knowledge, I own the copyright to the items 
contributed. 
2. I give permission for my recorded words, and other contributed items, 
to be used by Nigellngham in his Open University PhD research. 
3. I give permission for my recorded words, and other contributed items, to be kept 
and/or copied into the Unlocking the Past17 Archive and agree to their use: 
a. as an educational resource 
b. for public reference in libraries and museums 
c. as a source that may be published (including CD Rom) 
d. as a source that may be published on the Internet 
e. in public performance, lectures or talks 
yes/no 
yes/no 
yes/no 
yes/no 
yes/no 
yes/no 
I understand that Nigel Ingham will pass on the Unlocking the Past Archive (with any copyright 
conditions) to Lancashire County Council public archives and, in the case of master recordings, 
the North West Sound Archive for permanent long term preservation. 
4. Date(s) of any recording(s) __________________ _ 
5. I do/do not agree to my name being used. If you do agree to the use of your name - how would 
you like it to appear? _________________________ _ 
Please specify any other restrictions you would like placed upon the use of the material: 
Signed __________________ ,Date, _______ _ 
Name (Print} _____________________ _ 
Address ____________________________________________ ___ 
____________ Tel _________ Email, _____ _ 
Nigel Ingham, ________________________ Date _______________ _ 
16 Because of restricted thesis margins, this version of the form has a smaller font size, and 
more cramped layout, than the original. 
17 Referenced in Chapter One, this is a Royal Albert Hospital historical archive: 
www.unlockingthepast.org.uk 
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